SLUM AND J J DEPARTMENT MCD vs Vijay Singh

-HEARD.

THE petitioner aggrieved by the order of the District Forum directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 3,000 with interest @ 15% from the date of deposit till realization, to pay Rs. 3000 as compensation as also Rs. 1,000 as litigation expenses. They filed an appeal against the order of the District Forum before the State Commission. The appeal was dismissed by the State Commission. Hence, this revision. In this case, the respondents/complainants claimed that despite their registration under the Residential Flat Registration Scheme for Slum Dwellers for more than 25 years ago, they were not allotted a flat. In the year 1985, the respondents had deposited Rs. 3,000 each. They never received any intimation about the status of the registration. The DDA continued by making them believe that they might get the allotment of the flats any day. It is evident that the complainants were the prospective consumers. They had paid for it by way of registration. After 1991, no flat was developed under that scheme. However, even the scheme was not given up in terms of Clause 10. 2, which provided that DDA reserved the right to withdraw the Scheme at any time.

In the meanwhile, during this long duration, it is common knowledge that cost of construction would have gone up; and the rent payable for similar accommodation would had also gone up. But the petitioner did not care about the plight of the poor slum dwellers. If they could not provide flats to the complainants and other over 5000 more applicants, at least, it was expected that they would refund the money as soon as they found that it was not feasible to implement the scheme. Carrot dangling by keeping the scheme alive for over 23 years or so, without taking any tangible step to implement the scheme since 1992, at least, would have kept the hopes of the poor slum dwellers to get a flat alive; and would have made them run from pillar to post to be disappointed and get ultimately frustrated every time. The moment we place ourselves in such a situation and imagine, we would feel the mental agony and continuous harassment of decades to run from pillar to post to see soaring rents, soaring prices of land, cost of instruction and value of the land. These aspects coupled with the fact that they continued to retain the money for 25 years would itself indicate that it was not only deficiency in rendering housing service but it was also on the verge of unfair trade practice to retain the money of such poor slum dwellers an thereafter to take shelter under the Rule 6. 4 which reads as under: "the initial deposit will be made for a maximum period of one year and will carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum. "

IT gives a definite impression that in terms of Rule 6. 4 for initial one year the rate of interest could be payable @ 7% p. a. Even if margin of reasonable period of three years is allowed prospective consumers are required to be compensated not only by paying interest for retaining money but they are also required to be compensated for compensation for agony to a consumer. In Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir Singh, II (2004) CPJ 12 (SC)=iii (2004) SLT 161= (2004) 5 SCC 65, para 6 of the judgment would indicate that compensation would include not only the contractual obligation to pay interest but also compensation for harassment and agony. Para 6 is reproduced here for ready reference, as under: "6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Each hierarchy in the Act is empowered to entertain a complaint by the consumer for value of the goods or services and compensation. The word ''compensation'' is again of very wide connotation. It has not been defined in the Act. According to dictionary it means, ''compensating or being compensated; thing given as recompense,'' In legal sense it may constitute actual loss or expected loss and may extend to physical, mental or even emotional suffering, insult or injury or loss. Therefore, when the Commission has been vested with the jurisdiction to award value of goods or services and compensation it has to be construed widely enabling the Commission to determine compensation for any loss or damage suffered by a consumer, which in law is otherwise included in wide meaning of compensation. The provision in our opinion enables a -consumer to claim and empowers the Commission to redress any injustice done to him. Any other construction would defeat the very purpose of the Act. The Commission or the Forum in the Act is thus entitled to award not only value of the goods or services but also to compensate a consumer for injustice suffered by him. "

This Court then went on to hold as follows (SCC pp. 261-64, paras 10-11): "10. Who should pay the amount determined by the Commission for harassment and agony, the statutory authority or should it be realised from those who were responsible for it? Compensation as explained includes both the just equivalent for loss of goods or services and also for sufferance of injustice. For instance in Civil Appeal No. . . . . . . of 1993 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 659 of 1991 the Commission directed the Bangalore Development Authority to pay Rs. 2446 to the consumer for the expenses incurred by him in getting the lease-cum-sale agreement registered as it was additional expenditure for alternative site allotted to him. No misfeasance was found. The moment the authority came to know of the mistake committed by it, it took immediate action by allotting alternative site to the respondent. It was compensation for exact loss suffered by the respondent. It arose in due discharge of duties. For such acts or omissions the loss suffered has to be made good by the authority itself. But when the sufferance is due to mala fide or oppressive or capricious acts, etc. of a public servant, then the nature of liability changes. The Commission under the Act could determine such amount if in its opinion the consumer suffered injury due to what is called misfeasance of the officers by the English Courts. Even in England where award of exemplary or aggravated damages for insult, etc. to a person has now been held to be punitive, exception has been carved out if the injury is due to ''oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

CONTINUOUS carrot dangling for over two decades, leading to mental agony, harassment and the torture suffered by complainants and persons like him, would surely amount to an oppressive act and the petitioner cannot take shelter under the specious plea of provision relating to interest in Rule 6. 4 in view of the wide scope of the term compensation. Supposing for the sake of argument, we accept that for retaining initial interest would be payable at the rate of 7% p. a. as per Rule 6. 4 but compensation has not been separately awarded for mental agony, torture and harassment for over two decades caused due inaction in implementing the scheme resulting to oppression. There is no compensation for loss in real purchasing power of a rupee: there is no compensation for soaring rent and soaring prices of such flats. It may further be added that real value of Rs. 3,000 deposited in the year 1985 would be around 10 to 15 times or more, if we compare with the pay scale of a person at that time in the same post with the pay as on today and price index.

CONSEQUENTLY, the judgment Bharati Knitting Company v. DHL Worldwide Express Courier Division of Airfreight Ltd. , II (1996) CPJ 25 (SC)=air 1996 SC 2508, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner would not be of any help for the facts were totally different in this judgment. There was no such a prolonged delay over 25 years or so. There was no possibility in increase in the rate of construction and the loss of purchasing power to such an extent.

THE moment we consider all these aspects, we feel that the petitioner has been virtually shown indulgence by just awarding interest @ 15% by not separately assessing loss and compensation in respect of all the above counts. Considering all these circumstances, we are of the view that order passed by the State Commission does not call for any interference and we are not inclined to increase agony of the complainant-respondents as well as the petitioner to spend public money in the case in hand. We do not find any force in this revision petition. It is dismissed accordingly. . Revision Petition dismissed.