Soran Singh alias Swaran Singh . vs Mehta Sita Ram .

Pritpal Singh, J.

Two regular appeals No. 1485 and 1486 of 1975 arising out of the same judgment of the Senior SubJudge, Hissar, exercising enhanced appellate powers dated August 26, 1975, are being decided together.

State of Haryana auctioned land measuring 16 Kanals bearing Killa Nos. 364/4, 5/2, 6 situated in Hansi on May, 1967. This land was in possession of the plaintiffrespondent Sita Ram and it was purchased in auction by the appellantsdefendants Nos. 1 to 5. Subsequently, land measuring 1 Kanal 13 Marlas bearing Killa No. 365/10 Min. situated in Hansi and also in possession of Sita Ram was auctioned by the Haryana State on March 29, 1969 and this land too was purchased by the appellants. It is admitted that these lands originally belonged to Muslims before partition of the country and were eventually transferred by the Central Government to the Haryana State in Package Deal. Sita Ram plaintiffrespondent brought two suits for declaration that these sales by auction were illegal and the lands continued to be vested in Haryana State as part of the Package Deal. As a consequential relief permanent injunction was claimed restraining the appellants and the State from interfering with the plaintiffs possession.

Both the suits were contested by the appellants on various grounds. For the purposes of these appeals only two grounds are relevant. Firstly, that civil Courts had no jurisdiction to try the suits and secondly the two sales in appellants favour were lawful. The trial Court decided both the points against the appellants and the plaintiffs claim for declaration was decreed in both the cases. The relief of injunction was, however, declined. The first appeals filed by the appellants against the judgments and decrees of the trial Court were dismissed by the learned lower appellate Court which has resulted in the filing of the instant two second appeals.

As mentioned above the disputed lands are admittedly part of a package deal between the Central Government and the Haryana State. As to what is the said Package Deal is lucidly explained in a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Bishan Singh v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, 1973 P.L.J. 183. It is explained in this judgment that all evacuee property was originally managed by the Custodian. In the year 1954 the entire evacuee property was taken over by the President of India who was authorised under section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter called ''the Act'') to acquire proprietary rights therein. This property was meant to be utilised for the rehabilitation of the displaced persons from Pakistan. Till 1961 transfer of evacuee agricultural land was consequently made under the provisions of section 20 of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. By that time majority of the displaced persons had duly settled. As a result of negotiations between the Central Government and the Punjab Government, predecessor of the State of Haryana, Central Government decided to transfer and the Punjab Government agreed to purchase the entire surplus evacuee land and houses in the rural area on certain terms and conditions which were incorporated in D.O. letter No. Reh. (61)/833, dated 24th April, 1961. According to these conditions all rural houses/sites, entire remaining Ghair Mumkin land and all the unallotted cultivable agricultural lands were transferred to the State Government on certain agreed price. As a result of this agreement between the Central Government and State Government the unallotted surplus evacuee rural land etc. stood transferred to the State Government. This socalled Package Deal has been held by this Court to be valid in Ram Chander v. State of Punjab, 1968 P.L.R. 874. In view of the Package Deal the State Government became entitled to dispose of the property under the Rules made by it. The State Government after it had acquired surplus agricultural land in 1961 issued a pressnote indicated the mode of its transfer including the sale by auction. This pressnote was issued alongwith a covering letter No. 6029/Reh. (R), dated 17th May, 1962. It was held in Bishan Singh''s case (supra) that since the property covered by the Package Deal vested in the State Government the latter became empowered to legislate with regard to its disposal. Under Article 162 of the Constitution the State Government till such time as it undertakes such legislation can provide for the same matter by issuing Executive Instructions. Hence the instructions contained in the Press Note of 1962 would squarely fall under ''Executive Instructions'' covered by Article 162 and would to that extent be directions issued under that Article and so long as these directions are not withdrawn or modified they have to be followed in the matter of disposal of the property. Inevitably, therefore, the point for consideration in this case is whether the procedure adopted in the two auctions wherein the lands in dispute were sold to the appellants conformed with the instructions contained in the aforesaid Press Note or not.

Rule 5 of the Press Note, the relevant excerpts of which are reproduced below, deals with the procedure of sale of property by public auction :

"5. ... ... ... (a) The property shall be sold through the Officers appointed by the State Government in this behalf.

(b) The Settlement Commissioner or any other Officer empowered to sell any such property shall cause a proclamation of the intended sale to be made in the language of the principal Civil Court of the original jurisdiction within whose jurisdiction the property is situated.

(c) Notice of the intended sale shall be given at least fifteen days before the proposed sale and every such notice shall state the date, time and place of the proposed sale, the description of the property to be sold, its location and boundaries, where possible, the terms and conditions of the sale and any other particulars which the Settlement Commissioner or other Officer considers material. One copy of the notice shall be affixed in a conspicuous place in the village where the property is situated e.g. the Panchayat Ghar, Gurdwara, Mandir, School etc. It shall be within the discretion of the Settlement Commissioner or other Officer to advertise the sale in newspaper and in such other manner as he may deem fit.

(d) No sale shall take place until the expiry of a period of fifteen days from the date of the publication of the notice. .. ... ... "

The first requirement of this rule is that the auction is to be conducted by an Officer appointed by the State Government in this behalf. The two auctions under consideration were conducted by the Tehsildar (Sales) and it is not disputed that he was competent to hold the auctions having been appointed by the State Government to perform this function. The next requirement is that the Settlement Commissioner or any other Officer empowered to sell the property shall cause a proclamation of the intended sale giving minimum fifteen days notice before the proposed sale stating the date, time and place of the sale, the description of the property, its location and boundaries wherever possible, the terms and conditions of the sale and any other particulars which may be considered material. One copy of the notice is required to be affixed in a conspicuous place in the village where the property is situated and in appropriate cases the notice may be advertised in a newspaper. It is specifically provided in the Rules that no sale shall take place until the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the date of publication of the notice.

Both the Courts below have arrived at a concurrent finding of fact that no such notice as required under rule 56 was published and the auction was held by Tehsildar (Sales) in a most irregular and perfunctory manner. Manifestly, therefore, the two disputed auctions were conducted in violation of the aforesaid instructions contained in the Press Note and they were, therefore, rightly held to be illegal by the lower appellate Court. The instructions which were contravened in conducting the auctions were mandatory and their noncompliance invalidated the auctions. It is, therefore, plain that the appellants did not acquire proprietary rights in the land in dispute by means of these auctions.

The next point which is debated is that the civil Courts had no jurisdiction to try these suits. It is submitted by the learned appellants counsel that under rule 10 of the Press Note powers of review have been vested in the Settlement Commissioner, Settlement Officer (Sales), Tehsildar and Naib Tehsildar (Sales) and under rule 11 the Settlement Commissioner is empowered to call for the record of any case and in exercise of his powers of revision can pass such orders as may be deemed fit. The argument advanced is that since rights of review and revision are vested in appropriate authorities under the rules, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is barred by implication. In support of this contention the learned counsel placed reliance on F.M. Subbayya v. Venkataramana Subrao Barkur, A.I.R. 1959 Mysore 145. A bare reading of this judgment would show that it is entirely inapplicable to the present case. The view taken in that judgment was that when a statute creates special rights and obligations, it may or may not say anything about Courts in which such rights and obligations are to be litigated upon. If it says nothing on the subject, then if the rights created are civil rights the ordinary civil Courts will have the general jurisdiction to try suits relating to such rights under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless, of course, the cognizance of such suits by ordinary civil Courts is either expressly or impliedly barred. It was observed that the best example of such implied bar is available where the special Act sets up a special set or hierarchy of tribunals specially empowered to deal with or adjudicate upon the rights and obligations created by the special Act. In the present case the rights and obligations of the parties have been created by a Press Note issued by the Government which has not set up any hierarchy of tribunals specially empowered to deal with the rights and obligations of the parties. It is not a case of enactment of a special Act creating special rights and obligations or setting up of special tribunals to deal with those rights and obligations. There is, therefore, no question of ouster of jurisdiction of the civil Courts by implication. There is no rule in the Press Note excluding the jurisdiction of the civil Court to adjudicate upon the disputes relating to the Supreme Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. The Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, 1963 P.L.R. 912, that under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred, and that the mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of a matter does not in itself exclude the jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of a matter does not itself exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts. In my view the rules incorporated in the Press Note do not exclude the jurisdiction of civil Courts either expressly or impliedly. The lower appellate Court was, therefore, right in holding that the matter in dispute could be ajudicated upon by the civil Court and that its jurisdiction was not barred to try the suits.

In view of the above, I find no infirmity in the decision of the learned lower appellate Court and these appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs.

The miscellaneous applications of the appellants seeking permission to produce additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not pressed and they are also dismissed.