AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by the learned Single Bench on 30.01.2018 whereby the dispute referred for adjudication
regarding termination of the services of the workman on 02.12.1992 was found to be delayed as the appellant raised the dispute after 11 years of his
dismissal.
Learned counsel for the appellant argued that once reference has been made by an appropriate Government, then the question of delay cannot be
raised to defeat an Industrial Dispute which is required to be decided in terms of the reference made. Reliance is placed upon a judgment of Single
Bench reported as 2017(2) MPLJ 149 (Chief General Manager vs. Rajnoo).
The services of the appellant were terminated on 02.12.1992 and for 9 years thereafter, the appellant has not raised a little finger except filing an
appeal on 30.01.2001 against the order of dismissal. It is thereafter, the appellant sought to raise an Industrial Dispute.
Learned Single Bench relied upon Supreme Court judgment reported as (2015) 15 SCC 1 (Prabhakar v. Sericulture Department) wherein it has been
held that thought the law of limitation does not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act, but it has to be shown by the workman that
there is a dispute in presenti. It is required to be demonstrated that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay
has not resulted into making the Industrial Dispute cease to exist.
We find that an individual dispute of dismissal cannot be permitted to be raised after 11 years of the order of dismissal. The Industrial Disputes Act
was brought on the statute-book with the object to ensure social justice to both the employers and employees and advance the progress of industry by
bringing about the existence of harmony and cordial relationship between the parties. It is a piece of legislation providing and regulating the service
conditions of the workers. The object of the Act is to improve the service conditions of industrial labour so as to provide for them the ordinary
amenities of life and by the process, to bring about industrial peace which would in its turn accelerate productive activity of the country resulting in its
prosperity. The prosperity of the country in its turn, helps to improve the conditions of labour.
Though, the Limitation Act is not applicable, but the fact remains that the conduct of the appellant leads to estoppel or waiver of his right to dispute the
order of dismissal. Same is the view taken by the Supreme Court in another judgments reported as (2000) 2 SCC 455 (Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P.
Madhavankutty), (2007) 9 SCC 109 (Dharappa v. Bijapur Cooperative Milk Producer Societies Union Ltd.) and (2001) 1 SCC 133 (Balbir Singh vs.
Punjab Roadways).
In Rajasthan State Agriculture Mktg. Board v. Mohan Lal, (2013) 14 SCC 543 the Court held all relevant factors including the mode and manner of
appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute
before grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed. It is held as under:-
“19. We are clearly of the view that though the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the reference made under the ID Act but delay in raising
industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion irrespective of
whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down by this Court in Gitam Singh Rajasthan Development
Corpn. v. Gitam Singh, (2013) 5 SCC 136 that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors
including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the
delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed.â€
In view of the above, when an order of dismissal was passed against the Appellant after conducting domestic enquiry, therefore, the act of the
appellant in not disputing the order of dismissal for 11 long years bars the appellant to dispute the order of dismissal.
The judgment of the learned Single Bench referred to by the appellant arises out of the fact where an order of termination was passed against the
workman for remaining absent from duty after conduct of departmental enquiry. The workman challenged the order of termination after five years.
We find that whether a dispute suffers from delay and laches or whether the workman is estopped to challenge the order of dismissal depends upon
the facts of each case. In the present case, after conduct of the departmental enquiry, an order of dismissal was passed on 02.12.1992. The appellant
accepted the order of dismissal for long 9 years when he filed departmental appeal and later raised an Industrial Dispute. We find that long silence of
the appellant to challenge the dismissal order passed amounts to acceptance of the dismissal order which does not warrant any interference after long
lapse of time.
Consequently, we do not find any merit in the present appeal. The same is dismissed.