Smti. Nandita Chakraborty vs The State Of Tripura

“i.

To admit this Writ Petition; ii. Call for the relevant case records appertaining to this Writ Petition;

iii.

Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Certiorari and/or in the nature thereof, shall not be issued, to quash the Memorandum No.F.7 (23)-UDD/DUD/2022/1484-92 dated 26/06/2024 by declaring it arbitrary, illegal and non-est in the eye of Law;

iv Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the nature thereof, shall not be issued, directing the Respondents for regularization of her service in the Post of L.D.C. from 31/10/2003 i.e. the from the date when the Petitioner joined in the service in the Post of L.D.C.

v.

Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the nature thereof, shall not be issued, directing the Respondents to sanction Promotion and incremental of pay raise to the Petitioner which she is entitle to as per Law.

vi.

Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the nature thereof, shall not be issued, directing the Respondents to sanction Retirement benefits and Pension w.e.f. 01/02/2024.

vii.

Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the nature thereof, shall not be issued, directing the Respondents to sanction Retirement benefits and Pension w.e.f. 01/02/2024.

viii.

Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/ or any other appropriate Writ, in the nature thereof, or any other appropriate Writ, direction or order as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit Proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in favour of the Petitioner against the Respondents.

ix.

In the Ad-Interim, and thereafter, on hearing the parties, an Order in term of Relief mentioned above;

AND For this act of kindness, the humble Petitioner above named shall ever pray.”

“29.

More recently, this Court, in Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826, underscored whether the duties performed by long-serving temporary employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of the organisation concerned, clarifying that Umadevi (supra) was directed against illegal backdoor appointments, and was never intended to penalise employees who, though irregularly engaged, have rendered long service in essential, perennial roles. This Court has further, in Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, (2024) 9 SCC 327 and Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221, cautioned against a mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny regularisation to temporary employees, holding that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise exploitative engagements continued for years together without the employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. This body of precedent, distinguishing and refining Umadevi (supra) rather than displacing it, squarely governs the facts of the present case. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221, this Court has held as follows:

“14.

The Respondent Employer places reliance on Umadevi (supra) to contend that daily-wage or temporary employees cannot claim permanent absorption in the absence of statutory rules providing such absorption. However, as frequently reiterated, Uma Devi itself distinguishes between appointments that are “illegal” and those that are “irregular,” the latter being eligible for regularization if they meet certain conditions. More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. Given the record which shows no true contractor-based arrangement and a consistent need for permanent horticultural staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh recruitment, though real, cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or continued unfair practices.

15.

It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen continuously rendered their services over several years, sometimes spanning more than a decade. Even if certain muster rolls were not produced in full, the Employer's failure to furnish such records—despite directions to do so—allows an adverse inference under well-established labour jurisprudence. Indian labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing municipal requirements year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a genuine contractor agreement. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to recall the broader critique of indefinite “temporary” employment practices as done by a recent judgment of this court in Jaggo v. Union of India3 in the following paragraphs:

“22.

The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations. ………

25.

It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:

•

Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often labelled as “temporary” or

“contractual,” even when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.

•

Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service.

•

Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant.

•

Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment.

•

Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.”

30.

Tested on the touchstone of this line of authority, the present is manifestly a case falling within, and not outside, the one-time measure contemplated by paragraph 53 of Umadevi (supra) itself, which recognises that irregular, as distinct from illegal appointments of duly qualified persons, continued for ten years or more without the intervention of any court order, may be regularised on a one-time basis. The appellants’ engagement was not the product of a clandestine or illegal backdoor entry; it was the outcome of a structured process, constitution of a Society by the State, a Cabinet-approved categorisation exercise, and the grant of temporary status undertaken by the State itself, with full knowledge and active participation of its highest executive authorities, including the Chief Minister and the concerned Minister.

31.

In view of the above, we find that the High Court fell into error in treating the appellants’ engagement as vitiated at the threshold for want of due process while, in the very same breath, observing in paragraph 53 of the impugned judgment that, save for regularisation, the appellants had been treated at par with their counterparts in the regular establishment by the grant of temporary status together with parity in pay and emoluments. These two findings sit uneasily with one another. The grant of temporary status was preceded by a process of scrutiny and categorisation undertaken at the instance of the State itself, and reflects a conscious governmental decision that the appellants should continue to discharge the functions assigned to the respective posts. It also demonstrates that the State did not regard the appellants as lacking the requisite eligibility to continue in service. In such circumstances, the principal irregularity, if any, lay in the manner of their initial engagement rather than in any subsequent recognition of their utility or eligibility by the State. It is this distinction that paragraph 53 of Umadevi (supra) requires the Court to keep in view while considering claims for one-time regularisation.

32.

As regards the plea that the order dated 07.02.2014 lacked the concurrence of the Finance Department and the requisite approvals under the Rules of Business, we are of the view that this objection, even assuming it exists, is not available to the respondent-State at this belated stage. The said order was placed before the High Court on 09.04.2014 and formed the basis on which Writ Petition No. 307 of 2006 came to be disposed of upon the statement made by the learned Advocate General. Thereafter, the State continued to avail itself of the services of the appellants, extended to them temporary status and even forwarded their representation dated 23.11.2018 for consideration by the High-Level Empowered Committee by communication dated 30.11.2018, without raising the objection that the order dated 07.02.2014 lacked the requisite concurrence or approval. In these circumstances, the State cannot now be permitted to rely upon its own alleged procedural deficiency to defeat the legitimate expectation generated by its consistent conduct over a prolonged period. Such a course is inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a model employer, a principle repeatedly emphasised by this Court.

34.

The apprehension voiced on behalf of the State, that regularising the appellants would open the floodgates to similar claims by other contractual workers across the State cannot by itself defeat a case that is otherwise made out on facts, particularly where, as here, relief is confined strictly to the appellants before this Court and is not extended as a matter of general policy to workers who are not parties to these proceedings. The floodgates concern in Umadevi (supra) was addressed to the indiscriminate regularisation of illegal appointments at large; it was never intended to shut the door on a case-specific, one-time measure confined to identified and named claimants whose facts have been fully examined by the Court.

35.

For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the appellants have made out a case for regularisation of their services in the establishment of the PWD, Government of Goa, and that the impugned judgment of the High Court, insofar as it declines such relief, warrants interference.”

“15.

It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen continuously rendered their services over several years, sometimes spanning more than a decade. Even if certain muster rolls were not produced in full, the Employer's failure to furnish such records—despite directions to do so—allows an adverse inference under well-established labour jurisprudence. Indian labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing municipal requirements year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a genuine contractor agreement. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to recall the broader critique of indefinite “temporary” employment practices as done by a recent judgment of this court in Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 in the following paragraphs:

“22.

The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations.

………

25.

It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:

•

Misuse of “Temporary” Labels : Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often labelled as “temporary” or

“contractual,” even when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.

•

Arbitrary Termination : Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service.

•

Lack of Career Progression : Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant.

•

Using Outsourcing as a Shield : Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment.

•

Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits : Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.”

“19iii. Retired appellants: Any appellant who has already retired shall be granted regularization with effect from 24.04.2002 until the date of superannuation for pay fixation, arrears under clause (ii), and recalculation of pension, gratuity and other terminal dues. The revised pension and terminal dues shall be paid within three months of this Judgment.”

“25.

It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways:

•

Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often labeled as “temporary” or “contractual,” even when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.

•

Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service.

•

Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant.

•

Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment.

•

Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.

26.

While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-serving employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It categorically held that employees in irregular appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for more than ten years, should be considered for regularization as a one-time measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases where their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural formalities. Government departments often cite the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no vested right to regularization exists for temporary employees, overlooking the judgment's explicit acknowledgment of cases where regularization is appropriate. This selective application distorts the judgment's spirit and purpose, effectively weaponizing it against employees who have rendered indispensable services over decades.

27.

In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is imperative for government departments to lead by example in providing fair and stable employment. Engaging workers on a temporary basis for extended periods, especially when their roles are integral to the organization's functioning, not only contravenes international labour standards but also exposes the organization to legal challenges and undermines employee morale. By ensuring fair employment practices, government institutions can reduce the burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and uphold the principles of justice and fairness that they are meant to embody. This approach aligns with international standards and sets a positive precedent for the private sector to follow, thereby contributing to the overall betterment of labour practices in the country.”

“5.

That in reply to the statements made in paragraph 3 of the writ petition, I say that the petitioner, Smt. Nandita Chakraborty was temporarily engaged for the post of Lower Division Clerk (LDC) on contractual basis for a period of six months on a fixed remuneration of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand) only per month, subject to specific terms and conditions stipulated in the engagement order. Subsequently, her joining was accepted on 01.11.2003 (Annexure-2 & 3 to the writ petition).

6.

That in reply to the statements made in paragraph 4 of the writ petition, I say that the petitioner has been working as an LDC purely on contractual basis subject to the conditions stipulated in the engagement order.

It is further submitted that the petitioner's name was proposed for one-month computer training at the Community Information Centre (CIC) under the BDO, Kumarghat RD Block, vide letter dated 29.06.2005 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition).

7.

That in reply to the statements made in paragraphs 5 of the writ petition, I say that a list of four (04) employees, including the petitioner, was forwarded to the Director, Urban Development Department, vide letter dated 09.12.2014(Annexure-5 & 6 to the writ petition), wherein the details of the petitioner, including the date of engagement and amount of contractual remuneration, were mentioned.

8.

That in reply to the statements made in paragraph 6 & 7 of the writ petition, I say that the name of the petitioner, along with two others, was recommended for regularization vide letter dated 19.04.2016(Annexure-8 to the writ petition). However, it was clearly mentioned in the said communication that the posts in question had not been created with the concurrence of the Finance Department.

The said communication further reflects that the engagement of the said persons was made purely to meet administrative exigencies and office requirements. It was also stated therein that the Board of Kumarghat Nagar Panchayat recommended the regularization of the three employees including the petitioner.

It is respectfully submitted that the power to create, abolish, and regulate recruitment to any post or class of posts of officers and employees in a Municipality vests exclusively with the State Government under Rule 78(1) of the Tripura Municipal Act, 1994.

In the present case, no post against which the petitioner claims regularization was ever formally created or sanctioned by the competent authority with concurrence of the Finance Department.

9.

That in reply to the statements made in paragraph 8 & 9 of the writ petition, I say that a proposal was sent for the creation and regularization of three (03) posts against three employees to the Director, Urban Development Department, vide letter dated 25.03.2017(Annexure-9 to the writ petition), wherein the name of the petitioner was also included. However, mere forwarding of such proposal does not confer any legal or enforceable right upon the petitioner for regularization.

10.

That in reply to the statements made in paragraph 10 to 14 of the writ petition, I say that other employees namely Smti. Nandita Chakraborty, Sri Prafulla Kumar Deb, Sri Manoj Kanti Das, Sri Megnath Saha and Sri Milan Chakma were appointed and joined against duly created and sanctioned posts by the Urban Development Department with the concurrence of the Finance Department and following the prescribed procedure.

The petitioner, on the other hand, was engaged purely on temporary and contractual basis without any sanctioned post, and therefore her case cannot be equated with those appointed against duly sanctioned posts.

11.

That in reply to the statements made in paragraph 15 of the writ petition, I say that Sri Binoy Bhushan Paul, resident of Village Uttar Pabiacharra, Kumarghat, was appointed in the year 2009 as Junior Engineer against a duly sanctioned post, with the concurrence of the Finance Department, following separate advertisement, selection process and interview through direct recruitment in accordance with the applicable rules.”

“The consideration

42.

All the judgments noticed in paras 7 to 24 hereinabove, pertain to employees engaged on regular basis, who were claiming higher wages, under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. The claim raised by such employees was premised on the ground, that the duties and responsibilities rendered by them were against the same post for which a higher pay scale was being allowed in other government departments. Or alternatively, their duties and responsibilities were the same as of other posts with different designations, but they were placed in a lower scale. Having been painstakingly taken through the parameters laid down by this Court, wherein the principle of “equal pay for equal work” was invoked and considered, it would be just and appropriate to delineate the parameters laid down by this Court. In recording the said parameters, we have also adverted to some other judgments pertaining to temporary employees (also dealt with, in the instant judgment), wherein also, this Court had the occasion to express the legal position with reference to the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. Our consideration, has led us to the following deductions:

42.1.

The “onus of proof” of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post under the principle of “equal pay for equal work” lies on the person who claims it. He who approaches the court has to establish that the subject post occupied by him requires him to discharge equal work of equal value, as the reference post (see Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case [Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 645] , UT Chandigarh, Admn. v. Manju Mathur [U.T. Chandigarh, Admn. v. Manju Mathur, (2011) 2 SCC 452 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 348] , SAIL case [SAIL v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya, (2011) 11 SCC 122 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 192] and National Aluminium Co. Ltd. case [National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout, (2014) 6 SCC 756 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 353] ).

42.2.

The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant is in a “different department” vis-à-vis the reference post does not have any bearing on the determination of a claim under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”. Persons discharging identical duties cannot be treated differently in the matter of their pay, merely because they belong to different departments of the Government (see Randhir Singh case [Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 119] and D.S. Nakara case [D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145]).

42.3.

The principle of “equal pay for equal work”, applies to cases of unequal scales of pay, based on no classification or irrational classification (see Randhir Singh case [Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 119] ). For equal pay, the employees concerned with whom equation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity (see Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers case [Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 91 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 673] , Mewa Ram Kanojia case [Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, (1989) 2 SCC 235 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 329] , Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case [Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 619 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 621] and S.C. Chandra case [S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 897 : 2 SCEC 943] ).

42.4.

Persons holding the same rank/designation (in different departments), but having dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed in different scales of pay and cannot claim the benefit of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” (see Randhir Singh case [Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 119] , State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. [State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn., (2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822] and Hukum Chand Gupta case [Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 493] ). Therefore, the principle would not be automatically invoked merely because the subject and reference posts have the same nomenclature.

42.5.

In determining equality of functions and responsibilities under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, it is necessary to keep in mind that the duties of the two posts should be of equal sensitivity, and also, qualitatively similar. Differentiation of pay scales for posts with difference in degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality, would fall within the realm of valid classification, and therefore, pay differentiation would be legitimate and permissible (see Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers case [Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 91 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 673] and SBI case [SBI v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, (2002) 4 SCC 556 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 568] ). The nature of work of the subject post should be the same and not less onerous than the reference post. Even the volume of work should be the same. And so also, the level of responsibility. If these parameters are not met, parity cannot be claimed under the principle of “equal pay for equal work” (see State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia [State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 71] and Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case [Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 619 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 621] ).

42.6.

For placement in a regular pay scale, the claimant has to be a regular appointee. The claimant should have been selected on the basis of a regular process of recruitment. An employee appointed on a temporary basis cannot claim to be placed in the regular pay scale (see Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case [Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty, (2003) 5 SCC 188 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 645] ).

42.7.

Persons performing the same or similar functions, duties and responsibilities, can also be placed in different pay scales. Such as —“selection grade”, in the same post. But this difference must emerge out of a legitimate foundation, such as — merit, or seniority, or some other relevant criteria (see State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia [State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 71] ).

42.8.

If the qualifications for recruitment to the subject post vis-à-vis the reference post are different, it may be difficult to conclude that the duties and responsibilities of the posts are qualitatively similar or comparable (see Mewa Ram Kanojia case [Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, (1989) 2 SCC 235 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 329] and State of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy [State of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 225] ). In such a case the principle of “equal pay for equal work” cannot be invoked.

42.9.

The reference post with which parity is claimed under the principle of “equal pay for equal work” has to be at the same hierarchy in the service as the subject post. Pay scales of posts may be different, if the hierarchy of the posts in question, and their channels of promotion, are different. Even if the duties and responsibilities are same, parity would not be permissible, as against a superior post, such as a promotional post (see Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey [Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey, (2000) 8 SCC 580 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 56] and Hukum Chand Gupta case [Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 493] ).

42.10.

A comparison between the subject post and the reference post under the principle of “equal pay for equal work” cannot be made where the subject post and the reference post are in different establishments, having a different management. Or even, where the establishments are in different geographical locations, though owned by the same master (see Harbans Lal case [Harbans Lal v. State of H.P., (1989) 4 SCC 459 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 71] ). Persons engaged differently, and being paid out of different funds, would not be entitled to pay parity (see Official Liquidator v. Dayanand [Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 943] ).

42.11.

Different pay scales, in certain eventualities, would be permissible even for posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy in the cadre. As for instance, if the duties and responsibilities of one of the posts are more onerous, or are exposed to higher nature of operational work/risk, the principle of “equal pay for equal work” would not be applicable. And also when the reference post includes the responsibility to take crucial decisions, and that is not so for the subject post (see SBI case [SBI v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, (2002) 4 SCC 556 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 568] ).

42.12.

The priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the Government can also be a relevant factor for placing different posts under different pay scales. Herein also, the principle of “equal pay for equal work” would not be applicable (see State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn. [State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Assn., (2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822] ).

42.13.

The parity in pay, under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, cannot be claimed merely on the ground that at an earlier point of time the subject post and the reference post, were placed in the same pay scale. The principle of “equal pay for equal work” is applicable only when it is shown, that the incumbents of the subject post and the reference post, discharge similar duties and responsibilities (see State of W.B. v. Minimum Wages Inspectors Assn. [State of W.B. v. W.B. Minimum Wages Inspectors Assn., (2010) 5 SCC 225 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 1]).

42.14.

For parity in pay scales under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, equation in the nature of duties is of paramount importance. If the principal nature of duties of one post is teaching, whereas that of the other is non-teaching, the principle would not be applicable. If the dominant nature of duties of one post is of control and management, whereas the subject post has no such duties, the principle would not be applicable. Likewise, if the central nature of duties of one post is of quality control, whereas the subject post has minimal duties of quality control, the principle would not be applicable (see U.T. Chandigarh, Admn. v. Manju Mathur [U.T. Chandigarh, Admn. v. Manju Mathur, (2011) 2 SCC 452 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 348] ).

42.15.

There can be a valid classification in the matter of pay scales between employees even holding posts with the same nomenclature i.e. between those discharging duties at the headquarters, and others working at the institutional/sub-office level (see Hukum Chand Gupta case [Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 493] ), when the duties are qualitatively dissimilar.

42.16.

The principle of “equal pay for equal work” would not be applicable, where a differential higher pay scale is extended to persons discharging the same duties and holding the same designation, with the objective of ameliorating stagnation, or on account of lack of promotional avenues (see Hukum Chand Gupta case [Hukum Chand Gupta v. ICAR, (2012) 12 SCC 666 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 493] ).

42.17.

Where there is no comparison between one set of employees of one organisation, and another set of employees of a different organisation, there can be no question of equation of pay scales under the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, even if two organisations have a common employer. Likewise, if the management and control of two organisations is with different entities which are independent of one another, the principle of “equal pay for equal work” would not apply (see S.C. Chandra case [S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 897 : 2 SCEC 943] and National Aluminium Co. Ltd. case [National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Ananta Kishore Rout, (2014) 6 SCC 756 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 353] ).

44.6.

In State of Karnataka case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , a Constitution Bench of this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court, and directed that daily wagers be paid salary equal to the lowest grade of salary and allowances being paid to regular employees. Importantly, in this case, this Court made a very important distinction between pay parity and regularisation. It was held that the concept of equality would not be applicable to issues of absorption/regularisation. But, the concept was held as applicable, and was indeed applied, to the issue of pay parity — if the work component was the same. The judgment rendered by the High Court was modified by this Court, and the daily-wage employees concerned were directed to be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of the cadre concerned.

60.

Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the employees concerned (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities as were being discharged by regular employees holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” summarised by us in para 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted that during the course of their employment, the temporary employees concerned were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities which at some point in time were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts were also posted to discharge the same work which was assigned to temporary employees from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity on any of the principles summarised by us in para 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of “equal pay for equal work” would be applicable to all the temporary employees concerned, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages on a par with the minimum of the pay scale of regularly engaged government employees holding the same post.”

“54.

The Full Bench of the High Court while adjudicating upon the above controversy had concluded that temporary employees were not entitled to the minimum of the regular pay scale, merely for the reason, that the activities carried on by daily wagers and regular employees were similar. The Full Bench however, made two exceptions. Temporary employees, who fell in either of the two exceptions, were held entitled to wages at the minimum of the pay scale drawn by regular employees. The exceptions recorded by the Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment are extracted hereunder : (Avtar Singh case [Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, 2011 SCC OnLine P&H 15326 : ILR (2013) 1 P&H 566] , SCC OnLine P&H para 37)

“(1)

A daily wager, ad hoc or contractual appointee against the regular sanctioned posts, if appointed after undergoing a selection process based upon fairness and equality of opportunity to all other eligible candidates, shall be entitled to minimum of the regular pay scale from the date of engagement.

(2)

But if daily wagers, ad hoc or contractual appointees are not appointed against regular sanctioned posts and their services are availed continuously, with notional breaks, by the State Government or its instrumentalities for a sufficient long period i.e. for 10 years, such daily wagers, ad hoc or contractual appointees shall be entitled to minimum of the regular pay scale without any allowances on the assumption that work of perennial nature is available and having worked for such long period of time, an equitable right is created in such category of persons. Their claim for regularisation, if any, may have to be considered separately in terms of legally permissible scheme.

(3)

In the event, a claim is made for minimum pay scale after more than three years and two months of completion of 10 years of continuous working, a daily wager, ad hoc or contractual employee shall be entitled to arrears for a period of three years and two months.”

58.

In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work cannot be paid less than another who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare State. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Anyone, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage does not do so voluntarily. He does so to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self-respect and dignity, at the cost of his self-worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows that his dependants would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act of paying less wages as compared to others similarly situate constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation.”