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Judgment
Brij Kishore Dube, J.—This petition under Sections 482 read with 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the ''Code'') has been filed by the petitioners for quashing the criminal proceedings instituted against them by the respondent No. 2, Rajeev Jain vide Crime No. 435/2010 under Sections 420, 467, 466, 471 and 120-B of IPC registered at Police Station, Ashok Nagar, District Ashok Nagar and its consequent proceedings bearing Sessions Trial No. 37/2013 pending before II Additional Sessions Judge, Ashok Nagar. The quashment of the criminal proceedings has been prayed by the petitioners on the ground of compromise of the matter with the complainant being the respondent No. 2.
Shri S.S. Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that on account of the business rivalry with the petitioners, the respondent No. 2 filed a false complaint against the petitioners and on the basis of it, the Police Station, Ashok Nagar registered FIR at Crime No. 435/2010 under Sections 420, 467, 466, 471 and 120-B of IPC. After completing the investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet before the competent Criminal Court. The petitioners submitted a petition u/s 482 of the Code being Mis. Cr. Case No. 7766/2010 before this Court for quashing the FIR registered at Crime No. 435/2010 (supra). This Court vide order dated 14/02/2011, on the request of counsel for the petitioners dismissed the petition as not pressed with liberty to repeat it after framing of the charge, thereafter charge under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of IPC has been framed against the petitioners on 30/04/2013 by the Court below. The complainant and the petitioners have filed applications under Sections 320(8) and 320(2) of the Code for compromise of the matter before the Court below and the applications are still pending before it. Since, the complainant/respondent No. 2 settled the subject-matter of the crime with the petitioners amicably, therefore, this petition is preferred by the petitioners for quashing the aforesaid criminal proceedings and the charge framed against them by the Court below. Learned counsel for the petitioners cited the following judgments in support of his contention:
(i) B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another,
(ii) Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another,
(iii) Manoj Sharma Vs. State and Others,
(iv) Shiji @ Pappu and Others Vs. Radhika and Another, and
(v) Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another,
Learned Panel Lawyer appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 opposed the prayer on the ground that the charges framed against the petitioners are serious in nature.
Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submits that the petitioners and the respondent No. 2 have amicably settled the subject-matter of the crime amongst themselves and has no objection in dropping the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners. In this regard, the petitioners and the respondents No. 2 submitted I.A. Nos. 6247/13 & 6248/13 under Sections 320(8) and 320(2) of the Code.
The respondent No. 2, Rajeev Jain (Jat)/complainant by presenting himself before this Court also submits that now all the disputes have been settled amicably with the petitioners, therefore, he does not wish to prosecute the petitioners.
Considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the record.
It is revealed from the record that the complainant/respondent No. 2, Rajeev Jain (Jat) who is running a fair price shop in the name of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukerji Prathmik Upbhokta Sahkari Bandar Maryadit, District Ashoknagar made a complaint before the authorities alleging that the accused/Smt. Richa Sharma, Narmada Prasad, Ravindra Kumar and Arvind Kumar (petitioners herein) have prepared forged and fabricated ration cards and fraudulently submitted the same with an application for obtaining new fair price shop and, therefore, committed an offence of cheating and forgery. On enquiry, it was found that some of the ration cards are fabricated and forged one, therefore, an FIR at Crime No. 435/2010 (supra) was registered against all the four accused persons/petitioners herein. On completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against all the petitioners/four accused persons before the committal Court, which on its turn committed the case to the Court of Sessions from where it was received by the Trial Court for the trial. The Trial Judge on the material placed on record framed charge on 30/04/2013 for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of IPC against all the accused persons. The trial is pending before the Trial Court.
The respondent No. 2/complainant is only an informant of the commission of a cognizable offence. The forged ration cards did not belong to him.
The offence with which the petitioners herein stand charged, are not private or personal in nature so as to justify the quashing the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners in exercise of the jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code on the basis of compromise arrived at between the informant, Rajeev Jain (Jat) and the petitioners (Referred to: Ashok Sadarangani and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,
In B.S. Joshi and others (supra), the Hon''ble Apex Court observed as under:
It is thus, clear that Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers u/s 482 of the Code.
In the case of Nikhil Merchant (supra), the Hon''ble Apex Court held as under:
On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise.
In Manoj Sharma (supra), the Hon''ble Apex Court observed as under:
In our view, the High Court''s refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be supported. The first information report, which had been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute between the complainant and the accused which is of a private nature. It is no doubt true that the first information report was the basis of the investigation by the police authorities, but the dispute between the parties remained of a personal nature. Once the complainant decided not to pursue the matter further, the High Court could have taken a more pragmatic view of the matter. We do not suggest that while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court could not have refused to quash the first information report, but what we do say is that the matter could have been considered by the High Court with greater pragmatism in the facts of the case.
As we have indicated hereinbefore, the exercise of power u/s 482 of Cr. P.C., or Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary to be exercised in the facts of each case. In the facts of this case we are of the view that continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and quash the criminal proceedings pending before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Court, Delhi, in FIR No. 50 of 1997 dated 31-1-1997, PS Vivek Vihar (East Delhi).
In Shiji @ Pappu and others (supra), the offence under Sections 354 and 394 of IPC which were charged against the appellants are purely personal in nature arising out of a personal dispute between the parties and the aforesaid dispute was settled between the parties by entering into compromise. The Hon''ble Apex Court held as under:
It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable u/s 320 Cr. P.C., is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power u/s 482 Cr. P.C., That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trail is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trail court or in appeal on the one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution u/s 482 Cr. P.C., on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable u/s 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court u/s 482 Cr. P.C., are not for that purpose controlled by section 320 Cr. P.C.,
Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plentitude of the power u/s 482 Cr. P.C., by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power u/s 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition u/s 482 of the criminal procedure code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.
In Gian Singh (supra), a Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in a reference case considered the scope of the power of High Court u/s 482 of the Code for quashing the criminal offences in non-compoundable offences in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, answered the reference as under:
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences u/s 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.; (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim''s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
In view of the above, it cannot be said that B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, and Manoj Sharma Vs. State and Others, were not correctly decided. We answer the reference accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the Bench(es) concerned.
In view of the aforesaid principle laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court, in the case in hand, the offences with which the petitioners stand charged are not personal or private in nature, therefore, this Court is not inclined to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners in respect of Crime No. 435/10 (supra) which are pending in the shape of Sessions Trial No. 37/2013 before II Additional Sessions Judge, Ashoknagar in exercise of the inherent power u/s 482 of the Code on the basis of compromise arrived at between the petitioners and the informant/respondent No. 2. The petition is devoid of merit and stands dismissed. A copy of this order be sent to the learned Trial Court.