Smt. Shakuntla Yadav vs State of Haryana and Another

Ajay Tewari, J.—This petition has been filed challenging the order dated 09.06.2008 whereby the petitioner has been removed from the post of Member of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana on, what would have been in any case, the last date of her tenure.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that even a brief perusal of the chronology of events would reveal a complete breach of the principles of audi alterem partern. He has highlighted that the inquiry report was dated 04.06.2008. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 05.06.2008 on which date show cause notice was also issued. There Were holidays on 6th, 7th and 8th of June, 2008 and the petitioner filed an interim reply on 09.06.2008 wherein she specifically asked for permission to peruse the record of the cases cited in the inquiry report and on that very date the impugned order of removing her from service was passed.

In my opinion this writ must fail. The inquiry report has graphically detailed all the instances where the petitioner unilaterally passed effective orders in blatant violation of the provisions of Section 14(2) read with Section 18 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 and Section 18 are reproduced herein below:

14(2) Every proceeding referred to in Sub-section (1) shall be conducted by the President of the District Forum and at least one member thereof sitting together; Provided that where a member, for any reason, is unable to conduct a proceeding till it is completed, the President and the other member shall continue the proceeding from the stage at which it was last heard by the previous member.

Procedure applicable to State Commission.- The provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 14 and the rules made thereunder for the disposal of complaints by the District Forum shall, with such modification as may be necessary, be applicable to the disposal of disputes by the State Commission.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that in fact unilateral orders were passed on the verbal directions of the president since he was busy and that had the petitioner been given chance she may have been able to substantiate this assertion. However, on a query from the Court as to whether the President would have such power at all in view of the mandatory provisions of Section 14(2) read with Section 18 (supra), learned Counsel for the petitioner had no option but to admit that even the President of the Forum would have no power to verbally direct the petitioner to hear cases in single Bench. If that be so it was clearly expected of the petitioner who had been in office almost for five years to know this fact and, therefore, even if any such verbal direction was given to her she should have refused to pass any order sitting singly. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not disputed the fact that the petitioner did in fact pass the orders which are detailed in the inquiry report. In these circumstances no useful purpose could have been served even if the petitioner had been granted some time to peruse the record since, as mentioned above, her only defence was the alleged verbal direction of the then President. A perusal of the inquiry report reveals that the learned President, after going through the entire record, has in his exhaustive report, held as follows:

In view of the above discussion it has been established on record that Smt. Shakuntala Yadav, Member had preponed the cases from the actual dates of hearing and then decided the cases while sitting singly, which is in contravention to the provisions of Section 14(2) read with Section 18 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 wherein it has been specifically provided that every proceedings referred to in Sub-section (1) shall be conducted by the President of the District Forum and at least one member thereof sitting together and every order made by the District Forum under Sub-section (1) shall be signed by its President and the member or members who conducted the proceedings and the provisions of Section 14 are also applicable to the disposal of disputes by the State Commission as provided in Section 18 of the Act. In Section 16(1A)(ii) A Bench may be constituted by the President with one or more members as the President may deem fit. But in the present case no single member Bench has been constituted by the then President of the State

Commission. In the absence of the same, Smt. Shakuntala Yadav, Member was not competent to pass such orders while sitting singly.

The totality of circumstances as emerged form the aforesaid facts are that Smt. Shakuntala Yadav, Member has misused her official position knowing fully well that she could not hold the sitting of the Commission singly without their being any authority from the outgoing President and thus violated the provisions of Section 14(2) read with Section 18 of the Consumer Protection Act. The decision of afore-mentioned three cases raising an accusing finger on her to prove that these orders were passed for some extraneous consideration in the absence of the President of the State Commission and as such has acted in an unbecoming of a public servant. She has exercised these powers, fully conversant with statutory provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, being a member of the State Commission almost for the last five years.

I find no reason to differ with the inquiry report and the consequent order of termination.

It is trite to say that the rules of natural justice are not a mathematical formula and the same cannot be extended to breaking point. Apart from this the law also recognises the principle of post decisional hearing in appropriate cases. In Ashwani Kumar and others Vs. State of Bihar and others, etc. etc., the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under:

...though the principles of natural justice are omnipervasive, in given circumstances, their non-application may also advance cause of justice to prevent misuse or abuse of power or of the judicial process. It is settled law that post decisional opportunity is valid to cure the illegality complained of....

In my opinion the present petition could in the circumstances of the case be termed as post decisional hearing. Even during this process learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to justify the action taken by the petitioner.

Consequently this writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.