Smt. Mausumi Bose nee Bandopadhyay vs Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others

Jayanta Kumar Biswas, J.—The petitioner in this Article 226 petition dated April 28, 2010 is seeking a mandamus commanding the first-third respondents to pay her the benefits payable under her deceased husband''s life insurance policy.

The petitioner claims that she is the wife of one Susanta Bandopadhyay who was holding a valid a life insurance policy at the date of his death on March 14, 2009. Her case is that though in law she is entitled to the benefits under the policy, the fourth respondent, Susanta''s brother, has requested the Life Insurance of Corporation of India to pay him the benefits on the ground that he was nominated to receive the benefits.

Counsel submits that the petitioner has already applied for a succession certificate under the Indian Succession Act, 1925. She has invited me to make an order restraining the Corporation from paying the benefits to the fourth respondent. She has relied on Challamma Vs. Tilaga and Others, . The question is whether any order can be made in the matter by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

In view of the provision of section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938, the Corporation is under a statutory obligation to pay the benefits under the policy to the fourth respondent who was admittedly nominated by the deceased policy-holder to receive the benefits after his death. According to the existing law, the fourth respondent is only to receive the benefits and hold them for the benefit of the persons who became entitled to Susanta''s estate.

If the petitioner obtains succession certificate, needless to say, she will be entitled to the benefits. If she produces a succession certificate before the money is paid, it will be lawful for the Corporation to pay it to the petitioner, the person entitled to get and enjoy it. Admittedly, the petitioner has not yet obtained the succession certificate and her application for it is pending.

On these facts, I am of the view that the Writ Court cannot give the petitioner any relief. An order restraining the Corporation from paying the money to the fourth respondent till the disposal of succession certificate case pending before the District Judge, Barasat, will virtually amount to making an interim order in the pending succession certificate case. Such an order will also be contrary to the provision of section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938.

It is entirely another matter if on the facts the Corporation decides not to pay the money to any one until the succession certificate case is decided. The cited decision does not say that the Writ Court can make a restraining order contrary to the provision of section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938. If the Corporation decides not to pay the money until disposal of the succession certificate case, then, in my opinion, in all fairness, it will be appropriate for it to invest the payable amount in a mid-term deposit so that it may earn a fair rate of interest for the actual beneficiary.

With the above observations, the petition is disposed of. No costs. Certified xerox.