Sivan vs State of Kerala

R. Basant, J.—i) Is the circumstance leading to the allegation of patricide against the appellant established by satisfactory evidence?

ii) Can the circumstances established lead a prudent mind to a safe conclusion of guilt against the appellant?

iii) Is the appellant entitled to the benefit of doubt?

iv) Did the court below commit the error of importing extraneous information, which was not legally placed before the court in the course of trial, while attempting to adjudicate the guilt of the appellant?

These are the questions raised by Ms. V. Shylaja, learned Counsel for the appellant in her attempt to assail the impugned verdict of guilt, conviction and sentence against the appellant.

The appellant was the sole accused who faced indictment. The crux of the charge against him is that the accused on the night of 4/9/2002 at about 10.45 p.m. caused the death of his father by ligature strangulation with MO.2 towel in the workshop where PW3 was working as a mechanic. The alleged motive is the desperate yearning of the appellant to somehow get his marriage, which was scheduled to take place on 8/9/2002, postponed.

The investigation into this crime commenced on the basis of Ext.P1(a) F.I.R. registered on the basis of Ext.P1 F.I.S. lodged by PW1, another son of the deceased, at 7.15 a.m. on 5/9/2002. The crime was registered under the caption "unnatural death" u/s 174 Cr.P.C. After completing the investigation, it was PW13, who filed the final report/charge sheet against the appellant alleging the commission of the offence punishable u/s 302 I.P.C.

Consequent to committal of the case to the Sessions Court, cognizance was taken by the Sessions Court. The accused denied the offence alleged against him and thereupon the prosecution examined PWs. 1 to 15 and proved Exts.P1 to P12. MOs.1 to 17 were also marked. The accused took up a defence of total denial. According to him, he had nothing to do with the unfortunate death of his father. No defence evidence was adduced - oral or documentary.

The learned Sessions Judge, on an anxious consideration of all the relevant inputs, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing all ingredients of the offence punishable u/s 302 I.P.C. against the appellant. Accordingly, the learned Judge proceeded to pass the impugned verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence. The sentence of imprisonment for life was imposed on the appellant.

Before us, the learned Counsel for the appellant Ms. V. Shylaja and the learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Noble Mathew have advanced their arguments.

The learned Counsel for the appellant assails the impugned verdict of guilt, conviction and sentence on the four grounds referred to already in paragraph 1 of this judgment.

An appellate judgment is and must be read in continuation of the judgment of the trial court. The trial court has adverted to all the relevant pieces of oral and documentary evidence in the impugned judgment. In the impugned judgment, the trial court has also referred to all matters including charge levelled against the accused as also the examination of the accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C. It is not necessary, in these circumstances, for us to attempt to re-narrate such pieces of evidence and matters that were placed before the court below. Suffice it to say that the learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned Public Prosecutor have taken us meticulously through the oral evidence of PWs.1 to 15 and the documentary evidence, Exts.P1 to P12. Reference to Mos.1 to 17 have also been made. Our attention has also been drawn to the final report filed by the police, the charge framed by the court as also the answers given by the accused in the course of 313 examination.

We must at the outset note that this is a case where the indictment rests solely on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution has not been able to adduce any direct evidence to implicate the appellant herein in the trial. They chose to rely on certain circumstances, which according to them reveal the complicity of the appellant.

It is unnecessary to refer to the specific precedents. It is trite beyond controversy that in a case resting solely on circumstantial evidence, the burden is heavy on the shoulders of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence. Such circumstances must be strong links in the chain of circumstances. Together the links must constitute a strong chain which unerringly points to the guilt of the accused. Such chain of circumstances must effectively rule out any possible hypothesis of innocence of the accused. Then and only then can an accused be found to be guilty of such indictment in a criminal prosecution.

It is not the number of links that matters. It is the conclusiveness of the inference on the basis of the links in the chain, that is of crucial significance. Each of such links may throw open several possibilities and probabilities but what the court has to consider is the possibilities and probabilities thrown open after the links form a strong chain. The question is whether the links together - we mean, the chain, proves the indictment against the accused or whether it leaves behind scope for any reasonable doubt. Each link by itself may throw open several possibilities and probabilities. Benefit of doubt is not to be conceded on the basis of such possibilities and probabilities.

Having reminded ourselves of the law relating to proof of an indictment on the basis of circumstantial evidence, we shall now proceed to narrate the circumstances which, according to the learned Prosecutor Shri Noble Mathew, are made available before the court. We do include some of the circumstances relied on by him, though there is no material to assume that the prosecution had relied on any such circumstances before the court below. Some of those circumstances have not been accepted by the court below also. The circumstances are:

1)Motive, which the appellant allegedly entertained against his father.

2) The fact that the deceased - the father of the appellant had died on account of ligature strangulation on the night of 4/9/2002.

3) That the death of the deceased occurred in the workshop where PW3 is a mechanic and the body of the deceased was found near that workshop - a little (100 - 150 metres.) away from the workshop.

4) That the appellant and the deceased - father and son, were seen together by PW1 and PW14 at about 5 p.m. on that day.

5) PW4, a Police Constable on night patrol duty had allegedly seen the appellant at about 1.30 a.m. on 5/9/2002 on the public road under circumstances which generated dissatisfaction in the mind of PW4.

There was grease (black) on the clothes, MO.1 series, which the accused was wearing on that night.

The accused, the eldest son of the deceased, did not participate enthusiastically in the last rites and rituals which had to be performed consequent to the death of the deceased, his father.

We shall now proceed to consider the seven circumstances on which the prosecution now wants to place reliance on. We shall initially consider whether these circumstances have been established satisfactorily. We shall later consider whether the proved circumstances are sufficient to generate a safe satisfaction about the guilt of the appellant in the mind of the court.

Coming to the first circumstance, the appellant is the son of the deceased. The deceased was aged about 60 years. The appellant was aged about 25 years. The mother of the appellant, i.e. wife of the deceased had left the deceased and her children and had allegedly gone away about 15 years back. PW1 is the younger brother of the appellant. The deceased had only those two male children. PW1 had already got married. He along with his wife, PW2 - they at the relevant time are aged about 23 years and 20 years and were residing together in a separate house. The younger brother appears to have married earlier than the appellant herein. After the marriage of PWs.1 and 2, it appears that the deceased used to sleep in the house of his sister and the appellant used to sleep in the shop where he was working, leaving PWs. 1 and 2 in the house. The marriage of the appellant had been fixed. It was to take place on 8/9/2002. The appellant along with the deceased was going round to invite people for the wedding. Even on 4/9/2002, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the very case of the prosecution is that the appellant along with the deceased had gone to invite the paternal grand-father of the appellant for the wedding. There is practically no other or better evidence to indicate or even remotely suggest any strain in the relationship between the accused and the deceased. The prosecution sets up a case that the appellant was hard pressed for money. He was not able to find/raise requisite resources necessary for his marriage, which was to take place on 8/9/2002. PWs.1 and 2 have broadly indicated the attempts of the appellant to raise money for performance of his marriage. According to them, he was hard pressed for money. They have no case that the appellant had discussed the shortage of cash for the marriage with them. They have no case that they were in any way involved in the attempt to raise the amount for the marriage of the appellant which was scheduled to take place on 8/9/2002. However, it was the general impression of PWs.1 and 2 that the gold ornaments have not been purchased and necessary funds have not been raised for the solemnisation of marriage of the appellant.

From these circumstances, the prosecution wants the court to assume that there was motive for the appellant to do away with his father and the ingenious explanation is that the appellant, who had not obtained sufficient money to conduct his marriage on 8/9/2002, wanted a postponement of his marriage. To facilitate that - such postponement, the only method which he could devise was to do away with his father so that the death of his father would afford sufficient reason/justification for the postponement of the marriage.

To say the least, the theory is bizarre. The learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the imagination of the investigator is running wild. There is absolutely no evidence even to remotely indicate that the appellant, whose younger brother had already got married, had made any attempt to get the marriage postponed. There is no case for any witness that the appellant had entertained such a secret desire. At any rate, the desire, if any, had not been manifested and no one has a case that there was any indication of such desire of the appellant to get his own marriage postponed. The court below appears to have thought that the working of a human mind may be inscrutable and that if really the accused was hard pressed for money and he faced the prospect of humiliation before his prospective bride and people of the locality he may have entertained the desire to do away with his father to enable him to make use of that circumstance to get his marriage postponed.

Except surmises and conjectures, we find absolutely no tangible evidence which can suggest that the appellant did entertain such a motive or desire. The appellant is the son of the deceased. Going by all available indications, there is nothing to even remotely indicate that he entertained any motive/animus against his father or that he was planning to get his marriage postponed for some reason. The theory that he was waiting to invent reasons to justify postponement of his marriage and he found that death of his father would be a convincing reason to postpone his marriage, though suggested by the prosecution, has no legs to stand on. Even though, this circumstance has been heavily relied on by the prosecution and accepted by the learned Judge to a certain extent, we are of the opinion that this circumstance has not been proved satisfactorily. There is not a semblance of evidence from relative witnesses, PWs.1 and 2 or any other to suggest that the accused did want to get his marriage postponed to any later date to facilitate raising of money to meet expenses of his marriage. The accused, it appears, had taken a stand in the course of trial that his marriage had not been fixed also. The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 is sufficient to conclude that the marriage of the appellant was to take place on 8/9/2002. But we hold that there is absolutely nothing to indicate that the appellant wanted his marriage to be postponed and did ever entertain a desire to (and contemplate) do away his father to facilitate postponement of the marriage. This circumstance is not proved satisfactorily at all.

The second circumstance stands established convincingly. The inquest report prepared by PW15 to which PW5 is an attester as also the evidence of PW11, the Doctor who conducted postmortem examination and issued Ext.P6 and Ext.P8 postmortem certificates as also the oral evidence of PW12 and Ext.P7 report on the basis of which PW11 issued Ext.P8 do all clearly show that the deceased had died on account of ligature strangulation on the night of 4/9/2002. Not a semblance of doubt is left in our mind about this circumstance. We reckon this circumstance as proved satisfactorily.

The third circumstance relied on by the prosecution is that the death of the deceased must have taken place in the workshop of PW3 and the body of the deceased must have been removed from the workshop to the place where it was found lying - at a distance of about 100-150 metres away from the workshop by someone. We have evidence to indicate that some incident had taken place at the workshop where PW3 was a mechanic. PW3 was not available in the workshop during that night. Evidence available from the scene mahazar (Ext.P4) as also the inquest report (Ext.P3) suggest that the workshop was not kept under lock and key during the night. It appears to be a small workshop activity where three wheelers were repaired. It was a thatched shed and the evidence unmistakably conveys that access into that workshop was available for any one during the night.

That a violent incident had taken place inside the said workshop is eloquently revealed from the factual perceptions made by the Investigating Officer at the scene of the crime. Blood marks were there inside the workshop. The dead body was found at a place near the workshop. Though there are no significant external bleeding injuries on the person of the deceased, there is evidence to show that death occurred due to ligature strangulation. The possibility of the incident having taken place inside the workshop is certainly indicated and suggested by the presence of the blood marks at the scene. Of course it is true that we are unable to find any specific explanation as to why the body was carried by the miscreant (whoever he be) from the workshop to a place outside the workshop if as a matter of fact the murder had taken place inside the workshop. The court below had adverted to that aspect. The court was not able to find any positive circumstances to explain the presence of the dead body at a place away from the workshop within which indications suggest that the murder must have taken place. The identification of the precise spot of occurrence does not appear to be very crucial while considering this third circumstance relied on by the prosecution. We are satisfied that the conclusion is safe that the deceased must have suffered death at or near the workshop. We are unable to precisely locate whether the murder was caused inside the workshop and whether the incident had commenced inside the workshop, but had continued till the place where the dead body was found. It is also impossible to precisely ascertain whether the body was removed to the place where it was found by the miscreants whoever he be from the workshop. Suffice it to say that we are satisfied that the death of the deceased on account of ligature strangulation must have taken place at/near the workshop/the place where the dead body was found. This third circumstance is answered in favour of the prosecution to the above extent.

The fourth circumstance relied on by the prosecution is that the appellant and the deceased were seen together. PWs 1 and 14 deposed that they had seen the appellant and the deceased together at about 5 p.m. on that evening. It is the undisputed case that the deceased along with the appellant had gone to the house of the grandfather of the appellant to extend invitation for the wedding. There is nothing to show that the grandfather is alive or that he had met the accused and the deceased on that day. Seeing the father and son together at 5 p.m, when death must have taken place, according to the prosecution, late in the night at about 10.45 p.m, cannot certainly be reckoned as a very important or crucial circumstance. Moreover the evidence shows that the deceased and the appellant had returned from the house of the grandfather and thereafter the appellant had gone to the house of PW1 and PW2 at about 10 p.m. as stated by PW1 and PW2. It is the common case that the deceased sleeps at the house of his sister and the appellant sleeps at his place of work. Even though they were seen together at 5 p.m, at 10 p.m. when PW1 and PW2 saw the appellant, the deceased was not available with him. According to the prosecution the deceased was alive at that time. Moreover, they were not residing together at any place and in these circumstances the last seen theory cannot have any direct application to the facts of this case. That the appellant and the deceased were found together at about 5 p.m. in the evening by PWs 1 and 14 cannot, in any view of the matter, be reckoned as a relevant incriminating circumstance, in the facts of this case where death had taken place admittedly after 10 p.m. This circumstance of PWs 1 and 14 having seen the appellant and the deceased together at about 5 p.m. is accepted. But we are of the opinion that the value of this circumstance as an incriminating circumstance against the accused is not much.

The fifth circumstance relied on by the prosecution is that PW4, a police constable on night patrol duty, had seen the appellant on the public road at about 1.30 a.m. on 05.09.2002 (the night of 04.09.2002). According to the prosecution by the time PW4 saw the appellant at that odd hour, the murder of the deceased must already have taken place. Except the oral evidence of PW4, there is nothing tangible to support the version of PW4. According to PW4, another police constable was also available with him on duty when he intercepted the appellant on suspicion. The other police constable has not been examined. No test identification parade has been conducted. Though it is asserted that PW4 had made a record (noting) of the details of the appellant in a book/register maintained by him, such register is not placed before court at all. In these circumstances, the court below did not believe PW4 and did not choose to accept and act upon his evidence. If this evidence were proved, certainly that would have been a relevant circumstance though the value to be attached to that circumstance as a circumstance incriminating the appellant for the offence of murder will have to be considered in depth. But the fact remains that the court below chose not to accept and act upon the oral evidence of PW4. The only question now is whether we must take a different view on the question. We are also of the opinion that the trial court, which had the advantage of seeing the witness (PW4) perform in the witness stand, having chosen not to accept and act upon his evidence, we need not also accept and act upon the oral evidence of PW4. The uncorroborated testimony of PW4, which could easily have been corroborated by ocular and documentary evidence, cannot be accepted by us at this appellate stage, the court below having chosen not to accept the same. In any view of the matter, we are of the opinion that we need not reverse this finding of the court below. This circumstance thus must be held to be not established.

The prosecution relies on the sixth circumstance that there was some black (grease) mark on the clothes M.O1 series of the appellant. There was the evidence of PW4 also that when he saw the appellant on that night at about 1.30 a.m, there were some black marks on his pants. The evidence of PWs 1 and 2 suggest that at the time when the appellant went to the house of PW1 after coming to know of the death of his father, he was wearing M.O1 series and there were black (grease) marks on his pants. Those were washed by PW2 and after washing, there is no indication of any black (grease) marks on the pants worn by the appellant, which is one of the items in M.O1 series. According to PW2, these clothes were left by the appellant when he went to the house of PW1 in connection with performance of last rites of the deceased. At that point of time, it appears, the needle of suspicion was not pointed at the appellant.

M.O1 series, when it was seized after the incident, did not admittedly have any black (grease) marks on it. It was not sent to the expert to ascertain whether there was any black (grease) marks on it. It is the case of the prosecution that after washing, there was no black (grease) marks on M.O1 series. We can safely accept the evidence of PW2 to come to the conclusion that there were black (grease) marks on the clothes of the appellant before she washed them.

What is the importance of this circumstance? This has now got to be considered. The scene of the crime is described in detail in the scene mahazar and the inquest report. It is significant to note that there is nothing to indicate that there were any grease present/available at the workshop. Merely because it was a workshop, significance cannot be attached to the presence of black (grease) marks on the clothes of the appellant. We have already noted that except that there were black marks, there is nothing to authentically conclude that such black marks were caused by grease. Moreover there is nothing to indicate that such grease was available in the workshop.

It will not be inapposite in this context to note that even the clothes of the deceased did not have any black (grease) marks. If it is the case of the prosecution that black (grease) marks happened to be present on the clothes of the accused, because he was involved in an incident in the workshop, by the same reason and logic the absence of black (grease) marks on the clothes of the deceased is crucial. Admittedly there were no black (grease) marks on the clothes (M.Os 14 and 15) worn by the deceased which are described in the inquest report. In these circumstances, even though we find no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW2 about the presence of black (grease) marks on his clothes M.O1 series, we are unable to reckon the same as a vital or crucial circumstance to suggest that the appellant was involved in the incident which took place inside the workshop. This sixth circumstance, though established, cannot hence be reckoned as a crucial or vital circumstance against the appellant.

The court below appears to have reckoned another circumstance as important. The court below felt that this circumstance would be admissible u/s 8 of the Evidence Act. The court below came to the conclusion that the appellant, the elder son of the deceased, had not taken part in the funeral rites/rituals of the deceased. The court below came to the conclusion that the appellant being the elder son must normally have performed those rites. The court below also appears to have concluded that the mother of the appellant did not permit him to perform the last rites. The learned Counsel for the appellant argues that it is impossible to ascertain how and where from, the court below gathered this information. We have been taken through the entire evidence. We find that no witness had spoken on this aspect at all. There is nothing in evidence to show that the mother of the appellant, the estranged wife of the deceased, had objected to the appellant, the elder son of the deceased, to perform the last rites. We have also tried to scan through the entire evidence. We have been taken through the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 meticulously. The mother of the appellant, i.e. the estranged wife of the deceased has not been examined as a witness before court. We are unable to locate the precise source of this information for the court below. We requested the learned Public Prosecutor to point out the evidence if any on this aspect. The learned Public Prosecutor has also not been able to locate any such evidence adduced in this case about such conduct of the appellant''s mother.

Moreover, the evidence reveals that the appellant did, in fact, take part in the funeral rites/rituals. The evidence of PW2 clearly indicates that M.O1 series clothes were left at the house of PWs 1 and 2 by the appellant when he went there to perform the last rites. Of course the prosecution has a case that the appellant was compelled to take part in the funeral rituals. This is sought to be inferred from the evidence of PW1, who stated that on his request the appellant, the elder son of the deceased, had gone to perform the last rites. The reasons which prompted the appellant to wait for PW1''s request to take part in the funeral rites are not according to us so crucial as to draw any serious adverse inference against the appellant/accused. A son in grief could also have acted in the manner which the appellant is alleged to have behaved. At any rate, we are unable to attach any crucial significance to this seventh circumstance relied on by the prosecution.

After ascertaining the existence/non existence of the seven circumstances referred above, we shall now consider as to whether the circumstances proved can in any way point to the guilt of the accused/appellant safely. We have already adverted to all the relevant circumstances. We are unable to agree that there is any circumstance which can satisfactorily connect the appellant with the crime in question. The totality of circumstances cannot at all generate the requisite satisfaction beyond doubt that the appellant was responsible for the death of his father. The circumstances proved cannot lead a prudent mind to such a conclusion. The challenge raised against the impugned verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence must, in these circumstances, succeed. Evidence shows that M.O2 towel was available at the place where the dead body was found. The prosecution suggests that M.O2 must have been used for ligature strangulation. It is significant that there is nothing in M.O2 to connect the same with the appellant. On M.O2 blood marks were found and those blood marks were of the same group as that of the deceased. M.O2 cannot offer any linkage to connect the accused with the crime. In these circumstances, that cannot even be reckoned as a relevant circumstance.

In the result:

a) This Criminal Appeal is allowed;

b) The impugned verdict of guilty, conviction and the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on the appellant/accused u/s 302 I.P.C is hereby set aside;

c) If the appellant''s detention is not required in connection with any other case, he shall forthwith be released from custody.

The Registry shall forthwith communicate the operative portion of this judgment to the prison authorities and the court below for immediate necessary action.