Smt. Sarsa Bai vs Union Of India & Anr.

Hon’ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J):

The grievance of the applicant, Smt. Sarsabai, widow of Late Fage Lal, is that the respondents, despite the fact that her deceased husband had been appointed on compassionate grounds under the special powers delegated to the General Manager/Divisional Railway Manager, illegally subjected him to disciplinary proceedings and removed him from service through an authority which was not competent to impose such penalty. Thus, the applicant has filed the accompanying OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs:

Along with the accompanying OA, the applicant has also filed MA NO.660/2023 seeking condonation of delay in filing the accompanying OA in which the applicant has stated that husband of the applicant was appointed on compassionate ground as Gangman in the year 1995 at Chhindwara of South Eastern (now S.E.C.) Railway the control of SSE (P.W.) Chhindwara. The power to appoint on the compassionate ground is vested to the General Manager only and is not redelegated further. Thus, in Disciplinary cases, the Appointing Authority functions as the Disciplinary Authority in such cases. The chargesheet was served to him for remaining absent from 04.07.2007 to 03.10.2007 and was removed from service w.e.f. 08.06.2010 on a slipshod manner. Further, the disciplinary and revisionary authorities did not take cognizance of the illegality and infirmity of the entire D&A proceedings for which the husband of the applicant had to suffer a lot. After receipt of the termination order, the applicant represented by way of appeal dated 01.03.2012 to the appellate authority and revisionary application dated 01.06.2012 were also rejected.

Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the action on the part of the respondents were just, proper and legal. Learned counsel also raised a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the OA on the ground of limitation, as the applicant has admitted that the OA is not filed within the period of limitation and in the said MA, the applicant has miserably fell to assign any reason for the delay caused in filing the accompanying OA, as no ground is carved out for condonation of delay. Further, ignorance of law and illiteracy is no ground for condonation of delay.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings available on record.

Since the applicant seeks to challenge the order of removal dated 11.07.2018 (Annexure A-1) by filing the accompanying OA on 09.07.2023, a specific query was put to the learned counsel for the applicant with regard to the maintainability of the O.A. on the ground of limitation. In response, learned counsel submitted that there are several grounds on which the impugned order is liable to be challenged and contended that the present O.A. is within limitation in view of the submissions made in the MA. It was further submitted that, prior thereto, the deceased husband of the applicant had approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No.2170/2014, which was allowed with certain observations by this Tribunal vide Order dated 21.07.2017.

We are unable to accept the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant. The issue of limitation is not a mere technicality, which can be brushed aside on the ground that the applicant may have a good case on merits. Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 expressly prescribes the period within which an application under Section 19 can be entertained. Under Section 21(1)(a), where a final order has been made in connection with the grievance, the application is required to be made within one year from the date of such final order. The only statutory exception is contained in Section 21(3), under which a belated application may be admitted if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in D.C.S. Negi v. Union of India, reported in (2018) 16 SCC 721, has categorically held that Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act is couched in negative terms and that it is the duty of the Tribunal to first examine whether an application is within the prescribed period of limitation. The Tribunal cannot entertain a belated application unless the requirements of Section 21(3) are satisfied and an appropriate order condoning the delay is passed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further made it clear that the Tribunal cannot abdicate its statutory duty.

The aforesaid principle has consistently been followed in subsequent decisions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as High Courts and this Tribunal in a catena of cases. It is well settled that a stale or dead claim cannot be revived merely by making a representation/legal notice or by relying upon a subsequent communication, unless such representation is one recognised by law as a statutory remedy. The cause of action in service matters cannot be artificially extended by repeated representations/legal notice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that where a statutory remedy of appeal or representation is provided, limitation is governed in accordance with the principles laid down in S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (1989) 4 SCC 582, however, repeated representations which are not contemplated by law do not extend the period of limitation.

In the present case, the impugned order of removal was passed on 11.07.2018, whereas the present O.A. was filed on 09.07.2023, i.e. after a lapse of almost five years. Thus, the O.A. was filed far beyond the period of one year prescribed under Section 21(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Even assuming that the applicant intended to invoke Section 21(3), there is no sufficient explanation on record for such an extraordinary delay, nor has the applicant demonstrated any legally sustainable ground which could justify condonation of the delay. Further, it is apt to note that the supporting affidavit filed along with the present MA is also not in correct form, in as much as the contents of the said affidavit are not ^{verified by the applicant in the instant case.}Central Administrative Tribunal

The reliance placed upon the earlier O.A. No.2170/2014 is also of no assistance to the applicant. The said O.A. was instituted in respect of the grievance then existing and culminated in the order dated 21.07.2017. The impugned order dated 11.07.2018 is a subsequent and distinct order. The earlier proceedings, therefore, cannot have the effect of keeping alive, or extending, the limitation for challenging a subsequent order. The mere fact that the deceased employee had earlier approached this Tribunal does not confer a perpetual right to challenge every subsequent administrative action at any point of time.

It is equally well settled that a direction by a Court or Tribunal for consideration of a claim or representation does not, by itself, wipe out delay and laches or confer a fresh cause of action in respect of a stale claim. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against permitting stale service claims to be revived through the device of subsequent representations or orders passed pursuant thereto. The relevant consideration is whether the claim sought to be agitated before the Tribunal constitutes a live and legally enforceable grievance within the period prescribed by the statute.

In the present case, the applicant has challenged the order dated 11.07.2018 only in the year 2023. The grounds sought to be urged on merits cannot, in the absence of a legally sustainable explanation for the delay, override the mandatory requirement of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. A claim which is barred by limitation cannot be permitted to be examined on merits merely because the applicant asserts that the impugned order suffers from illegality.

In view of the foregoing discussion, and having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.C.S. Negi (supra) and the subsequent decisions consistently applying the principles governing limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, we are of the considered view that the present O.A., having been filed nearly five years after the impugned order dated 11.07.2018, is hopelessly barred by limitation. The applicant has also failed to establish sufficient cause warranting exercise of power under Section 21(3) of the Act ibid. Thus, MA seeking condonation of delay is found bereft of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the O.A. is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation alone, without entering into the merits of the challenge to the impugned order. Consequently, accompanying OA is also dismissed being barred by limitation.

There shall be no order as to costs.