Somkar Singh vs Bimla Devi

G.S. Chahal, J.

Somkar Singh, petitioner, seeks quashing of criminal complaint dated January 9, 1990 (Annexure P1 and summoning JUDGMENT passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak dated May 4, 1991 (Annexure ''The criminal complaint Annexure P1 was brought by Bimla Devi, respondent, for offence under Section 494 IPC.

The complainant was married in the year 1959 at Rohtak to Somkar Singh in accordance with Hindu rites and ceremonies and both of them cohabited at Bulandshehar in U. P. No child was born out of this wedlock and Somkar Singh started maltreating her and ultimately in the year 197172, he left the complainant of live with her inlaws at the native village on the lame excuse that she should serve his old parents. While Somkar Singh continued to stay at his place of posting, but he used to visit the village once or twice in a month or two. Somewhere in the year 1974 Somkar Singh remarried Smt. Prem Kumari in accordance with Hindu rites. The persons who attended the marriage included Ram Saran, brotherinlaw of Somkar Singh had opposed this act of the accused. As a consequence of this act, the complainant was left to lead a life of untold miseries for the rest of her life. The complainant learnt about ''this second marriage in the year 1980 and since the accused has committed the act under Section 494 IPC, hence the complaint.

According to the own showing of the complainant. she learnt about the second marriage in the year 1980 and the complaint has been ''instituted after a lapse of 10 years. On the basis of this fact. Shri Virender Singh, who appears for the accused petitioner, urges that the petitioner had an inalienable right of speedy trial and a stale matter should not be tried and such a trial is abuse of process of Court. In support of his arguments, he relies upon the observations of their Lordships of Patna High Court in Madheshwardhari Singh v. State of Bihar, 1990(3) Recent Criminal Reports 302 (FB) : 1986 Crl. LJ 324 . I may quote from the note

"Laying down of an outer time limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle. and precedent. A callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused, or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offence other than capital ones plainly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21. Unless the fundamental right to speedy trial is to be whittled down into a mere pious wish, its enforceability in Court must at least be indicated by an outer limit to which an investigation and the trial in a criminal prosecution may ordinarily extend. Holding otherwise would be merely paying lip service to a precious right whilst denuding it of the benefits of its actual enforceability AIR 1986 SC 289, AIR 1081 SC 641, AIR 1979 SC 1369 and AIR 1955 SC 792, followed.

The fixation of outer limit of seven en years must not be misunderstood or misconstrued to mean that a delay of less than seven years would not in any case amount to prejudice. Indeed what is sought to be laid down is the extreme outer limit whereafter grave prejudice to the accused must be presumed. And the infraction of the constitutional right would be plainly established. Nor is it sought to be laid down that in a lesser period than seven years an accused person would not be able to establish circumstances, pointing to the patent prejudice which may entitle him to invoke the guarantee of speedy public trial under Article 21. What. indeed is sought to be laid down is that beyond this period of seven years the continuation of the investigation and trial would bring in the weightiest presumption that the enshrined right of speedy public trial is violated and the prosecution should be halted in its tracks. This would perse be indicative of prejudice. Thereafter the burden would automatically shift heavily on to the shoulders of the State to show that such grave delay was either entirely the handiwork of the accused himself or was occasioned by such special and exceptional circumstances so as to merit condonation thereof."

Elaborating the core issue as to what'' does a speedy public trial in a criminal prosecution truly connote, it was observed as follows :

"Does it include within it the preceding Police investigations in the case also or is it confined only to the period of time when the portals of the court are entered in a regular trial? On principle I am clear of the opinion that in the majestic sweep of the fundamental right of a speedy public trial in the context of a criminal prosecution, initiated at the State's instance it necessarily connotes all the period from the date of the levelling of the criminal charge to the date of the rendering of'' the judgment in Court. Unless it is so held, the cherished fundamental right herein would be whittled down to a teasing mirage, where the investigation of the offence itself may protract on for years (as is well manifested in the present case, and, thus tendering the very concept and purpose of a speedy trial purely illusory. Therefore, a speedy trial in criminal prosecution herein includes within it both the police investigation of the crime and the later adjudication in Court based thereon."

Working on the abovesaid analogy, the prosecution of an offence committed in the year 1974 regarding which the complainant respondent received the information in the year 1980, its continuation will amount to abuse of process of the Court. At some moment of time, even a criminal should get his peace. I accept the petition and quash the complaint and the consequent proceedings.