Soumi Yoosuf vs Union Of India & Ors.

Soumen Sen, C.J.

This writ petition is filed by the mother of the detenu -Sri. Badhusha Shahul @ Shanu, aged 28 years, challenging Exhibit P1 detention order dated 14^th May, 2026, issued by the Government, under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (PITNDPS Act for brevity). The said order of detention was confirmed by the Government vide order dated 7^th July, 2026, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of two years, from the date of detention.

The detention order was passed on the basis of a proposal submitted by the District Police Chief, Kottayam, on 31^st March, 2026, and an additional report was filed on 30^th April, 2026, alleging that the detenu was involved in three crimes registered under the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act for short) during the period from 2024 to 2026. The Government placed the matter before the Screening Committee on 22^nd April, 2026 and after considering the same, a report was filed before the Government and based on its recommendation, the impugned detention order was issued on 14^th May, 2026.

The first adverse case relied upon by the Detaining Authority is Crime No.1767/2024 of Kottayam West Police Station registered on 13^th November, 2024, under Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act alleging possession of 5.90 grams of Ganja. The detenu was released on station bail on the same day and the case culminated in conviction and imposition of a fine. The investigation in the said case was completed and a charge sheet was filed in the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Kottayam on 20^th November, 2024.

The second case relied upon by the Detaining Authority is Crime No. 67/2024 of Kottayam Excise Range Office registered on 21^st November, 2024, under Section 20(b) (ii)(B) of the NDPS Act alleging possession of 1.100 Kg of Ganja. The detenu was arrested on 25^th September, 2025 and was remanded to judicial custody. Thereafter, on 25^th November, 2025, he was granted bail by the Special Judge for NDPS Act cases, Thodupuzha, as per order in Crl.M.C No. 265/2025 subject to the following conditions:

The investigation in the said case is completed and a charge sheet is filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thodupuzha, on 26^th October, 2025.

The third case relied upon by the Detaining Authority is Crime No. 88/2026 of Kottayam East Police Station, registered on 15^th January, 2026, under Sections 22(b), 29, 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act alleging possession of 14.2318 gram of Methamphetamine and 17.6787 gram of Hashish Oil. The detenu was arrested on 15^th January, 2026 and was remanded to judicial custody. Thereafter, on 9^th March, 2026, he was granted bail by the Special Judge for NDPS Act cases, Thodupuzha subject to following conditions:

The investigation in the said case is completed and a charge sheet is filed before the Special Court for NDPS Act cases,Thodupuzha on 19^th April, 2026.

Heard Mr. M.H Hanis, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Smt. O.M. Shalina, learned Deputy Solicitor General for India and Smt. O.A. Nooriya, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor for the respondents.

Mr. M. H. Hanis, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the order of detention dated 14^th May, 2026 (Exhibit P1) was passed in a mechanical manner without considering the relevant materials. It is submitted that the mandatory provision under Section 9(b) and (c) of the PITNDPS Act has not been complied with. The non-compliance of the statutory requirements under the Act has caused prejudice to the detenu. The mandatory procedure of sending a report in respect of Exhibit P1 order to the Central Government within 10 days of passing the order has also not been complied with. This is a clear violation of Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act. The non-compliance has caused serious prejudice to the detenu.

The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the detenu has made a detailed representation to the Secretary, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, on 24^th July, 2026 clearly stating the grounds of non-submission of the report to the Central Government within 10 days from the date of issuance of the detention order and failure to furnish the order of detention, the Screening Committee report and the recommendation report in the vernacular language. The learned counsel also submitted that it had been clearly represented by the detenu that he was unable to understand the meaning of the said documents sufficiently enough to make a representation, although he admitted that he could read English. The Central Government however has disposed of the said representation in a cryptic manner by a communication on 18^th August, 2026 without considering the merits of such submissions.

It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the last prejudicial activity attributed to the detenu is Crime No.88/2026 of Kottayam East Police Station, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 22(b), 29 and 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act. The allegation in the said case is that 14.2318 grams of methamphetamine and 17.6787 grams of hashish oil were recovered from the possession of the detenu. The occurrence took place on 15^th January, 2026. The detenu was subsequently released on bail on 9^th March, 2026 and the final report was filed on 19^th April, 2026. According to the learned counsel, the said case constitutes the last prejudicial activity that formed the basis for passing Exhibit P1 detention order. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, several of the documents relied upon in connection with the said case, which were supplied to the detenu along with the detention order, were illegible, in particular, pages 97, 103, 104, 126, 127, 128, 129, 137, 152, 153, 160 to 163, 166, 167, 195 to 200, 239 to 243, 316, 317, 324, 422, 427 to 432, 443, 444, 447, 449, 451, 467, 468 and 469. It is contended that, since the said documents constituted materials relied upon by the Detaining Authority, the supply of illegible copies deprived the detenu of an effective opportunity to understand the materials relied upon against him and to make a meaningful and detailed representation against the order of detention. The learned counsel submitted that the non-supply of legible copies of the relied upon documents had, therefore, caused serious prejudice to the detenu and amounted to a violation of the constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

Mr. M.H.Hanis, learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the Detaining Authority failed to take into consideration that the detenu was taken into custody in Crime No. 67 of 2024 based on a confession statement which is inadmissible in evidence, and that the Detaining Authority while considering the past conduct of the detenu has also failed to take into consideration that, such arrest and detention in respect of Crime No. 67 of 2024 in which he was arrested on 25^th September 2025 and a charge sheet was filed on 26^th October, 2025 cannot form the basis for the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mulla Afroz v. Union of India and Others^11.. The learned counsel has referred to paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the said decision in support of his submission, which read thus:

(emphasis ours)

It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in any view of the matter, the order passed by the Detaining Authority prescribing the maximum period of detention of two years suffers from total non-application of mind. In this regard he has referred to Sections 10 and 11 of the PITNDPS Act and has submitted that unless the Detaining Authority is satisfied that the alleged detenu has engaged or is likely to engage in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into, out of, through or within any area highly vulnerable to such illicit traffic, the detention order would show that the provisions of Section 10 were applicable in so far as the alleged detenu is concerned.

It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the issue as to whether the Central Government would be required to independently consider the representation under the PITNDPS Act and under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is no more res integra in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and Others^{22.(1995) 4 SCC 51}. It is submitted that since the Central Government is an authority empowered to revoke the order of detention on sufficient cause being shown, merely because the detention order was passed by the State Authority would not absolve the Central Government from proceeding with the order of detention afresh and pass a reasoned order.

Moreover, there is a delay of four months in passing the detention order from the date of the last prejudicial activity as well as a subsequent delay of 66 days following the release of the detenu from jail. The Detaining Authority has failed to offer any explanation for the aforesaid delay in passing the detention order. The delay vitiates the entire proceeding. The dictum laid down in Aleena Alex v. State of Kerala (supra) would be squarely applicable to the facts of this case. Lastly, it is submitted that the non-supply of translated copies of documents relied upon for passing the detention order prevented the detenu from submitting a detailed representation.

Per Contra, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor has submitted that the detention order is passed after due consideration of the proposal submitted by the Sponsoring Authority, namely, the District Police Chief, Kottayam, by letters dated 31^st March, 2026 and 30^th April, 2026, which were forwarded through the State Police Chief by letters dated 10^th April, 2026 and 7^th May, 2026. The Government duly examined the proposal and placed the same before the Screening Committee constituted for the said purpose under the Chairmanship of the Law Secretary on 22^nd April, 2026. The Screening Committee, after considering the materials in detail, opined that the case is subjectively and objectively fit for issuance of an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. Thereafter, upon consideration of the opinion of the Screening Committee, the detention order was issued on 14^th May, 2026.

The learned Senior Public Prosecutor further submitted that the detention order was duly communicated to the Ministry of Finance by letter dated 15^th May, 2026, in compliance with Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act. The detenu was arrested on 18^th May, 2026 and was subsequently detained at the Central Prison and Correctional Home, Thiruvananthapuram, on 19^th May, 2026. It was further submitted that, in compliance with Section 9(b) of the PITNDPS Act, the case of the detenu was referred to the PITNDPS Advisory Board by letter dated 8^th June, 2026, and the Advisory Board scheduled the hearing on 30^th June, 2026.

It was also submitted by the learned Senior Public Prosecutor that the allegation regarding the non-supply of the translated copies of the documents to the detenu is not correct, as the detailed grounds of detention in the Malayalam language, which is the language known to the detenu, were duly furnished to him at the time of detention. The same is acknowledged by the detenu by affixing his dated signature. It is, therefore, contended that the detenu is provided with the necessary materials in a language understood by him and that he is not deprived of an effective opportunity to understand the grounds of detention and make an effective representation against the order of detention.

The learned Senior Public Prosecutor submitted that the contention regarding the delay in passing the detention order is devoid of merit. It was submitted that the last prejudicial activity of the detenu was on 15^th January, 2026, in respect of which he was granted bail on 9^th March, 2026. The proposal for preventive detention is thereafter submitted by the Sponsoring Authority to the Government on 31^st March, 2026 and is recommended and forwarded by the State Police Chief on 10^th April, 2026. The Government examined the proposal and placed the same before the Screening Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of the Law Secretary on 22^nd April, 2026. The Screening Committee considered the materials in detail and opined that the case is subjectively and objectively fit for issuance of an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. It is further submitted that the report of the Screening Committee is thereafter forwarded to the members of the Committee and the Sponsoring Authority for authentication, and the authenticated report is received back by the Government on 5^th May, 2026. Upon receipt thereof, the Government again examined the proposal along with the opinion of the Screening Committee, and the detention order was issued on 14^th May, 2026.

It is therefore contended that the time taken in passing the detention order was attributable to the various procedural steps undertaken by the Sponsoring Authority, the State Police Chief, the Screening Committee and the Government in processing and examining the proposal. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor further submitted that the detenu is in judicial custody until 9^th March, 2026 and that the live and proximate link between the last prejudicial activity and the necessity for preventive detention had not been snapped. The slight delay, according to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor, was neither unexplained nor inordinate, but is occasioned by the time necessarily taken for completion of the aforesaid statutory and administrative procedures. It is therefore submitted that the delay in issuing the detention order does not vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority or render the detention order legally unsustainable.

He concluded his submissions by stating that the detenu had violated the bail conditions imposed by the jurisdictional Court and that, having regard to the narcotic offences committed by him, it was imperative to detain him with a view to preventing him from engaging in similar activities in the event of his release on bail.

The first issue for consideration before us is whether the mandatory requirement under Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act, namely, the requirement to send a report to the Central Government in respect of the detention order within ten days from the date of passing of the detention order, has been duly complied with by the Detaining Authority. Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act reads as follows:

The principal question to be discussed here is whether the failure by the State Government to forward the report of a preventive detention order to the Central Government within the period prescribed under Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act, by itself, invalidates the detention order or renders the continued detention unconstitutional, particularly when the Act does not expressly prescribe the consequence of such non-compliance.

The learned Deputy Solicitor General for India submitted that Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act imposes a mandatory obligation on the State Government to forward a report in respect of a detention order to the Central Government within ten days from the date of the order. The requirement is an integral part of the statutory scheme, as it enables the Central Government to remain informed of detention orders passed by the State Government and to exercise its independent statutory powers under Section 12 of the PITNDPS Act, including the power to revoke or modify the detention order. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India^{33.(1991) 1 SCC 476}, and Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel (supra), which recognised the importance of independent consideration of representations by the appropriate Government.

The learned Deputy Solicitor General further submitted that the reporting requirement under Section 3(2), though distinct from the obligations expressly imposed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, must be understood in the context of the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and the detenu’s right to make an effective representation against the order of detention. A failure to forward the report within the prescribed period, particularly where it impairs the Central Government’s ability to consider a representation or exercise its statutory powers, may have serious legal and constitutional consequences. Reference was also made to Shareefa P. v. Union of India^{44.2026 SCC OnLine Ker 12345}, and Thara L.S. v. Union of India^{55.2026 SCC OnLine Ker 12336}, wherein this Court considered the object of Section 3(2) and its connection with the Central Government’s ability to consider representations.

It was further submitted that, although Section 3(2) prescribes a mandatory time limit, the PITNDPS Act does not expressly provide that every breach of the requirement would automatically render the detention order invalid. The legal consequences of non-compliance must, therefore, be determined by considering the nature and extent of the delay, the explanation offered, the receipt of the report by the Central Government, and any resulting impairment of the statutory or constitutional safeguards available to the detenu. Compliance with the timelines prescribed under Sections 3(3) and 9 of the PITNDPS Act does not dispense with the independent obligation under Section 3(2), as the safeguards provided under these provisions serve distinct purposes.

In the present case, the learned Deputy Solicitor General submitted that the detention order was passed on 14^th May, 2026, and the report under Section 3(2) was forwarded by the State Government to the Central Government on 15^th May, 2026, well within the prescribed period of ten days. The fact that the Central Government received the report on 25^th May, 2026, was stated to be distinct from the date on which the State Government discharged its obligation to forward the report. Accordingly, it was contended that the allegation of non-compliance with Section 3(2) was unsustainable. The statutory safeguards under Sections 3, 9 and 12 of the PITNDPS Act, read with Article 22(5) of the Constitution, were relied upon to emphasise that the preventive detention framework incorporates procedural checks against arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mortuza Hussain Choudhary v. State of Nagaland and Others^{66.2025 SCC OnLine SC 502} has also held that Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act requires the State Government, which passes an order of detention under the Act, to forward a report of such detention order to the Central Government within ten days from the date of the order.

On consideration of the materials placed on record, it appears that a report dated 15^th May 2026 was forwarded by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Kerala to the Secretary and Joint Secretary, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, on 19^th May, 2026. The detention order having been passed on 14^th May, 2026, the report is thus forwarded to the Central Government on 19^th May 2026 and, therefore, well within the period of ten days prescribed under Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act. We are, therefore, satisfied that the mandatory requirement under Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act has been duly complied with.

Similarly, the other issue that arises for consideration is whether the mandatory requirements under Sections 9(b) and 9(c) of the PITNDPS Act have been duly complied with.

Sections 9(b) and 9(c) of the PITNDPS Act reads as follows:

The above provisions mandate that the appropriate Government shall make a reference to the Advisory Board within five weeks from the date of detention and that the Advisory Board shall, after considering the reference and the materials placed before it, submit its report, including its opinion as to whether there is sufficient cause for the detention, within eleven weeks from the date of detention.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aji Kumari v. State of Kerala^{77.1996 SCC OnLine Ker 170}, has held as follows:

On a perusal of the records placed before us it appears that the detenu is arrested and detained on 18^th May, 2026. The case of the detenu is referred to the Advisory Board on 8^th June, 2026. Thus, the reference is made within 21 days from the date of detention and, therefore, well within the period of five weeks prescribed under Section 9(b) of the PITNDPS Act. It is further seen that the Advisory Board submitted its report on 1^st July, 2026, which is within 11 weeks from the date of detention. Hence, the requirement under Section 9(c) is also duly complied with.

As regards the issue whether the detenu was given translated copies of the documents in the language known to him, we would like to reinforce our position on the aforesaid exposition of law by placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarfaraz Alam v. Union of India^{88.(2024) 3 SCC 347}, wherein it was held that:

Similarly, in the case of State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya^{99.AIR 1951 SC 157} it was held as follows:

(emphasis supplied)

On a perusal of the records made available before us, it clearly reveals that the grounds of detention and all the documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority were served on the detenu at the time of execution of the detention order. The acknowledgment bearing the dated signature of the detenu evidences receipt of the said documents and indicates that the same were furnished to him in the local language known to him. The report of the Advisory Board also records that all the relevant records had been furnished to the detenu. In the circumstances, we find no substance in the contention raised by the petitioner in this regard, and the said contention is devoid of merit.

The scope of rights of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India has been elaborately discussed in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel (supra) by the Five Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in which it has been categorically held that in view of Section 12 of the PITNDPS Act, an order made by the Officer specifically empowered by the State Government can be revoked by the State Government as well as by the Central Government. An order made by the State Government can be revoked by the Central Government and an order made by the Officer specially empowered by the Central Government can be revoked by the Central Government. The conferment of this power on the Central Government by the State Government does not however detract from the power that is available to the Authority that has made the order of detention revoked. The power of revocation that is conferred on the Central Government and the State Government under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 12(1) of the PITNDPS Act is in addition to the power of revocation that is available to the authority that has made the order of detention. This is ensured by the words “without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897)” in sub-section (1) of both the provisions. However, the said judgment does not much come to the aid of Mr. Hanis as it appears that the limited grounds on which revocation was prayed for in his representation before the Central Government, are clearly unsustainable as the requirement to send the report to the Central Government has been duly complied with as it was communicated within a period of ten days from the date of order of detention and with regard to his inability to make effective representation as the documents were in English also does not appear to be convincing as the original file would show that the documents are in Malayalam language except in the order of detention which was in English and the detenu has signed each page of the order of detention in vernacular language signed in English in each of the documents including the order of detention stating clearly that he had read the order, understood the same and he has received a complete copy of the said document. In fact he did not make any representation before the Advisory Board alleging that he was prevented from making an effective representation due to absence of vernacular documents. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Central Government, not to interfere with the order of detention on those limited grounds are sustainable.

With regard to the issue as to whether the detention order is vitiated on account of illegibility of the documents supplied to the detenu, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, at the time of execution of the detention order, certain copies of the relevant documents furnished to the detenu in pages 97, 103, 104, 126, 127, 128, 129, 137, 152, 153, 160 to 163, 166, 167, 195 to 200, 239 to 243, 316, 317, 324, 422, 427 to 432, 443, 444, 447, 449, 451, 467, 468 and 469 were illegible, thereby depriving him of an effective opportunity to make a meaningful representation.

This Court while considering a similar issue, in Aleena Alex v. State of Kerala and Ors^{1010.2026 SCC OnLine Ker 5459}, has held as follows:

Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pramod Singla v. Union of India^{1111.2023 SCC OnLine SC 374}, has held that:

It is also pertinent to refer to the case of Sneha Vijayan v. State of Kerala^{1212.2025 SCC OnLine Ker 695}, wherein it was held as follows:

However, in order to verify the correctness of the contention that the copies of the relied-upon documents served on the detenu are illegible, we have perused the pages made available before us. On such perusal, we are satisfied that the copies of the pages 97, 103, 104, 126, 127, 128, 129, 137, 152, 153, 160 to 163, 166, 167, 195 to 200, 239 to 243, 316, 317, 324, 422, 427 to 432, 443, 444, 447, 449, 451, 467, 468 and 469 are found to be legible and readable. It is due to this reason the submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the documents supplied to the detenu are illegible are devoid of merit.

Before concluding we would like to point out that in Excise Crime No. 67/2024 of the Kottayam Excise Range Office, a crime was registered alleging commission of an offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act, based on the confession statement of the first accused. The alleged occurrence took place on 21^st November 2024. The detenu was arrested on 25^th September 2025 and was subsequently released on bail on 25^th November 2025. The allegation in the said crime was that 1.100 kg of ganja was recovered from the possession of the first accused.

In Mulla Afroz (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a confession statement, by itself, cannot form the basis for arriving at the subjective satisfaction required for passing an order of preventive detention. The Court further observed that such a confession is inherently suspect and cannot be treated as substantive evidence to establish guilt.

We are also of the view that the Detaining Authority has not assigned any cogent or valid reasons for directing the detention of the detenu for a period of two years with effect from the date of detention u/s 11 of the PITNDPS Act. The Government herein also confirmed the said period of detention in compliance with clause (f) of section 9 read with section 10(2) of PITNDPS Act. The role of section 9 of the PITNDPS Act is discussed in the case of Shaikh Zibraeel @ Pinkey Shaikh Rajjak v. State of Maharashtra, through its Principal Secretary^{1313.2026 SCC OnLine Bom 16412}, thus:

In the instant case, the order of detention does not disclose any specific circumstances or materials warranting the imposition of such an extended period of detention. The mere fact that the detenu was allegedly involved in the prejudicial activities, without anything more, cannot justify the detention for the maximum period prescribed. The absence of proper reasoning in this regard reflects non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority. Therefore, the decision to impose detention for a period of two years, without recording adequate reasons justifying the necessity and proportionality of such a period, cannot be sustained.

The next issue for consideration before us is whether the delay in passing the impugned detention order, particularly the delay of about four months from the date of the last prejudicial activity and the delay of 66 days from the date of release of the detenu on bail, has snapped the live and proximate link between the prejudicial activities and the necessity for preventive detention, thereby vitiating the impugned detention order.

In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu^{1414.(1979) 1 SCC 465}, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the phrase “live and proximate link” in the following words:

While dealing with the question of delay it is also relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Licil Antony v. State of Kerala^{1515.(2014) 11 SCC 326} wherein it was observed as follows:

Similarly in Adishwar Jain v. Union of India,^{1616.(2006) 11 SCC 339} it was held as follows:

It is well settled that mere delay in passing an order of preventive detention, by itself, is not sufficient to vitiate the detention order. What is required to be examined is whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained and whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay has snapped the live and proximate link between the prejudicial activity and the necessity for preventive detention.

The explanation offered by the Detaining Authority for the said delay is as follows:

In the instant case, the detenu was in custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity until 9^th March, 2026. The Sponsoring Authority initiated the proposal on 31^st March, 2026, i.e., within 22 days of the release of the detenu on bail. The proposal was thereafter recommended and forwarded by the State Police Chief on 10^th April, 2026. The Government placed the proposal before the Screening Committee on 22^nd April, 2026. The subsequent furnishing of the charge sheet by the Sponsoring Authority on 30^th April, 2026 and the process of obtaining authentication of the Screening Committee report from the concerned members and the Sponsoring Authority resulted in the authenticated report being received by the Government on 5^th May, 2026. The detention order was thereafter passed on 14^th May, 2026.

It appears from the above explanation that the reason for the delay, as stated by the Government, was the time taken to complete the procedural formalities connected with the Screening Committee’s consideration and authentication of its report. However, the explanation does not satisfactorily disclose the circumstances that occasioned such delay. Though the proposal was considered by the Screening Committee on 22^nd April 2026, the Government has not explained why the authentication of the Committee’s report was necessary or why the process took until 5^th May 2026 to be completed. The only explanation offered by the Government was that some time was taken to complete the procedural formalities. However, the explanation does not disclose the specific circumstances that occasioned the delay, nor does it satisfactorily account for the intervening period. In the absence of a clear and cogent explanation justifying the time taken at each stage, the mere reference to the completion of procedural formalities cannot be accepted as a satisfactory explanation for the delay in issuing the order of detention.

In light of the above, we find that no satisfactory explanation has been offered by the Detaining Authority for the delay of about 22 days in submitting the proposal for preventive detention and the further delay of about 44 days thereafter in passing the detention order. The explanation offered by the Detaining Authority in the facts and circumstances of the present case, cannot be regarded as sufficient to account for the inordinate delay at each stage of the proceedings.

This Court in Anjana Das v. State of Kerala^{1717.2026 SCC OnLine Ker 3037}, has reiterated that lack of promptitude may vitiate a detention order. It was held as follows:

Therefore, the unexplained delay in submitting the proposal for preventive detention and passing the impugned order of detention will definitely snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention.

Having considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel on either side and having carefully perused the materials placed on record, we are of the view that, though the mandatory procedural requirements under Section 3(2),Sections 9(b) and 9(c) of the PITNDPS Act have been duly complied with, the impugned order of detention cannot be sustained for the following reasons.

Firstly, the delay in initiating the proposal for preventive detention and in passing the impugned order of detention has not been satisfactorily explained. The explanation offered by the Detaining Authority, which merely refers to the time taken for completing procedural formalities, does not adequately account for the delay at the various stages of the proceedings. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the unexplained delay has snapped the live and proximate link between the last prejudicial activity and the necessity for preventive detention.

Secondly, the Detaining Authority has failed to assign any cogent and convincing reasons for directing the detention of the detenu for the maximum period of two years. The absence of relevant materials and adequate reasons justifying such an extended period of detention clearly reflects non-application of mind in determining the period of detention.

Thirdly, in Excise Crime No. 67/2024 of the Kottayam Excise Range Office, the allegation against the detenu was founded upon the confession statement of the first accused. In the light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mulla Afroz (supra), such a confessional statement, by itself, cannot constitute a sufficient basis for arriving at the requisite subjective satisfaction for preventive detention. The Detaining Authority ought to have subjected such material to proper scrutiny before placing reliance upon it.

In the light of the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the considered view that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority suffers from serious infirmities and that the impugned order of detention cannot be sustained in law.

In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of detention, Ext.P1, dated 14^th May, 2026, and the subsequent order of confirmation dated 7^th July, 2026, are hereby quashed. The detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless his continued detention is required in connection with any other case or proceedings. There will be no order as to costs.