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Judgment
Heard Mr. D. K. Deori, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. O. Pada, learned counsel for the respondents.
The instant petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the petitioners being aggrieved by the common order dated 15.06.2026 passed by the learned court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu, District Lohit, Arunachal Pradesh in Title Appeal No.02/2025, praying for setting aside of the impugned order dated 15.06.2026.
The facts leading to filing of the instant civil revision petition are summarised herein below:-
The respondents have preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Anjaw District, Hawai against the judgment and order No.AJ-0021/2015 dated 01.10.2015 passed by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Hawai on 06.01.2016 after the expiry of the period of limitation specified. No application for condonation of delay was filed along with the appeal. After the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021 came into force, the Deputy Commissioner, Anjaw District, Hawai transferred the appeal to the Civil Court (Junior Division), Hawai. As the subject appeal is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of Civil Court (Junior Division), Hawai, the appeal was transferred to the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu.
The learned Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu issued notice in the Title Appeal No.02/2025, vide an order dated 24.06.2025. On receipt of notice from the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu, the petitioners, herein, appeared before the learned Court and sought time to file objection regarding maintainability of the appeal. Accordingly, 4(four) Nos. of interlocutory applications, i.e., IA No.30/2005, IA No.31/2025, IA No.32/2025 and IA No.33/2025 were filed by the petitioners for dismissal of the appeal on the ground of limitation as the appeal was filed after the expiring of the limitation period specified under Section 51 of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1947. A ground was also taken that no application for condonation of delay was filed along with the appeal as required under Order 41 Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The learned Civil Court (Senior Division), Tezu, vide its common order dated 15.06.2026, rejected the interlocutory applications. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid rejection, the petitioners who were respondents in the Title Appeal, have approached this Court by filing the instant civil revision petition.
Mr. D. K. Deori, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu failed to appreciate that an appeal presented after the expiry of period of limitation specified, is required to file an accompanying application for condonation of delay explaining sufficient cause for such delay. However, in the instant case, no such application for condonation of delay has been filed. He submits that the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu though admitted that the respondents had preferred the appeal after the expiry period of limitation specified, no such application for condonation of delay has been filed, still rejected the objection raised by the petitioners regarding the maintainability of the Title Appeal. He submits that the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu failed to appreciate the provision of Order XLI Rule 3-A of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908 which provides that it is mandatory to file an application for condonation of delay when an appeal is filed beyond the limitation period. He submits that since the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu has issued notices in the appeal thereby taking cognizance of the matter, the same is illegal and cannot be sustained as no application for condonation of delay has been filed along with the appeal. He submits that in the instant case, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu in spite of having knowledge that an appeal has been filed beyond the limitation period which is not accompanied by any application for condonation of delay, did not request the appellants (respondents herein) for filing any application for condonation of delay before issuance of notices. He submits that an appeal cannot be heard before condoning the delay in case when the appeal is filed after the prescribed limitation period. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has referred to the following cases:-
State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. Vs. Pradeep Kumar and Anr. reported in (2000) 7 SCC 372;
ii)Ragho Singh Vs. Mohan Singh and Ors. reported in (2001) 9 SCC 717;
iii) Saizami Sailo Vs. Hauthanga and Ors. reported in (2021) 3 GLR 618; and
iv) Rajen Sarma Vs. State of Assam and Anr. reported in (2015) 1 GLR 354
On the other hand, Mr. O. Pada, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that there is no wrong in passing of the order dated 15.06.2026 by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu. He submits that non-filing of the application for condonation of delay is a curable defect and in the instant case, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu has directed the respondents (petitioner herein) to file an application for condonation of delay. He further submits that, in fact, there is no delay in filing the appeal by the appellant (respondents herein) before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu by the appellants. He submits that there are sufficient materials on merit to submits that there is “sufficient cause” due to which the appellants (respondents herein) could not file the appeal before the Deputy Commissioner which was later on transferred to the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu.
TCR in the instant case has been received and the same is perused.
It is seen from the TCR that the Deputy Commissioner, Anjaw District, Hawai, Arunachal Pradesh had received an appeal against the Kebang decision order No.AJ-0021/2025 on 02.12.2015. It is seen that the Deputy Commissioner had passed an order for fixing a suitable date and time for hearing the appeal. On perusal of the TCR minutely, it is not seen that the appeal has been admitted by the Deputy Commissioner, Anjaw District. Subsequently, on 23.05.2023, the learned District Judge, Sessions Division, Tezu, Lohit District, Arunachal Pradesh had passed an order wherein, it has been recorded that the appeal has been sent to his court by the learned Deputy Commissioner, Anjaw in terms of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021 and Government Notification No.Law/Legm-20/2022 dated 03.08.2022 issued by the Law Department, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar. It is also recorded that as per the aforesaid notification, the Civil Judges (Senior/Junior Division) are competent to take up an appeal under the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945. As mentioned earlier, the matter was initially transmitted to the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hawai and the same was later on transferred to the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu, Lohit District. It is seen that on 24.06.2025, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu, Lohit District had issued summons to both the parties for appearances. On 22.09.2025, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu, had taken up the matter wherein, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents (petitioners herein) had sought time to file objection to the maintainability of the appeal and accordingly, the time was granted to the respondents. After exchange of the pleadings on the maintainability issue wherein 4(four) Nos. of interlocutory applications, i.e.,IA No.30/2005, IA No.31/2025, IA No.32/2025 and IA No.33/2025 were filed by respondents (petitioners herein), the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu, heard the parties on the maintainability issue. After due consideration of the submissions and pleadings, vide his common order dated 15.06.2026, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu has observed as follows:-
“On the perusal of the record, it appears that three appeals were filed on different dates by the appellants, i.e., Longling clan and Yun clan. The first appeal was filed on 17.12.2015 by the Longling clan before the Deputy Commissioner, Hawai. Thereafter, two appeals were filed on behalf of the Yun clan on 04.01.2016, and 28.12.2015. The impugned judgment is stated to be passed on 01.10.2015, and the appeal was filed by Longling clan on 17.12.2015. Hence, it is clear that the appeal was filed after thirty days from the passing of the impugned judgment. It is the case of the appellants that the copy of the judgment was dispatched to them on 27.11.2015 from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Anjaw, Hawai, and the same was received only on 05.12.2015. Hence, the appellants claimed that appeal is within the limitation period.”
The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu, had also observed that no application for condonation of delay was filed along with the appeals before the Deputy Commissioner, Anjaw, Hawai. The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu, has referred to the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. Vs. Pradeep Kumar and Anr., reported in (2000) 7 SCC 372 and rejected the interlocutory applications filed by the respondents (petitioners herein). He had also directed as follows:
“As stated above, three different appeals have been filed by the appellants (Longling and Yun clan) against the impugned judgment. Therefore, the appeals are returned to the appellants for the purpose of filing a single consolidated appeal (Order XLI, Rule 3 CPC) along with a condonation application.”
From the order dated 15.06.2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu, it is seen that all the three appeals have been returned to the appellants to file a fresh consolidated appeal along with an application for condonation of delay.
Now coming back to the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that since the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu had taken up the appeals and considered the interlocutory applications on the maintainability of the appeals, the directions given by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu for filing an application for condonation of delay, at that stage cannot be sustained. It is seen that the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu had not taken up the appeals on merit. No effective orders on the appeals had been passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu. It is only when the parties had appeared and the respondents (petitioners herein) had raised the issue of maintainability, allowed the interlocutory applications to be filed by the respondents. And upon hearing the issue on maintainability, passed the order rejecting the interlocutory applications and directing the appellants to file a consolidated appeal along with an application for condonation of delay. It is seen that the appeal has not been admitted as yet and an order has been passed to file consolidated appeal afresh along with an application for condonation of delay.
This Court has considered the cases relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. In the case of Pradeep Kumar (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with Rule 3-A of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code, while answering the issue whether the defect in filing an appeal as the same is not accompanied by an application for condonation of delay when the appeal was filed beyond the limitation period, has observed as follows:-
“10.What is the consequence if such an appeal is not accompanied by an application mentioned in sub-rule (1) of Rule 3-A? It must be noted that the Code indicates in the immediately preceding Rule that the consequence of not complying with the requirements in Rule 1 would include rejection of the memorandum of appeal. Even so, another option is given to the court by the said Rule and that is to return the memorandum of appeal to the appellant for amending it within a specified time or then and there. It is to be noted that there is no such rule prescribing for rejection of memorandum of appeal in a case where the appeal is not accompanied by an application for condoning the delay. If the memorandum of appeal is filed in such appeal without an accompanying application to condone delay the consequence cannot be fatal. The court can regard in such a case that there was no valid presentation of the appeal. In turn, it means that if the appellant subsequently files an application to condone the delay before the appeal is rejected the same should be taken up along with the already filed memorandum of appeal. Only then the court can treat the appeal as lawfully presented. There is nothing wrong if the court returns the memorandum of appeal (which was not accompanied by an application explaining the delay) as defective. Such defect can be cured by the party concerned and present the appeal without further delay.”
“19.The object of enacting Rule 3-A in Order 41 of the Code seems to be twofold. First is, to inform the appellant himself who filed a time-barred appeal that it would not be entertained unless it is accompanied by an application explaining the delay. Second is, to communicate to the respondent a message that it may not be necessary for him to get ready to meet the grounds taken up in the memorandum of appeal because the court has to deal with application for condonation of delay as a condition precedent. Barring the above objects, we cannot find out from the Rule that it is intended to operate as unremediably or irredeemably fatal against the appellant if the memorandum is not accompanied by any such application at the first instance. In our view, the deficiency is a curable defect, and if the required application is filed subsequently the appeal can be treated as presented in accordance with the requirement contained in Rule 3-A Order 41 of the Code.”
From the above observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is apparent that the object of enacting Rule 3-A in Order 41 of the Code, seems to be too two fold. Firstly, it is to be intimated to the appellant who filed a time-barred appeal that his appeal shall not be entertained unless the same is accompanied by an application explaining the delay and praying for condonation of delay. Secondly, it is to communicate to the respondent that it may not be necessary for him to meet the grounds taken up in the appeal because the court has to deal with the application for condonation of delay as a condition precedent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed that nothing could be found from the Rule that it is intended to operate as unremediably or irredeemably fatal against the appellant if the memorandum is not accompanied by such an application at the first instance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically observed that the deficiency is a curable defect, and if required, an application can be filed subsequently also.
The case of Ragho Singh (Supra) which has been relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is of no help to the petitioners’ case as the facts are totally distinguishable from the instant case. In the case of Ragho Singh (Supra), an appeal was filed before the Additional Collector which was beyond the 10 days and no application under Section 5 of Limitation Act was filed on condonation of delay. However, the Additional Collector, allowed the appeal. In that circumstance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the High Court was right in setting aside the judgment of the Additional Collector.
Similarly, in the case of Saizami Sailo (Supra), the Gauhati High Court has come to a finding that pending condonation of delay in filing connected with the appeal, the court below should not have passed any stay order. It is also observed that it is a condition precedent to deal with the application for condonation of delay before dealing with the appeal, therefore, this case has no relevance to the instant case in hand.
Also, the case of Rajen Sarma (Supra), is also distinguishable from the instant case. In the case of Rajen Sarma (Supra), the fact is that the learned Sessions Judge, in spite of the fact that such revision was filed beyond the period of limitation, had chosen to take cognizance of the proceeding and rendered the order in question quashing the order dated 21.05.2011 passed in C.R. Case No.3827C of 2014 vide judgment dated 12.12.2012.
From the above two cases of SaizamiSailo (Supra) and Rajen Sarma (Supra), it is seen that the concerned court had taken cognizance of the appeal/revision which were filed beyond time without filing any application for condonation of delay and passed the respective orders in merit. However, in the instant case, no effective order has been passed on merit by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu. The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu has only passed an order whereby, the appellants were directed to file a consolidated appeal along with an application for condonation of delay, without hearing the appeals on merit. By passing the order, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu has not caused any prejudice to the respondents (petitioners herein) as the respondents shall have an opportunity to raise their objections and contest the application for condonation of delay before the appeal is being heard on merit, if the delay is condoned. This Court has also considered the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar (supra) and does not find any infirmity in the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tezu dated 15.06.2026.
In view of the aforesaid, this Court does not find any merit in the instant civil revision petition and therefore, in terms of the discussions made above, the instant civil revision petition is dismissed.
Stay order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.