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Judgment
Dilip Gupta, J.—This petition seeks the quashing of the order dated 28th August, 2009 passed by the Additional District Judge, Bijnor by which the application filed by the Petitioner for being impleaded as a Respondent in the appeal filed by Bikram Singh Mahar u/s 17 of the Indian Forest Act against the order dated 22nd August, 2003 passed by the Forest Settlement Officer, was rejected. The Petitioner has also sought the quashing of the order dated 19th February, 2010 by which the third Additional District Judge, Bijnor has rejected the application filed by the Petitioner for review of the aforesaid order dated 22nd August, 2009.
It transpires from the records of the writ petition that notifications were issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Indian Forest Act. Land of Dan Singh Bisht was also included. One Bikram Singh Mahar, who claimed that a lease deed for 148 Bighas 10 Biswas of land was executed in his favour by Dan Singh Bisht, filed objections against the said notification which were registered as Case No. 835. Dalip Singh also filed objections that lease deed in respect of 216 Bighas of land was executed by the proprietor in his favour. The objections were registered as Case No. 836. The Forest Settlement Officer by the order dated 6th March, 1963 allowed the objections filed by Bikram Singh Mahar and Dalip Singh and excluded the plots mentioned in the order from the limits of the proposed reserve forest.
Two appeals were, accordingly, filed u/s 17 of the Forest Act by the State of U.P. but both the appeals were dismissed by the Commissioner by the order dated 17th August, 1963. Thereafter, two Revisions were filed by the State of U.P. before the District Judge, Bijnor which were allowed by the order dated 6th May, 1968.
Bikram Singh Mahar and Dalip Singh filed Writ Petitions in the High Court which were dismissed on 19th November, 1969. Special Appeals were filed against this judgment which were allowed on 15th December, 1972 with a direction to the Forest Settlement Officer to pass a fresh order in accordance with law.
The Forest Settlement Officer, thereafter, by the order dated 22nd August, 2003 declared the lease deed executed by the power of attorney holder of Dan Singh Bisht to be void and illegal. It is against this order that Bikram Singh Mahar filed an appeal before the District Judge, Bijnor u/s 17 of the Forest Act which is said to be pending.
During the pendency of this appeal, the Petitioner claiming herself to be the daughter of Dan Singh Bisht moved an application on 20th March, 2009 for impleadment as a party in the proceedings. This application was rejected by the order dated 28th August, 2009. The Petitioner filed a review petition which was rejected by the order dated 19th November, 2010. These two orders have been assailed in this petition.
Apart from rejecting the application for impleadment on merit, the Appellate Court also observed that the Petitioner could not file any evidence to substantiate her claim that she was the daughter of Dan Singh Bisht. It is in the review application that certain documents were filed by the Petitioner to support the claim but the review application was rejected on the ground that such additional documents cannot be made a ground for review of the order.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the legal heir of Dan Singh Bisht was a necessary party and, therefore, should have been impleaded but the Appellate Court rejected the application in an arbitrary manner. It is also his submission that the review application was wrongly rejected.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner cannot be accepted. As noticed hereinabove, it was for the Petitioner to plead and prove that the Petitioner was a necessary party but the Petitioner did not produce any evidence to even substantiate her claim that she is the daughter of late Dan Singh Bisht. This apart, the Court below has observed that the Petitioner had no right in the property. In the review application, certain additional documents were sought to be filed by the Petitioner. The review application, therefore, could not have been allowed on the basis of such additional documents which had not been filed when the initial order was passed.
There is, therefore, no error in the impugned orders which may call for any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
