Sohan Lal alias Goldy vs State Of H.P

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that FIR no. 89/2023 dated 31.03.2023 was registered at Police Station Haroli, District Una, H.P for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452, 326, 323, 324 and 307 of IPC against the petitioner. It was alleged that the petitioner tried to kill one Hanshit, son of the informant. The petitioner is suffering from mental illness. He is taking medicines for depression. The petitioner is to be treated at PGIMER, Chandigarh for his ailment and he is required to be released on bail for this purpose. The mental health of the petitioner is likely to deteriorate, in case, he is kept behind the bars. The investigation is complete and the challan has been filed before the Court. Nothing is to be recovered from the petitioner. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions, which may be imposed by the Court; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that an intimation was received in the Police Post, Pandoga on 31.03.2023 that an injured boy was brought to the hospital. The police went to the hospital to verify the correctness of the information. The informant-Babita Dhiman made a statement that she had returned to her home on 31.03.2023 at around 8:05 pm and found that her son was lying in an injured condition in the room. She tried to take her son to the hospital but the petitioner attacked her with a Darat. She sustained injuries on her head and body. The petitioner had caused hurt to Hanshit, son of the informant. The Police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The Police arrested the petitioner and recovered Darat. As per the medico-legal case summary from PGIMER, Chandigarh, Hanshit had sustained injuries on his head with right petromastoid fractures. The nature of the injury was stated to be grievous. Hanshit used to beat the son of the petitioner and the petitioner attacked him with Darat due to this reason. As per the report of the analysis, DNA taken from the blood found on the shirt of the petitioner matched the DNA profile obtained from the blood sample of Hanshit. The matter is now listed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Una on 18.11.2023.

I have heard Mr. Ashok Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

Mr. Ashok Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. As per the medical report, the injured Hanshit had suffered grievous injury and no case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is made out against the petitioner. The petitioner is suffering from a mental disease and his condition would deteriorate in case of his continued detention in the prison; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that the petitioner had attacked a minor child without any reason. He had also attacked the informant when she tried to take the minor child to the hospital. The conduct of the petitioner clearly shows that he is a danger to the informant and her son. Releasing him on bail would put the lives of the informant and her son in danger. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1059, wherein it was observed as under:-

“12. The grant of bail is a discretionary relief which necessarily means that such discretion would have to be exercised in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. The grant of bail is dependent upon contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the Court and may vary from case to case. There cannot be any exhaustive parameters set out for considering the application for a grant of bail. However, it can be noted that;

(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind factors such as the nature of accusations, severity of the punishment, if the accusations entail a conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations;

(b) reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with the Court in the matter of grant of bail.

(c) While it is not accepted to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought to be always a prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge.

(d) Frivolity of prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to have an order of bail.

We may also profitably refer to a decision of this Court in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 where the parameters to be taken into consideration for the grant of bail by the Courts has been explained in the following words:

“11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are:

(a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.

(b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.

(c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh [(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688] and Puran v. Rambilas [(2001) 6 SCC 338: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124].)”

A similar view was taken in State of Haryana vs Dharamraj 2023 SCC Online 1085, wherein it was observed:

A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496, the relevant principles were restated thus:

‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.’

As per the medical report the minor had suffered a grievous injury. It was submitted that keeping in view the nature of the injuries, no offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is made out against the petitioner. This is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surinder Singh Versus State, 2022 (1) Crimes 133, that causing injury is not necessary to attract Section 307 of IPC. It was observed:-

“18. Before we advert to the factual matrix or gauge the trustworthiness of the witnesses, it will be beneficial to brace ourselves of the case- law qua the essential conditions, requisite for bringing home a conviction under Section 307 IPC. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Saleem @ Chamaru & Anr., (2005) 5 SCC 554, this Court, while re-appreciating the true import of Section 307 IPC held as follows:

"12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still, there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be a penultimate act. It is sufficient in law if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.

It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in the execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt." (Emphasis Applied)

These very ingredients have been accentuated in some of the later decisions, including in State of M.P. vs. Kashiram & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 26, Jage Ram & Ors. vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of M.P. vs. Kanha @ Om Prakash, (2019) 3 SCC 605.

It is by now a lucid dictum that for the purpose of constituting an offence under Section 307 IPC, there are two ingredients that a Court must consider, first, whether there was any intention or knowledge on the part of the accused to cause the death of the victim, and, second, such intent or knowledge was followed by some overt actus rea in the execution thereof, irrespective of the consequential result as to whether or not any injury is inflicted upon the victim. The Courts may deduce such intent from the conduct of the accused and surrounding circumstances of the offence, including the nature of the weapon used or the nature of the injury if any. The manner in which occurrence took place may enlighten more than the prudential escape of a victim. It is thus not necessary that a victim shall have to suffer an injury dangerous to his life, for attracting Section 307 IPC.

It would also be fruitful at this stage, to appraise whether the requirement of 'motive' is indispensable for proving the charge of attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC.”

This question was also considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Versus Kanha @ Om Parkash (2019) 3 SCC 605 and it was held:-

“11. Several judgements of this Court have interpreted Section 307 of the Penal Code. In State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil, (1983) 2 SCC 28, this Court held that it is not necessary that a bodily injury sufficient under normal circumstances to cause death should have been inflicted:

"9...To justify a conviction under this section it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof."

This position in law was followed by subsequent benches of this Court. In State of M.P. v. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554, this Court held thus:

"13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present intent coupled with some overt act in the execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under the circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt."

In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366, this Court held that to establish the commission of an offence under Section 307, it is not essential that a fatal injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted:

"12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit the murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that a fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of the injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, the motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc."

The above judgements of this Court lead us to the conclusion that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.”

Similar is the judgment in Chhanga @ Manoj Versus State of M.P. (2017) 11 SCC 115, wherein it was observed:

“7. Neither of the points raised by Shri Garg appeals to us. First and foremost, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted in order that the charge under Section 307 be made out. It is enough if there is an intention coupled with some common act in execution thereof. This position has been repeatedly laid down by this Court in “State of M.P. vs. Kashiram and Others” (2009) 4 SCC 26 at paragraphs 12 to 16. In addition, in a recent Judgment in `Jage Ram and Others vs. State of Haryana' (2015) 11 SCC 366, the law has been laid down as follows:

“For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit the murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that a fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of the injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, the motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc.”

Therefore, the submission that since no serious injury was caused, the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is not made out cannot be accepted.

The petitioner had used a deadly weapon namely a Dharat. He caused injuries on the head of the informant and her son. The situs of the injury and the weapon used clearly show that if the death had been caused by the act of the petitioner, it would have amounted to murder. Thus, the circumstances clearly show that an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC is prima facie made out against the petitioner at this stage.

The petitioner had attacked the minor child simply because he was harassing the petitioner’s son. This was no reason to cause grievous injury to the minor child with a Darat. The fact that the petitioner had also attacked the informant with the Darat clearly shows that releasing the petitioner on bail will put the lives of the informant and her son in danger. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be released on bail at this stage.

It was submitted that the petitioner is suffering from a mental ailment and he requires treatment. It is not stated that the treatment is not being provided to him during the custody. The State is bound to provide proper treatment to the person who has been detained behind bars; hence, the petitioner cannot claim bail based on mental ailment.

Final Order:

Keeping in view the above, the petitioner is not entitled to bail and the present bail petition is dismissed.

The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.