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Judgment
Srinivasan J.
4th respondent in this appeal is the owner of T. S. Nos. 1356 and 1357 in Puliankulam village, Coimbatore District. T. S. No. 1356 comprises
of an extent of 11,472 sq. mts, out of which an extent of 2579 sq. mts. is vacant. In T. S. No. 1357 4th respondent owns 55,579 sq. mts. out of
which an extent of 3,536 sq. mts. lies vacant. 4th respondent is engaged in the business of coffee roasting, grinding and marketing in wholesale and
in retail. It is also dealing with grade packing and marketing of tea. The appellant herein took on lease the entire extent owned by 4th respondent in
T. S. No. 1357 with buildings thereon for a period of five years from 1.10.1965. The lease was extended for a further period of five years and
ultimately it came to an end on 30.9.1980.Under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1978 (hereinafter
referred to as ''the Act'') 4th respondent submitted a return under S. 7 of the Act on 13.9.1978. Even before submitting the return, 4th respondent
filed an application on 7.9.1978 under S. 21 of the Act for exemption of excess land from the provisions of the Act. The appellant applied for
assignment of the excess vacant land in its favour by the Government. The application for exemption as well as the appellant''s request for
assignment were considered by the Government and the Commissioner for Land Reforms made a report in his letter No. H.3 42668/78 dated
22.5.1981 addressed to the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Fort St. George, Madras-9. The Commissioner
has recommended in that letter that out of the total extent of vacant land of 3.115 sq. mts. over and above the ceiling limit, an extent of 1,818 sq.
mts. can be allowed to be retained by the 4th respondent and the remaining extent of 1,297 sq. mts. in T.S.No.1357 can be declared as excess
and acquired under the provisions of the Act. The Government considered the report as well as the applications and passed an order on 4.1.1981
in G.O.Ms,No.2900 exempting the excess vacant land of 1,815 sq. mts. out of the total extent of excess vacant land of 3,115 sq. mts. Thereafter,
the 4th respondent made representations on 9.12.1981, 29.12.1981 and 20.2.1982 urging to reconsider the order made by it and grant exemption
for the entire excess land of 3.115 sq. mts. At the same time, the appellant was also pursuing his application for assignment. The Assistant
Commissioner for Urban Lands had advised the appellant to apply for assignment under S. 24 of the Act read with R. 23 of the Rules after
declaration of the excess vacant land under Ss. 9 to 11 of the Act. But, the appellant was repeatedly urging the authorities to assign the excess land
in its favour even before such declaration was made.
It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that S. 24(4) of the Act has given a right to the appellant as a lessee of the land to apply for
assignment and he had already made an application for such assignment. It is argued that once the Government made an order on 4.11.1981
exempting an extent of 1,818 sq. mts. only thereby declaring the excess extent of 1,297 sq. mts. that has become final and it is not open to the
Government to re-consider or review its order. According to learned counsel, the power of Review is not inherent in the Government and it should
have been conferred by statute. It is contended that no such power having been conferred by the statute, the earlier order dated 4.11.1981 will
stand and the later order made on 25.6.1986 is unsustainable. It is also argued that without giving an opportunity to the appellant, who has
acquired a right to seek assignment of the excess land, the Government has passed the order dated 25.6.1986 and therefore, it is vitiated by failure
of the Government to follow the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel Places reliance on definition of the expression ""to old"" in S. 3(l). As
per definition, a person who possesses the land as tenant is also a person said to hold any land within the meaning of the Act. It is pointed out that
a lessee is also bound under S. 7 of the Act to file a statement setting out the details of the land. It is further argued that under S. 24(4) of the Act,
the lessee in possession is entitled to continue to be in possession of the excess land declared and the Government is bound to consider the claims
of such lessee.
Per contra, it is contended by learned counsel for the 4th respondent that the right to seek an assignment of land will arise in any person only
after the excess land is declared by the Government under S. 10 of the Act. It is submitted that only when a final statement is published under S.
10 of the Act, the excess land is declared and a right under S. 24(4) of the Act will arise only after such Declaration. It is therefore, submitted that
the appellant has no locus standi to seek assignment of the land in his possession before such Declaration is made. It is also argued that the power
of exemption under S. 21 of the Act is a continuing power and it can be exercised any number of times. It is submitted that it is not a case of
reviewing the earlier order, but to consider the request for grant of exemption by the Government under S. 21 of the Act and to pass another order
under that section. It is, therefore, submitted that the order of the learned single Judge does not warrant any interference.
Before considering the respective contentions, it is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Act, to appreciate the scope of the right
which is claimed by the appellant under S. 24(4) of the Act. S. 7(l) provides that every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at
the commencement of the Act shad file a statement before the competent authority giving particulars of such land also specifying the vacant ands
within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain. Section itself enables the owner of the vacant land to specify that he is desirous of retaining a
particular land. The mere fact that he possesses lands in excess of the ceiling limit would not automatically mean that a particular vacant land would
vest in the Government or is liable to be acquired. Section itself provides that the land owner should be given an opportunity to state which land he
wants to retain and which land he wants to surrender in favour of the Government. The relevant form prescribed by the Rules is in Form I. Clause
15 of Form I reads thus:
(a) Is any land in respect of which exemption is sought under S. 21 included in Annexure A and if so, (b) have particulars of such land been
furnished in Annexure C
Clause 18 is in the following terms:
Have the particulars of land which is desired to be retained and the land which is proposed to be surrendered been furnished in Annexure H?
Annexure A should contain particulars of vacant lands, land with buildings and land with building proposed to be demolished or possessed as
owner or tenant or a mortgagee etc, Annexure C provides for particulars of land for which exemption has been sought under S. 21. Annexure H
contains two sections. S. I refers to land desired to be retained by the owner and S. II refers to lands proposed to be surrendered. Thus, the
owner of the land is given an opportunity by the provisions of the Act to make a statement with regard to the lands which he wants to retain even if
he is having vacant lands in excess of the ceiling limit. Ultimately if the Government decides the extent of the excess land, it has to prepare initially a
draft statement under S. 9 and publish the same. Then opportunity should be given to make representations and ultimately final statement should be
prepared and published under S. 10 of the Act. It is the final statement which declares the lands which are in excess of the ceiling limit of the owner
concerned. The Form in which the final statement should be published is found in Form III. Column 1 refers to lands held as owner. Part C
mentions the details of vacant lands which the person concerned desires to retain. Part D contains details of land exempted under Ss. 20,21 and
Part E contains the particulars of extent (in hectares and square meters and identity of the lands to be surrendered (as provisionally/finally
assessed). It is the land which is described in Part E to the said statement which can be considered to be a land declared as excess extent within
the meaning of S. 24 of the Act. S. 11 of the Act provides that after the service of the final statement under S. 10 on the person concerned, the
competent authority shall cause a Notification giving the particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit and also
mentioning other particulars set out in the section. The relevant Form of the Notification is in Form No. VI. Under the Notification, the competent
authority declares that the exempted vacant land referred to in the schedule to the Notification is deemed to have been acquired by the State
Government and that such land shall be deemed to have been vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect on
and from the date specified. Thus, the statement that is published under S. 10 and the Notification issued under S. 11 of the Act will show the land
which is declared as excess.
Now turning to the provisions of S. 24 of the Act. the marginal note is that the subject concerned in the section is the disposal of the vacant and
acquired under the Act. Sub-S. (4) on which reliance is placed by the appellant reads thus:
Where any vacant land which is in the possession of any person for any purpose relating to, or in connection with any industry but owned by any
other person, is declared as excess vacant land under this Chapter, such person in possession of such vacant land shall, notwithstanding anything
contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, continue to possess such land under the State Government under such terms and
conditions may be fixed by the State Government.
It is not necessary for us to refer to the Explanation under sub- S. (4). The crucial wordings are.
any vacant land which is in the possession of any person for any purpose relating to, or in connection with, any industry but owned by any other
person, is declared as excess vacant land under this Chapter...
In order to fulfill the conditions prescribed in the sub-Section, a vacant land must be in the possession of a person, but owned by any other person.
Secondly, it should be in the possession of that person for any purpose relating to or in connection with, any industry, thirdly, it should have been
declared as excess vacant land under that Chapter. Unless such a Declaration is made, there is no question of invoking S. 24(4). Such Declaration
can be made under the provisions of the Act only after a final statement is published under S. 10 and a Notification is issued under S. 11 of the
Act. The necessity for providing that the land should be owned by any other person is to prevent the person who was the owner of the land before
the acquisition by the Government from claiming the benefit of S. 24(4) of the Act. To illustrate the position, one example can be given. If ''A'' has
been the owner of the land and he has been in possession in connection with any industry, he cannot claim the benefits under S. 24(4) of the Act.
Only if the land is in possession of the person who was not the owner previously and it is used for the purpose of any industry, S. 24(4) can be
invoked.
In the present case, two conditions are satisfied. But, the condition that the land should be declared as excess vacant land has not been satisfied.
Moreover, the Section talks of the particular land which is in the possession of the person concerned. Unless the particular land which is in the
possession of the lessee is declared as excess vacant land, he cannot claim any right under S. 24(4) of the Act. The Government has not yet
declared T. S. No. 1357 as excess vacant land. Nobody can assume at this stage that the Government will declare only that land as excess vacant
land. We have already seen that the 4th respondent owns lands in two survey numbers, namely T. S. Nos. 1356 and 1357. The Government may
well declare the excess extent in the land in T. S. No. 1356 and some portion in T. S. No. 1357. Then they cannot give any benefit to the appellant
herein under the Section. Hence, the question of considering the appellant''s claim under S. 24(4) will arise only after tire Declaration by the
Government of a particular extent in T. S. No. 1357 as excess vacant land under the provisions of the Act.
Hence, the appellant herein has no locus standi to claim an assignment at this stage of the land in which he is in possession. In fact, as pointed
out earlier, the appellant was advised by the Assistant Commissioner in L. Dis. No. 27590/80 dated 22.3.1981 and L. D. S. No. G1/27589/90
dt.28.3.81 that the appellant could apply for assignment after Declaration of excess vacant land under Ss.9 to 11 of the Act. Hence, the appellant
cannot claim the benefit of S. 24(4) of the Act before such Declaration is made under the said sections.
In the view that we have taken, it will not be necessary to consider whether the power of Commissioner under S. 21 can be exercised more
than once and whether the Commissioner has power of Review to re-consider the earlier order dated 4.11.1981. But, for the sake of completion,
we will consider that matter also in this judgment. Learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel
Narshi Thakershi and Others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, . That case arose under the provisions of the Sowrashtra Land Reforms Act.
There was a dispute between the members of the family who were holding an estate known as Manghani Taluka. The question which was in
dispute was whether the family was divided or remained undivided. If the family remained undivided, it can hold only a smaller extent of land. If the
family had got divided, then each of the sharers can get a separate extent of land, thereby the total extent to be held by them shall be more. The
provisions of the said Act were applied and an order was passed by Mahalkari, who was one of the authorities under the Act that the family had
separated and the members were entitled to separate extents, which are known as gharkheds. After the said order was passed, the tenants who
were in occupation of those lands appealed to the District Deputy Collector challenging the correctness of the order. The said appeal was
dismissed. That matter was taken up in Revision by the tenants to the Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected the Revision Application taking the view that
it had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter as the matter had already been considered by the State Government. Thereafter, the tenants filed a
revision to the State Government of Bombay. That revision petition was sent to the Commissioner, Rajkot Division who heard the parties and
submitted a report, After getting the report, the State Government agreed with the recommendations of the Commissioner and set aside the orders
passed by the Mahalkari and the District Deputy Collector. But, by that time, the area in question came under the jurisdiction of the State
Government of Gujarat. The Gujarat Government by its Notification delegated its functions to the Commissioner, Rajkot Division, who took up the
matter for consideration and passed an order setting aside the order passed by the Government on the earlier occasion, taking the view that the
Government was not competent to make that order. It was the validity of that order which was challenged in those proceedings. The High Court
set aside the order holding that the Commissioner could not have passed the order as the Government already passed an order which was binding.
The Supreme Court confirmed the order of the High Court and dismissed the appeal. In that context, the Supreme Court observed that the
Government had no power to Review and it was not an inherent power. The Supreme Court said that the power of Review should be conferred
by law either specifically or by necessary implication and that there was no provision in the Act which confers such power. The facts stated above
already show that the order passed by the Government in question was really a judicial order deciding the rights between the parties. It was not a
case of the Government passing an administrative order. As there was a dispute between the parties regarding the lands, which was decided by the
Government, obviously the Supreme Court held that the Government had no power of Review. That ruling will have no bearing for the present
case.
Reliance is placed on the judgment of a single Judge of this Court in Sudharshanlal Gupta v. State of Tamil Nadu 1991 -2-L.W. 150. The
learned Judge had to consider certain quasi judicial orders under the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act Referring to classification of
orders into statutory orders, administrative orders, and judicial orders, the learned Judge observed that some of the orders are quasi-judicial
orders and they involve some adjudication or consequences affecting someone''s legal rights. The learned single Judge held that in such cases, there
could be no review unless such a power was conferred expressly. Referring to administrative orders, the learned Judge observed.
While it may be seen that certain administrative orders, which intend to give effect to some policy of the State, are issued without any observance
of the rules of natural justice or modified or rescinded or annulled, statutory orders which are always in the nature of subordinate legislation so long
as they do not suffer from any vires or invalidity, can also be rescinded, modified recalled or repealed.
Thus the learned Judge has clearly held that the statutory order which does not affect the rights of any particular party can be rescinded, modified,
recalled or repealed. The said judgment has been referred to by the same learned Judge in Madras Citizens Progressive Council v. The Secretary
to Government of Tamil Nadu 1991-2-L.W.159. That was a case under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. An order of
exemption under S. 21 was made by the Government with certain conditions. The owner concerned, without fulfilling those conditions, was taking
further proceedings for getting further orders of exemption from the Government. When those proceedings were pending, this Court was
approached with a prayer for the issue of a mandamus directing the Government to enforce the order already passed. While refusing to issue a
mandamus as prayed for by the petitioner, the Court observed that the powers of the Government were circumscribed by the provisions of the
statute and it was not open to the Government to pass any order as it liked. The relevant passage in the judgment reads thus:
The State Government''s power under S. 21 of the Act is sufficiently circumscribed and it is possible to project as to what may be deemed to be
necessary or expedient in the public interest with reference to the purpose for which exemption is asked for and granted. S. 21(l)(a) under which
admittedly the exemption was granted to the 4th respondent states that before granting exemption, the State Government has to be satisfied having
regard to the location of such land the purpose for which such land is being used or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the
circumstances of the case may require that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest to do so. The State Government thus cannot grant
exemption for no predictable reason. The reason for which exemption is granted must satisfy the public interest and whether the purpose for which
such land is sought to exempt will serve the public interest or not must be judged by the State Government in every case before the order of
exemption is granted. It will be deemed on the facts of this case that the State Government granted the exemption having regard to the specified
industrial purposes in the application for exemption filed on behalf of the fourth respondent. A specified industrial purpose may be deemed to serve
the public purpose. It will be indeed beyond comprehension to think that a person seeking exemption will be allowed to change reasons of
exemption from stage to stage, day-to-day exemption is asked for a particular purpose and when that purpose is not achieved, tomorrow another
application for exemption is made and the purpose is changed. The fourth respondent specified the purposes which were held by the State
Government to serve the public interest. The petitioner, however, has made a grievance that the 4th respondent has not shown any inclination to
utilize the exempted land for any of the above purposes. In its affidavits, the fourth respondent has taken shelter under a technicality with reference
to the provisions in sub-S. (2) of S. 21 of the Act to which I shall later advert. It has not been stated that it still intends to fulfill the purpose
aforementioned. It is, in this situation, one may doubt the intentions of the 4th respondent and give credit to the petitioner for bringing the case to
the Court, if not, for any immediate relief to the public at large, atheist for vindicating the cause that a person who satisfied the public purpose at
one stage but is not interested in fulfilling them, yet it has sought exemption and the State Government has granted the exemption.
The order of the learned Judge was challenged in appeal before a Division Bench and the Judgment of the Division Bench is in Sri Meenakshi
Mills Limited v. The Madras Citizens Progressive Council 1991-2-L.W.498. The Division Bench held that after having revised to issue a
mandamus as prayed for by the petitioner, the learned Judge was not right in making the observations to the effect that the power of the
Government was circumscribed. The Division Bench Observed
We have carefully gone through the order of the learned Judge. The learned Judge has rightly declined to issue a writ of mandamus as prayed for in
view of the pendency of the proceedings under S. 21(2) of the Act. Having declined and having noticed the pendency of the proceedings under S.
21(2) of the Act, the learned Judge was not right in indicating/pointing out the manner in which the Government should proceed further and dispose
of the subject matter pending under S. 21(2) or the Act. Under S. 21(2"") of the Act, it is for the Government to take or decide such action as
deemed fit and proper, in accordance with law. As rightly pointed out by the earned counsel for the appellant any observations made by this Court
are likely to influence the Government in the disposal of the matter pending under S. 21(2) of the Act. To that extent, with respect, we are of the
view that the order of the Learned Judge has to be modified.
On the facts and circumstances of this case, all the rulings relied on by learned counsel for the appellant do not help him in any manner.
It is contended by learned counsel for the 4th respondent that the Government was not requested to exercise the power of Review, but was
only requested to grant exemption. According to learned counsel, under S.21 of the Act, the power of exemption can be exercised any number of
times and there is no limitation prescribed in the Act. Reliance is placed on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Kailasam v. Secretary
to Government of Tamil Nadu, 1981 11 MLJ 210 :94 L.W.578. That case arose under the Tamil Nadu Cinemas Regulation Act, IX of 1955. S.
11 of that Act provides for grant of exemption to any cinematograph exhibition or any place where a cinematograph exhibition is given from any of
the provisions of the Act or of any Rules made there under. The Bench held that the power under S. 11 will not get exhausted with the grant of one
exemption and it is a continuing power and there is no need for giving an opportunity to any third party before such grant of exemption by the
Government. We bold that the language of S.21 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act is similar and the power of the
government does not get exhausted by passing one order. It is open to the Government to reconsider the matter and pass a fresh order. At this
stage the Government has to take note of the desire of the owner of the land which is sought to be deprived of the land. The provisions of the Act
do show that all the relevant materials should be taken into account and the desire of the owner to retain any particular land should also be
considered before any land is declared as excess. It is a matter only between the Government and the owner. Hence, we are of the view of the
conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge is confined there is no merit in this appeal. The affably is dismissed. No costs.