Smt.Chalasani Kalyani Leela vs M/s.ADR Estates Private Limited & Ors.

Heard Sri P.Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Srinivasa Rao Putluri, learned counsel for the appellant; Sri B.Chandrasen Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri B.Vamshidhar Reddy, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2; Sri Muralidhar Reddy Katram, learned Government Pleader for Revenue appearing for respondent Nos.3 to 7; and Sri S.Ravi, learned Senior Counsel representing M/s. R.S.Associates, appearing for respondent Nos.8 to 10 and perused the record.

This writ appeal is preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, against the order dated 06.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in I.A.No.2 of 2026 in W.P.No.3974 of 2026. By the said order, the learned Single Judge dismissed I.A.No.2 of 2026 filed by the appellant seeking vacation of the interim order of status quo granted on 16.02.2026 and consequently extended the said interim order until further orders.

Sri V. Krishna Murthy was the absolute owner and possessor of land admeasuring Ac.17-10 Gts. in Sy.No.140, situated at Bachupally Village, earlier within Quthbullapur Mandal, Medchal-Malkajgiri District. On 12.04.1982, Sri V. Krishna Murthy entered into an agreement of sale with the appellant in respect of an extent of Ac.10-00 Gts. out of the aforesaid land. Subsequently, on 30.08.1982, Sri V. Krishna Murthy executed a registered General Power of Attorney (GPA) in favour of the appellant's husband.

On 15.10.1993 and 21.10.1993, Sri V. Krishna Murthy and his five sons executed GPA in favour of Sri K. Seetha Ram Reddy. Acting as GPA holder, Sri K. Seetha Ram Reddy executed three registered sale deeds dated 17.02.1998, conveying an extent of Ac.5-30 Gts. each in favour of three purchasers, namely Sri P. Hanumanth Rao, Sri D. Kondal Rao and Sri M. Venkat Rao, respectively, covering the entire extent of Ac.17-10 Gts. in Sy.No.140. The purchasers thereafter got their names mutated in the revenue records and obtained Pattadar Passbooks and Title Deeds.

Thereafter, the aforesaid purchasers conveyed their respective extents of land in favour of respondent No.1, M/s. ADR Estates Private Limited, under registered sale deeds bearing Document Nos.10387 of 2007, 10388 of 2007 and 12065 of 2006, pertaining to transactions dated 22.11.2006, 22.11.2006 and 02.06.2006, respectively.

The appellant instituted O.S.No.86 of 1999 before the Court of the Junior Civil Judge, Medchal, seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 12.04.1982. The suit came to be decreed and, in execution of the decree, a registered sale deed bearing Document No.7601 of 2000 dated 19.09.2000 was executed in favour of the appellant.

The appellant thereafter instituted O.S.No.23 of 2002 seeking declaration of title and O.S.No.159 of 2002 seeking perpetual injunction. Both suits were dismissed by the I Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, by a common judgment and decree dated 14.10.2004. The learned District Judge held, inter alia, that the appellant could not acquire title on the strength of the sale deed dated 19.09.2000 and accepted the title claimed through the purchasers under the earlier sale transactions. It is material to note that the said sale transactions were of the year 1998, and not 1995.

Aggrieved by the said common judgment and decree, the appellant preferred A.S.No.4184 of 2004 against the judgment in O.S.No.23 of 2002 and A.S.No.90 of 2005 against the judgment in O.S.No.159 of 2002 before this Court. Both the appeals were subsequently dismissed as withdrawn on 13.04.2012 and 16.04.2012, respectively.

The appellant thereafter filed I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2017 and I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2018 seeking restoration of A.S.No.4184 of 2004. All the said applications were dismissed by this Court on 20.08.2019. Aggrieved by the order dated 20.08.2019, the appellant approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (Civil) Diary No.44154 of 2019, which was dismissed on 31.01.2020, without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner to avail such other remedies as may be available in law.

In the meantime, respondent No.1 obtained proceedings for conversion of the subject land from agricultural to non-agricultural use. A conversion letter was issued on 14.06.2019, followed by proceedings dated 28.06.2019. Subsequently, the Municipal Administration and Urban Development (MA&UD) Department issued G.O.Ms.No.135 dated 30.07.2022 in respect of a portion of the land in Sy.No.140/P, permitting change of land use. Respondent No.1 and the developer also obtained requisite planning and building permissions from the competent authorities and secured RERA registration bearing No.P02200005071 dated 13.09.2022.

Respondent No.1 had earlier instituted W.P.No.31860 of 2021 seeking deletion of the appellant's sale deed bearing Document No.7601 of 2000 dated 19.09.2000 from the Encumbrance Certificate. The said writ petition was disposed of on 03.12.2021. The appellant, who had not been impleaded in the said proceedings, challenged the order by filing W.A.No.754 of 2022. By judgment dated 12.12.2025, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeal, set aside the order dated 03.12.2021 and dismissed W.P.No.31860 of 2021.

Following the judgment in W.A.No.754 of 2022, the appellant submitted an application before respondent No.4 seeking updation of the revenue records in the Bhu Bharati Portal. Pursuant thereto, respondent No.4 issued three notices bearing No.B/3600/2025, all dated 20.12.2025, proposing modification of the entries in respect of the lands situated in Sy.Nos.140/1, 140/2 and 140/3 at Bachupally Village and Mandal, Medchal-Malkajgiri District. The notices were issued to the persons whose names were reflected in the revenue records.

Respondent Nos.1 and 2 instituted W.P.No.3974 of 2026 questioning the aforesaid notices dated 20.12.2025. On 16.02.2026, this Court directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the impugned notices. The interim order was subsequently extended from time to time. The appellant filed I.A.No.2 of 2026 seeking vacation of the interim order. After hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge, by order dated 06.05.2026, dismissed the vacate-stay application and continued the interim order until further orders.

Aggrieved by the order dated 06.05.2026 passed in I.A.No.2 of 2026 in W.P.No.3974 of 2026, the appellant has preferred the present writ appeal.

Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has advanced the following submissions:

a. The impugned notices dated 20.12.2025 are only show-cause notices issued to respondent Nos.8 to 10, and no final order has been passed by the competent authority. Therefore, the writ petition, having been filed at the stage of show-cause notices, is premature.

b. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are not parties to the proceedings pending before the 4^th respondent and, therefore, cannot maintain the writ petition without obtaining leave of this Court.

c. The question regarding the applicability of the Telangana Bhu Bharati (Record of Rights in Land) Act, 2025 (for short ‘ROR Act 2025’) is yet to be considered by the 4th respondent in the pending proceedings. Hence, the writ petition is premature and liable to be dismissed.

ii) That the appellant claims valid title over the subject property on the strength of the agreement of sale dated 12.04.1982, the registered GPA dated 30.08.1982, the decree dated 16.12.1999 in O.S.No.86 of 1999 and the registered sale deed bearing Document No.7601 of 2000 dated 19.09.2000, executed through the Court in pursuance of the said decree.

iii) That respondent Nos.1 and 2 derive their title through respondent Nos.8 to 10, who claim to have purchased the property through the GPA holder, Sri K. Seetha Ram Reddy.

iv) That the GPAs dated 15.10.1993 and 21.10.1993 were not executed by all the persons claiming interest in the property and, therefore, the authority of the GPA holder to convey the entire property is disputed.

vi) That the respondent Nos.1 and 2 failed to properly disclose material facts relating to the earlier civil proceedings. In particular, it was contended that:

a. The judgments in O.S.Nos.23 of 2002 and 159 of 2002, though adverse to the appellant, did not themselves constitute a source of title in favour of the respondent Nos.1 and 2.

b. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 failed to place the complete effect of the findings recorded in the said proceedings in their proper perspective, particularly in the context of the appellant's claim under the sale deed dated 19.09.2000.

c. The fact that respondent Nos.8 to 10 had filed A.S.No.109 of 2000 challenging the decree in O.S.No.86 of 1999, which was dismissed on 14.10.2004.

vii) That the learned Single Judge failed to properly consider the judgments and legal precedents relied upon by the appellant in support of the application seeking vacation of the interim order. It was contended that the impugned order does not adequately deal with the factual and legal objections raised by the appellant.

viii) That continuation of the interim order has the effect of restraining the statutory proceedings pending before the competent authority, even though no final order has been passed in the proceedings. It was contended that continuation of the interim order has caused serious prejudice to the appellant.

The learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 has advanced the following submissions:

a. Petitioner No.1 claims ownership and possession over Ac.17-10 Gts. in Sy.No.140, having purchased the property under registered sale deeds executed by respondent Nos.8 to 10 in the year 2006.

b. Petitioner No.2 is the registered Development Agreement-cum-GPA holder of petitioner No.1 under Document No.27781 of 2018 dated 19.12.2018.

c. The petitioners have obtained HMDA approvals, municipal building permissions and RERA registration and have undertaken substantial development of the subject property, including construction of a multi-storied residential project.

d. Though the impugned notices are addressed to respondent Nos.8 to 10, the proposed modification of entries in the Bhu Bharati Portal would directly affect the registered and statutory interests claimed by the petitioners in the subject property.

e. The petitioners, therefore, cannot be treated as strangers to the proceedings and have sufficient legal interest to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The record also indicates that the petitioners' registered title and development interests would be directly affected by any alteration of the revenue entries.

ii) By placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Vicco Laboratories^{11.(2007) 13 SCC 270} it is contended that, although a writ petition ordinarily would not lie against a mere show-cause notice, interference is permissible in exceptional circumstances, particularly where the notice is issued without jurisdiction or the proceedings constitute an abuse of process of law.

iii) That the present case falls within the exceptions as provided in Vicco Laboratories (supra 1), on the following grounds:

a. The impugned notices have been issued by respondent No.4 under the ROR Act 2025 in respect of land which, according to the petitioners, had already been converted from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

b. The subject land is therefore contended to fall outside the scope of “agricultural land” under Section 2(1) of the Act, 2025.

c. Reliance was placed on Section 5(9) of the 2025 Act to contend that in respect of non-agricultural land, the provisions of the Telangana Municipalities Act, 2019 and the GHMC Act, 1955 would apply.

d. It was accordingly contended that the impugned notices suffer from want of jurisdiction and that this Court can interfere even at the show-cause notice stage.

iv) By placing reliance upon the judgment dated 14.10.2004 in O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of 2002, wherein the civil Court held that respondent Nos.8 to 10 were bona fide purchasers and that the appellant did not acquire title by virtue of the subsequent court-executed sale deed dated 19.09.2000, it is contended that the said judgment, in fact, contains findings concerning the competing claims of title and the effect of the earlier GPA transactions and sale deeds.

vi) That the subject property has undergone substantial development pursuant to various statutory permissions and approvals, as the land was converted from agricultural to non-agricultural use pursuant to proceedings dated 14.06.2019 and 28.06.2019; G.O.Ms.No.135 dated 30.07.2022 was issued confirming change of land use in respect of a portion of the subject land; HMDA granted technical approvals for development of a multi-storied residential project; Building permission was obtained from the competent municipal authority; and the project obtained RERA registration bearing No.P02200005071 dated 13.09.2022.

vii) That substantial construction has been completed and that third-party interests have arisen in the project through sale transactions. That the material on record supports the existence of the conversion proceedings, HMDA approvals, building permit and RERA registration.

viii) That the appellant has no subsisting title over the subject property, contending that:

a. The sale deed dated 19.09.2000 in favour of the appellant was executed pursuant to the decree in O.S.No.86 of 1999, after the earlier GPA transactions and sale deeds in favour of respondent Nos.8 to 10.

b. By the time the decree dated 16.12.1999 was passed and the consequential sale deed dated 19.09.2000 was executed, the original owners had already dealt with and divested their rights in respect of the property through the GPA transactions and subsequent sale deeds.

c. The appellant's subsequent court-executed sale deed could not, according to the respondents, convey a better title than what remained with the persons through whom the decree was obtained.

d. Reliance was placed upon the findings in O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of 2002, wherein the civil Court held that the appellant did not acquire title under the sale deed dated 19.09.2000.

ix) That the appellant had failed to disclose material facts, including, the findings rendered by the civil Court in O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of 2002 concerning the appellant's claim of title; the proceedings arising out of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) entered into during the subsequent period, which, according to the respondents herein, acknowledge the rights claimed by the writ petitioners and/or their vendors; the withdrawal of A.S.Nos.4184 of 2004 and 90 of 2005 and the subsequent dismissal of the restoration applications; and the dismissal of SLP (Civil) Diary No.44154 of 2019 on 31.01.2020.

We have taken note of the respective contentions urged and perused the material on record.

The primary contention raised by the appellant is that respondent Nos.1 and 2 have no locus standi to challenge the impugned notices, since the notices are addressed only to respondent Nos.8 to 10 and the respondent Nos.1 and 2 are not parties to the proceedings before the 4^th respondent.

It is pertinent to note that the concept of locus standi in the context of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not confined only to persons who were parties to the proceedings before the statutory authority. A person who is not a party to such proceedings may also invoke the jurisdiction of this Court where the impugned action directly affects such person's legally cognizable rights or interests.

In the present case, the material on record discloses the following:

ii) Respondent No.1 herein obtained proceedings for conversion of the subject land from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The record further discloses subsequent statutory permissions and approvals relating to development of the property.

iii) Respondent No.1 herein obtained HMDA approvals, municipal building permission and RERA registration in relation to the residential project proposed/developed on the subject property.

iv) The record further indicates that substantial development has taken place on the property and that third-party interests have arisen in the project through sale transactions.

It is to be noted that the impugned notices have been issued by the 4^th respondent proposing modification of entries in the Bhu Bharati Portal in respect of the subject land. Though the notices are addressed to respondent Nos.8 to 10, any alteration of the revenue entries concerning the property has the potential to directly affect the registered and development interests claimed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein. Therefore, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 cannot be regarded as persons having no legal interest in the subject matter of the proceedings.

Further, the mere fact that the impugned notices are addressed to respondent Nos.8 to 10 does not, by itself, disentitle respondent Nos.1 and 2 from invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. What is relevant, for the purpose of locus standi, is whether the impugned action has a direct and legally cognizable bearing upon their rights or interests. In the facts of the present case, such a direct nexus is established.

It is also to be noted that the contention of the appellant that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 are complete strangers to the proceedings is not acceptable. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 claim registered title through respondent Nos.8 to 10 and have placed on record subsequent statutory permissions and development-related transactions concerning the same property. Their interest is consequently not merely remote or speculative.

As regards the contention relating to obtaining “leave”, the requirement applicable to a third party seeking to prefer an appeal against a decree in a civil proceeding cannot automatically be imported into an original writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The maintainability of the writ petition must be examined on the basis of the existence of a legally cognizable right or interest and the nature of the impugned statutory action. Therefore, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 have sufficient locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and to challenge the impugned notices, notwithstanding that the notices were issued to respondent Nos.8 to 10.

It is well-settled that a writ petition would not ordinarily lie against a show-cause notice, as the person to whom such notice is issued would have an adequate opportunity to place his case before the competent authority. However, this general rule is subject to recognized exceptions, particularly where the notice is issued without jurisdiction or where the proceedings are found to constitute an abuse of the process of law.

In Vicco Laboratories (supra 1), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

In the present case, respondent Nos.1 and 2 have questioned the jurisdiction of the 4^th respondent primarily on the ground that the subject land had already been converted from agricultural to non-agricultural use pursuant to proceedings dated 28.06.2019. It is further contended that G.O.Ms.No.135 dated 30.07.2022 was issued in respect of change of land use of a portion of the subject land and that the property was thereafter developed pursuant to HMDA approvals, municipal building permissions and RERA registration. Substantial construction is stated to have been undertaken and flats sold, resulting in third-party interests.

Reliance is also placed upon Section 5(9) of the ROR Act, 2025, which, according to respondent Nos.1 and 2, recognizes the applicability of the Telangana Municipalities Act, 2019 and the GHMC Act, 1955 in respect of non-agricultural land. On this basis, it is contended that the provisions of the ROR Act, 2025 invoked in the impugned notices may not apply to the subject land after its conversion to non-agricultural use.

The aforesaid contention raises a specific jurisdictional issue and cannot, at this stage, be regarded as a mere assertion without prima facie foundation. The material on record discloses the conversion of the subject land and its subsequent development pursuant to statutory permissions and approvals. Whether, in these circumstances, the 4^th respondent could initiate proceedings under the ROR Act, 2025 is a matter requiring consideration on merits. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the writ petition cannot be rejected as premature at the show-cause notice stage.

There is also a significant aspect relating to the competing claims of title. The civil Court, in its judgment dated 14.10.2004 in O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of 2002, adjudicated the rival claims and, inter alia, held that the appellant did not acquire title by virtue of the sale deed executed through Court pursuant to the decree in O.S.No.86 of 1999. The said judgment also recognized the title of the appellant's vendors' transferees and rejected the appellant's claim in respect of the said property.

Further, the said findings have remained undisturbed in the subsequent proceedings referred to before us. The appeals filed against the judgment were withdrawn, the applications seeking restoration were dismissed, and the SLP filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was also dismissed. Thus, the findings rendered by the competent civil Court, to the extent relevant to the present controversy, cannot be ignored while examining the prima facie basis of the appellant's claim.

In this background, the appellant’s claim of title, having already been negatived by the competent civil Court, cannot by itself furnish a basis to reject the jurisdictional challenge raised by respondent Nos.1 and 2. At this stage, this Court confines itself to the prima facie jurisdictional issue and does not finally adjudicate upon the merits of the proceedings proposed under the impugned notices.

It is also relevant to advert to the findings of the learned Single Judge wherein the learned Single Judge has made the following observations:

In view of the above, this Court finds no error in the aforesaid approach of the learned Single Judge. The challenge before the writ Court is not founded merely on an assertion that the show-cause notices are erroneous on facts. A specific jurisdictional objection has been raised, supported by the conversion proceedings, subsequent development permissions and the statutory provision relied upon by the respondent Nos.1 and 2. Thus, where determination of the jurisdictional issue requires the response of the official respondents and examination of the statutory scheme, the writ petition cannot be rejected as premature.

The contention that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the objections relating to locus standi and maintainability is not borne out and is, in fact, contradicted by the record. The impugned order deals with both issues, notices the direct bearing of the impugned action on the interests of respondent Nos.1 and 2, and, relying upon Vicco Laboratories (supra 1), holds that the jurisdictional objection warrants consideration.

A perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Single Judge considered both the objections relating to locus standi and maintainability and recorded reasons for rejecting them. With regard to locus standi, the learned Single Judge noticed that the impugned notices, though addressed to respondent Nos.8 to 10, had a direct bearing on the rights and interests claimed by respondent Nos.1 and 2. On maintainability, the learned Single Judge relied upon Vicco Laboratories (supra 1) and found that the jurisdictional objection raised by respondent Nos.1 and 2 warranted consideration. Therefore, the contention that these issues were not considered is not borne out by the record.

The further contention of the appellant that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the judgments and legal precedents relied upon by the appellant also does not persuade us to interfere with the order under appeal. The learned Single Judge has considered the principle laid down in Vicco Laboratories (supra 1) and applied the same to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Merely because every contention or authority cited by a party is not separately dealt with, it cannot be said that the relevant objections were not considered, particularly when the essential issues have been identified and answered by the learned Single Judge.

The appellant has also contended that the impugned notices are only show-cause notices and that no final order has been passed by the competent authority. However, where a specific jurisdictional objection is raised and the Court finds that such objection has prima facie substance, the mere fact that the impugned action is at the stage of a show-cause notice would not render the writ petition non-maintainable. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has found that the jurisdictional issue requires consideration after the official respondents place their stand on record.

It is to be noted that the interim protection is intended to preserve the subject matter of the writ petition and prevent the impugned notices from causing irreversible consequences. The material on record indicates substantial development of the subject property and creation of third-party interests.

At this interlocutory stage, the balance of convenience also lies in maintaining the existing position. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 rely on the 2006 transactions, subsequent conversion and development permissions, building approval and RERA registration, and assert that flats have been constructed and sold. The appellant’s claim of title has already been considered and negatived by the competent civil Court. Altering the existing position pending adjudication of the jurisdictional challenge may cause prejudice to respondent Nos.1 and 2 and third-party purchasers.

In these circumstances, this Court finds no error in the exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the application seeking vacation of the interim order and in continuing the interim protection. The order under appeal is based on the material available on record and the reasons assigned therein cannot be said to be perverse, arbitrary or contrary to the settled principles governing interlocutory relief.

A careful reading of the judgment in O.S.Nos.23 and 159 of 2002 dated 14.10.2004 reveals that the learned I Additional District Judge recorded the following findings:

The judgment in A.S.No.109 of 2000 dated 14.10.2004 held that the decree in O.S.No.86 of 1999 was not binding on the vendors of the respondent Nos.1 and 2. The appeals in A.S.Nos.4184 of 2004 and 90 of 2005 were dismissed as withdrawn on 13.04.2012 and 16.04.2012 respectively; the restoration applications were dismissed on 20.08.2019, leaving the issues relating to the MOU dated 12.04.2012 open, and the SLP was dismissed on 31.01.2020. Thus, the findings of the competent civil Court against the appellant's claim to title and possession, including the finding that the appellant did not acquire title under the sale deed obtained through Court, remained undisturbed in the subsequent proceedings and are relevant to the present controversy.

The record also refers to MoU dated 11.12.2007 and 28.05.2008 entered into between the parties. The appellant disputes the MOU dated 12.04.2012 and has raised contentions regarding the same. The subsequent proceedings also indicate that the issues relating to the said MOU were expressly left open. Thus, this Court does not consider it necessary, at this stage, to record any final finding regarding the validity, enforceability or effect of the disputed MOU.

Moreover, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 have raised a specific jurisdictional objection based upon the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to non-agricultural use and the subsequent development carried out pursuant to statutory permissions. They have also relied upon Section 5(9) of the ROR Act, 2025, to contend that the statutory regime applicable to non-agricultural land is different. The aforesaid circumstances, therefore, disclose a prima facie jurisdictional issue warranting consideration by the learned Single Judge on merits.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 have sufficient locus standi to challenge the impugned notices and that the writ petition is maintainable in view of the prima facie jurisdictional issue raised therein. The findings of the competent civil Court rejecting the appellant's claim to title and possession have remained undisturbed and are relevant to the present controversy. The learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the vacate stay petition and continuing the interim protection. Thus, this Court finds no legal infirmity in the order dated 06.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in I.A.No.2 of 2026 in W.P.No.3974 of 2026 warranting interference by this Court.

Accordingly, this Writ Appeal is dismissed. The order dated 06.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in I.A.No.2 of 2026 in W.P.No.3974 of 2026 is hereby affirmed. The interim order of status quo granted by the learned Single Judge on 16.02.2026 and extended from time to time shall continue to operate until final disposal of the writ petition. The learned Single Judge is requested to dispose of the writ petition on merits, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six (6) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The learned Single Judge shall consider the matter on merits after taking into account the counter affidavit, if any, filed by the official respondents and the replies filed by the respective parties.

As a consequence, all pending miscellaneous petition, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.