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Judgment
Hon'Ble Jai Krishna Upadhyay, J.
This criminal revision has been filed by the revisionist - Smt. Anju Sharma assailing judgment and order dated 5.3.2011 passed by the A.C.M.M. 1st, Kanpur Nagar in Criminal Case No. 3994 of 2008, arising out of case crime no. 337 of 2008, under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Naubasta, District Kanpur Nagar whereby the trial court acquitted the opposite party nos. 2 to 8 from the charges framed against them and the judgment and order dated 24.8.2013 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 9, Kanpur Nagar in Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 2011 whereby the appeal filed against the said order dated 5.3.2011 has been dismissed and the said order has been affirmed.
Facts of the case, in short, are that informant - Smt. Anju Sharma was married on 25.04.2007 to Gaurav Sharma son of S.C. Sharma, resident of House No. 114 W-2, Basant Bihar, Police Station Naubasta, Kanpur Nagar according to Hindu rites and rituals. In the marriage, sufficient dowry was given, but her husband Gaurav Sharma, mother-in-law Maya Sharma, father-in-law S.C. Sharma, brother-in-law (Jeth) Gagan Sharma and uncle-in-law (Chachiya Sasur) Mahesh Chandra Sharma were not satisfied with the same and right after the marriage, the said persons began taunting her for bringing insufficient dowry and demanded a car and Rs. 50,000/- in cash and over this demand, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment. On several dates, she was tortured and beat severely, causing her to fall semi-unconscious. They repeatedly threatened that if the demand was not fulfilled, they would kill her and dispose of her body. Consequently, a case was registered based on the written complaint. Investigation started and after completion of investigation and necessary formalities, the Investigating Officer submitted charge sheet. Following the submission of the charge sheet, cognizance was taken against the accused persons under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act and they were summoned to face trial.
The accused persons appeared and charges under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act were framed against them. The accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Trial started and in order to prove its case on behalf of the prosecution, five witnesses, namely, PW-1 Amit Pandey, PW-2 Constable 2732 Ramdas, PW-3 Smt. Anju Sharma, PW-4 Smt. Rani Pandey, PW-5 Sub-Inspector Ashok Kumar, were examined.
After the closure of prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in which they stated that false statements have been given by the witnesses and no such incident, as alleged, ever took place. They further stated that PW-3 and PW-4 had given poison to Gaurav and a case was registered against them and this false case was filed merely to make pressure upon them in counter blast.
The learned trial court upon scrutiny of the evidence on record concluded that the case of prosecution was not proved beyond reasonable doubt against the accused persons and recorded acquittal, as mentioned here-in-above. Aggrieved with the said judgment and order, the revisionist - wife filed criminal appeal before the appellate Court, which after hearing the parties and considering the matter in detail, affirmed the order of acquittal. Hence, this criminal revision.
Heard Shri Anurag Vajpayee and Ms. Neha Chawla, learned counsel for the revisionist, Shri Pradeep Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the opposite party nos. 2 to 8 and Shri Shakeel Ahmad, learned AGA appearing for State of U.P.
Learned counsel for revisionist contended that the Trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence in acquitting the opposite party nos. 2 to 8 and the Appellate Court has also not considered the matter in right perspective and illegally affirmed the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. It is also submitted that both the concerned Courts have mistaken and ignored the material evidence produced by the prosecution and have not considered the statement of PW-3 - wife who has supported the prosecution case. It is further submitted that the opposite party nos. 2 to 8 were making demand of additional dowry and due to non-fulfillment of the said demands, the victim was subjected to cruelty and harassment. The trial court has wrongly acquitted the opposite party nos. 2 to 8 basically on the grounds that there was no injury report of the revisionist on record, the FIR was lodged belatedly without any plausible explanation regarding the delay and the father of the victim was not examined before the Court during trial. The impugned orders are perverse and illegal and have been passed without application of judicial mind and are against the material facts available on record and both the Courts have wrongly ignored the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has proved its case against opposite party nos. 2 to 8 beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgement and orders are liable to be set-aside and the criminal revision is liable to be allowed.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party nos. 2 to 8 and the learned AGA for the State have submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court and the order of Appellate Court affirming the said order of acquittal are not perverse and are based on correct appreciation of facts and evidence available on record. The present prosecution has been launched against the opposite party nos. 2 to 8 in counter blast, as the revisionist / wife had poisoned her husband - opposite party no.2 at her parental house but he survived and for this offence an FIR under Section 328 IPC was lodged against her for which she was sent to jail. Therefore, no interference is warranted in the matter and the instant revision is liable to be dismissed.
I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the entire record including the impugned judgment and orders carefully.
From a perusal of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the revisionist, it is evident that he wants to take this Court to the judgments of trial court and the appellate court and made his endeavor to show that the view taken by the concerned Courts in appreciating the evidence is not correct. However, this Court finds difficult in accepting above submission for the reason that in revisional jurisdiction this Court cannot sit in appeal and re-appreciate the evidence. It is not shown that any finding recorded by both the Courts is contrary to record or perverse or that any material evidence has been ignored or misread. In the assessment of evidence, if concerned Courts have taken a view, unless it is shown that such view is impermissible, no interference is called for.
The judicial review in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is not like an appeal. It is a supervisory jurisdiction which is exercised by the Court to correct the manifest error in the orders of subordinate courts but should not be exercised in a manner so as to turn the Revisional court in a Court of Appeal. The legislature has differently made provisions for appeal and revision and the distinction of two jurisdictions has to be maintained.
Construing old Section 439 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, pertaining to revisional jurisdiction, Court in D. Stephens Vs. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 said that revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 of Code ought not to be exercised lightly particularly when it is invoked by private complainant against an order of acquittal which could have been appealed against by Government under Section 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for correction of a manifest illegality, or prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. In other words, revisional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of law or misappreciated the evidence on record.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788 held that revisional jurisdiction should be exercised by High Court in exceptional cases only when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or a manifest error on a point of law resulting in flagrant miscarriage of justice. However, this was also a case in which revisional jurisdiction was invoked against an order of acquittal. If Court lacks jurisdiction or has excluded evidence which was admissible or relied on inadmissible evidence or material evidence has been overlooked etc., then only this Court would be justified in exercising revisional power and not otherwise.
The above view has been reiterated in Mahendra Pratap Singh Vs. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707; Khetrabasi Samal Vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1970 SC 272; Satyendra Nath Dutta and another Vs. Ram Narain, AIR 1975 SC 580; Jagannath Choudhary and others Vs. Ramayan Singh and another, 2002(5) SCC 659; and, Johar and others Vs. Mandal Prasad and another, 2008 Cr.L.J. 1627 (S.C.).
In Duli Chand Vs. Delhi Administration, 1975(4) SCC 649, Court reminded that jurisdiction of High Court in criminal revision is severely restricted and it cannot embark upon a re-appreciation of evidence. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction in revision, Court would be justified in refusing to re-appreciate evidence for determining whether concurrent findings of fact reached by learned Magistrate and Sessions Judge was correct.
In Pathumma and another Vs. Muhammad, 1986(2) SCC 585, Court reiterating the above view and said that in revisional jurisdiction High Court would not be justified in substituting its own view for that of a Magistrate on a question of fact.
In Munna Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan and another, 2001(9) SCC 631, Court said:
"The revision power under the Code of Criminal procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the First Information Report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged."
In Ram Briksh Singh and others Vs. Ambika Yadav and another, 2004(7) SCC 665, in a matter again arising from the judgment of acquittal, revisional power of High Court was examined and Court said:
"4.Sections 397 to 401 of the Code are group of sections conferring higher and superior courts a sort of supervisory jurisdiction. These powers are required to be exercised sparingly. Though the jurisdiction under Section 401 cannot be invoked to only correct wrong appreciation of evidence and the High Court is not required to act as a court of appeal but at the same time, it is the duty of the court to correct manifest illegality resulting in gross miscarriage of justice."
More so, if an appeal is filed against acquittal despite the fact that plenary power of Appellate Court to review the whole evidence on which order of acquittal is founded has been recognized by a Three Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade and another vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622 and it has been followed in Girija Prasad (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007(7) SCC 625 and State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran, 2007(3) SCC 755, still Court has held that in the matter of acquittal there are certain other principles which are to be kept in mind.
In Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2007(4) SCC 415, Court said that an Appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by Trial Court.
Further in State of Rajasthan vs. Shera Ram alias Vishnu Dutta, 2012(1) SCC 602, Court said that High Court is required to see that unless there are substantial and compelling circumstances, the order of acquittal is not required to be reversed in appeal. All these authorities have been referred and followed in Shivasharanappa and others vs. State of Karnatapa and others, 2013(5) SCC 705.
In the case of K. Ravi vs. State of Tamilnadu and another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2283, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner and should be exercised very sparingly.
Placing reliance on several landmark precedents, the Apex Court in the case of Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 184, reaffirmed that there is a limit on the powers of the High Court as a Revisional Court and Section 401 CrPC prohibits the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.
Recently, in Vishnu Kumar Gupta Vs. State of M.P. and Another, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1443 differentiating between an appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction under Cr.P.C., the Apex Court reiterated that the revisional jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure is fundamentally distinct from appellate jurisdiction. Unlike an appeal, which is a continuation of the original proceedings and entails a rehearing on facts and law, the power of revision is a discretionary supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court and the Court of Session, to satisfy themselves as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the subordinate criminal court. The revisional court does not ordinarily function as a court of appeal, nor is it expected to undertake a fresh appreciation of the entire evidence merely because another view is possible. Consequently, the revisional court ordinarily interferes only where there exists a patent error of law, a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction, non-compliance with mandatory provisions of law or findings which are so unreasonable or perverse that they occasion a failure of justice. The powers conferred under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. are, therefore, supervisory and corrective rather than appellate.
In the present case, above principles are not only applicable in entirety but makes the jurisdiction of this Court further narrower for the reason that here the judgment of acquittal has been challenged in revision where the scope of judicial review is further limited, as already discussed above, and not as wide as that of Appellate Court. Therefore, unless there is a patent and culpable illegality justifying interference in judgment of acquittal, this Court shall not and should not interfere in the matter. Since this Court does not find any illegality, material irregularity, perversity, impropriety or incorrectness in the impugned orders, there is no sufficient ground for interfering with or for setting it aside the acquittal and converting the same into conviction. The revision has got no force and is liable to be dismissed.
The Criminal Revision is accordingly dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Copy of this judgment be sent to the concerned trial court alongwith trial court record.