Sreelakshmi P.B vs Kerala State Pollution Control Board & Ors.

Dr. A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, J.

As both these writ appeals impugn a common judgment dated 23.09.2026 of a learned Single Judge that disposed two writ petitions, namely, W.P.(C).No.23583 of 2026 and W.P.(C).No.23895 of 2026, they are taken up together for consideration and disposed by this common judgment.

The brief facts necessary for disposal of these writ appeals are as follows:

W.P.(C).No.23583 of 2026 was filed by Smt. Sreelakshmi P.B., who is working as a Senior Environmental Engineer in the Kerala State Pollution Control Board and W.P.(C).No.23895 of 2026 was filed by Smt. Pravithamol T.N., who is working as an Environmental Engineer with the Kerala State Pollution Control Board. The writ petitioners impugned an order dated 07.07.2026, by which Smt. Sreelakshmi was transferred along with the post of Senior Environmental Engineer that she was occupying at Kottayam to the Head Office of the Board at Thiruvananthapuram, and Smt. Pravithamol was transferred as Environmental Engineer from her current station at Pathanamthitta to a vacancy that existed at Head Office, Thiruvananthapuram. The transfers were impugned inter alia on the ground that (i) the Chairperson of the Kerala State Pollution Control Board did not have the power to issue the transfer order as the power was one that was vested in the Board itself; (ii) even if the Board had delegated some of its powers to the Chairperson, the said delegated power did not include a power to transfer an incumbent along with the post itself to another station; (iii) the Chairperson had, vide a work distribution order dated 02.11.2016 already distributed the various posts sanctioned for the Board among the Head Office, Regional Offices, Central Laboratory, Ernakulam and the District Office, and the said distribution could not be altered without prior sanction from the Board; (iv) the action of the Chairperson in issuing the impugned order of transfer was tainted with mala fides, since the same was issued in the immediate aftermath of a memo issued to the writ petitioners for alleged acts of insubordination; and (v) the transfer was punitive in nature, without being preceded by any disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioners, and in circumstances where a transfer was not specified as a punishment under the applicable service rules.

The learned Single Judge, who considered the matter, took note of the averments in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Board to find (i) that the mala fides alleged were not proved, (ii) that the transfers were effected in the exigencies of service and (iii) that the appellant in W.A.No.1916 of 2026 [Smt. Pravithamol T.N.] had been working in Pathanamthitta for almost 14 years. The learned Judge therefore found that there was no ground established to interfere with the order of transfer impugned in the writ petitions and proceeded to dismiss the writ petitions as devoid of merit.

In the appeals before us, we have heard the learned senior counsel Sri. George Poonthottam, duly assisted by Smt. Silpa Sreekumar, the learned counsel for the appellants and Sri. Paul Jacob, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Board. We have also gone through the pleadings before us and the precedents cited across the bar. Before we proceed to analyze the submissions of the learned counsel on either side, we deem it apposite to notice the law on the subject, and in particular, the circumstances under which the order of transfer can be interfered with in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

It is now a fairly well-settled principle of service law that the power to transfer an employee in a transferable service, is within the prerogative of the employer, for it is he who knows best where an employee should be deployed for an effective discharge of his/her social duty for the establishment [See Shilpi Bose (Mrs) and Others v. State of Bihar and Others - [1991 Supp (2) SCC 659], Union of India and others v. S.L. Abbas - [(1993) 4 SCC 357], National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Shri. Bhagwan & another - [(2001) 8 SCC 574] and Divyamol v. Director General, Central Industrial Security Force -[2022 (4) KLT OnLine 1093]]. In N.K. Singh v. Union of India and others - [(1994) 6 SCC 98], the aforesaid principles were reiterated, and it was observed that in cases where the career prospects of a person challenging the transfer were unaffected and no detriment was seen caused to the said person, interference with the transfer order would ordinarily be eschewed. Further, in order to introduce and rely on an element of prejudice to public interest as a vitiating factor of the transfer of a public servant, it had to be first pleaded and proved that the replacement was by a person not suitable for the post in question and that the transfer was avoidable. Unless such facts were pleaded and proved at the threshold, no further inquiry into that aspect was necessary and the absence of such pleading was sufficient to exclude the said factor from consideration as a vitiating element in the transfer order that was impugned before the court. Thereafter, in Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited v. RDS Projects Limited and Ors. - [(2013) 1 SCC 524], it was clarified that as and when allegations of mala fides are made, the persons against whom such allegations are levelled need to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings in their personal capacity so as to enable them to answer the charge. This is because in the absence of the person concerned as a party in his/her individual capacity, it would neither be fair nor proper to record a finding that malice had in fact vitiated the action taken by the authority concerned. The principles aforesaid were summarised recently by the Supreme Court in Sri Pubi Lombi v. The State of Arunachal Pradesh and Others - [2024 KHC 6135 (SC)] by observing that in the absence of (i) pleadings regarding mala fide; (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegations were made; (iii) violation of any statutory provision; and (iv) the allegation of transfer being detrimental to the employee who was holding the transferable post, judicial interference with the order of transfer was not warranted.

Applying the aforesaid settled legal position to the facts and pleadings before us in these appeals, we note that while there is an allegation of mala fide pleaded in the writ petitions with specific reference to the alleged conduct of the Chairperson of the Kerala State Petition Control Board in issuing the transfer orders in the immediate aftermath of the memos issued to the writ petitioners in connection with an alleged instance of insubordination that took place on 09.06.2026 in the chambers of the Chairperson, we find that the Chairperson, against whom the allegation of mala fide is made, was not arrayed as a party in the writ petition, in her personal capacity. In our view, the said lapse on the part of the appellants effectively prevents them from urging the plea of factual mala fide while assailing the impugned transfer order. Axiomatically, therefore, we cannot entertain such a plea in these appeals either.

The appellants, however, contend that even if factual mala fides cannot be urged, it is always open to them to urge the plea of legal mala fides, which they claim, arises from the fact that the transfer order was issued in gross disregard of the work distribution order that was in force, and without getting a prior approval from the Board for effecting transfers by transferring the post along with the incumbent to a different office than what was specified in the work order. The learned counsel for the appellants- the learned senior counsel Sri. George Poonthottam at first instance and supplemented admirably by his instructing counsel Smt. Silpa Sreekumar – submit that in the case of Smt. Sreelakshmi P.B., the work distribution order of the respondent Board reveals that there are four sanctioned posts of Senior Environmental Engineer, out of which, three posts are earmarked for Thiruvananthapuram, and one post is earmarked for Ernakulam. Despite the said distribution envisaged in the work distribution order, the respondent Board had been shifting sanctioned posts from one station to another purportedly on the ground of administrative convenience, thereby facilitating the accommodation of particular employees at stations of their choice. It is pointed out that prior to the promotion of the appellant to the post of Senior Environmental Engineer, the sanctioned post which ought to have been located at Ernakulam, had been shifted to Wayanad, allegedly to accommodate a particular employee and to provide him with a favourable post. Consequently, when the appellant was promoted to the post of Senior Environmental Engineer, instead of restoring the said sanctioned post to Ernakulam, the post was shifted to Kottayam and the appellant was posted there. It is further pointed out that one sanctioned post of Senior Environmental Engineer which ought to have been located at Thiruvananthapuram, is presently placed at Kannur, and the said post is held by a person who has been continuing in the said post at Kannur from 03.05.2025.

The learned counsel further submits that, in the case of Smt. Pravithamol T.N., as per the work distribution order, there are only four sanctioned posts of Environmental Engineer at the Head Office of the respondent Board. However, after the impugned order of transfer of the appellant, there are presently six Environmental Engineers working at the Head Office including the appellant. The fact that the Head Office was never envisaged to accommodate so many Environmental Engineers is sought to be substantiated by pointing out that the appellant is currently working at the Head Office without even being provided with the basic facilities, including a chair and a table, and no special duties have been assigned to her even after her joining duty at Thiruvananthapuram. Referring to the finding of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, that the appellant had been working at Pathanamthitta for almost 14 years, it is contended that the appellant was posted at Pathanamthitta on her promotion, having regard to the efficiency, experience and service rendered by the appellant. The present transfer of the appellant from Pathanamthitta to Thiruvananthapuram is, therefore, contended to be not founded on any general administrative exigency.

To appreciate the aforesaid contentions of the appellant, we have to notice the nature of the work distribution order dated 02.11.2016 issued by the Chairperson of the Board, pursuant to Section 11A of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act. The said provision enables the Board to delegate certain powers to the Chairperson and powers of General Administration fall within the scope of the delegated powers. The work distribution order dated 02.11.2016 itself was admittedly issued by the Chairperson in exercise of the aforesaid delegated power, and hence, we find it difficult to accept the contention of the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant that the Chairperson was not empowered to transfer incumbents to the various posts in the service, either independently or along with the posts, to other offices of the Board in the exigencies of service. As has already been noticed while discussing the law on the subject, there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinizing all transfers, and the courts lack the necessary expertise for personnel management of Government Departments. Ordinarily, the decision to transfer must be left, in public interest, to the departmental/institutional Head, for it is he who knows best where an employee should be deployed for an effective discharge of his/her duties for the establishment. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the interests of the Board would be better served by retaining the appellants at their Stations. That decision was never for the appellants to take.

In the case of Smt. Pravithamol, we also find that she had been working in Pathanamthitta for over 14 years, and her transfer to Thiruvananthapuram was necessitated only because there was a felt need of an Environmental Engineer at the Head Office. Similarly, in the case of Smt. Sreelakshmi, we find that there was a shortage of Senior Environmental Engineers in the Head Office, on account of the other two Senior Engineers having been accommodated at other stations by transferring them along with their posts, since they had a preferential claim to such transfers to their Home stations in anticipation of their imminent retirement from service. We are therefore of the view that the appellants have not made out a case for interference with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge that dismissed their writ petitions. The Writ Appeals therefore fail, and are accordingly dismissed.

Before parting with these appeals, we deem it necessary to record our appreciation for the efforts taken by Smt. Silpa Sreekumar, the junior lawyer who was assisting the learned senior counsel Sri. George Poonthottam, and later supplemented his arguments with impressive and eloquent arguments of her own. We were very impressed with her erudition and critical analysis of the issues involved and the manner in which she presented the case before us. While our verdict in these appeals may not have gone in her client's favour, we are sure and confident that she will make a mark in the profession if she keeps up her industry, and towards that end, we wish her the very best.