Smt. Asha Agrawal & Ors. vs Hemraj And Company & Ors.

Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.

The present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioners, assailing the order dated 05.09.2026 passed by the learned 8th District Judge, Durg, District Durg, in Civil Suit No. A/ 69/2025, whereby the application preferred by defendant Nos. 1 to 5, 7 and 8 before the learned Trial Court, seeking return of the plaint on the ground that the suit is overvalued to bring it within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court, has been dismissed. The petitioners prayed for the following reliefs in the petition:-

The facts of the case are that respondent No. 1 filed a civil suit on 22.07.2025 before the learned 8th District Judge, Durg, seeking specific performance of contract and permanent injunction against the petitioners and respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The suit was founded upon an agreement to sell dated 07.05.2018, stated to have been registered on 08.05.2018 before the Sub-Registrar, Durg, for a total sale consideration of Rs. 8,00,000/-. According to the plaint, respondent No. 1 had paid an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/-, including Rs. 1,00,000/-towards earnest money, and the balance amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- was payable at the time of registration of the sale deed. In paragraph 20 of the plaint, respondent No. 1 valued the relief of specific performance at Rs. 8,00,000/- and the relief of permanent injunction at Rs. 2,50,000/-, thereby assessing the total valuation of the suit at Rs. 10,50,000/- and paying court fees of Rs. 91,300/-. The petitioners object that the valuation of the relief of permanent injunction at Rs. 2,50,000/- is arbitrary, excessive and without any proper basis, and has been deliberately adopted to bring the suit within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned 8th District Judge, Durg, instead of the learned 3rd Civil Judge, Class-I, Durg, who has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain suits valued up to Rs. 8,50,000/-. The petitioners, therefore, filed an application dated 16.06.2026 seeking return of the plaint on the ground that respondent No. 1 had artificially inflated the valuation of the relief of permanent injunction with the object of invoking the jurisdiction of a particular court. It is their case that such valuation is contrary to the settled principles governing valuation of suits and payment of court fees. The learned Trial Court, vide order dated 05.09.2026, dismissed the application, giving rise to the present writ petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the impugned order dated 05.09.2026 passed by the learned 8th District Judge, Durg, is contrary to the settled principles governing valuation of suits and determination of pecuniary jurisdiction and, therefore, warrants interference by this Court. He would submit that respondent No. 1 has deliberately and unreasonably valued the relief of permanent injunction at Rs. 2,50,000/-, in addition to valuing the relief of specific performance at Rs. 8,00,000/-, thereby fixing the aggregate valuation of the suit at Rs. 10,50,000/-. Such excessive valuation of the relief of permanent injunction has been adopted with the sole object of invoking the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned 8th District Judge, Durg, although the suit, on a proper and lawful valuation, would fall within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Civil Judge, Class-I.

He would further submit that the valuation of the relief of permanent injunction cannot be arbitrarily inflated merely to select a particular forum. Referring to the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870, particularly Section 7(iv)(c) and (d), read with Article 17 of Schedule II thereof, he would submit that the learned Trial Court failed to examine the applicable statutory provisions and the principles governing court fees in respect of the relief claimed. He would submit that, according to the petitioners, the requisite court fee for the relief of permanent injunction would be Rs. 300/- before the Civil Judge, Class-I, and Rs. 500/- before the District Judge or Additional District Judge, as applicable, and that the valuation adopted by respondent No. 1 is wholly disproportionate to the nature of the relief sought. Placing reliance upon the order passed by this Court in Daulatram and Others v. Mordhwaj and Others, in W.P. (227) No. 777 of 2018, decided on 08.08.2022, learned counsel would submit that the learned Trial Court ought to have examined the legality and propriety of the valuation adopted by respondent No. 1 instead of rejecting the application seeking return of the plaint. He would also submit that, had the relief of specific performance been valued at Rs. 8,00,000/- and the relief of permanent injunction been valued in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions, the suit would have fallen within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Civil Judge, Class-I. On these grounds, learned counsel would pray that the impugned order be set aside and the plaint be directed to be returned for presentation before the court of competent pecuniary jurisdiction.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, perused the documents annexed with the petition and gone through the relevant provisions on valuation of the suit and payment of court fees.

The question that arises for consideration is whether respondent No. 1 could independently value the relief of permanent injunction at Rs. 2,50,000/-, in addition to the valuation of Rs. 8,00,000/- for specific performance of the agreement to sell, and whether such valuation, in the facts of the present case, was arbitrary or intended merely to invoke the pecuniary jurisdiction of a particular court. The determination of this question requires a distinction between the plaintiff's right to value the relief claimed and the court's power to examine whether such valuation is bona fide and consistent with the applicable statutory provisions. It is well settled that a plaintiff ordinarily has the discretion to value the relief, wherever the governing statute permits such discretion. However, such discretion cannot be understood as an unrestricted licence to adopt an arbitrary valuation solely to select a preferred forum. At the same time, a valuation cannot be rejected merely because the defendant considers it excessive or because a lower valuation would result in the suit being tried by a court of a different pecuniary jurisdiction. The objection must be examined with reference to the nature of the relief claimed, the applicable provisions governing court fees and jurisdiction, and the material available on record.

The plaintiff has put the valuation for the relief of permanent injunction in the suit and relevant pleadings in paragraph 20 of his plaint, is as under:-

The plaintiff prayed for the following reliefs in the plaint, which are as under:

In the present case, the suit instituted by respondent No. 1 is for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 07.05.2018, registered on 08.05.2018, for a total consideration of Rs. 8,00,000/-, together with the consequential relief of permanent injunction. The relief of specific performance has been valued at Rs. 8,00,000/-, whereas the relief of permanent injunction has been separately valued at Rs. 2,50,000/-. The petitioners have challenged the valuation of the suit for permanent injunction on the ground that it is excessive and has been adopted to bring the suit within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned 8th District Judge, Durg. The valuation of the suit is to be governed by the provisions under the Suit Valuation Act, 1887, and Court Fees Act, 1870. Section 7(iv)(d) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, provides the court fees payable in the suit for permanent injunction, which reads as under:-

Section 4 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887, provides that :-

Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, empowers the State Government to make rules for determining the value of land for the purposes of jurisdiction in suits falling within the categories specified therein, namely, Section 7, paragraphs (v), (vi) and (x), clause (d), of the Court Fees Act, 1870. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the State Government has prescribed any specific valuation of the land applicable to the suit in question. Therefore, merely because respondent No. 1 has separately valued the relief of permanent injunction at Rs. 2,50,000/-, it cannot, by itself, be concluded that such valuation is arbitrary, excessive or mala fide. The validity of the valuation must be examined with reference to the nature of the relief claimed, the applicable provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870, as in force in the State of Chhattisgarh, and the relevant statutory provisions governing the determination of pecuniary jurisdiction.

In Smt. Nandita Bose v. Ratanlal Nahata, reported in (1987) 3 SCC 705, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that ordinarily the valuation of a suit depends upon the reliefs claimed in the plaint, and the valuation made by the plaintiff determines the court in which the suit is to be instituted. However, the plaintiff cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a particular court by grossly overvaluing or undervaluing the suit. The Court further held that the power to return the plaint under Order 7 Rule 10 of the CPC cannot be exercised by prejudging an issue that requires judicial determination in the suit. Thus, the principle emerging from the aforesaid judgment is that the plaintiff's valuation is ordinarily entitled to acceptance, subject to the court's power to prevent abuse of its process where the valuation is demonstrably arbitrary or manipulated to confer jurisdiction upon a particular court.

The aforesaid principle also needs to be considered in the light of A.K.A.Ct.V.Ct. Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. A.K.A.Ct.V.Ct. Venkatachalam Chettiar, reported in (1980) 1 SCC 616, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that, where the governing law permits the plaintiff to estimate the relief, such estimate must be fair, adequate and reasonable. The plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately undervalue the relief claimed. Though the said judgment dealt with the valuation of a suit for accounts, the underlying principle concerning bona fide valuation is relevant to the present controversy. Consequently, neither the plaintiff's discretion nor the court's power to scrutinise valuation can be considered absolute; the issue must be determined with reference to the nature of the relief and the statutory scheme applicable to the suit.

In this regard, the decision of this Court in Smt. Neelam Dagla v. Sarwan Gond, decided on 20.06.2019 in First Appeal No. 557 of 2018, is relevant. In the said case, this Court considered the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) and (d), read with Article 17 of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, 1870, as applicable in the State of Chhattisgarh, in the context of a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The Court recognised that, where the applicable statutory provision prescribes a fixed court fee, the valuation adopted for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction cannot automatically be equated with the amount of court fee payable. The plaintiff's valuation for jurisdictional purposes must be considered in accordance with the governing statutory framework. Applying the aforesaid principles, the petitioners' contention that the relief of permanent injunction could attract only a fixed court fee of Rs. 300/- before the Civil Judge, Class-I, or Rs. 500/- before the District Judge or Additional District Judge, as asserted by them, cannot by itself determine the pecuniary valuation of that relief. The amount of court fee payable and the valuation relevant for determining pecuniary jurisdiction are distinct questions, though their relationship must be examined under the applicable statutory provisions. Therefore, the mere assertion that a fixed court fee is payable for the relief of permanent injunction does not establish that the valuation of that relief at Rs. 2,50,000/- is impermissible. Equally, the court cannot accept such valuation mechanically if the pleadings and surrounding circumstances demonstrate that it has been adopted merely to secure the jurisdiction of a particular forum.

The principle against forum shopping has also been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Cipla Ltd., reported in (2017) 5 SCC 262, wherein the Court discussed the circumstances in which a litigant's conduct may amount to forum shopping, including the deliberate creation of circumstances to invoke the jurisdiction of a particular court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further considered the principle in Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of West Bengal, reported in (2022) 7 SCC 124, observing that forum shopping is a disreputable practice that has no sanction in law. Nevertheless, the applicability of these principles in the present case depends upon whether the petitioners have demonstrated, from the plaint and the relevant circumstances, that respondent No. 1 has deliberately adopted an artificial valuation to confer pecuniary jurisdiction upon the learned Trial Court. The allegation of forum shopping cannot be accepted merely on the basis of the difference between the valuation of the principal relief and that of the relief of permanent injunction.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the petitioners have failed to establish that the valuation of the relief of permanent injunction at Rs. 2,50,000/- is, by itself, arbitrary or mala fide, or that the said valuation has been deliberately adopted by respondent No. 1 solely to invoke the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned 8th District Judge, Durg. The mere difference between the valuation of the relief of specific performance and that of permanent injunction, or the assertion that a lower valuation would bring the suit within the pecuniary jurisdiction of another court, is insufficient to warrant return of the plaint in the absence of a demonstrable violation of the applicable statutory provisions. The petitioners have also failed to establish that the impugned order suffers from any jurisdictional error, patent illegality or material irregularity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.