High CourtsSingle Bench(2021) 07 DEL CK 0184

S.R Duggal (Ex-Director Of M/S ICRI Pvt.Ltd In Liquidation) vs Vijay Pal Kaushik

Delhi High Court · Decided on 27 July 2021

HON’BLE JUDGES
Asha Menon, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Miscellaneous (Main) No. 482 Of 2021, Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 22396, 22397, 22398 Of 2021

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Judgment

42 paragraphs · 816 words

Asha Menon, J

CM APPL. 22397/2021 (Exemption)

1.

Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

2.

The application stands disposed of.

CM(M) 482/2021, CM APPLs. 22396/2021 (by the petitioner u/S 151 CPC for stay)& 22398/2021 (by the petitioner u/S 5 of the

Limitation Act for condonation of delay)

1.

This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the plaintiff before the learned Trial Court, being aggrieved by the

rejection of his plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by the Senior Civil Judge (South East District), Saket Courts, New Delhi.

2.

The petitioner/plaintiff had filed a suit for possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act claiming to have been illegally dispossessed from

property bearing No.318, Sant Nagar, East of Kailash, New Delhi i.e. the suit premises. The learned Trial Court rejected the plaint on the ground that

the petitioner/plaintiff had no locus standi to file the same.

3.

Mr. Sunil Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff submits that the view taken by the learned Trial Court was completely erroneous

inasmuch as it had overlooked all the averments made in the plaint which clearly disclosed that the petitioner/plaintiff had filed the suit under Section 6

of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 in his personal capacity as also in the capacity of the Ex-Director of the company M/s. ICRI Research Pvt. Ltd.

Learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff also drew attention to the Rent Agreement placed as Annexure ‘C’ in the e-file, to point out that the

Rent Agreement had been signed by the petitioner/plaintiff as the Director of the said company. Therefore, the petitioner/plaintiff could maintain the

suit, having been illegally dispossessed by the son of the respondent/defendant by snatching the keys from the employee of the petitioner/plaintiff, who

had been called to the spot on the plea of cleaning and attending to the water logging in the suit premises. Learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff

submitted that the petitioner/plaintiff was the one running an office from the premises in question, which had remained closed on account of the Covid-

19.

Thus, since, it was he, who had been illegally dispossessed, he alone could file the suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to be put

back in possession immediately.

4.

The learned Trial Court vide the impugned order observed that a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 could be filed only by a

person, who was in actual physical possession of the property and, if such person, who was in possession, was an agent or an appointee or deputee of

another, the actual physical possession would be of the person appointing or deputing him. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court

in A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam , (2012) 6 SCC 430. It was also observed that

the Rent Agreement had been executed between the company, M/s. ICRI Research Pvt. Ltd. and the respondent/defendant through the then Director

i.e., the petitioner/plaintiff. It was held that on this score also, it could not be said that it was the petitioner/plaintiff, who was in possession of the suit

property. It also noticed that the High Court of Delhi had vide order dated 25th September, 2018, appointed an Official Liquidator as the company,

M/s. ICRI Research Pvt. Ltd admittedly, had gone into liquidation.

5.

When queried as to how these observations were incorrect, learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff insisted that he had sued, not only in his

individual capacity but also in the capacity of an Ex -Director of the company which was no doubt, under liquidation. There was no convincing answer

as to why, the Official Liquidator was not before the Court. Learned counsel in the course of the arguments, did indicate that the Official Liquidator

had visited the suit premises to take over all the documents and records.

6.

It would therefore appear, that possibly, the dispossession is being claimed on account of the fact that now, the Official Liquidator is taking charge

of all the assets of the company under liquidation.

7.

Be that as it may, it is to be noted that the Rent Agreement nowhere records that the premises are to be used exclusively for the personal benefit of

the petitioner/plaintiff. There is nothing on the basis of which, it could be inferred that though it was the company that was the tenant, the

petitioner/plaintiff had a right independently of the company to remain in possession of the premises. Even if that clause had been included in the Rent

Agreement, it appears that the petitioner/plaintiff would then have to come through the Official Liquidator to protect his possession so obtained through

the company now under liquidation.

8.

There is no merit in the present petition, which is accordingly, dismissed along with the pending applications.

9.

The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.