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Judgment
S.B. Majmudar, C.J.—The Appellant, who is the original writ petitioner, is aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge dismissing her writ petition. The few relevant facts leading to this appeal are required to be noted at the outset to appreciate the grievance of the appellant.
The notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (for short ''the Act'') was issued by the State of Andhra Pradesh on 13th September, 1979. The notification sought to acquire a total extent of Ac.8.02 cents comprised in S.Nos. 133/1A, 135/1A, 136 and 137/1 of Manchala village, Mantralayam Mandal, Kurnool District, for the purpose of construction of bus stand by the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ''the Corporation''), which is the second respondent herein. Possession of the land was taken on 6th November, 1979 and award was passed on 31st August, 1980 determining the compensation. In the meantime, the third respondent herein filed Writ Petition No. 2704 of 1980 in respect of one acre of land in S.No. 136. Out of Ac.2.95 cents in S.No. 136, which originally belonged to one Mallaiah, S/o. Laxmaiah, the third respondent purchased one acre for a sum of Rs. 5,000/-. He filed the said writ petition contending that the acquisition is invalid, and sought for quashing of the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act. Now it must be stated at this stage that earlier the said third respondent had appeared before the Land Acquisition Authority and submitted that he had no objection to the land being acquired and his dispute was regarding quantum of compensation to be awarded to him for acquisition of his one acre of land in S.No. 136. It is not in dispute between the parties that this land is a pocket land situated in the midst of other land, which is sought to be acquired for the purpose of bus stand. When the Corporation found that a dispute with respect to this pocket land of one acre was taken to the High Court and was on the anvil, an arrangement of compromise was arrived at between the Corporation on the one hand and the third respondent on the other, as a result of which an agreement was entered into on 29th September, 1984 in the following terms:
"1. The second party agrees to withdraw the writ petition No. 2704 of 1980 filed by him before the A.P. High Court, Hyderabad and also other proceedings filed by him in respect of one acre of land belonging to him in S.No. 136.
The second party shall request the Land Acquisition Officer to pass an award in respect of one acre in S.No. 136/2 as per the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and the compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer shall be final and accepted by the second party.
The second party shall not seek enhancement of compensation higher than the compensation by Land Acquisition Officer in his award in respect of one acre in Sy.No. 136/2, vide clause 2 supra.
The first party agrees to sell the second party an area of one acre with measurements of 964/5'' x 450'' on southern side in S.No. 1l3/lA as fully described in Schedule-I and as shown in Schedule-II at the rate of Rs. 5,750/- per acre.
The second party shall pay the sale consideration by way of Demand Draft drawn in favour of the first party within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of compensation from the Land Acquisition Officer, Adoni in respect of the land bearing S.No. 136/2.
The first party shall deliver to the second party the possession of the land within 15 days from the date of receipt of the sale consideration and shall also execute a sale deed within 15 days from the date of handing over the possession of the schedule land.
The expenses of registration and stamp duty shall be borne by the second party.
The second party agrees to pay to the first party any further sum received from the Land Acquisition Officer granted in respect of one acre of land."
Pursuant to the said agreement, the third respondent was given one acre from the southern side of S.No. 133/lA on his paying Rs. 5,750/- per acre, and in bargain the third respondent gave up his contention regarding acquisition of his one acre of land inS.No. 136;he also agreed to forego the excess compensation, which may be awarded for the acquisition of his land in S.No. 136. It is not in dispute that this agreement has been acted upon. The third respondent withdrew his writ petition; award was passed for acquiring his one acre of land in S.No. 136 and the third respondent was allotted one acre of land out of S.No. 133/lA. It is thereafter that the present writ petitioner, who is the legal representative of the deceased tenant of the land, which was sought to be acquired out of S.No. 133 /1A, filed the writ petition contending that the transfer of one acre of land acquired out of S.No. 133/lA by the Corporation in favour of the third respondent was patently illegal and contrary to Section 44A of the Act read with Rule 8 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Rules''). It was submitted that when a land is acquired for a public purpose, it had to be strictly utilised for such purpose only, as the land acquisition proceedings represent exercise of power of eminent domain by the State. They cannot be bartered away, in order to gain profit, to persons like the third respondent, it was contended that part VII of the Land Acquisition Act was required to be followed strictly, as the acquisition was for the Corporation, which is a Company and as Section 44A of the Act is part of Part VII, it had to be strictly followed. That has not been done. Hence it may be declared that the transfer of one acre of land out of the acquired land in S.No. 133/lA in favour of the third respondent by the Corporation is null and void and inoperative in law.
The learned single Judge, who disposed of the writ petition, came to the conclusion that the State Government had already given sanction to the said transfer by the Corporation and therefore, Section 44A of the Act was complied with. In any case, this was not a case of transfer as such. It was a case of adjustment between the parties. But for this adjustment, the pocket land would not have been easily acquired for the Corporation so that the Corporation can put up the bus stand and guest house for which the land was sought to be acquired under the notification and that in order to facilitate the said public purpose underlying the acquisition and to speed it up that the said adjustment was entered into. Therefore, there was nothing wrong in the said transaction. Accordingly the writ petition was dismissed.
As noted earlier, the widow of the original deceased tenant has moved this appeal against the said decision. The learned counsel for the appellant made it clear at the outset that he is not aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings. But, sofar as the land acquired, in which the deceased husband of the appellant had tenancy rights, is concerned those rights have stood extinguished by Section 16 of the Act and she has no challenge about the same. However, the contention is that when that land was acquired for a public purpose by the Corporation, it could not have been bartered away in favour of the third respondent, who is a private party, and which would give him personal benefits. That is the only grievance in these proceedings.
Now, it becomes at once clear that once the appellant''s deceased husband, who was a tenant of the land in S.No. 133/1A, acquiesced in the acquisition proceedings and whatever compensation was available to him was awarded, his right, title and interest in the acquired land ceased by virtue of Section 16 of the Act. Thereafter, the only contention which was vehemently contended before us and which requires our consideration at this stage is, whether the Corporation was entitled to enter into the said arrangement with the third respondent by parting with one acre of land on the southern side of the acquired land in S.No. 133/lA for clearing the cloud over the acquisition of the pocket land in S.No. 136. But for this clearance, the entire acquisition proceedings would have remained thwarted for an indefinite time, as the writ petition was pending before the High Court and the High Court had granted interim relief staying all further proceedings regarding acquisition of one acre of land in S.No. 136 belonging to the third respondent. Sofar as this moot question is concerned, we will proceed on the assumption that the acquisition for the Corporation is acquisition for a company as mentioned in Part VII of the Act. Section 44A in Part VII of the Act, which is relevant and with which we are concerned, reads as under:
"44-A: Restriction on transfer etc:- No Company for which any land is acquired under this Part shall be entitled to transfer the said land or any part thereof by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise except with the previous sanction of the appropriate government."
A mere look at this provision shows that no company shall be entitled to transfer the land, which is acquired for it, or any part thereof by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise except with the previous sanction of the appropriate government. In the present case, sanction of the government was already obtained, but it was not obtained at the time when the agreement was entered into between the Corporation on the one hand and the third respondent on the other but subsequently. In our view, that would not affect the core of the agreement or arrangement and it can be said that Section 44A of the Act had been substantially complied with. Even that apart, this was not a case of any sale of the acquired land by the company as such. Here was a case in which the entire acquisition, sofar as S.No. 136 was concerned, was in dispute before the High Court. Section 4(1) notification sought to acquire different pieces of land in the locality so that comprehensively a large chunk will be available to the Corporation to put up the bus stand and the guest house. It was a composite acquisition. Sofar as the other lands were concerned, there was no dispute by the owners. It may also be kept in view that the acquired land originally belonged to a temple and sofar as the appellant is concerned, her deceased husband was a tenant on the southern portion of the land in S.No. 133/1A, which was also the subject matter of acquisition. When that acquisition was resorted to, one acre of land in S.No. 136, which was part and parcel of that composite acquisition and which was a pocket land, created a hurdle, as its owner, third respondent herein, had moved the High Court in a writ petition and obtained stay of all further proceedings. Therefore, the entire object of the public purpose underlying the project undertaken by the Corporation, got thwarted and stalled. It was not certain as to when the cloud would be cleared and the acquisition would proceed further in accordance with law. In order to avoid this uncertainty, if the acquiring body, namely, the Corporation, by way of jettisoning operation, decides to part with one acre of land on the southern portion, which can be parted with without affecting the core of the public purpose and the main requirement underlying therein, and when it could easily get one acre of the pocket land from the third respondent in the bargain, it could not be said that the object underlying the public purpose would get frustrated because of this arrangement. On the contrary, it would get protected. That has actually happened in the present case, as after the settlement, the third respondent withdrew his writ petition; paid consideration for one acre of land which he got from S.No. 133/lA and also suffered award of compensation in respect of his one acre of land in S.No. 136 over which he gave up all his claims. Thus, it was a package deal entered into with a view to fructify the public purpose underlying the acquisition and was not contrary to it. Therefore, it could not be held, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, that this transaction was contrary to the public purpose underlying the acquisition proceedings.
The next submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was that when Section 44A was applied, Rule 8 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 would become relevant and as per Rule 8 such permission could have been granted by the Government to the Corporation, only in given contingencies contemplated by the said Rule, to part with the acquired land in favour of the third respondent. The said Rules were issued by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture by notification dated 22nd June, 1963. The preamble of the Rules provides that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 55 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Central Government hereby makes the following rules for the guidance of the State Government and the officers of the Central Government and of the State Governments. The relevant Rule 8 reads as under:
"8. Conditions under which sanction may be given for transfer of land: Where a Company for which land has been acquired under the Act applies for the previous sanction of the appropriate Government for the transfer of that land or any part thereof by sale, gift, lease or otherwise, no such sanction shall be given unless:-
(i) the proposed transfer of land along with dwelling houses, amenities, buildings or work, if any, is to some other company or where the company is a co-operative society, such transfer is to any or all of its members, or
(ii) where the land has been acquired solely for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company, the proposed transfer of the land alongwith dwelling houses, if any, is to such workmen or their dependent heirs;
Provided that before giving any such sanction the appropriate government shall consult the Committee."
It is true that the rule is couched in such a language that only in given contingencies the Company for which the land was acquired, can be given sanction by the appropriate government for transfer of that land. The present situation is not governed by any of the contingencies contemplated by Rule 8. However, it cannot be forgotten that these Rules are for the guidance of the State Government and they have to be read as supplementary to the parent provision, namely, Section 44A and not in derogation thereof. It is well settled that no rule, framed in exercise of statutory powers under an Act, can cut across the main parent section, and if it tries to cut across, it has to be treated as ultra vires. It is not necessary for us to go that far in the present case, as we find that Rule 8 will have to be read as supplementary to Section 44A, as the rules are enacted for guidance of the State Government and its officers. It means that as far as possible the guidance emanating from Rule 8 has to be followed, but in exceptional cases, like the present one not covered by Rule 8, the main Section 44A can always be resorted to, even independently of Rule 8.
In the present case, as noted earlier, subsequently sanction was accorded by the Government permitting the Corporation to transfer one acre of land in S.No. 133/1A to the third respondent. It was rightly done, as but for it the entire public purpose underlying the acquisition would have remained hanging fire for indefinite number of years till the writ petition; further writ appeal before a Division Bench of this Court and further proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court could have ended. In order to put an end to all these uncertainties, the arrangement was made and it was acted upon by all the concerned. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the transaction in question was violative of Section 44A of the Act from any angle. These were the only contentions canvassed in this writ appeal. There is no substance in any of them.
The writ appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.