Smt. Maya Meshram vs Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax (Admn)

Vasanti A. Naik, J.—By this petition, the petitioner impugns the order passed by the Industrial Court Nagpur on 1.11.2001 allowing the revision application filed by the respondent and setting aside the order passed by the Labour Court on 18.9.1995 in complaint ULPA No. 217/1994.

The petitioner was working as a daily wager in the Sales Tax Department. The respondent had terminated the services of the petitioner. The petitioner filed a complaint against her termination before the Labour Court, Nagpur. The Labour Court granted temporary reinstatement to the petitioner by order dated 2.1.1995. Since the order was not complied, a criminal complaint u/s 48 of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act 1971 was filed by the petitioner. The court convicted the respondents by an order dated 28.7.1999 for non compliance. In the meanwhile, the petitioner was reinstated in service on 30.4.1998. The Labour Court finally decided the matter on 18.9.1995 by allowing the complaint and reinstating the petitioner in service. A revision was preferred against the order dated 18.9.1995 by the respondent before the Industrial Court, Nagpur. The Industrial Court, Nagpur by the order dated 1.11.2001 allowed the revision and remanded the matter to the Labour Court by quashing and setting aside the order of the Labour Court, dated 18.9.1995.

Shri Manoj Pillai, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Industrial Court was not justified in entertaining the revision after a lapse of almost four years from the passing of the judgment by the Labour Court on 18.9.1995. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the reason stated by the respondent for not preferring the revision application within a reasonable time was not sufficient and the Industrial Court ought to have dismissed the revision filed by the respondent. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court was not justified in allowing the revision and setting aside the order passed by the Labour Court.

Smt. Sharda Wandile, the learned AGP appearing on behalf of the respondents supported the order passed by the Industrial Court on 1.11.2001 and submitted that due to bonafide reasons the matter was not defended before the Labour Court though there were good grounds for opposing the complaint filed by the petitioner. The learned AGP submitted that after the notice of the complaint was received, the respondent had asked for sanction/permission to appoint a private Counsel and since that permission was awaited, nothing could be done in the matter before the Labour Court. According to the learned AGP all these facts have been rightly considered by the Industrial Court and the order passed by the Industrial Court remanding the matter to the Labour Court is just and proper.

I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have perused the impugned order dated 1.11.2001. On perusal of the same, it appears that it would not be proper for this Court to interfere with the order passed by the Industrial Court on 1.11.2001 in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Industrial Court considered the reason for the delay in filing the revision, as also the reason for non appearance before the Labour Court to grant one more opportunity to the respondent to defend the case, before the Labour Court. The Industrial Court observed that the respondent desired to take a plea of absence of jurisdiction of the Labour Court to decide the matter and also of the absence of continuous rendering of services for 240 days. In the facts and circumstances of the case, and in the interest of justice, it would not be proper for this Court to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Industrial Court in entertaining the revision and remand the matter to the Labour Court for granting an opportunity to the respondent to defend the matter. Though it is necessary to grant opportunity to the respondent to prosecute the matter before the Labour Court for the inaction on the part of the respondent to diligently prosecute the case, it would be necessary in the fitness of things to impose some costs on the respondents. The respondents, therefore, are liable to pay costs of Rs. 3000/-to the petitioner within a period of three months. Since the petitioner is working as daily wager with the respondents since 30.4.1998, the respondents should continue the petitioner as daily wager till the complaint is decided by the Labour Court.

Order accordingly. No order as to costs.