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Judgment
Gopal Rao Ekbote, Chief Justice
W.P. No. 4118 of 1973 seeks two reliefs. Firstly a mandamus is sought directing the respondents to pay forthwith to the petitioner compensation for the lands surrendered by her under the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act) and the Rules made thereunder. Secondly in effect a direction is sought prohibiting the 3rd respondent from proceeding with the revision u/s 19 (1) as amended by Act 1 of 1972 with effect from 19-1-1972.
The facts in outline are that the petitioner''s husband owned extensive lands in Gadwal. After the Act came into force, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gadwal issued a notice u/s 3 (2) of the Act directing the petitioner''s husband to file declaration of his holdings. The petitioner''s husband accordingly filed the declaration.
The Petitioner''s husband died in 1969 leaving behind him the petitioner and three Minor children.
The Revenue Divisional Officer held an enquiry u/s 6 of the Act By his order dated 25-1-1971 he held that the petitioners, the legal representatives of the petitioner''s husband, held the land of an extent of 29.72 family holdings in excess of the celling area which they were entitled to hold.
A Notice was then issued to the petitioner u/s 7 (2) on 25-1-1971 requiring the petitioner to file a statement indicating the land which she proposes to surrender.
The Petitioner thereupon filed a detailed statement of the lands she proposed to surrender on 19-3-1971.
The Revenue Divisional Officer on being satisfied after an enquiry that the lands proposed to be surrendered satisfy the requirements of section 7 (1) and (2) of the Act passed an order on 31-3-1971 u/s 7 (3) of the Act approving the surrender of 713-16 acres (an equivalent of 29-72 family holdings) by the petitioner.
The petitioner thereafter filed an application before the Revenue Divisional Officer for fixation of the compensation in respect of the lands surrendered u/s 10 of the Act. The Revenue Divisional Officer fixed compensation of Rs. 6,44,265,09 as payable to the petitioner in respect of the lands surrendered by her.
The Revenue Divisional Officer published a notification containing particulars of the lands surrendered by the petitioner and the compensation payable therefor in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 7-7-1971 according to section 11 of the Act.
Instead of paying the compensation as determined, the District Revenue Officer, Mahaboobnagar, the 3rd respondent, issued a notice dated 21-3-1972 proposing to revise the orders of the then Revenue Divisional Officer dated 15-4-1971 fixing compensation of the lands surrendered by the petitioner. This notice is purported to have been issued u/s 19 (1) of the Act as amended.
The petitioner therefore filed a counter contending inter alia that the 3rd respondent has no jurisdiction to revise the order fixing the compensation which was passed before the District Revenue Officer was conferred with the jurisdiction to revise the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer and when on the day the notice was issued the order sought to be revised had become final. Although this counter was filed on 17-5-1972, the 3rd respondent has not disposed of the revision proceedings, nor has he paid the compensation determined earlier. Hence this Writ Petition.
Writ Appeal No. 808 of 1973 arises out of W.P. No. 2439 of 1973. In that case also, the proceedings under the Act were commenced in 1962. It was ultimately found that in so far as Kothagudem Revenue Division was concerned, the petitioners had to surrender a total extent of Act. 2178. The respondents thereafter determined the compensation payable in respect of the lands of Kothagudem revenue division at Rs. 7,26,433/-. A notification u/s 11 was also published in the Gazette of 15-6-1972. Thereafter the respondents have not paid the compensation so determined although the petitioners have been demanding the same. The Government sanctioned the amount by a memo dated 27-3-1973. Nevertheless the compensation has not been made available to the Revenue Divisional Officer and not paid to the petitioners. A writ of mandamus therefore was sought directing the respondents to pay the compensation so determined in respect of the petitioner''s lands surrendered by them.
The writ petition was heard by O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. By a judgment dated 19-9-1973, the learned judge held that "when section 7 says that the lands shall be deemed to have been surrendered, the lands may be considered to have come into the power or control of the Revenue Divisional Officer without transfer of title or possession but the extent to enable the Revenue Divisional Officer to take further action pursuant to the other provisions of the Act."
The learned judge further held that the Revenue Divisional Officer is bound to pay the compensation if be wants to take over the land. But there is nothing is section 8 which obliges the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over the land within any definite period of time. The language in respect of the taking over of the land is permissible and not imperative. He therefore concluded that no owner of a land can insist that his land be taken over u/s 8 of the Act and compensation paid to him. The learned judge therefore dismissed the writ petition. Hence the appeal.
In both these cases the first contention of the learned Advocates for the petitioners was that when the Revenue Divisional Officer approves the surrender, the title in the lands so surrendered by the petitioners vests in the Government. The Government therefore is bound to pay the compensation determined u/s 10 and notified u/s 11. There is no option left with the respondents either to take over the lands so surrendered or refuse to do so. Even if it does not desire to take over the lands, since the title in the surrendered lands has vested in the Government, the Government is obliged to pay the compensation.
In order to appreciate the implications of this contention, it is necessary to read a few provisions of the Act.
Section 2 (a) defines the term ''ceiling area'' to mean "the extent of land specified in section 3 to be the ceiling area".
Section 3 then lays down what the ceiling area would be.
Section 5 requires every person whose holding is in excess of the ceiling area to furnish a declaration of his entire holding as on the notified date within 90 days there from to the Revenue Divisional Officer.
The Revenue Divisional Officer has also been empowered to require any person to furnish a declaration of his holding as on the notified date.
Section 6 then empowers the Revenue Divisional Officer to determine on the basis of such declaration or on the basis of information obtained by him, after making such enquiry as he deems fit, ceiling area which such person is entitled to hold and the extent of land which is held by him in excess of the ceiling area.
Section 7 then states that if the extent of holding of a person is more than the ceiling area, he shall be liable to surrender the extent of land in excess of the ceiling area.
Sub-section (2) of section 7 obliges the Revenue Divisional Officer to issue notice to every person who is liable to surrender land in excess of the ceiling area specifying the extent of land which he has to surrender and require him to file a statement indicating the land which he proposes to surrender.
Sub-section (3) then states that if the person files such a statement and the Revenue Divisional Officer is satisfied, after making an enquiry that the proposed surrender of land is proper, he may pass an order approving the surrender. Such a land thereupon shall be deemed to have been surrendered by such a person.
Section 10 relates to the compensation for lands. It shall be the amount calculated at the rates specified in the second schedule or the market value whichever is less. The Revenue Divisional Officer is required also to determine the value of any structure or trees existing on such a land.
Section 11 empowers the Revenue Divisional Officer to determine the compensation and to publish notification containing the particulars of the land taken over and the compensation payable therefor. The Revenue Divisional Officer is further empowered to hear the claims, if any and to determine the persons who are entitled to payment from out of the compensation and the amount which each of them is entitled.
It is only on payment of compensation the Revenue Divisional Officer u/s 8 can by order take over the land which is deemed to have been surrendered u/s 7. It is only thereafter that such land can be disposed of by assignment to landless persons.
It would thus immediately be seen that the argument advanced is opposed to the Scheme of the Act and would, if accepted, amount to overthrow the scheme. Section 7 declares as to when the land shall be deemed to have been surrendered. After holding a person liable to surrender the surplus land and requiring him to indicate in a statement as to the land which he proposes to surrender, that the proposal of surrender is made and then approved by the Revenue Divisional Officer. It is only after such an approval or acceptance of proposal of surrender that the land shall be deemed to have beep surrendered.
Whatever may be the dictionary meaning of the word ''surrender'' there are no words in section 7 justify an argument that such a deeming provision would mean vesting of the title of such land in the government. Section 7 merely finalises as to what specific surplus land is accepted by the Revenue Divisional Officer to be surrendered by the person owning the land and no more.
No doubt in finding the meaning of the words in statutes, Judges make some use of the layman''s crutch, the dictionary. Yet the value of the dictionaries is limited by the fact that in English, as in any living language, the meanings of the words vary according to the use to which they are put. The utility of dictionary definitions is obviously limited where different words are used. Moreover, the words are always in steady process of charge. As an authority on meanings the dictionary is a man made institution without pretence of guidance by a higher power or by a basic sub stratum of natural law or even by superior wisdom, to all of which jurists sometimes lay claim. "Why should we follow the dictionary?" Justice Holmes said once to have remarked to his brother "Let the dictionary follow us". Lord Colridge, however, said :
I am quite aware that dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of meaning of words used in Acts of Parliament, but is a well-known Rule of courts of law that the words should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense and we are therefore sent for instructions to those books See R. VS. PETERS 16 Q.B. DIV. 636 at 641.
This, however, is subject to the general rule that the dictionaries should be consulted only in the absence of any judicial guidance or authority.
Even the dictionary meaning of the word "surrender" is not always vesting of the title According to Oxford Dictionary it means "give oneself up", "cease from resistance", "accept enemy''s demand of submission".
The Corups juris, Volume 83, page 917 no doubt gives various, meanings but it is difficult to hold therefrom that the word, ''surrender'' invariably carries the meaning of vesting of the title. Its use naturally depends upon the context in which it is used.
What is thus plain is that merely because the word ''surrender'' is used in section 7, it does not necessarily follow that it means vesting of the title. Any such interpretation would be inconsistent with the plain language of section 8. It would also be quite contrary to the scheme embodied in sections 5 to 11 of the Act.
In our judgment, the vesting of title takes place only on payment of compensation and that too after an order of taking over the land is made by Revenue Divisional Officer u/s 8. That section rules out vesting of title at any stage prior to making such an order by the Revenue Divisional Officer. It is true that in the body of section 8, the words "such land shall thereupon vest in the Government" do not appear. The marginal note of the section, however, reads "vesting of land deemed to have been surrendered by the owner".
Marginal notes, it is now seen, serve the same functions for sections that the title does for the entire Act and generally should be judicially used in the same manner. It is true that certain English as well as Indian decisions in the earlier days had held that the mariginal notes are not available for interpretative purposes even in case of ambiguity. That was because the mariginal notes were originally added after the enactment by the printer. The situation now is different. It has now become customary for the legislatures to provide their own headings and marginal notes. They should therefore be available for judicial consideration when they have legislative sanction. It may be that they are not specifically put to the House for sanction, but they go usually with the clauses of the Bill and when these clauses are made part of the Act by the approval of the Legislature, it can validly be said that the headings and mariginal notes are part of the Act and are sanctioned in the same manner as the rest of the Act. The headings Prefaced to sections in modern statutes are regarded as preambles to those sections. It has now been held that there can be no objection to the reference to marginal notes for the purpose of construing the section of an Act, if they are inserted by or under the authority of or assented to by the legislature. Ram Saran Das Vs. Bhagwat Prasad and Another Emperor v. Mumtaz Husain AIR 1935 oudh 337 at 342 (F.B.), and Iswari Prosad and Others Vs. N.R. Sen and Another,
The Supreme Court also in the undermentioned case has held that a marginal note to an Article of the Constitution of India is a part of the Constitution as passed by the Constituent Assembly and prima facie furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the Article: The Bengal Immunity Company Limited Vs. The State of Bihar and Others,
What follows therefore is that whenever there is ambiguity in the section, the marginal note can be referred to for solving the ambiguity. It may also be looked at the determine the drift of the section.
Thus if the marginal note is read along with the body of section 8, it will he clear that it is only after the order to take over the land is made that the land "deemed to have been surrendered" vest in the Government, The vesting is in reference to title is clear from the last few words of the said section It states that "such land shall he disposed of .... by assignment to and less poor persons". It is obvious that the land can so be assigned by the Government only when it becomes the owner of the same Although thus the body if section 8 does riot expressly refer to the vesting of title of the surplus land taken over, the marginal note does so mention expressly and the said last few words of the section leave no one in doubt on payment of compensation and on making the order of taking over the land vests in the Government.
In this connection, it is relevant to mention that when the draft outlines of the Act were presented to the Cabinet for approval, clause 8 was proposed in the following words:
the lands surrendered shall vest in the Government free of all encumbrances.
The draft note was approved and a bill was directed to be drafted on the lines approved.
The draft bill so prepared carded clause 8 in the following manner:-
Where the land surrendered u/s 7 is by an owner (other than a limited owner), the Government may take over such land on payment of compensation u/s 12 and such land shall thereupon vest in the Government free from all encumbrances.
The draft Bill was approved by the Cabinet subject to certain nidufucatuibs but clause 8 was approved as above.
The detailed note which was an appendix to draft bill said:
Clause 8, 10 (3), 11(3) and 18(2) relating to the taking over of surplus land by the Government.
After the approval of the draft bill by the Cabinet it was published in the Gazette of 16-7-1958 as a Bill to be introduced in the Legislative Assembly. Clause 8 so published was the same as was approved by the Cabinet.
After the Bill was introduced in the Legislative Assembly, it was referred to a joint Select Committee of both the Houses. It was returned by the Select Committee with some modifications. In so far as Clause 8 was concerned, it was approved with a slight modification as follows:-
clause 8 ("vesting of land deemed to have been surrendered by the owner"). The Committee agreed to delete the words "other than a limited owner" in clause 8.
"It was also decided to substitute the words "R.D.O. for "Government
See para 22 of the Report at page 7.
In para 25 at page 7 of the Report which relates to clause 10, it is quite relevant to notice that the following words are used :
The compensation payable for any land to be taken over by the R.D.O.....
Clause 8 as it finally emerged from the Select Committee is seen at page 16 of the Report. It reads :
8 Vesting of land deemed to have been surrendered by the owner Where any land is deemed to have been surrendered u/s 7 by the owner, the Revenue Divisional Officer may, by order, take over such land on payment of such compensation u/s 10 and such land shall thereupon vest in the Government free from all encumbrances from the date of such order.
The Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Bill, 1960 as reported by the Select Committee on submission of the Report by the Select Committee was considered clause by clause by the Assembly. On 7-7-1960 clause 8 was taken up for consideration, Sri P. Rajagopala Naidu, M.L.A. seems to have moved an amendment to add the following at the end of clause 8 :
For distribution to the landless people in that village.
Sri K.V. Ranga Reddy, the Minister, then moved the following amendment to the said amendment of Sri Naidu:
For the words ''in that village'' substitute the following "And such lands shall he disposed of in the prescribed manner by assignment to landless poor persons".
The Speaker at the end of the discussion on the said clause put the motion before the House as follows:
The question is ''for the words in that village'' in amendment No. 34, substitute the following words :-- "and such land shall be disposed of in the prescribed manner by assignment to landless poor persons".
The amendment was declared adopted. The Speaker then put the amended clause 8 for approval.
Mr. Speaker : The question is : --
That clause 8 as amended to stand part of the Bill". The motion was adopted. It was then declared that clause 8 as amended was adopted to the Bill.
What is thus plain is that except the above said addition to clause 8 as proposed by the Select Committee, the Legislative Assembly debates do not disclose that there was any amendment moved to delete the following words which appeared in clause 8 as recommended by the Select Committee but which do not appear in clause 8 of the Act which was published after the assent of the President in the Gazette of 9-2-1961.
And such land shall thereupon vest in the Government free from all encumbrances from the date of such order.
It is clear therefore that although the above said words were in the Bill from its inception and were approved both by the Select Committee as well as by the legislative Assembly by some mistake do not seem to have been published in the Gazette.
It is also pertinent to notice section 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceilings on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. The following words appear :
Which shall thereupon vest in the Government free from all encumbrances from the date of such order.
It is pertinent to note that section 8 of 1961 Act is in parimateria with section 11 of the 1973 Act.
We are we think entitled to refer on this point to all this material upon which section 8 of the 1961 Act and section 11 of the 1973 Act are based. This is certainly not a forbidden tree of knowledge. If not for any other purpose, it can surely be looked into to keep our eyes open wider on this point than they are likely to be if confined only to section 8 which, as seen above, is ex facie inadequate in its full expression.
The intention of the legislature therefore seems to be clear. It is immaterial whether the above said express words appear in clause 8 or not. The intention of the Legislature is that the land was to be taken over on payment of compensation and by an order of the Revenue Divisional officer u/s 8.
It is relevant to mention that Rule 7 of the Rules made under the Act uses the words "and vested in the Government" after it is taken over u/s 8.
It is only then that the land would vest in the Government so as to be available for assignment to the landless poor. We have therefore, no hesitation in holding that the land does not vast in the Government immediately after proposed surrender is approved by the Revenue Divisional Officer u/s 7 but the surplus land vests in the Government only after the compensation is paid and an order to take over land is made by the Revenue Divisional Officer u/s 8 of the Act.
The contention that since sections 10 and 11 appear after section 8 we should hold that even before the compensation and the claims relating there to are determined and the compensation paid, the title in the land vests in the Government the moment proposed surrender is approved is not sound. It ignores the words "on payment of compensation" appearing in section 8. It also ignores the last few words of section 8 which necessarily imply the stage at which the title in the Government vests. It omits from consideration that the land shall be taken over by an order by the Revenue Divisional Officer. It completely puts out of sight the marginal note to section 8, the history of section 8 and the scheme of vesting of land in the Government.
Moreover, it is now well settled that the order in which sections of the Act occur in a statute is immaterial when the meaning is plain and there is no conflict. A later clause or provision may qualify an earlier one and the convers is equally true. The place of the section therefore is not decisive. Ultimately it is the intention of the Legislature that matters.
It is true that sections 10 and 11 use the words "the compensation payable for any land taken over by the Revenue Divisional Officer". They are likely to create an impression that the compensation is to be determined only after the land is taken over. But the words "under section 8" appearing immediately thereafter dispel any such impression. Thus section 10 speaks of the land to be taken over u/s 8 for which the compensation is to be determined. This is the only meaning which would harmonise with the words "on payment of compensation" appearing in section 8. Section 10 therefore unequivocally indicates that the compensation shall be determined according to section 10 but the land shall vest in the Governments only after the compensation is paid and an order to take over the land is made.
The same thing applies to section 11. It refers back to section 10 when it says "determine the compensation payable u/s 10". Thus the words "land taken ova" appearing in section 10 and II do not indicate any conflict between those sections and section 8. This group of sections make out a complete scheme of taking over of the surplus land on payment of compensation and by an order to that effect u/s 8.
The argument that section 12 prohibits alienation only till the order u/s 7 is passed and therefore it should be presumed that the land vests in the Government upon the approval of the proposed surrender of land u/s 7 is equally an acceptable. After the surplus land is deemed to have been surrendered, no doubt is left in the minds of the owners as to which land is likely to be taken over by the Government. He would not ordinarily transfer such land not any body is likely to purchase although there may not be prohibition to alienate. In spite of this, if the alienation of surplus land takes place, it may not be void but it is the purchaser who would be entitled to get the compensation and the land may by order be taken ever by the Revenue Divisional Officer. Such an alienation, if any, would not vitiate the taking over of such surplus land. Sec. 12 therefore does not assist the petitioners in any manner to support their contention.
It is therefore plain that since in this case the compensation is not paid and no order of taking over the surplus land is made by the Revenue Divisional Officer, the title in the land remains with the owner and has so far not vested in the Government.
The question then is whether a mandamus can be issued in the above said circumstances directing the respondents, to pay forthwith the compensation for the lands as determined by the Revenue Divisional Officer and published by him in the Gazette. We do not think in the face of section 8 the mandamus can be issued. Firstly because since the land is not vested in the Government, there is no statutory obligation on the Government to pay the compensation although determined. In other words, since the title to the surplus land remains still with the owner, he cannot claim the compensation. He cannot have the title to the land as well as the compensation for the same.
The words "by order take over such land on payment of compensation u/s 10" clearly indicate that an order to take over the land first must be made and it is only then that the question of payment of compensation would arise. Thus the order must contain both the things, that is to say the direction to take over the land and the direction to pay the compensation as determined. Until such an order is made, the land does not vest in the Government. Since the order to take over the land on payment of compensation is not made, it is plain that writ of mandamus would not be issued It is patent that such a writ is issued to obey the law and not to disregard it. Compensation cannot therefore be directed to be paid until and unless the order to take over on payment of compensation is made u/s 8. Admittedly no such order is made. It is not therefore possible to issue mandamus.
Moreover, section 8 uses the permissive word ''may''. Even after the surplus land is deemed to have been surrendered, it is left to the discretion of the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over the land by order on payment of compensation We are not impressed with the argument that the word ''may'' should be read as ''shall''. The Legislature knew very well the difference between the two words can be seen from the use of these words in the said group of sections.
In ordinary usage ''may'' is permissive and ''shall'' is imperative. In accordance with such usage the words "may" and ''it shall be lawful'' are not taken as words of compulsion. They are enabling words and the only confer capacity, power or authority and imply discretion. They are both used in a statute to indicate that something may be done which prior to it would not be done.
But when a capacity or power is given to a public authority it is true there may be circumstances which couple with the power a duty to exercise it. As stated by Cotton, L.J in R.E. Nichols v. Baker 50 L.J. Cha. 661 at 663.
May'' can never mean ''must'' so long as the English language retains its meaning; but it gives a power and then it may be questioned, in what cases, when any authority or body has a power given to it by the word ''may'' it becomes its duty to exercise that power.
We have therefore to examine as to whether there are any circumstances which compel us to take the view that the power of the Revenue Divisional Officer is coupled with a duty to take over on payment of compensation the surplus land. We do not think there are any such circumstances. The intention of the legislature is clear to leave it to the discretion of the Revenue Divisional Officer. It can be seen that the compensation can be paid either in cash or in the form of bonds. It can also be seen that such lands taken over are to be assigned to the landless poor. Those things indicate not a compelling duty on the Revenue Divisional Officer but a power to take over the land. The power is not deposited with the Revenue Divisional Officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons specifically pointed out with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the Legislature of the conditions upon which they are entitled to call for its exercise. In the absence of any such thing there is no obligation on the Revenue Divisional Officer that be ought to exercise that power and the Court will not require him to so exercise. It is plain that the enabling words are construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to effectuate a legal right. And we have seen that the land owner has earned no legal right to the compensation determined. Nor the (sic) group of landless poor have acquired any legal right to assignment of such lands in their favour. The power entrusted to the Revenue Divisional Officer is not conditional on the satisfaction of which he is bound to make an order of taking over on payment of compensation. The permissive word merely indicates an enabling power and nothing more. It is also pertinent to note that the restriction on alienation does not remain valid after an order u/s 7 is made and therefore the owner of the land cannot compel the Revenue Divisional Officer to exercise his power u/s 8. We are therefore satisfied that there is nothing in the context which shows that the power u/s 8 is coupled with an obligation to exercise it We are therefore not inclined to hold that the word ''may'' which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command.
If section 8 thus leaves it to the discretion of the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over by order the land on payment of compensation, then it is obvious that no writ of mandamus can be issued. We agree with the learned judge that in the face of section 8 which is permissive the Revenue Divisional Officer cannot be compelled by mandamus to exercise such disctionary power.
It is necessary to point out that the petitioner has not asked for a mandamus directing the Revenue Divisional Officer to make an order u/s 8. He has merely asked for mandamus to pay the compensation. No such relief, however, can be granted.
The next question which arises in the writ petition, and not in the appeal is whether the District Revenue Officer who has issued the impugned notice to revise the order determining the compensation, can so revise it.
The position of law in this regard is this : On the day when the order under sec. 10 was made, sec. 18 provided an appeal to the Collector and a revision u/s 19 to the High Court. While retaining section 18 in fact section 19, however, was amended by Act I of 1972 with effect from 19-2-1972 Section 19 is reamed as section 19 (2). Sub-section (1) is added. It enacts that the District Collector may either suo motu at any time or on an application made to him within the prescribed period call for and examine the record of Revenue Divisional Officer in respect of any decision, Order, or other proceedings made under the Act and may modify, annual or reverse or remit for reconsideration of the order. Thus the power to revise any order of the Revenue Divisional Officer either suo motu or on an application is conferred for the first time on the District Collector with effect from 19-2-1972 The question therefore is whether the District Collector u/s 19 (1) can revise the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer which were made before 19-2-1972 and which became final by that date.
It is well known that right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure but is a substantive right. The same principle would apply to the right of revision. In other words, remedial rights such as right of appeal or revision are substantive rights. Although these rights are the creatures of statute and there is no inherent right as such to file appeal or revision in any case, where such statutory right exists, it becomes vested in the litigant the moment a proceeding is initiated. Any subsequent change in the law cannot affect the vested right unless of course it is expressly provided or necessarily implied by the statute that it should be so affected.
Lord Mancaughten observed in Colonial Sugar Refinery Co. Ltd. v. Irving'' 1905 A. C. 369 that, that
To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belong to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure in principle these lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with (sic) rights contrary to the wellknown general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intension to that effect is manifested.
In that case a right of appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland to the Privy Council was given by an order in Council of 1860. This right was taken away by the Australian Commonwealth Judiciary Act. 1903, from which the only right of appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland was that to the High Court of Australia. It was held that the Act was not retrospective and the right of appeal to the Privy Council in a suit pending when the Act was passed was not taken away although the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland was prounced after the Act was passed.
What is thus plain is that since the proceedings in the instant case were commenced and concluded at a time when the District Collector had no power of revision, but it was the High Court which had the power to revise, the litigant therefore had a vested right of revision to the High Court. It can be taken away only by express language or language which necessarily has that effect. Section 19 (1) is not retrospective in the sense that it affects the pending revisions in the High Court. Those cases are to continue before the High Court, us it continues to enjoy the jurisdiction. Once it is found that section 19 (1) is not retrospective both for the purposes of suo motu action or filing of the revisions and that the litigants whose proceedings were commenced before section 19 (1) was introduced, then they have a vested right to prefer revision to the High Court directly which still continues to be the Court of revision. That right cannot be taken away or conditioned in any manner except by clear language. We do not find any such language in section 19 (1) of the Act.
In Janardan Reddy and Others Vs. The State, and Lloyds Bank Ltd. Vs. The Lloyds Bank Indian Staff Association and Others, the Supreme Court held that prima facie every legislation is prospective a no there is no reason to depart from this rule of interpretation in the case of Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution. Hence the Article has no application to judgments of the High Court of Hyderabad passed prior to the coming into force of the Constitution. Art. 136 (1), it may be recalled, empowers the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any case or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. It would be seen that there were no words in the Article to give it retrospective effect and that is why it was held that orders made prior to the Constitution do not fall within the ambit of Article 136. Applying the same principle to the present case, we have no hesitation in holding that since section 19 (1) is not retrospective, order made prior to the introduction of section 19 (1) and which order by the date when section 19(1) came into force had become final is not revisable by the District Collector under that provision.
In a similar case, in regard to Rule 75 of the Village Officers Service Rules, a Full Bench of this Court has taken the same view. In P. Sriramaiah v. P. Purshorhama Rao 1973 (1) A.P.L.J. 112 F.B. : (1973)11 A.L.T 272 (F.B.) it is held that it was not intended that the new remedy of revision made available under Rule 75 would empower the Government to revise order of the Board of Revenue which has become final by the date of the Ordinance or the subsequent Act.
The same principle applies to the instant case also. An order which on the date it is made is final gives rise to vested rights and a subsequent change in law giving rise to new rights of appeal or revision is presumed not to affect the finality of orders already made. This principle was settled by the Privy Council in AIR 1927 242 (Privy Council) Lord Blanesburgh in delivering the opinion of the Privy Council said at page 244 :
provisions which, if applied retrospectively would deprive of their existing finality orders, which, when the statute came into force, were final, ate provisions which touch existing rights. Accordingly, if the section new in question is to apply to orders final at the date when it came into force, it must be clearly so provided.
In this case, section 19 (1) came into force at a time when the order u/s 10 had become final. That finality our judgment, is not taken away by section 19 (1) of the Act. It is not necessary in this case to decide if new right of appeal or revision is conferred before making of the order, although after institution of proceedings, whether such right of appeal or revision would be available against all orders subsequently made.
We are therefore clear in our view that section 19 (1) which has for the first time confined power of revision on the Collector is not retrospective in its operation and consequently the orders passed prior to that provision coming into force are not revisable by the Collector when such orders had by them become final.
What is the relief we can then give to the petitioner in W.P. No. 4818 of 1973? Originally, although in paragraph 9 of the petition, objection to the jurisdiction of the District Revenue Officer to revise the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer passed before 10-1-1972, when section 19 (1) came into force is raised, (sic) in paragraph 13 if was prayed that a direction may be issued to the District Revenue Officer "to dispose of the proceedings B-7-3077/22 forthwith". When the conflict was noticed, a petition to amend was presented on 20-12-1973. But the petition merely asked for deletion of paragraph 13 which we permitted. No specific relief, however is asked to prohibit the District Revenue Officer, 3rd respondent, from proceeding with the revision as he has no jurisdiction to do so. In the view which we have taken that the District Revenue Officer, 3rd respondent, has no jurisdiction to revise the order which became final prior to 19-1-1972, it must follow that he cannot proceed with the hearing of the revision. We would therefore issue a writ of prohibition directing the 3rd respondent not to proceed with the hearing of revision pending before him. The writ petition is to be allowed partly to that extent only. For the reasons which we have endeavoured to give, we would dismiss the appeal with costs Advocate''s fee Rs. 100/-. We would, however, partly allow W.P. No. 4818 of 1973 and issue the Writ or Prohibition as above. We dismiss the said writ petition regarding the rest. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own cost in the said writ petition. Advocate''s fee Rs. 100/-.