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Judgment
This revision is at the instance of the de facto complainant in Crime No.367 of 1999 on the file of Inspector of Police, Kaliyakkavilai Police
Station. The crime was registered for offences under Sections 304-A, IPC and 134(A)(B) r/w 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, on the allegation
that at 8.30 p.m. on 28.5.1999, the petitioner, being the driver of a Tempo van, drove it in a rash and negligent manner and as a result of the said
rash and negligent driving, it dashed against Lakshmi, daughter of the petitioner, and caused her death. Investigation was taken up and final report
was filed. The petitioner appeared before the learned Magistrate and when questioned, he pleaded guilty. The benevolent Magistrate, accepting
the plea, convicted and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.2,000 with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for a period of four months for the
offence u/s 304-A IPC. He was also convicted under Sections 134 (A) (B) r/w 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act and for the said conviction, he was
directed to pay a fine of Rs.200 with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for period of one month. The second respondent/accused paid the
fine. But, the de facto complainant, aggrieved by the inadequacy of sentence imposed upon the second respondent, has chosen to prefer the
present revision.
The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the learned Magistrate has committed an error in imposing only fine when the
second respondent has caused the death of an eight-year old girl by driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. According to him, the
sentence is too inadequate and it must be enhanced. The learned counsel appearing for the second respondent submits that the learned Magistrate
has every power to impose fine only and that the petitioner leaded guilty on the hope that he will be let off leniently.
It is, of course, true that the learned Magistrate has power to impose fine only, but it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The
facts in this case do not show that the second respondent is entitled for leniency in the matter of sentence, though he admitted that he drove the
vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and caused the death of eight-year old girl. The contention that the second respondent pleaded guilty on the
hope that he will be let off leniently and hence, the sentence should not be enhance, is to be stated only to be rejected. I am unable to understand
as to from which source, the second respondent had the knowledge that by pleading guilty, he will be let off leniently. The second respondent has
no grievance that the plea was not voluntary. He has also not preferred any appeal against his conviction, challenging the judgment. In the absence
of any appeal by the second respondent, it is to be presumed that he pleads guilty to the charge voluntarily and there is no material before this
Court to indicate that the said plea was made on the hope that he will be let off leniently. If it had been made on that hope, this Court cannot be a
silent spectator and put a stamp of approval on the said sentence. If that be the case, every accused prosecuted for an offence u/s 304-A, IPC,
will plead guilty and walk out of the court by paying some fine.
In this connection, an useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Dalbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, ,
wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devasling consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts
cannot treat the nature of the offence u/s 304-A, IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the P.O. Act. While considering the
quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations
should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly
inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity of inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He
cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs, it need not
necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly that even if he
is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for
causing death if a human being due to his callous driving of vehicle, he cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play,
particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.
The Supreme Court also relied upon the judgment rendered in State of Karnataka Vs. Krishna alias Raju, . In the judgment second cited supra,
the driver was convicted and sentenced only to pay fine and the High Court confirmed the said sentence. When the matter came to the Supreme
Court, the sentence of fine was not allowed to remain in force, but it was enhanced to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides the fine.
On consideration of the facts and on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, I am of the view that the sentence of fine imposed upon the
second respondent is too inadequate and it does not met the ends of justice. Therefore, I enhance the sentence. Accordingly, the sentence is
enhanced and the second respondent is directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year, and the fine amount, which was imposed
by the trial court, is confirmed.
In the result, the revision is allowed.
