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Judgment
Heard Sri Sri Prakash, learned counsel for the revisionists. The record has been perused.
The present revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act, 1887’), has been filed, assailing the order dated 27.07.2026 passed by the Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court No.1, Gautam Buddh Nagar, in SCC Suit No.05 of 2018 (Smt. Lalita Chauhan v. Vinod Kumar Mishra), whereby the application Paper No.63-Ga, preferred by the revisionists under Order I Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’), seeking their impleadment as defendants in the suit, has been rejected.
The facts, as emerging from the record, are that respondent no. 1 instituted the aforesaid S.C.C. suit against respondent no. 2, Vinod Kumar Mishra, seeking his eviction from the commercial premises situated at Village Sadarpur, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Buddh Nagar, besides recovery of arrears of rent and other consequential reliefs. The suit is founded on the plaintiff's assertion that a relationship of landlord and tenant exists between her and the defendant.
Revisionist no. 1, Smt. Chandri Devi, claims to have executed a sale deed dated 22.07.2016 in favour of respondent no. 1 in respect of a plot measuring 100 square yards. Disputing the said transaction, she instituted Original Suit No. 38 of 2018 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gautam Buddh Nagar, seeking cancellation of the aforesaid sale deed along with a decree of injunction.
It appears that the defendant in the S.C.C. suit, namely, Vinod Kumar Mishra, disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant pleaded by the plaintiff in his written statement dated 11.07.2018. He asserted that he was neither a tenant nor in possession of the disputed premises and that one Manoj, son of Krishna Kumar, was carrying on business therein under the name and style of Ayush Electronics and Electricals as a tenant of Smt. Chandri Devi. Manoj is also stated to have instituted Original Suit No. 23 of 2018 against Smt. Lalita Chauhan and Smt. Chandri Devi, seeking protection against his alleged illegal eviction.
The revisionists subsequently set up the case that Manoj had remained in possession of the basement and upper basement of the disputed premises as a tenant of revisionist no. 1 from the year 2010 till 31.12.2019 and that, thereafter, with effect from 01.01.2020, revisionist no. 2, Pushkar Chauhan, was inducted as a tenant by revisionist no. 1 and commenced running coaching classes from the premises. It is further their case that revisionist no. 2 has been regularly paying rent to revisionist no. 1.
Earlier, the revisionists had moved an application, Paper No. 40-Ga, seeking appointment of an Amin Commission to ascertain the factual position at the disputed premises. The said application was rejected by the court below on 23.10.2019. Subsequently, on 04.11.2025, the revisionists moved the application, Paper No. 63-Ga, under Order I Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, seeking their impleadment as defendants in the pending S.C.C. suit. The said application has been rejected by the impugned order dated 27.07.2026.
While considering the application, the court below noticed that the revisionists were asserting claims of ownership and tenancy in respect of the disputed premises. It observed that, despite the assertion that revisionist no. 2 had been inducted as a tenant by revisionist no. 1, no rent agreement, rent receipt or other relevant document establishing the alleged tenancy had been brought on record. On the other hand, the plaintiff had relied upon the registered sale deed dated 22.07.2016 executed by revisionist no. 1 in her favour, which had not been declared void by any competent court.
The court below further observed that the controversy in the pending S.C.C. suit was confined to the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant, whereas questions relating to title and ownership fell beyond the scope of adjudication in those proceedings. It accordingly held that the revisionists were neither necessary nor proper parties for effective adjudication of the dispute and rejected their application for impleadment.
Learned counsel for the revisionists submits that the court below has failed to appreciate the nature of the claim set up by the revisionists as well as the material placed on record in support thereof. It is contended that revisionist no. 1 is the actual owner and landlady of the disputed premises and that revisionist no. 2 is in occupation thereof as her tenant. It is pointed out that the defendant in the S.C.C. suit, namely, Vinod Kumar Mishra, has himself denied the relationship of landlord and tenant with the plaintiff and asserted that Manoj was occupying the premises as a tenant of revisionist no. 1. It is, therefore, urged that the S.C.C. proceedings are being pursued against a person who, according to the revisionists, is neither a tenant nor in possession of the disputed premises.
It is further contended that the revisionists have placed on record documents relating to the business activities of Manoj, including GST, VAT and sales tax registrations, besides other relevant documents, which, according to learned counsel, substantiate the nature of his occupation of the premises. It is urged that the court below has also failed to properly consider the claim of revisionist no. 2 regarding his subsequent induction as a tenant and his possession of the premises.
Learned counsel further submits that the revisionists have a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit and that any decree passed in their absence may prejudice their possession and independent rights in the disputed property. It is also contended that the court below has placed undue reliance upon the sale deed dated 22.07.2016 without appreciating that the very validity of the transaction has been questioned by revisionist no. 1 in Original Suit No. 38 of 2018. On these grounds, it is submitted that the impugned order is legally unsustainable and warrants interference by this Court.
The principal question that arises for consideration is whether a person asserting an independent claim of ownership, tenancy or possession in respect of the premises forming the subject matter of a pending S.C.C. suit is entitled to seek impleadment merely on the ground that a decree passed in the suit may affect such asserted rights, and whether the presence of such person is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Before examining the rival submissions in the light of the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to consider the scope and object of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC and the principles governing the impleadment of a third party in pending proceedings.
Order I Rule 10(2) CPC confers upon the Court the discretionary power to add a person as a party to the proceedings where such person ought to have been joined or whose presence is necessary to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. The object of the provision is to ensure effective and complete adjudication of the controversy before the Court and to enable it to grant the reliefs to which the parties may be found entitled. The power, however, is not intended to bring before the Court every person who may claim an interest in the subject matter of the suit, irrespective of the nature of the controversy requiring adjudication. An independent claim or interest in the subject property, howsoever substantial it may be, does not, by itself, furnish a ground for impleadment.
The exercise of this power is thus governed by the nature of the questions arising for determination in the suit and the necessity of the proposed party's presence for their effective adjudication. It is not the mere existence of an interest in the subject matter, but the relevance of the proposed party's presence to the adjudication of the controversy, that assumes significance. In this context, the law recognises two distinct categories of parties, namely, necessary parties and proper parties.
The expressions 'necessary party' and 'proper party' have distinct legal connotations. A necessary party is one without whom no effective decree can be passed, whereas a proper party is one whose presence, though not indispensable for passing an effective decree, is required for complete and effectual adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. Thus, the mere assertion of an interest in the property forming the subject matter of the suit does not, by itself, render a person either a necessary or a proper party.
The enquiry under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC must, therefore, be directed towards the nature of the controversy, the reliefs claimed and the questions that actually arise for determination in the proceedings. The relevant consideration is whether the presence of the proposed party is required for adjudication of those questions. An independent claim or interest in the subject property, howsoever substantial it may be, does not, by itself, furnish a ground for impleadment.
The aforesaid principles have been considered by the Supreme Court in Kanaklata Das and Others v. Naba Kumar Das and Others1. The Supreme Court held that, in an eviction suit instituted by a landlord against a tenant, the landlord and the tenant are ordinarily the necessary parties. The controversy in such proceedings essentially concerns the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant and the grounds on which eviction is sought under the applicable rent legislation. The question of title to the premises is not, as a general rule, germane to the adjudication of such proceedings.
The Supreme Court further explained that the plaintiff, being dominus litis, cannot ordinarily be compelled to implead a third person against his or her wish unless the proposed party establishes that his or her presence is necessary for effective adjudication of the controversy. A person asserting an independent right, title or interest in the property does not, merely by reason of such assertion, acquire a right to be impleaded in an eviction proceeding.
The aforesaid position has also been followed by this Court. In Shahnaj Begum v. Taj Mohammad and Another2, this Court considered a case in which a third party claiming ownership of the suit premises sought impleadment in an eviction suit pending before the Small Causes Court. While declining the prayer for impleadment, this Court observed that the lis in an eviction suit is essentially between the landlord and the tenant and that determination of the controversy between them does not ordinarily require adjudication of an independent claim of ownership asserted by a third party.
It was further held that a question of title or ownership cannot be brought within the scope of an eviction suit merely because a third person seeks to assert an independent interest in the property. The decisive consideration remains whether the suit can be effectively adjudicated and a decree passed in the absence of the person seeking impleadment.
The aforesaid approach finds support from the decision of this Court in Murti Markandeshwar Ji Maharaj Gopal Ki Bagiya City Jhansi v. Smt. Jyoti Gangwani and Another3, wherein the Court considered the question of impleadment of a third party in proceedings under Section 21 of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021. This Court held that proceedings under the Act are confined to adjudication of disputes arising out of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant and that questions relating to independent title or ownership fall beyond the statutory jurisdiction of the Rent Authority. It was further observed that a person asserting an independent proprietary right adverse to the landlord cannot, by invoking Order I Rule 10 CPC, enlarge the scope of eviction proceedings or convert them into a forum for adjudication of complicated questions of title. Such disputes are required to be agitated before the competent civil court in appropriately instituted proceedings. Accordingly, an independent claim of title, by itself, was held insufficient to qualify the claimant as either a necessary or a proper party to proceedings under Section 21 of the Act.
The principles governing impleadment of a third party in proceedings before the Small Causes Court have also been examined by this Court in Manish Bansal v. Jagdish Prasad Mittal and 7 Others4. In that case, the revisionist sought impleadment on the basis of an independent claim founded upon an unregistered Will, disputing the title asserted by the plaintiff on the basis of a registered Will. The revisionist had also instituted independent proceedings seeking declaration of his rights.
The Court, while examining the scope of Order I Rule 10 CPC, held that a person asserting an independent right or title in the property cannot claim impleadment merely on the ground that such claim is inconsistent with the title set up by the plaintiff. It was observed that proceedings before the Small Causes Court are concerned with adjudication of the landlord-tenant relationship and cannot be enlarged to determine an independent dispute relating to title. The Court further held that where the independent claim of the person seeking impleadment can be adjudicated in separately instituted declaratory proceedings, his presence is neither necessary nor proper for effective adjudication of the dispute before the Small Causes Court.
The same approach was reiterated by this Court in Smt. Gayatri Devi v. Smt. Omwati Devi and Another5. While examining a claim of independent ownership set up by a third party in an S.C.C. suit, this Court held that the existence of a competing claim of title does not, by itself, warrant impleadment. The relevant test is whether the controversy pending before the Small Causes Court can be effectively and completely adjudicated in the absence of the person seeking impleadment.
This Court also explained the distinction between an incidental consideration of a question relating to title and its final adjudication. The mere assertion of an independent title by a third party does not necessarily mean that the relief claimed in the S.C.C. suit depends upon determination of such title. Section 23 of the Act, 1887, becomes relevant where the plaintiff's right to obtain the relief claimed depends upon the determination of a question of title which the Small Causes Court is not competent to finally adjudicate. An independent assertion of title by a third party, without more, does not attract the application of the said provision.
More recently, this Court, in Lalit Chaturvedi v. Santoshi Lal Chaturvedi6, considered the scope of Order I Rule 10 CPC in the context of a third party seeking impleadment in an S.C.C. suit on the assertion that the property belonged to a deity and that the applicant was its Shebait/Mohatmin. While declining the prayer for impleadment, this Court reiterated that Order I Rule 10 CPC is a procedural and facilitative provision and does not confer upon every person asserting an interest in the subject matter of a suit a substantive right to participate in the proceedings. It was emphasised that the power of impleadment must remain confined to the controversy which the Court is competent to adjudicate and cannot be exercised to introduce an independent substantive dispute concerning ownership, representative capacity or other rights which are not necessary for determination of the pending suit.
The aforesaid decisions, read together, indicate that the determination of whether a person is a necessary or proper party cannot rest merely upon the assertion of an interest in the suit property or an apprehension that the outcome of the proceedings may affect such interest. The decisive consideration is whether the presence of the proposed party is necessary for passing an effective decree or for complete and effectual adjudication of the questions actually involved in the suit. The power under Order I Rule 10 CPC cannot be invoked to enlarge the scope of the proceedings by introducing an independent controversy which does not arise for determination in the suit.
The principles emerging from the aforesaid discussion may be summarised thus: In an eviction suit, the controversy is ordinarily confined to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant and the grounds on which eviction is sought under the applicable rent legislation. A third party does not become a necessary or proper party merely by asserting an independent claim of ownership, title, interest or possession in respect of the premises forming the subject matter of the suit. The same principle applies to a claim founded upon an independent relationship of tenancy, including one alleged to have arisen subsequent to the institution of the suit. The question of impleadment must be determined with reference to the pleadings, the reliefs claimed and the questions actually arising for adjudication. The decisive consideration is whether the presence of the proposed party is necessary for passing an effective decree or is required for complete and effectual adjudication of the controversy before the Court. An independent dispute relating to ownership, title, possession or a separate relationship of tenancy cannot ordinarily be introduced into an eviction suit through an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC, unless its determination is shown to be necessary for deciding the controversy involved in the suit. The mere possibility that the outcome of the proceedings may have some bearing upon the independent rights asserted by the proposed party does not, by itself, satisfy the statutory test.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the S.C.C. suit was instituted by respondent no.1 against respondent no. 2 seeking his eviction from the disputed premises, recovery of arrears of rent and other consequential reliefs. The controversy arising in the suit must, therefore, be determined with reference to the pleadings of the plaintiff and the defendant and the questions which fall for adjudication between them. These would include whether the relationship of landlord and tenant pleaded by the plaintiff exists between the parties, and whether the grounds on which eviction is sought have been established. The enquiry for the purposes of impleadment must be confined to whether the presence of the revisionists is required for adjudication of these questions.
The revisionists, however, seek impleadment on the basis of two distinct claims. Revisionist no. 1 asserts an independent claim of ownership over the disputed property and disputes the sale deed dated 22.07.2016 executed in favour of respondent no. 1. Revisionist no. 2, on the other hand, claims to have been inducted as a tenant in the premises by revisionist no. 1 with effect from 01.01.2020. The claim of revisionist no. 1 is already the subject matter of Original Suit No. 38 of 2018, instituted for cancellation of the aforesaid sale deed.
Thus, while revisionist no. 1 seeks to assert a proprietary claim adverse to the title claimed by respondent no. 1, revisionist no. 2 relies upon an alleged tenancy created independently by revisionist no. 1. The proposed impleadment would, in substance, bring into the S.C.C. suit disputes concerning the ownership of the premises, the validity of the sale deed and the existence and legal effect of a separate tenancy allegedly created in favour of revisionist no. 2. The mere fact that these claims relate to the same premises does not, however, establish that their adjudication is necessary for deciding the controversy already pending between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The material consideration is not whether the revisionists have asserted an interest in the disputed premises, or whether such interest may ultimately be established in independently instituted proceedings. It is whether, having regard to the nature of the reliefs claimed and the questions arising in the S.C.C. suit, an effective decree can be passed and the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant can be completely adjudicated in their absence. The two claims advanced by the revisionists must be examined in that context.
So far as revisionist no. 1 is concerned, her claim is founded upon an assertion of ownership which directly disputes the transaction through which respondent no. 1 claims her right in the property. The validity of the sale deed dated 22.07.2016 is already in issue in Original Suit No. 38 of 2018, where revisionist no. 1 has sought its cancellation. The existence of that independent dispute does not, by itself, make her presence necessary in the S.C.C. suit. The question whether the sale deed is liable to be cancelled, or whether revisionist no. 1 has any subsisting proprietary right in the premises, is not required to be finally determined in order to adjudicate the landlord-tenant controversy pleaded between respondent nos. 1 and 2. Nor can the pending S.C.C. proceedings be converted into a forum for adjudication of the competing claims of ownership merely by seeking impleadment.
The claim of revisionist no. 2 stands on a distinct footing and requires separate consideration. He does not claim to be a party to the original transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. His case is that revisionist no. 1 inducted him as a tenant with effect from 01.01.2020. Significantly, the S.C.C. suit had already been instituted in the year 2018. The alleged tenancy in favour of revisionist no. 2 is thus founded upon an arrangement which, even according to the revisionists, came into existence after institution of the S.C.C. suit. Such subsequent induction does not, without more, alter the nature of the controversy as it stood when the suit was instituted, or make the subsequent alleged tenant a necessary party to the adjudication of the dispute originally brought before the Small Causes Court.
The material relied upon in support of the alleged tenancy also assumes relevance in this context. The court below noticed that no rent agreement, rent receipt or other document evidencing the alleged induction of revisionist no. 2 as a tenant had been produced. The documents relating to GST, VAT and sales tax registrations of the business allegedly carried on by Manoj may indicate the existence of business activities at the premises. They do not, however, establish either the creation of a tenancy in favour of revisionist no. 2 with effect from 01.01.2020 or the legal character in which he claims to occupy the premises. In any event, the question whether revisionist no. 2 has an enforceable right arising out of the alleged arrangement with revisionist no. 1 is distinct from the question which the Small Causes Court is called upon to determine in the pending suit.
The further submission that respondent no. 2, Vinod Kumar Mishra, has himself denied the relationship of landlord and tenant with respondent no. 1 and has referred to Manoj as a tenant of revisionist no. 1 does not alter the nature of the enquiry. The defendant's denial of the relationship pleaded by the plaintiff raises a matter for adjudication on the basis of the pleadings and evidence in the suit. His reference to Manoj as a person occupying the premises as a tenant of revisionist no. 1 may be relevant to the defence set up by him and will have to be considered by the court below while adjudicating the controversy on the basis of the pleadings and evidence. Such reference, however, does not, by itself, establish that the revisionists are necessary parties to the suit or that the controversy cannot be effectively adjudicated in their absence.
To hold otherwise would mean that every person whose name or alleged interest is referred to in the written statement, or who sets up an independent claim to the premises, could seek entry into an eviction suit, even though the adjudication of that claim is not necessary for determining the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant. Such an approach would permit the scope of proceedings before the Small Causes Court to be enlarged by the introduction of collateral disputes concerning title, possession or separate arrangements of tenancy. The power under Order I Rule 10 CPC is not intended to serve that purpose.
The apprehension that a decree passed in the absence of the revisionists may adversely affect their asserted rights also does not, by itself, furnish a ground for impleadment. The possibility that the outcome of a suit may have some bearing upon the interests claimed by a third party is not the test prescribed under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC. What is required to be shown is that the presence of such person is necessary for passing an effective decree or for complete and effectual adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. In the present case, the revisionists have not demonstrated such necessity. Their grievance, in substance, relates to the possible impact of the proceedings upon claims which they assert independently of the landlord-tenant relationship pleaded in the suit. The possibility that an adjudication may have some bearing upon an independent claim asserted by a third party is not equivalent to a finding that such party's presence is indispensable for adjudication of the suit.
It is equally necessary to clarify that rejection of the application for impleadment does not amount to an adjudication, either expressly or by implication, of the independent claims advanced by the revisionists. The validity of the sale deed dated 22.07.2016, the claim of revisionist no. 1 to ownership of the disputed premises and the question whether revisionist no. 2 was validly inducted as a tenant by her are not matters determined by the impugned order. Nor is their determination necessary for deciding the present revision. Those questions must remain open for consideration in appropriate proceedings before the competent forum, in accordance with law.
The procedural power of impleadment cannot be employed to secure, within proceedings of a limited and defined scope, an adjudication of substantive rights which do not form part of the controversy before the Court. The refusal to implead a person signifies only that his or her presence is not required for deciding the questions involved in the pending proceedings. It does not, in itself, determine or extinguish any independent right which such person may otherwise be entitled to assert before the competent forum.
On a cumulative consideration of the pleadings, the material placed on record and the nature of the controversy involved in the S.C.C. suit, this Court finds that the revisionists have failed to establish that their presence is necessary for passing an effective decree or is required for complete and effectual adjudication of the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. The claim of revisionist no. 1 raises an independent dispute concerning ownership of the premises and the validity of the sale deed, whereas the claim of revisionist no. 2 rests upon an alleged tenancy said to have commenced after institution of the S.C.C. suit. Neither of these claims has been shown to constitute a question requiring determination for adjudication of the suit as instituted. The fact that both claims relate to the same premises, or that the defendant has referred to Manoj in his written statement as a person occupying the premises under revisionist no. 1, does not, by itself, render the revisionists necessary or proper parties to the suit. Their independent claims, if otherwise maintainable, may be pursued before the competent forum in accordance with law.
The court below has considered the nature of the claims set up by the revisionists, the material relied upon in support thereof and the scope of the controversy pending before it. Its conclusion that the revisionists are neither necessary nor proper parties is a view consistent with the principles governing impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC and does not suffer from any illegality or material irregularity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1887
It is, however, clarified that the adjudication in the present revision is confined to the question of impleadment of the revisionists in the pending S.C.C. suit. The refusal to implead them does not involve, nor does it entail, any adjudication of their independent claims in respect of the disputed premises. Accordingly, no opinion is expressed on the merits of Original Suit No. 38 of 2018, the validity or otherwise of the sale deed dated 22.07.2016, or the existence and legal effect of the alleged tenancy claimed by revisionist no. 2. All such questions shall remain open for consideration by the competent court in appropriate proceedings, in accordance with law and uninfluenced by any observation made in this judgment.
For the reasons recorded above, and subject to the clarification made hereinbefore, the revision is found to be devoid of merit. The impugned order dated 27.07.2026 does not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1887. The revision is, accordingly, dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.