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Judgment
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:
Affidavit of service filed today be kept on record.
The present challenge has been preferred against an order whereby the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal entertained a challenge against an order passed by the concerned Block Land and Land Reforms Officer (B.L & L.R.O).
Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that the order of the B.L & L.R.O was passed on remand after the matter was sent back by the Appellate Authority, in connection with an appeal filed on an earlier occasion by the private respondents themselves under Section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.
However, upon being apparently aggrieved by the order passed on remand by the B.L & L.R.O, the respondents choose a shorter path this time, by taking out a challenge against the order of the B.L & L.R.O directly before the Tribunal, bypassing the Appellate Authority which is stipulated under the statute as the appropriate forum for such challenge.
Learned senior counsel submits that the Tribunal considered the suffering of one of the applicants before it (present respondent no.4) from a terminal illness as a ground of “undue hardship” as contemplated in Section 10(3)(b) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 to justify preferring the challenge directly before the Tribunal. However, learned senior counsel argues that the “undue hardship” contemplated in the said provision is inextricably tied up with the previous portion of Clause (b), where the remedial measures available under the provisions of the relevant specified Act are not adequate.
Learned senior counsel submits that although subsequently time has been sought by the appellant for filing affidavits before the Tribunal, no assent at any point of time was given to the Tribunal usurping the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority, therefore depriving the parties to a forum of challenge. Moreover, it is pointed out that even if the respondent no. 4, one of the applicants before the Tribunal, was suffering from such illness, nothing prevented the other applicants/private respondents from preferring the challenge or conducting the same before the Appellate authority.
Learned counsel appearing for the private respondents contends that the ailment of the respondent no. 4 herein was sufficient “hardship” to justify the order of the Tribunal.
Furthermore, it is pointed out that subsequent to the impugned order, the present writ petitioner participated in the proceeding before the Tribunal and sought time to file affidavit-in-opposition, thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It is contended that therefore, the writ petitioner cannot now resile from such position and turn back on its participation by challenging the order whereby the Tribunal held that the application before it was maintainable.
Upon a perusal of Section 10(3)(a) of the 1997 Act, we find that under normal circumstances, a challenge before the Tribunal shall not be admitted at all unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has availed all remedial measures available to him under the relevant specified Act. As an exception thereto, Clause (b) of sub-section (3) provides that the remedial measures available under the provisions of the relevant specified Act, where not adequate or causes undue hardship to the applicant, the Tribunal, if satisfied on such count, may permit the application to be filed even without all remedial measures being availed.
Even if we proceed on such presumption, it is evident from a plain reading of Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 that the “undue hardship” envisaged in the said provision is connected with the prior portion of the provision, which stipulates that the Tribunal will entertain an application if satisfied that the remedial measures available under the provisions of the relevant specified Act are not adequate. By use of the expression “or” between the two parts of Clause (b), it has been clarified that the undue hardship contemplated therein is directly linked with non-availability of remedial measures. Under the said provision, for the Tribunal to entertain a challenge without the challenger first exhausting all statutory remedies otherwise available to him, the Tribunal must record its satisfaction that such remedy will not be either adequate or may cause undue hardship.
Hence, both inadequacy and undue hardship are linked with the remedy and not independent of it.
Thus, in the present case, the serious ailment of one of the applicants could not furnish sufficient cause for the Tribunal to give a go-by to Clause (a) of Section 10(3) of the 1997 Act.
Mere ailment of a person, unless it renders inadequate the alternative statutory remedy, cannot per se furnish a ground for directly approaching the Tribunal.
In fact, the ailment of the concerned applicant (respondent no. 4 herein), in the present case, if construed to be a deterrent to go before the Appellate Tribunal, would have equally applied in appearance of the said applicant before the Tribunal as well.
Mere ailment of any nature cannot be sufficient justification to permit a party to skip or jump a forum altogether, although the law specifically contemplates such forum.
Secondly, in the present case, there were several other co-applicants with the concerned applicant (present respondent no. 4) who is suffering from the said ailment. Even if the respondent no. 4 was unable to prefer a statutory appeal, the other applicants could very well do so.
Thus, in the absence of any explanation as to what prevented the other co-applicants to prefer the challenge even if respondent no. 4 was ailing, the Tribunal also erred on such count in entertaining the application directly, thereby usurping the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority.
In respect of the alleged participation of the writ petitioner before the Tribunal after the impugned order was passed, we do not find that at any point of time the writ petitioner has conceded or submitted to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by participating in the hearing of the matter on merits. Rather, only an adjournment was sought to file written objection, in which the writ petitioner could very well have incorporated the plea of maintainability as well.
Hence, we find that by the impugned order, the learned Tribunal has deprived both parties of one forum of challenge, which runs contrary to the scheme of the 1997 Act itself.
Accordingly, WPLRT 99 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby setting aside the impugned order dated December 15, 2025 passed by the Third Bench, West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in OA 2975 of 2025 (LRTT) and dismissing the said OA as not maintainable. Consequentially, all subsequent orders passed in connection with the said OA stand recalled.
However, nothing in the above order shall preclude the private respondents from preferring a challenge against the order of the B.L. & L.R.O. which was impugned before the Tribunal, if so otherwise entitled in law, before the appropriate Appellate Authority.
No order as to costs.
Urgent certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of requisite formalities.
I agree. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)