High CourtsSingle Bench(1965) 09 MAD CK 0008

Sivaswami Chettiar vs Muthuswami Chettiar and others

Madras High Court · Decided on 10 September 1965

HON’BLE JUDGES
Veeraswami, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
S.A. No. 594 of 1962

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Judgment

41 paragraphs · 1,071 words

Veeraswami, J.—The plaintiff who lost in both the Courts below is the appellant. His suit was to enforce a mortgage dated 30th June, 1928,

which was executed by Subbiah and two of his sons in favour of three minors, who were the sons of another son of Subbiah. There was a family-

partition in February 1928, which the minors represented by their mother attacked as unequal in a plaint sought to be filed in forma pauperis.

Sometime later there was a compromise at which it would appear Subbiah and his two sons were asked to pay the minors a sum of Rs. 2,000.

The mortgage was accordingly executed to secure payment to the minors of the sum of Rs. 2,000. There was a stipulation in the mortgage for

payment of Rs. 220 annually until discharge of the debt to the minors. There is no dispute that this sum of Rs. 220 was paid every year until 1933,

but there was default thereafter. One of the respondents purchased the equity of redemption subject to the charge on the plaint scheduled

properties. The suit was resisted on the ground that more than double the amount secured under the mortgage had been paid and the principle of

damdupat would apply under S. 8 of Madras Act IV of 1938. Alternatively, the contesting defendants relied on S. 4(f) and (g) of the Act. The

Courts below concurred in rejecting the defence based on S. 4(f) and (g) but accepted the contention that under S. 8 the plaintiff was not entitled

to recover anything. The Suit was, therefore, dismissed and the appeal arising there out also failed. Before me the contention for the appellant is

that the Courts below were wrong in applying S. 8 to the facts of the case. It is said that the sum of Rs. 2,000 the payment of which was secured

by the mortgage was in fact an owelty to equalise the partition. In the suit that was sought to be filed by the minors, the partition was challenged as

being Unequal and unfair to them. In the context of this litigation compromise was entered into at the direction of a panchayat that a sum of Rs.

2,000 should be paid to the minors by the other sharers who were their paternal uncles and grandfather. In the circumstances, it is said that this

amount should be taken as an owelty. In fact the lower appellate Court has made an observation to that effect and so, according to the appellant,

what is an owelty cannot be regarded as a debt for the purpose of Act IV of 1938.

2.

Owelty of course represents the difference arising out of unequal partition and is in the nature of property and not a debt. When equal partition

for some reason or other is not possible, in order to adjust rights and equities, the sharer who has been allotted property in excess of his due is

directed to make good to the other sharer who has been allotted less, to the extent of such excess. In my view, such owelty is clearly not a liability

in the nature of a debt, but is property. I find Ramaswami, J., took a similar view in In re Mohamed Allar Sahib AIR 1958 Mad. 217, whether a

liability in respect of payment of owelty may in certain circumstances become a debt will have to be decided in the light of particular facts. It is

possible that what originally was an owelty may, in the light of particular facts, take the shape of a debt. It is contended that the provision for

payment of interest in the mortgage deed indicated that what the mortgage deed secured was essentially a debt, though it had its origin to owelty.

There is perhaps force in the contention. But on the view I take on the facts, it seems unnecessary to pursue the question.

3.

Neither in the plaint nor in the mortgage deed was it ever mentioned that the liability under the mortgage had its origin to owelty. Whether the

liability was due to owelty is a question of fact and there must be a clear allegation to the effect and will have to be proved like any other fact. But

there is neither pleading nor evidence in this case to justify the conclusion that what was secured by the mortgage deed was an owelty. The recitals

in the mortgage though refer to a panchayat did not mention that there was any unequal partition and that therefore the decision of the panchayat

was to award owelty in order to equalise the shares. The plaint that was filed on behalf of the minors represented by the mother would appear to

have not been pursued and there was no finding at any time even apart from the panchayat that there was any unequal partition. It follows that the

very premises on which the point of law relating to owelty, is argued are not established. It is true that both the Courts below in the course of their

judgments made casual observations that the sum secured by the mortgage was in lieu of a share of the mortgagee. But there is literally no evidence

in support of these observations. What is more, the plaint itself proceeded on the basis that what was secured by the mortgage was a debt like any

other without any suggestion as to its possible origin from owelty.

4.

Learned Counsel for the appellant with a view to take the case outside the purview of S. 8 contended that the obligation under the mortgage

deed to pay a sum of Rs. 220 per year towards the maintenance of the minors was an obligation in the nature of a trust within the meaning of S.

4(b). I am unable to accept this contention. A perusal of the mortgage deed leaves no room for doubt that the sum of Rs. 220 payable every year

to the minors was on account of interest accruing on the principal secured by the mortgage. Merely because, there was mention in the deed that the

sum of Rs. 220 per annum was to be paid for the support of the minors could not make any difference to the real nature of this payment, namely,

as interest for the principal. It follows that S. 4(g) also has no application. The second appeal is dismissed but with no costs. No leave.