High CourtsDivision Bench(1996) 07 MAD CK 0001

Sree Karpagambal Mills Limited vs The Union of India (UOI) and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 26 July 1996 · Citation: (1996) 2 MLJ 549

HON’BLE JUDGES
K.A. Swami, C.J

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

43 paragraphs · 817 words

K.A. Swami, C.J.—In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought for quashing the Notification

Nos.214/Customs/80 dated 1.11.1980, No. 215/Customs/80, dated 1.11.1980 and No. 171/80 C.E., dated 1.11.1980 in so far as they affect

the petitioner and further to direct the respondents to refund the sum of Rs. 86,993.38 collected from the petitioner as customs duty and to pass

such other and further orders as may be deemed fit and proper, in the matter.

2.

By the Notification dated 1.11.1980, bearing No. 214-Customs/80, issued u/s 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) (hereinafter referred

to as ''the Act'') the earlier notifications bearing No. 6 Customs, dated 5.1.1979 and No. 8-Customs dated 5.1.1979 were rescinded. Whereas

under Notification No. 215-Customs/80 dated 1.11.1980, issued u/s 25(1) of the Act, the Central Government exempted viscose staple fibre and

viscose tow, falling within Chapter 56 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975) when imported into India, from so much

of the duty of customs leviable thereon under the said First Schedule as is in excess of 10% ad valorem. The said Notification also further stated

that nothing contained in the Notification shall apply to:

(i) high performance viscose staple fibre and high performance viscose tow;

(ii) high tenacity viscose staple fibre and high tenacity viscose tow;

(iii) high west modulus viscose staple fibre and high wet modulus viscose tow; and

(iv) polynosic staple fibre and polynosic tow.

3.

Under Notification No. 171/80, dt. 1.11.1980 the Government exempted excise duty as in excess of Rs. 2.50 per kilogram.

4.

Thus, under the notification No. 214-Customs/80, dated 1.11.1980, the concessions that were given in the customs duties under Notification

Nos.6 and 8 dated 5.1.1979 were rescinded, whereas under Notification No. 171/80, with effect from 1.11.1980, exemption was granted in

excise duty as is in excess of Rs. 2.50 per kilogram.

5.

The contentions raised in this writ petition are that the notifications, rescinding the earlier, notifications u/s 25 of the Act, are bad in law,

inasmuch as they cannot be considered to be in Public interest, that they are not applicable to the petitioner, as on the date when the exemptions

were withdrawn, the petitioner had already placed orders for importing the goods in question and letter of credit was opened on 6.8.1980, though

bill of entry was subsequent to 1.11.1980.

6.

The above two contentions have been specifically dealt with by the Supreme Court in Kasinka Trading and another, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India

and another, . That was also a case in which the Notification, according concession in Customs duty, was withdrawn in exercise of powers u/s 25

of the Act. The Supreme Court has held that Notification can be withdrawn at any time and such Notification issued u/s 25 of the Act in public

interest does not enable the party for applying the principle of promissory estoppel.

7.

In paragraph 24 of the said judgment, it has been specifically held as follows:

We are unable to agree with learned Counsel for the appellants that Notification 66/79 could not be withdrawn before 31.3.1981. First, because

the exemption Notification having been issued u/s 25(1) of the Act, it was implicit in it that it could be rescinded or modified at any time if the

public interest so demands and secondly it is not permissible to postpone the compulsions of ""public interest"" till after 31st March, 1981 if the

Government is satisfied as to the change in the circumstances before that date. Since, the Government in the instant case was satisfied that the very

public interest which had demanded a total exemption from payment of customs duty now demanded that the exemption should be withdrawn, it

was free to act in the manner it did....

8.

Regarding ''promissory estoppel'', it has been observed as follows:

In our considered opinion therefore the High Court was perfectly right in holding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel had no application to the

impugned notification issued by the Central Government in exercise of its powers u/s 25(1) of the Act in view of the facts and circumstances, as

established on the record.

9.

A Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with the withdrawal of the export quota relating to garments, applying the ratio laid down in

Kasinka Trading and another, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and another, held that the principle of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation

could not be applied to the case, (vide order dated 7.3.1996 in W.P.No. 17744 of 1995 etc. M/s. Tehzeeb Katari v. Government of India).

10.

Another Division Bench of this Court, applying the ratio laid down in Kasinga''s case (supra) on 15.7.1996 dismissed W.P.No. 245 of 1981

(M/s. Techno Impex (India) v. Union of India.

11.

Following the decision in Kasinga''s case J.T. (1994)7 S.C. 362 the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.