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Judgment
Preliminary
These two intra-Court appeals (W.A. Nos. 6870/2017 and 6871/2017) are directed against the common order dated 13.12.2017, whereby the
learned Single Judge of this Court has dismissed the respective writ petitions (W.P. Nos. 41507/2017 and 41506/2017) preferred against similar orders
dated 23.08.2017, as passed by the second respondent- the Director of Agricultural Marketing, Bengaluru, wherein and whereunder the
petitioners/appellants were declared disqualified for being the representatives of agriculturists in the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee,
Gangavathi Taluk, [hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Committee’ or ‘the Market Committee’] in view of clause (a) of Section 16 (1) of
the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and Development) Act, 1966 [hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Act’ or ‘the
Act of 1966’], essentially for the reason that their respective spouses were holding license to function as a trader in the market area of the
Committee.
Having regard to the similar facts and identical issues involved, these appeals have been heard together and are taken up for disposal by this
common judgment.
The provisions relating to the constitution of Market Committee and disqualification from membership
The basic question requiring consideration in these appeals is as to whether in the scheme of the Act of 1966, the petitioners-appellants were
disqualified for being the members of the Market Committee as representative of agriculturists because of their respective spouses holding license to
do the business as a trader in the market area of the Committee in question?
For a comprehension of the subject-matter, before narration of facts, appropriate it would be to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act of
1966, relating to the composition of a market committee and disqualification of a person to be elected or to be a member of the market committee
from a particular constituency.
The Act of 1966 has essentially been enacted to provide for better and improved regulation in the marketing of agricultural produce, for
development of efficient marketing system, for establishment and proper administration of markets of agricultural produce, and for the matters
incidental thereto. Under the scheme of the Act of 1966, the State Government provides for regulating the marketing of such agricultural produce in
such area as may be specified. Every market area is required to have market yards and market sub-yards, and after establishment of such markets,
marketing of the agricultural produce is to be controlled in the manner specified.1
In the scheme of the Act of 1966, save as provided in Chapter IX2, a market committee is required to be established for every market area. The
first market committee for a market area is to be constituted by the State Government in the manner provided for in Section 10 of the Act. However,
the second and subsequent market committees are constituted in accordance with the other provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act. Section 11
thereof specifies different categories of persons who would be the members of such subsequent market committees.
 1 As per Sections 3 to 8 (Chapter II) of the Act.
2 Chapter IX (Section 96) provides for establishment of independent markets and market committees for the specified ‘special commodities’.
Clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 11, being relevant for the present purpose, could be noticed as under:
“11. Constitution of second and subsequent market committees. - (1) Save as provided in Section 10, every market committee shall consist of the
following members, namely -
(i) eleven members shall be elected by the agriculturists in the market area of whom two shall be woman, one shall be a person belonging to the
Scheduled Castes, one shall be a person belonging to the Scheduled Tribes and two persons belonging to the Backward Classes, out of which one shall
be from persons falling under category 'A' and one shall be from persons falling under category 'B':
Provided that if no person belonging to the Scheduled Castes is available, the seat reserved for that category shall also be filled by a person belonging
to the Scheduled Tribes and vice versa:
Provided further that if no person falling under category 'A' is available, the seat reserved for that category shall also be filled by a person falling under
category 'B' and vice versa;
(ii) one member shall be a person elected by the commission agents and traders other than retail traders, in the market area;
 xxxx’’
The election of members of a market committee is governed by the provisions contained in Sections 12 and 13 of the Act; and as per the
requirement of the aforesaid clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 11, the constituencies for election of the members are provided in Section 14 that reads as
under:
“14. Constituencies for election of certain members. - (1) For the purpose of electing the members referred to in clause (i) and (ii) of sub-section
(1) of Section 11, to a market committee, there shall be the following constituencies in every market area. â€
(i) eleven agriculturists’ constituencies for electing representatives of agriculturists, each constituency being a single member constituency;
(ii) one traders' constituency for the entire market area for the electing one representative of licensed traders; and
 (iii) x x x x
(2) For the purpose of clause (i) of sub-section (1) , the Deputy Commissioner shall by notification determine the territorial extent of the eleven
agriculturists' constituencies and shall reserve two for women, one for persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, one for persons belonging to the
Scheduled Tribes, one for persons falling under Category 'A' and one for persons falling under Category 'B'. The number of voters in each such
constituency shall as far as practicable be the same throughout the market area.’’
The qualification of candidates for election is provided in Section 15 of the Act that reads as under:
“15. Qualification for candidates for election - Every person, unless disqualified under the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being
in force, shall be qualified to be elected as a member of the market committee -
(i) by an agriculturists' constituency, if his name is in the list of voters of any of the agriculturists' constituencies of the market area.
Provided that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen from an agriculturists constituency reserved for the persons belonging to the Scheduled
Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or the Backward Classes or for women unless such person belongs to those castes, tribes or classes or is a woman;
(ii) by the traders' constituency, if his name is in the list of voters of the traders' constituency of the market area; and
 (iii) x x x x’’
In Section 16 of the Act of 1966, several disqualifications have been enumerated; and sub-section (1) thereof specifies the disqualification of a
person for being chosen as, or for being, a member of a market committee as a representative of agriculturists, or as a representative of traders, as
the case may be, as follows:
“16. Disqualifications for membership - Without prejudice to any other disqualifications provided in this Act -
(1) a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, or for being, a member of a market committee. -
a) as a representative of agriculturists, if he or a firm in which he is a partner, or a body corporate (other than a co-operative society) in which he is a
Director, or a joint family of which he is a member, does business as a trader, commission agent, broker, importer or exporter in any market area or
was doing business as a trader, commission agent, broker, importer or exporter, till such date not later than five years immediately preceding the date
of election;
(b) as a representative of traders, if he has ceased to be a licensed trader;
 (c) xxxx’’
In sum and substance of the issues raised, it is the aforesaid clause (a) of Section 16(1) that calls for interpretation in the present appeals. Though
certain submission were made before the learned Single Judge as regards the operation and effect of Section 17 of the Act, wherein the provisions are
made for disqualification of a sitting member and as regards jurisdiction of the Director to deal with the matter relating to the disqualification of the
appellants, however, in view of the submissions made in these appeals and looking to the overall circumstances, those aspects shall not require further
dilation herein and hence, are left at that only. The relevant factual aspects and the background:
Having taken note of the relevant provisions concerning the constitution of a market committee, election of its representative members and
disqualification of certain persons from being elected as, or for being, the representative member, appropriate now it would be to look into the relevant
factual aspects pertaining to these cases, particularly the reasons and circumstances for which, the appellants were held disqualified as being the
representatives from agriculturists’ constituency. The basic facts relating to these cases are not of much debate or controversy except a few
assertions of the petitioners/appellants that have been contested by the respondents.
Put in brief, the relevant factual aspects pertaining to these cases are that in the election of the representatives to the Agricultural Produce
Marketing Committee, Gangavathi Taluk, as held on 14.01.2017, both the appellants were declared elected as the representatives of agriculturists.
Thereafter, in the meeting held on 04.02.2017, the appellant of W.A.No.6870/2017 was elected as the President whereas, the appellant of
W.A.No.6871/2017 was elected as the Vice President of the Committee. However, on 08.02.2017, the fourth respondent filed a petition under
Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1966 while contending that the appellants were disqualified to be chosen as the representatives of the agriculturists,
as their respective spouses were registered as traders and were holding trading license under the Act of 1966.
The second respondent â€" Director, upon receipt of the petitions so filed by the fourth respondent, issued notice to the appellants for enquiry
under Section 17 of the Act of 1966. The appellant of W.A.No.6870/2017, in response to the said notice, contended that the license was granted in the
name of Sri Laxmi Vinayaka Agencies Siddapur, which was a proprietorship concern of his wife Smt. Chitturi Ramalaxmi. It was, however, asserted
that though the license was granted on 24.06.2015 for a period of seven years but the same was not communicated nor the licensee got issued the
receipts, bill books, audit books, etc. It was also contended that the name of appellant’s spouse was not enrolled in the list of voters of the traders
constituency.
Similarly, the appellant of W.A.No.6871/2017 contended in response to the notice that the entity, M/s. Sri Neelakanteshwara Trading Company,
was a proprietorship concern of her husband Sri Kanti Basava Bagodi. It was submitted that though the trading license was granted on 17.04.2010,
but the same was surrendered on 20.04.2011 and the Secretary of the Committee had issued a report confirming the fact of surrender of the license.
It was also contended that the husband of the appellant did not conduct any business from the date of issue of license until the date of surrender; and
that the husband of the appellant had surrendered the receipts, bill books, audit books, etc.
Thus, it was the common ground of both the appellants that their respective spouses had not conducted any trading/business under the license even
if granted and hence, they had not incurred any disqualification.
While the aforesaid proceedings were pending, another complaint was lodged against the appellants, whereupon another enquiry notice dated
20.02.2017 was issued. Aggrieved by the second notice for enquiry, the appellants approached this Court by way of Writ Petition Nos.10570/2017 and
10574/2017. In the said writ petitions, the learned Single Judge of this Court, by the order dated 17.07.2017, directed the appellants and the private
respondents to appear and participate in the enquiry being conducted by the second respondentâ€" Director, who was expected to hear and pass
appropriate orders expeditiously.
It had been pursuant to the aforesaid order of this Court in the aforementioned writ petitions that the proceedings were conducted by the second
respondentâ€" Director and ultimately, the impugned orders dated 23.08.2017 came to be passed, holding the appellants disqualified.
In essence, the second respondentâ€" Director held in relation to both the cases that the appellants were elected as members of the Committee
from the farmers constituency, but their respective spouses were carrying on business after obtaining traders license and hence, the appellants were
disqualified as per Section 16(1)(a) of the Act of 1966. The second respondent particularly referred to the object of the Act of 1966 and the primary
importance being given to the agriculturists in the composition of Market Committee; and held that the appellants, whose spouses were traders, carried
the disqualification for being elected as the representatives of agriculturists.
Â
The orders so passed by the second respondent on 23.08.2017 were challenged on several grounds in the respective writ petitions leading to these
appeals. Suffice it to notice for the present purpose that the challenge by the appellants was founded mainly on the grounds that merely for their
respective spouses holding the traders license as individuals, they had not incurred any disqualification; that the licenses in question had either been
surrendered or not intimated and in any case, no business was transacted by the respective spouses on the referred licenses; that no proper enquiry
was conducted in these matters; and that the Director had no jurisdiction to conduct an enquiry with regard to the pre-election dispute. The grounds so
urged were duly opposed by the official respondents as also the private respondents. The observations and findings of the learned Single Judge
In the writ petitions, a prayer had also been made for striking down Section 17(2) of the Act of 1966 as being unconstitutional, to which, the
learned Single Judge found that no serious arguments were canvassed and even otherwise, the provision in question neither suffered from want of
legislative competence nor any other infirmity.
The learned Single Judge, thereafter, proceeded to consider the contentious issues and sustainability of the reasoning adopted by the second
respondent for holding the appellants disqualified on the ground that they were the members of the family whose other member was holding a
trader’s license. The learned Single Judge referred to the provisions of Section 16 of the Act of 1966, particularly clause (a) of sub-section (1)
thereof, and held that the classification contained in the said clause (a) was not an exhaustive enumeration of the persons who were made ineligible to
act as representative of agriculturists. Such observations and conclusions, forming the very foundation of the order of the learned Single Judge, as
contained in paragraph 64 of the order impugned, could be reproduced for ready reference as under:
“64. On a plain reading of the provisions of section 16 what is contemplated is made apparent by the very heading of the section and the language
employed in sub-section (1). The legislature has not only chosen to provide the disqualification to contest but also from continuing in the post.
Thereafter it attempts to broadly classify “the persons†who are ineligible to contest or be a representative of the agriculturists. The classification
in clause (a) is not an a exhaustive enumeration of the persons who are made ineligible to act as representatives of agriculturists. The provision is only
indicative, it is not exhaustive definition. Hence, the contention of the learned senior counsel that in the clause (a) of sub-section (1) debars only four
classes of people is misplaced. It not only debars the persons described therein but also their family members. The rigor of the prohibition imposed
under the clause is made apparent by the imposition, by which a person who was earlier a trader is not qualified to become a representative of the
agriculturists, till the completion of a moratorium five year period, prior to the date of election. This stringent condition is by itself ample proof of the
intent of the legislature and object of the provision. Thus, it is to be held that the legislature while crafting Section 16 (1) has not only provided for a
prohibition, which disentitles a person from contesting the elections but also provides a bar for the continuance of such person even if he be elected.
The language used is “ for being chosen as, or for being, a member of a market committeeâ€. Thus, the person who is ineligible to contest is not
only prohibited from contesting but if in fortuitous circumstances, gets elected even such a person is brought within the ambit of the provision by the
phrase “or for being, a member of the market committeeâ€. Hence, the contention that the provision of section 16(1) does not provide for a
prohibition with regard to continuance of an ineligible candidate in office is unsustainable. This court concludes as above after a conjunctive reading of
section 16 (1) and clause (a) and (b). Sub-section (2) deals with eligibility criteria which are attracted even in respect of a person who otherwise was
eligible to contest from the agriculturists constituency and act as a representative of the farmers.â€
(underlining supplied)
The learned Single Judge further held that the Act emphasized on the status of contestant i.e., as to whether the contestant was a trader or was
hailing from a family of traders, or was associated with a juristic entity carrying on business as a trader. The learned Single Judge said,-
“65. The learned senior counsel would endeavor to stress and emphasize on the relative importance of the status as declared in the application as
provided in the Form-41. On a closer scrutiny of Section 16 (1)(a) it becomes apparent that the provision only contemplates the status of the
contestant. If the provisions of Section 2(30) and Section 16(1)(a) are read conjointly, invariably the only and logical conclusion that one could arrive at
is that the Act lays emphasis on the status of the contestant i.e., as to whether the contestant is a trader or hails from a family of traders or is
associated with the juristic entity carrying on business as a trader.â€
 (underlining supplied)
The learned Single Judge also observed that the focus of enactment was on the farmer and the intention was to vest the administration of market
committee to the agriculturists. On the question as to whether the relevant provisions of the Act of 1966 were to be interpreted under the literal and
strict rule, or by adopting the purposive rule, while referring to several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge
concluded that the scope and object of the enactment was also to be relied upon for a purposive and meaningful interpretation; and thereafter, entered
into the process of interpretation of the different expressions used in the provisions under consideration in the following:
“80. In the light of the above decisions, it is apparent that the Apex Court has laid down that in the event of ambiguity in a provision the Court while
interpreting it has to place reliance on the rule of purposive interpretation. In the instant case the querry raised by the learned Senior Counsel Sri
Jayakumar S Patil, is that the provisions of Section 16(1)(a) do not bring within its ambit, of family, and the reference is to a joint family only and
hence the order impugned is based on inferences and unsustainable. On examination of the provision it is seen that sub-Section 1 commences with the
phrase ‘a person shall’. It is true that the word ‘family’ is not defined under the Act, but the word ‘person’ is defined as to include
a joint Hindu Family a company or firm or association or a body of individuals whether incorporated or not. Thus, if the definition of word
‘person’ and the provision of Clause (a) of Section 16(1) are read in conjunction and if the rule of purposive construction is applied, the only
inevitable conclusion that one could arrive at is that the word ‘joint family’ denoting a larger body would also include the unitary family of a
husband and a wife. The Court is constrained to arrive at this interpretation, in view of the definition of word ‘person’ which is meant to include
even an “association of individualsâ€. That apart, the classes of person included under Clause (a) and the definition of ‘person’ make the
intention of the legislature very obvious. The intendment of the legislature can be gathered from the description of the classes of person. To sum-up
the entire focus of the enactment is to prevent not only a trader but also his associates and his family members be they a partner or director, a firm,
joint family, joint Hindu family, company and even an incorporated body and body of individuals. The phrase body of individuals whether incorporated
or not assumes significance and cannot be interpreted in a narrow sense, to refer to a company alone as it is commonly known that incorporation
refers to a company. The legislature has already included the company in the definition of person. Hence, can it be said that the reference to ‘a
body of individuals’ is superfluous ? Such an interpretation is what the Apex Court has positively disapproved. It is settled law that the courts in
the course of interpreting cannot place an interpretation which would render nugatory any of the provisions of an enactment. Even assuming for
argument sake that the petitioner and their respective spouses, who admittedly constitute a family as defined by the dictionary and under various other
enactments referred supra and as settled by the Apex Court in the case of K.V.Muthu vs. Angamuthu Ammal, the word ‘family’ would not just
mean husband and wife but the children, grand children and dependent parent which virtually amounts to a joint
family…………………………….â€
 (underlining supplied)
The learned Single Judge further proceeded to examine the meaning of the expression ‘family’ for the purpose of Section 16(1)(a) of the
Act of 1966 and, even while observing that there was some opacity in the expressions used in the enactment, concluded that the petitioners and their
respective spouses who constituted a family as husband and wife, would fall within the ambit of the word ‘joint family’ and would, thus, stand in
the prohibited class of persons, i.e., the persons not entitled to be chosen as the representative of agriculturists. The learned Single Judge observed,
held and concluded as under:
“…..What flows from the above is that the word ‘family’ is not merely referable to only a husband and wife and children but would also
include grandchildren and dependent parents, which in the essence signifies, a joint family in common parlance. If such an interpretation, that “a
joint family includes a family†is not placed it could lead to an absurdity and one can gainfully argue that the year does not include a month or a month
does not include a week or a week does not include a day. This Court also draws sustenance for such an interpretation from the language of the
provision itself. On a plain reading the Clause (a) not only engulfs a corporate entity or a juristic person carrying on business but also the individuals
attached to such entities be a Director or a Partner or an associate but even a member of a joint family which does business as a trader. Admittedly
the constituents of a joint family include (wife, husband, etc.). Hence, where one’s spouse is registered as a trader it must necessarily be
interpreted that the other spouse would also come within the prohibited class of persons under Section 16(1) and such an interpretation alone would
advance the object of the provision of disentitling a trader and all connected with the trader, from being a representative of the agriculturist.
On the contrary if the interpretation placed by the petitioner is accepted it could lead to a situation where a business house (trader) run by a joint
family and possessing agricultural lands, would easily qualify to be enlisted in the voter’s lists of the Agriculturists Constituency and using their
clout and influence amongst the farmers, who trade their produces with them, would easily get the entire 12 constituencies (11 agriculturists + 1
trader) represented by the Members of their family. It is exactly this mischief which the provisions seek to remedy and if the interpretation as placed
by the petitioners is accepted it is this very mischief that would be advanced.
It is not in dispute that there is some opacity in the language of the provision and the definition. Whether the petitioners or persons similarly situated
like them can be permitted to take advantage of the opacity in the drafting of the provision and obscurity in the meaning of joint family ? The answer
can only be an resounding and a emphatic No. For otherwise as detailed in the above it could lead to bizarre and absurd situations whereby persons
using deviant methods would be enabled to negate and defeat the object of the enactment.
Hence, this Court concludes that the petitioners and their respective spouses who constitute a family, as husband and wife, come within the ambit
of the word ‘joint family’ and thus fall within the prohibited class of persons who are not entitled to be chosen as a representative of
agriculturists. Even otherwise as the provision begins with the word ‘person’ and if the same is read in conjunction with the definition which
includes an association of a person, then the trader and the spouse would also constitute one such association of persons. Hence, the word ‘joint
family’ used in the provision of Section 16(1(a) must be read to include not only a husband and wife but also an association of persons.
In the light of the above interpretation placed by this Court on the provision of Section 16(1)(a) the questions formulated are answered against the
petitioners by holding that the petitioner come within the ambit of Clause (a) of Section 16(1)(a).â€
 (underlining supplied)
Thereafter, the learned Single Judge rejected the other contentions of the appellants as regards inexecutability of the orders impugned and on the
jurisdiction of the second respondent while leaving one of the issues relating to the question of fraud, as alleged on behalf of the private respondents, at
that only.
In view of the finding on the principal issues, the learned Single Judge found no case for interference and dismissed the writ petitions. Hence these
appeals.
 Rival submissions
Assailing the order impugned, learned senior counsel for the appellants has argued that the learned Single Judge has approached the principal issue
involved in the matter from an altogether wrong angle and has failed to notice that the expression ‘person’ as occurring in Section 16 of the Act
of 1966 refers only to any individual living entity who could be qualified or disqualified to be a member of the Market Committee; but there is no
concept of a family or a body corporate to be qualified or disqualified.
The learned counsel has referred to Form No.41 provided in the rules framed under the Act of 1966 for making an application for grant of license,
and has also referred to the copies of the applications made by the respective spouses of the appellants. The learned counsel would particularly
emphasize on the fact that in the application seeking license, the applicant is required to specify if the license was being sought in the capacity of ‘an
individual’, or ‘a partnership firm’, or ‘a company’, or ‘a proprietor’, or ‘a person in management of a joint Hindu
family.’ According to the learned counsel, respective spouses of the appellants having applied only as individuals, the licenses in question could
only be read as being applicable to the said individual (that is, the spouse of each appellant); and it cannot be said that any other person related to the
said individual applicant/licensee would also be treated as a ‘trader’ for the purpose of the Act of 1966.
The learned senior counsel for the appellants has presented before us a dissection of the ingredients of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16
of the Act of 1966 to submit that thereunder, an individual is disqualified for being a representative of agriculturists, if he is doing business as a trader,
or if a firm in which he is a partner is doing such business, or a body corporate in which he is a director is doing the business, or a joint family of which
he is a member is doing the business. According to the learned counsel, the present appellants do not fall under any of the prohibitive status aforesaid
and hence cannot be held disqualified.
The learned senior counsel for the appellants has also placed before us the contrast and contradistinction of the phraseology used in Section 16 of
the Act of 1966 with that employed in Section 29-C (1) (c) and (f) of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 19593, several provisions in the
Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 including Section 12(h)4, and Section 16(1)(k) of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 19645.
Learned counsel would submit that there is no such disqualification in the Act of 1966, as made in The relevant parts of Section 29-C of the
Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 read as under:
 29-C. Disqualification for membership of the board:
(1) No person shall be eligible for being elected or appointed or continued as a member of the board of any co-operative society, if â€
 xxxx
(c) he carries on a business of the kind carried on by such co-operative society or by a co-operative society of which such co-operative society is a
member;
 xxxx
 (f) he is a near relation of a paid employee of such co-operative society.
4 The relevant part of Section 12 of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 reads as under:
 Section 12. Disqualification of members:
 A person shall be disqualified for being chosen and for being a member of a Grama Panchayat,--
 xxxx
if, save as hereunder provided, he has directly or indirectly any share or interest in any work done by order of the Grama Panchayat, or in any
contract or employment with, or under, or by, or on behalf of the Grama Panchayat, or if he is directly or indirectly by himself or by his agent, partner
or employee involved in obtaining or execution of any such work or contract on behalf of the Grama Panchayat or of any contract for the supply of
goods and services to the Grama Panchayat.
5 The relevant part of Section 16 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 reads under:
Section 16. General disqualification for becoming a councillor: (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a councilor:-xxxx
(k) if, save as hereinafter provided, he has directly or indirectly by himself or is partner any share or interest in any work done by order of the
municipal council, or in any contract or employment with or under, or by or on behalf of the municipal council; or
 xxxx
 (underlining supplied for emphasis)
the aforesaid enactments by virtue of the relationship, or by virtue of direct or even indirect interest in the license or contract. That being the position,
according to the learned counsel, the plain and unambiguous language has to be given effect to.
The learned senior counsel has argued that on a plain and direct interpretation, it is but clear that the disqualification envisaged by clause (a) of
sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 1966 is not attracted in the case of the present appellants. The learned counsel would argue that the matter
being of disqualification, rules of strict interpretation only would apply and no disqualification could be assumed by inference. The learned counsel has
particularly referred to the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SHARDA KAILASH MITTAL .vs. STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH & OTHERS : [2010] 2 SCC 319; TARLOCHAN DEV SHARMA .vs. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS : [2012] 6 SCC 260; and
SAGAR PANDURANG DHUNDARE .vs. KESHAV AABA PATIL AND OTHERS : [2018] 1 SCC 340. The learned counsel has also pointed
out that the reading of the relevant passage in the case of K.PRABHAKARAN .vs. P.JAYARAJAN : [2005] 1 SCC 754 by the learned Single
Judge6 had not been correct and has placed for perusal the correct paragraph no.59 of the report as also paragraph 36 in the case of SHIBU SOREN
V. DAYANAND SAHAY AND OTHERS: [2001] 7 SCC 425.
The learned senior counsel for the appellants has also argued that the concept of spouse having direct or indirect interest in the property or license
held by the other spouse is not applicable in respect of a Hindu family of husband and wife, unlike the principles contained in the Portuguese Civil
Code whereunder, a spouse acquires right, title and interest in the property of the other spouse by virtue of the marriage; and has referred to the
decisions in M.C.VERGHESE .vs. T.J.POONAN AND ANOTHER : [1969] 1 SCC 37 and ZELIA M.XAVIER FERNANDES E.GONSALVES
.vs. JOANA RODRIGUES AND OTHERS : [2012] 3 SCC 188.
Per contra, learned senior counsel for the contesting respondent, while supporting the impugned orders passed by the second respondent and the
impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, has strenuously contended that in the 6 in paragraph 71 of the order impugned scheme of the Act
of 1966, composition of a market committee is envisaged in the manner that the same predominantly comprises the representatives of bona fide
agriculturists whose interests are to be safeguarded by the market committee. In that sequence, the learned counsel would emphasize, as per Sections
11 and 14 of the Act, as many as eleven members of the market committee are to be the representatives of agriculturists; and in order to ensure that
only bona fide representatives of agriculturists are elected as such representatives, specific disqualification has been provided for the persons who are
either traders themselves, or belong to the family engaged in trading. In this background, the learned senior counsel has argued that clause (a) of sub-
section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 1966 obviously intends to disqualify a person to be the representative of agriculturists, if he/she is a member of
the family doing business as a trader/commission agent/broker, etc.
The learned senior counsel for the contesting respondent has also referred to the definition of the expression ‘person’ occurring in clause
(30) of Section 2 of the Act of 1966 and has argued that the same is required to be applied and understood as per the context. According to the
learned counsel, in the said definition, a joint Hindu family as also a body of individuals is included in the expression ‘person’ and when
contextually interpreted, for the purpose of Section 16, the result would be that if there is a trade license with any one member of a family, every other
member of the family would stand disqualified to be the representative of agriculturists. The learned counsel would argue that purposive interpretation
adopted by the learned Single Judge remains just and proper so as to achieve the aims and objects of the Act of 1966 and hence the impugned order
calls for no interference.
The learned senior counsel for the respondent has referred to and relied upon the decisions in ABHIRAM SINGH .vs. C.D.COMMACHEN
(DEAD) BY LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS : [2017] 2 SCC 629; RAMANLAL BHAILAL PATEL AND OTHERS .vs. STATE
OF GUJARAT : [2008] 5 SCC 449; K.V.MUTHU .vs. ANGAMUTHU AMMAL : [1997] 2 SCC 53; ZELIA M. XAVIER FERNANDESE
E.GONSALVES .vs. JOANA RODRIGUES AND OTHERS : [2012] 3 SCC 188; DURGA PRASAD .vs. NARAYAN RAMACHANDAANI
[2017] 5 SCC 69; BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY .vs. PALITANA SUGAR MILLS (P) LTD. AND OTHERS : [2003] 2 SCC 111; and STATE
OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER .vs. JUSTICE R.A.MEHTA (RETIRED) AND OTHERS : [2013] 3 SCC 1. The appellants cannot be held
disqualified:
Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the record with reference to the law applicable, we are clearly of
the view that the orders impugned cannot be sustained and these appeals deserve to be allowed.
As noticed, the basic question calling for determination in these appeals is as to what is the true scope of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section
16 of the Act of 1966; and as to whether the appellants suffer from disqualification envisaged therein?
Before proceeding further, appropriate it shall be to take note of the principles of law explained and exposited in the cited decisions. In the case of
BHAVNAGAR UNIVERSITY (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court expounded, on the principles of interpretation, as under:
“23. It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and
words by words. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not
otherwise. An effort must be made to give effect to all parts of the statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered
surplusage or redundant.
True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language with due regard to the scheme of
law.
Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provisions is plain and unambiguous. In
other words, statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless
it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest
of the statue.â€
The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ABHIRAM SINGH (supra) was rendered on the interpretation of Section 123(3)
of the Representation of People’s Act, 1951, and on the question as to what amounts to an appeal on the grounds of religion, caste, community,
etc.; and in that context, it was held per majority that Section 123(3) should be given a broad and purposive interpretation. In the case of STATE OF
GUJARAT .vs. R.A.MEHTA (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the principles that the doctrine of purposive construction may be
taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to the statutory provisions and the Courts must state what meaning the statute should bear,
rather than rendering it nullity.
In the case of RAMANLAL BHAILAL PATEL & OTHERS (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the inclusive definition of the
expression ‘person’, as occurring in the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960; and in the given context, it was pointed out that though
the ordinary and natural meaning of the word ‘person’ is a specific individual human being but, in law, it also refers to an entity that is
recognized as having rights and duties of a human being. In the case of DURGA PRASAD (supra), the definition of the expression ‘family’ as
occurring in Section 3(g) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 was examined and the same was found to be carrying an inclusive list and in the given
context, it was held that what was not given has to be excluded. In the case of K.V.MUTHU (supra) also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court pointed
out the principles of interpretation of statutes for construing the expression ‘family’ and indicated that the interpretation should be so placed
which is not repugnant to the context and ought to be to the aid of achieving the purpose sought to be served by the enactment.
In the case of ZELIA XAVIER FERNANDESE (supra), Section 10(f) of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1984, was under consideration, that
provided for disqualification of membership from the Panchayat if the person has directly or indirectly any share or monetary interest in the work done
by or to the Panchayat, or any contract or employment with, under, by or on behalf of the Panchayat. The money acquired by the appellant’s
husband from a contract with the village Panchayat was found to be community property and the appellant having indirect share therein, or in any
case, having monetary interest in the contract awarded to her husband.
On the principles of interpretation, it remains trite and fundamental that ordinarily and primarily, the language employed in the statute is the
determining factor of the legislative intention. As the first and primary rule, the intention of Legislature is to be found in the words and expressions
used by the Legislature itself. The approach cannot be to find out as to what might be supposed to have been intended. These principles have come to
their fuller exposition and application in the case of SAGAR PANDURANG DHUNDARE (supra) as referred to by the learned counsel for the
appellants. The question in the said case was as to whether a family member of the original encroacher upon Government land or public property
could be disqualified as being a member of the Panchayat under the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act, 1958. The enabling provision, as introduced
by an amendment in the year 2006 in the said enactment, had been as under:
 ’14. Disqualifications:-
 (1) No person shall be a member of a panchayat or continue as such, who â€
* * *
 (j-3) has encroached upon the Government land or public property;’
The allegations against the appellants in the said case had been that their father/grandfather were encroachers and they were the beneficiaries of
encroachment. It had not been the allegation that the appellants themselves had encroached upon Government land or public property. However,
according to the State and the contesting respondents, the appellants were to be treated as disqualified for being the beneficiaries of encroachment.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after having referred to the scheme of the enactment as also several decided cases, pointed out the specific line of
distinction in the process of interpretation that the Court cannot lay down what was desirable because that remains within the domain of law makers;
and that the Court is essentially required to find as to what is discernible. The Hon’ble Supreme Court stated the law as under:
Thus, under the statutory scheme, an encroacher is liable to be evicted by the panchayat and if the panchayat fails, the Collector has to take
action. The encroacher is also liable to be prosecuted. Encroachment is certainly to be condemned, the encroacher evicted and punished. Desirably,
there should not be a member in the panchayat with conflicting interest. But once a person is elected by the people, he can be unseated only in the
manner provided under law. Even with the best of intention, if there is no statutory expression of the intention, the Court cannot supply words for the
sake of achieving the alleged intention of the la-maker. It is entirely within the realm of the law-maker to express clearly what they intend. No doubt,
there is a limited extent to which the Court can interpret a provision so as to achieve the legislative intent. That is in a situation where such an
interpretation is permissible, otherwise feasible, when it is absolutely necessary, and where the intention is clear but the words used are either
inadequate or ambiguous. That is not the situation here. In the Act, wherever the la-makers wanted to specify family, they have done so. As noted by
some of the judgments of the High Court, in Explanation 2 for Section 14 (1) (h), the failure to pay any tax or fee due to the panchayat or Zilla
Parishad by a member of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) or by a person belonging to a group has been expressly mentioned as a disqualification on
others in the family or group. It is, therefore, evident that when the intent of the legislature was to disqualify a member for the act of his family, it has
specifically done so. The Court, in the process of interpretation, cannot lay down what is desirable in its own opinion, if from the words used, the
legislative intention is otherwise discernible.
x x x x
As we have already noted above, the duty of the Court is not to lay down what is desirable in its own opinion. Its duty is to state what is
discernible from the expressions used in the statute. The Court can also traverse to an extent to see what is decipherable but not to the extent of
laying down something desirable according to the Court if the legislative intent is otherwise not discernible. What is desirable is the jurisdiction of the
la-maker and only what is discernible is that of the Court.â€
We need not multiply on the other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties. Suffice it would be to say that the balance of approach is
required in the matter relating to the disqualification to the elected offices as indicated in the case of K.PRABHAKARAN (supra) in the following:
“59. In Shibu Soren v. Dayanand Sahay: [2001] 7 SCC 425), a three-Judge Bench of this Court was seized of the question of examining a
disqualification on account of the person at that time holding an office of profit. The Court held that such a provision is required to be interpreted in a
realistic manner having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and the relevant statutory provisions. While ""a strict and narrow
construction"" may not be adopted which may have the effect of ""shutting of many prominent and other eligible persons to contest elections"" but at the
same time ""in dealing with a statutory provision which imposes a disqualification on a citizen, it would be unreasonable to take merely a broad and
general view and ignore the essential points"" (SCC p. 447, para 36). What is at stake is the right to contest an election and hold office. ""A practical
view, hot pedantic basket of tests"" must, therefore, guide courts to arrive at appropriate conclusion. The disqualification provision must have a
substantial and reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved and the provision should be interpreted with the flavour of reality bearing in
mind the object for enactment.â€
Proceeding on the principles aforesaid, what is required to be borne in mind is that strict and narrow construction should not be adopted which may
have the effect of shutting off the eligible persons; and it would be unreasonable to take merely a general approach and view and to ignore the
essential points.
On the principles aforesaid, in our view, on the plain language employed by the statute, such persons who are, or had been, either directly involved
in the trade/business stand disqualified as representatives of agriculturists, but for incurring such disqualification on account of family, the
business/trade ought to be of the family and not of a member of the family.
A bare look at clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act as also the provisions contained in Sections 11 and 14 of the Act is sufficient
to find that it is an individual, a natural person, who is elected as the representative of agriculturists. In the composition of market committee under the
Act of 1966, there would be as many as eleven such individuals with the scheme for reservation for the specified categories of persons as provided.
The member, i.e., the representative of agriculturists could only be a natural person and obviously, the disqualification could also be attached to an
individual, a natural person and not to any body of individuals or to a family. On a proper appreciation of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of
the Act of 1966, it is at once clear that a person would be disqualified, if:
 (a) if he does business as a trader, etc.; or
 (b) if a firm in which he is a partner does business as a trader, etc.; or
(c) if a body corporate in which he is a director does business as a trader, etc. ; or
 (d) if a joint family of which he is a member does business as a trader, etc.7
The excessive emphasis of the learned senior counsel for the contesting respondent on the definition of the expression ‘person’ as also on
the concept of ‘family’ remains rather misplaced. The definition of ‘person’, as provided in the Act of 1966, has to be contextually
understood and applied. In the context of Section 16(1)(a) of the Act, the expression ‘person’ 7 As per the second part of clause (a) ibid., a
person would also be disqualified if he, or the firm of his partnership, or a body corporate of his directorship, or a joint family of his membership, had
been doing such business until five years immediately preceding the date of election. would only mean an individual and not a body of individuals, be it
a firm or a body corporate or a family. This is for the simple reason that the person to be elected as a representative of agriculturists is only envisaged
to be a natural person and not a body of individuals. Needless to reiterate that there are eleven elected representatives of agriculturists and some
reservations are provided in relation to the persons belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe/Other Backward Classes categories as also to
women.
The other aspects argued by the learned counsel for the parties on the fact that the spouse taken together would also mean family, or that in a
Hindu family, there is no concept of one spouse being the equal owner of the property of the other, are all, in our view, unnecessary for the purpose of
the present case. Qualification or disqualification for the purpose of elected representative of the agriculturists is attached to an individual, if he or she
is (or had been) doing the business, or is (or had been) a participant in the business carried on by the body of individuals, by being either a partner of a
firm, or a director of a body corporate, or a member of joint family.
Â
Though on behalf of the appellants, it was sought to be suggested that their respective spouses did not actually transact any business under their
licenses or that the license was either not even received or was surrendered, however, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the cases, we
do not intend to enter into this controversy for the basic reason that if there was a trading license available with the respective spouses of the
appellants, it would be difficult to assume that the licensee was not doing business (for the purpose of Section 16(1) (a) of the Act) because the
license could have been used at any time and hence, the concerned licensee transacting the business cannot be ruled out. The question, however,
remains as to what is the legal effect and implication of such a trading license obtained by the respective spouses of the appellants.
It remains rather indisputable that the respective spouses of the appellants had applied for the trading license so as to carry on the business in the
capacity as individual, and not for carrying on the business by the joint family, or by any firm, or by any body corporate. The second respondent -
Director as also the learned Single Judge have predominantly relied on the purpose and intent of the Act of 1966, as also the fact that as many as
eleven representatives of agriculturists are to be elected in the composition of the market committee and hence, have assumed that so far as the
agriculturists’ constituencies are concerned, any person who has a close relation with the trade license holder, as being a member of the family,
needs to be considered as disqualified. The same had been the main plank of the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the contesting
respondent who elaborated upon the definition of the expression ‘person’ as also the concept of ‘family.’ We are afraid, the approach of
the second respondent-Director and the learned Single Judge, as also the emphasis of the learned counsel for the contesting respondent, is not in
conformity with the plain and clearly discernible meaning of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 1966.
Having regard to the question involved, it gets per force reiterated that in order to examine if any person suffers from any one or more of the
disqualifications aforesaid, what is required to be seen is as to whether the person concerned himself is carrying on such business, or he is a partner of
the firm which is carrying on such business, or he is a director of a body corporate which is carrying on such business, or he is a member of such joint
family which is carrying on the business. In the context of the expression ‘family,’ it appears to be too far stretched and, rather impermissible in
the plain language of the provision to assume that if one member of the family is carrying on business, every other member of such family, ipso facto,
gets disqualified for being a representative of agriculturists, even if such a person is not carrying on the business and even if the family is not carrying
on such business.8 If every member of the family of a license holder was to be excluded, the Legislature would have stated so in specific words and
expressions, as had been used in the other enactments where the broader expressions have been used as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ interest for
the purpose of disqualification. That being not so in the Act of 1966, we are afraid, the process of interpretation by the learned Single Judge cannot be
sustained. 8 The same principle would apply in relation to the business carried on for five years immediately preceding the date of election.
Learned counsel for the petitioners-appellants has aptly referred to the other provisions contained in The Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act,
1959, The Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, and The Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, where disqualification for a particular
post/office is attached with reference to any direct or indirect interest of the person concerned. For the reason that in Section 16 of the Act of 1966,
the phraseology used is different and the exclusion has been provided specifically with reference to the fact that the person himself is either directly
engaged in the business or is a participant in the body of individuals carrying on such business. Obviously, it stands at contradistinction to an eventuality
where, though a person is a member of the family and one of the members of the family is carrying on business, but the business is not of the family
and thereby, the person concerned himself cannot be considered as a beneficiary of such business. The appellants herein do not fall in any of these
categories and hence, cannot be held disqualified. Neither any of the appellants is doing any business nor holding any license nor is said to be a partner
of a firm doing business, nor is said to be the director of a body corporate doing business, nor is said to be a member of the joint family doing business.
When the trade license is in the name of an individual, that is, the spouse of each appellant in the present appeals, we are unable to assign the
license to a body of individuals and then to insert in such body, the appellants also. Thus, with respect, we are unable to endorse the view taken by the
learned Single Judge in this matter, and for the same reason, the contentions of the learned senior counsel for the contesting respondent are required to
be rejected.
We may, in the passing, indicate with respect that the approach of the learned Single Judge, at the very commencement of the discussion, went
into a wrong trajectory, when it was assumed9 that the classification in the aforesaid clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 1966, is
not an exhaustive enumeration of ineligible persons and that it refers not only to persons described therein, but also to other family members. Such
observations, with respect, do not stand in conformity with the plain language employed in clause (a) of 9 paragraph 64 of the order impugned sub-
section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 1966. There is specific and exhaustive enumeration of the persons who could be held disqualified under clause
(a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 ibid.; and it is entirely impermissible to incorporate any other category therein for the purpose of disqualification. It
has been with this erroneous approach the learned Single judge assumed that even the persons not enumerated in clause (a), but purportedly standing
at the periphery (like the spouse of license holder), could also be taken as disqualified. Further, while entering into the analysis of the definitions of the
expressions ‘family’ and ‘person,’ the learned Single Judge has proceeded to observe10 that the focus of the enactment was to prohibit
not only a trader, but his associates and family members and even a body of individuals. The learned Single Judge would even observe that the
reference to body of individuals was not superfluous. With great respect, we are constrained to observe that the expression ‘body of individuals’
is not even found in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 1966. It is, however, found in the definition of the 10 paragraph 80 of the
order impugned expression ‘person’ in Section 2(30) of the Act but, as aforesaid, such a definition of ‘person’ is of no bearing or
implication on the question of disqualification of an individual, who is, or could be elected as, a representative of agriculturists.
Before concluding, we would, of course, indicate that the observations made by the learned Single Judge to the extent of mischief likely to take
place cannot be ignored as altogether unfounded. However, the limitations of the Courts, as re-emphasized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of SAGAR PANDURANG DHUNDARE (supra), is that it could only travel to the extent what is ‘discernible’ and ‘decipherable’;
and it cannot traverse to the extent of laying down what is ‘desirable’. The plain, clear and unambiguous language employed in clause (a) of
sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 1966 cannot be overstretched and expanded to provide for disqualification to persons who are otherwise
not envisaged to be disqualified in the said provision. As to what ought to be provided is required to be left to the Legislature. In this regard, we would
only refer to the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SAGAR PANDURANG DHUNDARE (supra) as follows:
‘16. In case, the appellants suffer from any off the three situations indicated above, they shall be unseated. The rest is for the State to clarify by
way of a proper amendment in case they really and truly want to achieve the laudable object of preventing persons with conflicting interest from
becoming or continuing as members of the panchayat. The extent of conflicting interest is also for the legislature to specify.’
For what has been discussed and observed above, these appeals are allowed; the common impugned dated 13.12.2017 is set aside; and the writ
petitions are allowed to the extent and in the manner that the impugned orders dated 23.08.2017, as passed by the second respondent-Director against
these appellants, shall stand quashed. Having regard to the circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs.