Special Deputy Collector (Industries) vs Bee Man Bi and Others

Jagannadha Rao, J.

C.C.C. A. 164 of 1982

These to appeals are connected and can be disposed of together.

C.C.C.A. No. 164/82 is an appeal preferred by the Special Deputy Collector, Industries, Hyderabad against the judgment and decree passed in O.P. No. 268 of 1979 on 8-2-1982 under the Land Acquisition Act. The judgment was given by the Court below on a reference u/s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The notification in question u/s. 4(1) was issued on 9-6-1977 acquiring an extent of Acs. 21. 28 guntas in S. No. 24/A of Bowen-pally village. The acquisition was made for the purpose of R&D Department B.H.E.L. Possession was taken on 18-3-1978 and the award was passed on 28-6-1978. Thereupon, a reference was claimed u/s 18 and was registered in the Civil Court as O.P. No. 268 of 1979 referred to above. While the Larid Acquisition Officer granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 4/- per sq. yard, the Civil Court enhanced the same to Rs. 10/-. Against the said decree, the claimants have not preferred any appeal. But it is only the Land Acquisition Officer that has preferred this appeal.

In this appeal, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant Sri R. Subba Rao that the rate of compensation awarded by the lower court is excessive, it will be noted that the claimants have filed various registered sale deeds pertaining to lands in and around Bowenpally for the period 1976 to 1978 and the rates vary from Rs. 10/- to Rs. 30/-. Ex. A-4 however is the sale deed which relates only to Bowenpally village and is dated 20-3-1977. Under the said document, an extent of 182 sq. yards was sold for Rs. 3,500/-. The rate works out to Rs. 19/- per sq. yard. S. No. of the land concerned is 91. The Court below deducted about 50% towards roads and development charges having regard to the fact that the document Ex. A-4 was in respect of a very small extent of land. The Court below then arrived at a marginal rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. yard. So far as the claimants are concerned, they had relied upon Ex. A-2 dated 1-12-1976 under which 400 sq. yards were sold at the rate of Rs. 20/- per sq. yard in Balanagar; Ex. A-2 dated 9-12-1977 under which 200 sq. yards were sold for Rs. 25/- per sq. yard again at Balanagar; Ex. A-5 dated 25-1-78 under which 100 sq. yards were sold at the rate of Rs. 30/- per sq. yard in Ferozguda; Ex. A-6 dated 3-2-76 under which 711 sq. yards were sold at the rate of Rs. 25/- per sq. yard in Balanagar; and Ex. A-7 dated 25-9-1978 under which 240 sq. yards were sold at the rate of Rs. 29/- per sq. yard in Ferozguda.

It will be noticed that Exs. A-2, A-3, A-5 and A-6 and A-7, which pertain to lands situated near about Bowenpally, do show that during 1976 to 1978, the rates were ranging from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 30/- per sq. yard. Even so, the trial Court do not place any reliance on these documents which give higher rares, but selected the lowest rate of Rs. 19/- per sq. yard referred to in Ex. A-4 which related to this very village Bowenpally. So far us the Government is concerned, they had not filed any documents which would give a rate lower than Rs. 19/-per sq yard. Further the Court had made a deduction of 50% which normally could have been considered to be on the high side.

It is true that in an earlier acquisition made in 1962 in respect of S. No. 24/A, the Civil Court had awarded compensation at Rs. 2/- per sq. yard and the same was confirmed by this Court; that cannot be of any help to the appellants in as much as the notification in that case was in 1962 whereas the notification in the present case is on 9-6-1977.

It is also true that the requisition for acquisition of the present land came into being on 28-12-1975 and even Ex. A-4 relates to a period subsequent to that date, but on that ground alone, the document cannot be rejected altogether. In fact, the deduction of 50% from the rate mentioned in Ex. A-4 would sufficiently account for any small increase between 1975 and 1977.

For the aforesaid reasons, we affirm the finding of the lower court that the rate of compensation should be Rs. 10/- per sq. yard.

So far as the provisions relating to solatium and interest under the Amendment Act, 1984 are concerned, we are unable to grant any relief in this case inasmuch as the award is dated 28-6-1978 and the judgment of the trial court is dated 8-2-1982. They do not fall within the crucial dates i.e., 30-4-1982 to 24-9-1984. Therefore, the provisions of the Amending Act, 1984 cannot apply.

In Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. Etc., the position was that the notification was issued on 13-11-1959, the award was passed on 30-3-1963 by the Land Acquisition Officer and by the trial court on reference on 10-6-1968. Later the matter came up in appeal to the High Court on 6-12-1984. It vas held that the ''awards'' referred to u/s 30(2) of the Amending Act, meant only the awards of the Land Acquisition Officer and the Civil Court on reference. It is only in cases of appeals to the High Court or Supreme Court against the above two kinds of awards that the higher solatium and interest as per the Amending Act are payable. If either of the awards is between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, the High Court or Supreme Court could apply the provisions of the Amending Act, and not otherwise. If either of the awards is before 30-4-1982, the High Court or Supreme Court cannot apply the Amending Act.

A different point arose in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, AIR 1990 S.C. 981. In that case, a notification u/s 4 was issued on 6 10-67 and the award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 5-3-1969, but the award by the District Court was on 28-5-85. It was argued that even though the award passed by the District Court was after 24-9-1984, the provisions of the Amending Act, 1984 would be attracted, and the said contention was accepted. The Supreme Court pointed out that though the crucial period was 30-4-82 to 24-9-84, the awards passed either by the Land Acquisition Officer or by the Civil Court during that period should, on appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court, be given the benefit of the Amending Act, 1984, the benefit was not restricted to those cases only, bat by way of implication would also be extended to cases of awards made by the Civil Court for the first time u/s 18 of the Act, after 24-9-84. As already stated, the award passed by the District Court in that case was on 28-5-85. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was right in applying the provisions of the Amending Act to an award pasted on 28-5-85, even though it was subsequent to 24-9-84.

At the same time it must be noted that the Supreme Court clearly laid down that so far as Section 23(1-A) is concerned, the applicability of it was mentioned in Section 30(1) of the Amending Act and it clearly stated that the said provisions would not apply to the awards of the Land Acquisition Officer passed between 30-4-82 and 24-9-84. Even though the award passed by the Civil Court u/s 18 was well within these two dates, Section 23(1-A) should not be applied and benefit given.

In the present case before us, the position is more or less similar to that of Union of India v. Raghuvir Singh (1 supra) referred to above. In that case also, the award of the Land Acquisition Officer, as well as the award u/s 18 passed by the Civil Court, were both prior to 30-4-82, as in the present case. Therefore, the decision in Raghuvir Singh''s case (1 supra) is directly on point and the decision in Union of India v. Fillp Tiago (2 supra) is not attracted. The claimants are not therefore entitled to the benefits of the Amending Act of 1984 in any manner whatsoever.

Learned Counsel for the respondent however contended that during the pendency of this appeal, the appellant had obtained stay in regard to 50% of the compensation and insisted on the claimants'' furnishing security. The claimants could not furnish security and therefore, did not withdraw the 50% of the enhanced compensation. Learned Counsel therefore, contends that this is a fit case in which this Court can direct interest at the rate of 6% u/s 34 C.P.C instead of confining the rate of interest to 4%, as awarded by the reference Court. In this connection we may point out that, according to the unamended provisions of Section 34, interest is payable only at 4% from the time of taking possession. The amount could either be paid or deposited Under Sections 31, 32 and 33 of the Act. This is so far as the reference Court is concerned. But, once the matter comes up to this court the position in relation to the grant of interest would be governed by Section 53 of the Act read with Section 34 of C.P.C. Section 53 of the Act states that save, in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the CPC shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act. To the extent that Section 34 permits the grant of interest at the rate of 4% only before the reference court, under the unamended provisions, it can be said that interest is limited to 4% in the reference court. But once the matter comes up to this court, there is no provision in (he Land Acquisition Act, restricting the rate of interest to 4%. On the other hand, Section 34 C.P.C. read with Section 53 of the Act would permit this Court to grant interest at 6%. It is well settled that if a party who is liable to pay any amount under a decree, insists upon the successful party withdrawing the amount only on furnishing security, and the amount remains in court as the party is not able to comply with the conditions, the party who insists on such condition must be made to pay interest.

We, therefore, consider that this is a fit case to direct award of interest at 6% in respect of the 50% of enhanced compensation, from 26-8-82, the date on which this Court granted the conditional stay order till payment of the said amount to the claimants. Subject to the above modification in favour of the respondents, this appeal is dismissed. No costs. Having regard to the fact that the notification is dated 9-6-1977, the appellant will deposit the additional rate of interest within one month from today in the execution court and the amount already deposited and the amount to be deposited, as mentioned above, shall be permitted to be withdrawn by the claimants in accordance with the judgment and decree passed by the lower court with costs in the lower courts.

in this appeal, the appellant has been granted 1/4 share (Ac. 1-02 guntas) in the acquired properly by the court below. The appellant contends that under a subsequent agreement dated 24-11-1969 between the appellant and some of the respondents, the appellant is entitled to Ac. 1-11 guntas rather than Ac. 1-02 guntas. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in view of the said agreement'', the appellant should be allowed to get compensation in respect of Ac. 1-11 guntas, rather than Ac. 1-02 guntas.

It is contended for the respondents that in an earlier OP No. 86/65 arising under the Land Acquisition Act, the OP was disposed of on 14-12-70 and the matter went to Civil Court some time in 1973, and came up to the High Court in CCCA No. 11/73. In all those proceedings, the appellant claimed Ac. 1-02 guntas only and her claim was restricted to that extent. Further, even in the present OP, out of which the present appeal arises, the appellant had claimed only Ac. 1-02 guntas before the Land Acquisition Officer and did not claim Ac. 1-11 guntas. It is well settled that judgments by the civil Courts on reference and in subsequent appeals under the Land Acquisition Act, attract the provisions of Section 11 C.P.C. including the provisions of constructive res judicata. In any event, having claimed only Ac. 1-02 guntas even in the present land acquisition proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer, the claimant could not have claimed more than that when the matter was referred to civil court. For the aforesaid reasons, CCCA No. 126/82 is dismissed. No costs.