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Judgment
M.S. Liberhan, C.J.
11:27 AM 10/11/2011 1. This appeal arises out of a judgment of the Hon''bie Single Judge, declining to quash the land acquisition proceedings.
Lands in dispute were acquired for a public purpose for setting-up of an industrial complex by SIPCOT vide Notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') dated 24.8.1996. Urgency provision Section 17(4) of the Act was invoked thereby enquiry u/s 6 of the Act was dispensed. Notification dt. 17.9.96 u/s 6 of Act with respect to the land in dispute was issued. Compensation to the extent of 80% was assessed and was deposited. Possession of the lands under the notification was taken over and further delivered to SIPCOT, who allotted Unacquired lands to various industries.
Acquisition was challenged, inter alia, on the grounds.
(i) Appellant wanted to set up an amusement park, for which necessary equipments and machineries were purchased and huge amount was spent. Setting up of an amusement park is in pari materia with the public purpose for which the lands were acquired. Acquisition was made at the instance of a local entrepreneur and an NR1 for a private company. Thus, the exercise of power for acquisition is colourable.
(ii) The acquisition was made in violation of Environmental and Forest Laws, and thus is violative of the policy of the Government of India, prohibiting setting up of polluting industries within 10 KM radius of the boundary of the Reserve Forest area without Government of India''s approval as well as the policy of the State of Tamil Nadu dated, banning the setting up of polluting industries within 1 KM radius from the embankments of rivers, lakes, streams, etc.
(iii) Invoking of urgency provisions suffers from the vires of arbitrariness as there was no sufficient material before the authorities to be satisfied with respect to the urgency especially when the earlier proposed acquisition at a different place for the same purpose could not succeed on account of litigation. Acquisition being for an industry, in all fairness to the Appellant, could have well brooked a delay of 30 days. Invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act is an act of arbitrariness especially when through letter dated 17.12.1996 the same land was offered for cultivation to the Appellants.
(iv) Lands in dispute were acquired for a company and the mandatory provisions of Chapter VII of the Act were riot complied with; Consequently, acquisition is without jurisdiction and void.
Brief facts in order to dispose of the objections noticed by the Hon''ble Single Judge and not disputed before us runs thus:
SIPCOT, an industrial development agency of the State, put forth a project at the cost of Rs. 7,148 crores for setting up of an industrial complex by inviting foreign investment and multinational corporations for whom the lands were to be provided. The State accepted the project and sanctioned the acquisition of 1465 acres of patta lands. Special staff for the acquisition of proceedings was recruited. Various notifications on different dates were issued. We may hasten to add that the Appellants, who were Petitioners in different writ petitions disposed of by common judgment, who owns small bits of lands ranging from 16.5 Hec, 9600Sq. Ft., 2400 Sq. Ft. etc. some even purchased the lands either on the eve of acquisition or some time prior to the acquisition.
Hon''ble Single Judge, rejecting the superfluous contentions, like publication of notification, non-service of notice, which findings were not challenged before us in this appeal, found that the urgency provisions were rightly invoked; mere offer made for cultivation of surplus land postdated to the acquisition is of no consequence; comparitive utility of public purpose cannot be gone into by the course; there is no colourable exercise of power for acquisition; the lands were acquired for the Government company, compliance of Chapter VII of the Act was not required.
Learned Counsel for the Appellants vehemently contended that in view of the letter dated 17.12.1996 offer being made to the Appellants for their lands acquired renders the invoking of urgency provisions a colourable exercise of power. It was contended that there was no material before the authorities to come to a conclusion of urgency though handing over of possession to Hyundai Motors, a foreign based company, is not disputed. Mere failure in the earlier proceedings for the same object having not succeeded in courts would not raise the requirement of acquisition to that of urgency requirement. Counsel for the Appellants relied on Narayan Govind Gavate and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, .
We find no force in the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Appellants. We fully concur with the findings of the Hon''ble single Judge and confirm the same to the extent that in the circumstances and the need of the hour when the State is at the stage of industrial development and all attempts are being made to attract foreign investment to improve the economy of the Nation, the records being before the authorities with respect to the demands made by the foreign companies and the local companies feeding the companies, before the authorities; Memorandum of Understanding between the foreign institutions placed before the authorities; thus in totality keeping in view of the demand, a decision was taken on 27.10.1995 at the stage of proposal and negotiations to provide lands to attract foreign investments, it cannot be said that there was no material before the Government to come to the decision for invoking the urgency provisions of the Act. We may hasten to add that around 117 acres of land were taken possession and given to SIPC Ol. who has further allotted it to various industries including Hyundai Motors, a foreign based industry. One cannot infer anything, but bona fides of the State that the lands were urgently needed to attract foreign investment. There is no gain saying, as observed by the Hon''ble Single Judge, after noticing the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vs. Smt. Pista Devi and Others, . Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. ect. etc. Vs. State of Rajasthan and others, , and Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, , that the decision with respect to invoking of urgency provision is an administrative decision and it is the subjective satisfaction of the Government on the material available on record to decide whether urgency provisions are to be invoked or not. State is not bound to record reasoned order while invoking the urgency provision in exercise of its administrative power while making the administrative decisions. Apart from the facts as observed earlier, the Hon''ble Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion, after perusal of the records, that there was sufficient material before the authorities and the decision of the authorities does not suffer from any infirmity or arbitrariness, mala fide or colourable exercise of jurisdiction. Mere delay in execution of the projects subsequent to the acquisition proceedings for some reason or other would not render the invoking of the urgency provisions a colourable exercise of power. It is common experience that completion of a project, after taking over the possession of the lands, erection of buildings, sanction of plans, providing other amenities like electricity, water, etc. importing of plant and machinery, etc. do take its own time. Intervening circumstances and the need to the extent of the land utilised for the object for which lands were acquired cannot render the invoking of the urgency provisions bad or illegal or arbitrary or it cannot be said to be an exercise of jurisdiction which is colourable. We further find support for the above observation from Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, wherein it was observed that one has to take notice of the fact that we have launched an ambitious programme of economic and industrial development to compete with foreigners for which infrastructure is needed which we owefully are lacking for which we need acquisition without delay. There is no dispute with respect to the proposition of the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in AIR 1997 SC 183. In view of the observations made above, we are of the considered view that invoking of urgency provisions does not suffer from any vice of illegality, irregularity, arbitrariness or it is being violative of any of the provisions of the Act.
We find no force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the acquisition is being made for public complex while the land was being purchased by the Appellant for setting up of an amusement park, which is also a public purpose. It is well-established that comparative utility of public purpose cannot be gone into by the Courts. Reference may be made to Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. ect. etc. Vs. State of Rajasthan and others, .
It would further be expedient to notice the provisions of the Act 1984, as amended, wherein a change has been brought about in the definition of the term ''company'', which runs as under:
a Company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, other than a Government company referred to in CL. (cc).
Chapter VII of the Act provides for acquisition of land for companies. One may notice that lands can be acquired for a company with previous consent of the appropriate Government and execution of an agreement necessary for an industrial concern after holding a previous enquiry with respect to the object of the company serving the public purpose, etc. It further enjoins a duty to enter into an agreement necessary for an industrial concern after holding a precious enquiry with respect to the object of the company serving the public purpose,etc. It further enjoins the duty to enter into an agreement by the company with the appropriate Government for providing finance for the acquisition. Various proceedural restrictions were provided for by Ch. VII. By amendment Section 44B got added which provides that land cannot be acquired under this part (Ch. VII) for certain purposes for private company other than Government Companies. Reading of Section 44-B and the definition, defining the expression ''company'' leads us to an inference that the provisions of Ch. VII of the Act does not apply in cases where the land is acquired for a Government company or for the local authorities. Lands for private companies can be acquired for the statutory objects provided for by Ch. VII of the Act, which is not the case of a Government company where the public purpose is inherent in itself, as such industries are established mostly to self-serve the public purpose for production of goods needed by the public and generating employment for the unemployed youth especially in this era of expertise when the Govt, is diversifying its sovereign functions in the various fields and entrust them to the experts constituting various Government companies, corporate bodies, legal bodies, etc.
We find no force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that compliance of Ch. VII of the Act is quintessential for a valid acquisition for a Government company or a local authority. Once the acquisition has been made for the industrial development by the Government authority or through its agency allotment of the plots to various companies would not render the acquisition for private companies requiring the compliance of Ch. VII. For the above observation, we find support from the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in 1997 SC 1284 (A.P. Sarin and Ors. v. State of U.P.) wherein almost in pari materia facts and circumstances land was acquired for the planned development by Ghaziabad Development Authority and it was observed that there is no requirement of law for compliance of Ch. VII of the Act. The observations made in Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji and Another Vs. The State of Bombay (Now Gujarat) and Others, and in State of Punjab and Others Vs. Raja Ram and Others, to the effect that even in case of the acquisition for a Government company compliance of Ch. VII of the Act is a must is the law laid down prior to the amendmeni and in view of the observation made above, amendment was brought about within the definition of the term ''company'' and ''Government company'' was taken out of the definition of the term ''company''; further Section 44B was inserted providing for land not to be acquired under Ch. VII except for certain purpose for private companies other than Government Companies. We are of the opinion that granting harmonious construction upon the statute and all provisions allowed to be operative and not render otiose compliance of the provisions of Ch. VII is no more required in case of acquisition for the Government companies especially as the law laid down by the Apex Court as referred to above.
No other point has been pressed into during the course of arguments.
For the reasons recorded above, we find no force in the appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. Connected C.M.P. No. 17687/97 is also dismissed.