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Judgment
(Dr.T.Amarnath Goud, J)
Heard Mr. A. Bhaumik, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. K. De, learned Additional GA appearing for the respondents-State and Mr. K. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-TPSC.
By means of filing this writ appeal, the appellant herein, challenged the judgment and order dated 15.07.2026 passed by a learned Single Judge of this High Court in WP(C) 486 of 2026.
Shortly stated, the Appellant, currently serving as a Staff Nurse, applied for the post of Assistant Professor under TPSC Advertisement No. 05/2025. Having crossed the prescribed upper age limit of 45 years (after standard relaxation), the appellant submitted multiple representations to the administrative authorities requesting one-time age relaxation in light of exceptional circumstances and prior government practice. Upon the total inaction and non-consideration of those pending representations by the respondents, the appellant preferred a writ petition under Article 226 seeking a direction for fair consideration and disposal of her requests. The Ld. Single Judge dismissed the writ petition in limine on the ground that no cause of action existed. Hence, this appeal preferred by the appellant. For convenience, the relevant part of the judgment and order dated 15.07.2026 is reproduced hereunder:
“05.Heard both the sides. Admittedly, the petitioner is a Government Servant and her present age is 49 years. As per advertisement vide No. 05/2025 the requirement in respect of age is maximum 40 years on 07.03.2025 which is relaxable by five years in case of ST/ST/PH candidates and Government Servants. Since the petitioner is at present 49 years of age, so, there is no scope on the part of the petitioner to apply for the post against the said advertisement vide No.05/2025. The notification dated 20.01.2007 as relied upon by the petitioner issued by the Government was onetime relaxation for filling up of certain posts of Assistant Professor. The present petitioner cannot rely upon the said notification as precedent because it is the matter of policy of the Government to consider relaxation of age. The petitioner in this case save and except the aforesaid assertions could not place any other grounds to consider her grievance by issuing any rule and as such the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this writ petition. In this regard in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. reported in (2004) 6 SCC 254, in para Nos.6, 16 & 18, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“Cause of action
6.Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily.
16.In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 567] it was held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose that the integral facts pleaded
Mr. A Bhaumik, learned counsel for the appellant contended that failure or inaction on the part of administrative authorities to consider representations itself constitutes a valid, continuing cause of action amenable to judicial review under Article 226. Learned counsel further submitted that the right of the appellant to her right to fair administrative consideration without asserting an automatic right to age relaxation, emphasizing that administrative silence violates principles of natural justice and Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel has further submitted that the petitioner is at present 49 years of age and being a Government Servant she is eligible for five years relaxation in respect of age but since she has come across 45 years of age as such normally she is not eligible for applying for the said post and in this regard, the Government of Tripura by a notification dated 20.01.2007 granted relaxation in upper age limit up to 45 years from 37 years and as such in view of the said notification she is also eligible for relaxation of age and in this regard the petitioner submitted representation to the Authority of the Department but that has not been considered. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant has only urged for a direction upon the respondents to consider the representations of the petitioner. In fine, learned counsel has sought for and interference of this court by setting aside the transfer order.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents unanimously submitted that the learned single Judge passed a well reasoned order and the same requires no interference.
We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at bar and have carefully gone through the impugned judgment and the materials available on record.
It is admitted fact that as per advertisement No. 05 of 2025, the age limit is 40 years as on 07.03.2025 which is relaxable by 5 years in case of ST/SC/PH and government servant. The petitioner-appellant presently is 49 years of age, so bar automatically creates for the appellant to apply for the said post. Further, the notification dated 20.01.2007, as relied upon by the appellant, relates to One Time Relaxation. Hence, there is no infirmity in the findings returned by the Single Judge.
Admittedly, Court has no legal jurisdiction or power to mandate age relaxations for public employment. A High Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to force an employer or State agency to relax upper age limits unless a specific rule permits. The State uniformly prescribed age limit of 40 years to all candidates. The petitioner-appellant submitted her representations to the respondents seeking age relaxation on the basis of notification dated 20.01.2007, but the said representations were not considered by the respondents in exercise of its discretionary power since the respondents were of the opinion that the petitioner-appellant was not eligible to be granted the benefit of an age relaxation on the basis of notification dated 21.01.2007 which is not in force. No individual candidate can claim a vested right to age relaxation which lies in the discretion of the appointing authority. The appellant-petitioner cannot claim age relaxation as a matter of right. Eligibility criteria should be uniform and there cannot be scope of arbitrary selections. A candidate cannot have a vested right to claim an exemption from a uniform criteria. Grant of age relaxation to a selective candidate will cause serious prejudice in the process of selection.
In the aforesaid perspective, we do not find any merit in the appeal, as such, the same stands dismissed.
As a sequel, pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed.