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Judgment
Ashok B. Hinchigeri
The petitioner has called into question the order, date 26.5.2011 (Annexure-F) passed on I.A. No. 2 by the Court of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Nelamangala in LAC No. 5/09 allowing the impleadment of the respondent Nos. 3 to 5.
The facts of the case in brief are that the land measuring 37 guntas out of total extent of 6 acres 23 guntas standing at Survey No. 73 of Sompura Village was acquired for the purpose of National Highways. The claims for compensation amount are advanced by the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 3 to 5. The respondent Nos. 3 and 4 had filed W.P. No. 21039/2000 and obtained an interim order on 7.7.2000 restraining the respondent No. 1 from disbursing the compensation amount to the petitioner and one Bharath R. Gajaria. On 7.9.2001 the petition was withdrawn with the liberty to pursue the remedies u/s 11 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, When the respondent No. 1 disbursed a sum of about Rs. 1,42,500/- the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 filed W.P. No. 30639/2002. this Court, by its order, dated 28.1.2004 rejected the petition with the liberty to the petitioners to approach the Civil Court, as serious questions of title are involved. The respondent No. 1 presented the reference to the Civil Court invoking Section 3H (4) of the National Highways Act, 1956.
The reference was registered as LAC No. 7/2003, subsequently renumbered as LAC No. 5/2009. In the said proceedings the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 filed I.A. 2 and sought their impleadment. The Civil Court, on finding that the impleading applicants have an arguable case and in order to minimise the multiplicity of the proceedings has allowed the said IA. On account of the inconvenience caused to the petitioner it has also imposed a cost of Rs. 1,000/- on the respondent Nos. 3 to 5. It is this order, which is being impugned in this petition.
Sri B.M. Halaswamy, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the third parties cannot seek the impleadment in the reference proceedings. The reference sent is regarding the compensation in respect of some structure and that too between different parties. He submits that the scope of enquiry cannot be enlarged. It has to be strictly within the parameters of reference sent. He relies on the Apex Court''s judgement in the case of Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Vs. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran and Another, , wherain it is held chat a Reference Court has no jurisdiction to decide a matter which is not referred to it. As the reference sent is not in respect of the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 3 to 5, they cannot be permitted to be arraigned as the parties in the LAC proceedings to resist the claims of the petitioner. He read out paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the said decision. The said paragraphs are extracted hereinbelow:
It is well established that the Reference Court gets jurisdiction only if the matter is referred to it u/s 18 or 30 of the Act by the Land Acquisition Officer and that the civil court has got the jurisdiction and authority only to decide the objections referred to it The Reference Court cannot widen the scope of its jurisdiction or decide matters which are not referred to it This question was considered by various judicial authorities and one of the earliest decisions reported on this point is Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur v. Secy. of State. This was a case where the claimant sought a reference u/s 18 of the Act. In the application filed by the claimant, he raised objection only regarding the valuation of the land. The claimant did not dispute the measurements of the land given in the award. Before the Reference Court, the claimant raised objection regarding the measurements of the land and sought for the fresh measurements. This was refused and the claimant applied to the High Court for revision of this order, but without success. Again, in the appeal, the claimant raised the same objection regarding measurements and the High Court rejected it. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held thus: (AIR p. 65).
Their Lordships have do doubt that the jurisdiction of the courts under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of these sections. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector''s award, and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Once therefore it is ascertained that the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation, that alone is the ''matter'' referred, and the court has no power to determine or consider anything beyond it.
In another case, namely, Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, this Court observed : (SCC p. 584, para 25)
Every tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not only entitled but bound to determine whether the matter in which it is asked to exercise its jurisdiction comes within the limits of its special jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain facts or circumstances. Its obvious duty is to see that these facts and circumstances exist to invest it with jurisdiction, and where a tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the statute that creates it and that statute also defines the conditions under which the tribunal can function, it goes without saying that before that tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a matter, it must be satisfied that the conditions requisite for its acquiring seisin of that matter have in fact arisen. As observed by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan wherever jurisdiction is given to a court by an Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in that Act, it is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction for if they be not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise.
In K. Kankarathanamma & Ors. v. State of A.P., the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference u/s 30 for the apportionment of the compensation amount amongst the various claimants. Six of the appellants did not accept the award of the Land Acquisition Officer and made application to him for referring the matter for determination by the court, but no reference was made by him pursuant to this application. When the matter came up before the court, it proceeded on the footing that the reference made to it was not merely limited to the apportionment of compensation but also with respect to the amount of compensation. No objection, however, was raised by the State before the reference court regarding the absence of reference. When the matter came up before the High Court, the Govt. Pleader raised this objection. Though the High Court allowed the plea to be raised before it, but ultimately it negatived the plea. The appellants contended before the High Court that pursuant to the failure of the State to raise the plea before the Subordinate Judge as to the absence of a reference, the State must be deemed to have waived the point Rejection this contention, this Court held: (AIR p.306, para 3)
The matter goes to the court only upon a reference made by the Collector It is only after such a reference is made that the court is empowered to determine the objections made by a claimant to the award. Section 21 restricts the scope of the proceedings before the court to consideration of the contentions of the persons affected by the objection. These provisions thus leave no doubt that the jurisdiction of the court arises solely on the basis of a reference made to it. No doubt, the Land Acquisition Officer has made a reference u/s 30 of the Land Acquisition Act but that reference was only in regard to the apportionment of the compensation amongst the various claimants. Such a reference would certainly not invest the court with the jurisdiction to consider a matter not directly connected with it This is realty not a mere technicality for as pointed out by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan wherever jurisdiction is given by a statute and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained therein it is a universal principle that those terms should be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, and if they are not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. This was, therefore, a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction and the failure of the State to object to the proceedings before the court on the ground of an absence of reference insofar as the determination of compensation was concerned cannot amount to waiver or acquiescence. Indeed, when there is an absence of inherent jurisdiction, the defect cannot be waived nor can be cured by acquiescence.
Nextly, he relies on the Apex Court''s judgment in the case of Shyamali Das Vs. Illa Chowdhry and Others, , wherein it is held that the Reference Court derives its jurisdiction from the order of reference.
Sri Halaswamy nextly contends that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 having withdrawn the W.P. No. 21039/2000 and respondent Nos. 3 to 5 having suffered the order of rejection of W.P. No. 30639/2002 are not justified in seeking their impleadment in the LAC proceedings. According to him, their only remedy is to approach the Civil Court.
Smt. Shilpa Shah, the Learned Counsel representing Singhania and Partners for the respondent No. 1 submits that the declaration in respect of the petitioner''s land is issued on 12.1.1999 and that there is an injunction order on 11.4.2003 in favour of the respondent Nos. 3 to 5. She submits that the scope of enquiry in the reference sent under National Highways Act, 1956 cannot be restricted on account of Section 21 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, because Section 30 of the National Highways Act states that nothing in the Land Acquisition Act shall apply to the acquisition made under the National Highways Act.
Sri M. Ganesh, the Learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 submits that the names of the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 figure in the preliminary notification. He submits that the civil suits between the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are pending consideration before the Civil Court. He brings to my notice the interlocutory order passed by the Court of the Senior Civil judge and JMFC, Nelamangala in O.S. No. 52/1996. He submits that by the said order, the temporary injunction was granted after hearing the petitioner in respect of the remaining portion of the same land (the unacquired portion of the land standing at Survey No. 73 of Sompura Village). He submits that the temporary injunction order is continued.
Sri Ganesh submits that the impleadment of the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 does not automatically entitle them to receive the compensation. An investigation has to take place. An opportunity is to be given to both the parties to establish their claims for receiving the compensation.
He submits that the petitioner has not produced any title deed in support of her claim. The revenue entries earlier standing in favour of the petitioner are already cancelled. He submits that the petitioner is drawing strength from the orders passed in the previous cases. He submits that W.P. No. 21039/2000 came to be withdrawn based on the Land Acquisition Officer''s submission that the compensation amounts are not going to be disbursed immediately and without verifying the rival claims. He submits that W.P. No. 30639/2002 came to be rejected with the liberty to the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 to file the suit for recovery, as a sum of Rs. 1,42,500/- was already released by the respondent No. 1.
the Learned Counsel brings to my notice the first respondent''s order, dated. 19.8.2009 (Annexure-R15) depositing certain amounts with the Civil Court so that the rival claimants can approach the Civil Court and on the adjudication of the matter by the Civil Court receive the compensation.
The submissions of the Learned Counsel have received my anxious consideration. To answer the formidable question raised by Sri Halaswamy as to whether the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 can seek impleadement in LAC No. 5/2009, it is necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions. Section 3H (3) and (4) of the. National Highways Act read as follows:
3H, Deposit and payment of amount. -
(3) Where Several persons claim to be interested in the amount deposited under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of them.
(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the came or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated.
The perusal of sub-section 3 of Section 3H of National Highways Act, 1956 shows that the competent authority (the respondent No. 1) has to determine the persons, who in his opinion, are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of them. Sub-section 4 of Section 3H states that if there is a dispute as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same is payable, the matter has to be referred to the Civil Court.
At this juncture it is difficult to wish away the claims of the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 as frivolous or untenable. this Court, while disposing of W.P. No. 30639/2002 on 28.1.2004 has indeed noticed that there is a serious dispute regarding the title of the property. That the preliminary notification contains the names of the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 in respect of the property in question is not in dispute. The Civil Court has granted the temporary injunction on 11.4.2003 in O.S. No. 52/1996 after hearing the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 and the petitioner. The temporary injunction order restrains the petitioner from interfering with the possession of the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 in respect of the remaining portion of the land, i.e., the unacquired portion of the lands standing at Survey No. 73 of Sompura Village. The respondent No. 1 has also formed the considered view that there is a dispute in the matter of disbursement of the compensation on account of there being rival claimants. The same is evident from the order, dated 19.8.2009 (Annexure -R15).
The authorities relied upon by the petitioner''s side have no application for the facts of the said case, as the facts of the instant case and of the reported case are entirely different. My perusal of the impugned order reveals ''chat it is a well-reasoned and balanced order. The Civil Court has allowed the application on finding that the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 have an arguable case. What has also weighed is that if such an application is not allowed, it leads to multiplicity of proceedings. To compensate the petitioner for the inconvenience caused to her, it has imposed a cost of Rs. 1,000/- on the respondent Nos. 3 to 5. Such a just order does not warrant interference. The order is upheld in its entirety.
In taking this view, I am fortified by the Division Bench''s judgment of this Court, dated 14.10.2011 passed in W.A. No. 2242/2011 and other connected appeals. The operative portion of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow:
Such determination based on evidence could be made in a reference proceedings in view of the rival claim. Only if there is no reference the need for seeking declaration would arise.
However, the petitioner''s grievance that the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 may protract the proceedings also cannot be left unaddressed. The respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are directed to co-operate with the Civil Court in the speedy disposal of the matter without seeking the adjournments unnecessarily. The Court of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Nelamangala is directed to dispose of LAC No. 5/2009 as expeditiously as possible and in any case within an outer limit of one year from today.
This petition is accordingly disposed of. No order costs.