Sikander Ali vs State of U.P.

S.K. Agarwal, J.

1 This revision was preferred against the judgment and order dated 8.4.2002 passed by Sri Brijesh Kumar, IV Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Lucknow in S.T. No. 1076 of 2002, State v. Sikander Ali and others S.T. No. 1076 of 2002, holding the applicant a non-juvenile.

Before this Court could enter into purposeful hearing of the case, learned A.G.A. raised a preliminary objection that this applicant cannot be declared a juvenile in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Arnit Das Vs. State of Bihar, . According to learned A.G.A. this judgment lays down that the ''juvenility has to be determined by reference to the date of appearance of the person before the competent authority or the date on which such person was brought before such authority and not with reference to the date of commission of the offence. The Act deals with the post-delinquency stage of investigation, inquiry and trial i.e., when the juvenile is available to the law administration and justice delivery system. The date of the commission of the offence is relevant for finding out whether a person is juvenile within the meaning of Clause (h) of Section 2 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act''). If that would have been the intendment of Parliament, nothing had prevented it in saying so specifically. Section 2 which defines "juvenile" and "neglected juvenile" itself begins by saying that the words defined therein would have the assigned meaning "unless the context otherwise requires". So far as the present context is concerned, it is clear that the crucial date for determining the question whether a person is a juvenile is the date when he is brought before the competent authority''.

In order to deal with this objection one has to understand the entire scheme of this Act. There are two Acts, one deals with delinquency of a child below 18 years of age, i.e., the Act of 2000, and in the 1986 Act 16 years and 18 years in a frame different from a juvenile. The Act comprehends two distinct situations. One is the social reform aspect which embraces not only his rehabilitation but also measures to bring the juvenile back into the main stream of the social system. It is reformative side. A ''Juvenile'' is different from a delinquent juvenile or a child in conflict with law. The other aim the Act endears to is to end the delinquency and restore the delinquents to the society as a normal and decent citizen. In the case of juvenile both the Acts contemplate only their rehabilitation and protection from vagrancy and from abuse of their impressionable immaturity in any manner. To accomplish it the Act created a scheme. Specific provisions have been incorporated. These provisions deal with different situations of the state of juvenility. It includes measures or reforms to be undertaken both by the State as well as by public welfare bodies. This, in reality, is the social aspect of the Act. It is in effect introduced in the Act to give full effect to Articles 14, 16, and 19 and directive principles enshrined in the Constitution of India regarding children. In this respect the age of a juvenile is to be determined from the date of his appearance either before the advisory board or the juvenile court or where none of them exists, a competent authority, as envisaged in Chapters II and III of the Act especially. The endeavour, therefore, is to determine his age in this context, social purpose. It was what the Apex Court has determined in Arnit Das''s case (supra). Rightfully age of a juvenile for this purpose is to be determined from the date of his appearance since the purpose in doing so would be drastically different, i.e., simply rehabilitative. It includes his upbringing in a healthy atmosphere. It is a prelude to bring a juvenile back to mainstream of the social system as a decent citizen wedded fully to the social system and laws of the land. The purpose is to prevent him from being wayward or abused.

The term "delinquent juvenile" precedes the term ''juvenile'', whereas Section 2 (h) defines a delinquent juvenile in 1986 Act. A juvenile includes as defined in Section 2 (1) ''neglected juvenile''. It has enumerated five further classification of this category. They are, juveniles engaged in begging, juveniles having no home or settled place of abode and has no ostensible means of subsistence. He is to be termed or called a destitute juvenile. Being a child of a guardian, who is unfit or incapacitated to exercise control over its child or lives in a brothel, with a prostitute or is a flagrant visitor to any such place for the purpose of prostitution or is associating with any prostitute or any other person who leads an immoral, drunken or depraved life or lastly one who is being or is likely to be abused or exploited for immoral or illegal purposes or unconscionable gain. It thus classifies ''destitute juveniles''.

Thus, the enactment itself has apparently intended a distinction to be drawn between a ''delinquent juvenile'' or ''child in conflict with law'' and the general category of juveniles such as neglected and destitute and those whose childhood is being abused physically and socially both.

While considering the scheme of the enactment we cannot shut our eyes to the criminality aspect. The Act deals with it in the nature of a delinquent juvenile. Delinquent juvenile as defined in Section 2 (h), ''is a person below 16 years and now 18 years of age, who had committed an offence''. Criminality to any act of any person is attended due to contravention of any provision of the Penal Code or other penal laws. Once the law is breached or violated by a juvenile involving penal consequences it immediately becomes an offence. In cases of commission of offence what is to be determined, ascertained or realised in essence is the intendment of the Act. The question that smarts under our eyes is related to the date of criminality, i.e., the day he committed a breach of any penal law. It is this act which is most relevant for the grant of post delinquency benefits to him. Benefits are always to be posterior to an event. They can never be anterior to. Without an event consequences do not follow.

I am favourably confronted in coming to the above conclusion from the changes introduced in the new Act promulgated in the year 2000. Some very important changes giving a clarity to this question have been introduced. This Act has constituted an advisory board under Clause (a) of Section 2. Such board is to be constituted u/s 62 of the Act. They may be Central, State or a district and city level boards. They may be constituted to advise the Government on matters relating to the establishments and maintenance of juvenile homes, mobilisation of resources, provision of facilities for education, training and rehabilitation of a child in need of care and juvenile in conflict with law and to cause coordination among the various official and non-official agencies busy in the task. Thus, the obligation of these boards or authorities is clearly rehabilatory. According to Section 2 (k) ''juvenile'' or ''child'' means a person who has not completed 18 years of age. The child has been defined in Section 2 (d). Section 2 (d) contains all possible categories of a child who is in need of care and protection some of which were included in Section 2 (1) of the Act of 1986. A ''juvenile in conflict with law'' is the new name given to ''delinquent juvenile'' according to Section 2 (1) of the new Act. It means a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence under any penal provision. Competent authority has also been specified in the new Act. Section 2 (g) defines that competent authority means in relation to children in need of care and protection a committee and in relation to ''juvenile in conflict with law'' a board. A committee according to Section 2 (f) means a child welfare committee constituted u/s 29 of this Act. Board according to Section 2 (c) means a Juvenile Justice Board. Section 49 of the 2000 Act is analogous to Section 32 of the 1986 Act. Here the term used is ''competent authority''. This section provides for presumption and determination of age of a child or a person who is brought before it to determine his age by taking evidence to assume jurisdiction to pass necessary orders. It is evident from this part of the section ''whether the person is a juvenile or the child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be''.

In this context let us dwell into Chapter II of this Act. Section 4 deals with the constitution of a Juvenile Justice Board. It is to deal exclusively with juvenile in conflict with law. When read in conjunction with Section 49 of this Act it has first to determine the age of the juvenile to assume jurisdiction when such a juvenile is produced or brought. It has been empowered by Section 6 to deal exclusively with all proceedings under this Act relating to ''juvenile in conflict with law''.

A most sanguine deviation is adhered to by this Act regarding apprehension by police of a juvenile in conflict with law. Section 10 of this Act lays down that as soon as a juvenile in conflict with law is apprehended by police, he shall be placed under the charge of special juvenile police unit or the designated police officer who shall immediately report the matter to a member of the board. The intention behind the introduction of this provision in the Act is crystal clear. It is evident that as little a distance as possible be there in the production of the child and the determination of his age by the board. This is inducted in to avoid any refusal of the benefits accruable to any ''delinquent juvenile'' or ''juvenile in conflict with law'' guaranteed under the Act. This further goes to show that the new Act has provided for arrest and consequent follow-up by introducing this section.

Section 14 deals with enquiry regarding juvenile in conflict with law or the juvenile having been charged with the offence. As soon as such a juvenile is produced before the board, the board shall hold the enquiry in accordance with provisions of this Act and may make such order in relation to the juvenile as it deems fit. The proviso to this section specifies period of 4 months for the conclusion of any such enquiry from the date of commencement of such inquiry.

Reading these two sections conjointly, i.e., Section 10 and Section 49 in league with Section 2 (c) and (g) the intention of the Legislature becomes abundantly clear. The age is to determined at the earliest opportunity not long away from the date of commission of the offence. The period elapsed in between the commission of the offence and the determination of his age is certainly to accrue to the delinquent. It has to be adjusted in the age so determined by the board. There can''t be any conflict in this regard. It flows from the entire scheme of the enactment discussed above unerringly otherwise the sanguine purpose of the Act to reform and rehabilitate the juvenile in conflict with law will stand lost. It is not a case of simple rehabilitation as is desired in regard to a juvenile or a child in need of care and protection. It involves security of every delinquent juvenile from crimes and the company of criminals or bad elements and some other benefits guaranteed under various provisions of the Act.

The question that crops up in view of Arnit Das''s case (supra) is whether it is the date of his criminality or the date of his appearance or his production before the desired authority, the board, the Court or the competent authority. The question that accosts us is what should be the ''cut off date'' in the case of a delinquent juvenile or a juvenile in conflict with law. For this purpose we have to analyse the scheme of the Act as enshrined in Chapter IV which is analogous to Chapter II of the 2000 Act and the benefits that would visit him under the scheme of these Acts. Without doing so, it would not only be preposterous but also cause serious damage to the very intent of the enactment. If we examine the entire scheme, it would immediately occur that Arnit Das''s (supra) conclusion will be to the peril of such a juvenile. It would amount clearly to denial to him of the benefits ensured by this Act. For realising it, let us examine the benefits that would accrue to him otherwise than a simple juvenile.

Under the scheme of this Act if a juvenile commits an offence, he would be in the category of an accused. The benefits envisaged by the Act would thus flow to an accused (juvenile) in that capacity of his. These benefits are distinct in nature from the social justice aspect of the juvenility. In the social justice aspect for a juvenile his rehabilitation and his growth as a normal citizen was the ultimate goal. In the case of a delinquent juvenile the purpose is to segregate and protect him from the ordinary meaning of an ''accused'' and the consequences visiting him from this nomenclature once he is put to prosecution and if his conviction results. The Court or the board has to dispense criminal justice against him there is no doubt. However, under the scheme of the Act he is to be tried by a different judicial set up and is not to be sentenced or convicted but is to be reformed and rehabilitated and thereby redeemed to the society as a normal decent civilian, leading a life in accordance with the rules of the society and laws of the nation. The main purpose behind the conferment of the benefits by this Act was removal of his criminality first and his rehabilitation and redemption to the main stream of social life thereafter.

In order to achieve this end, we have to examine this aspect in the light of the relevant provisions of this Act. Relevant sections in this connection are Sections 2, 18, 20 to 26, 32, 36 and 41 to 46 of the Act of 1986. Most important amongst them are Sections 23, 24, 25 and 32. Section 32 of the Act is to be interpreted in the case of a delinquent juvenile in the light of the above intendment. Chapter IV and Section 33, is also equally of relevance in this context, especially its first proviso.

Section 18 (1) of the Act makes the release on bail of such a delinquent juvenile a must subject to the conditions, which are envisaged by this provision, i.e., such a release is not to be made if it is likely to bring such a juvenile in association with any known criminal or expose him to such danger or that his release would defeat the ends of justice. But for these three exceptions, his release on bail has been made obligatory on the juvenile justice courts by the Act. Purpose behind these exceptions too is to serve this above aspect. Section 18 (2) of the Act provides for treatment to be meted out to him in case bail is denied in view of any of the said exceptions. Sub-section (3) is also to the same end except providing the length for which his such confinement is to be, i.e., till the conclusion of the enquiry. Section 20 of the Act envisages the mode of enquiry. It refers to Section 39 of the Act which provides for the procedure. It contemplates the adherence of the procedure provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for trials in summons cases for holding such enquiry. Section 21 deals with the orders to be passed in the cases of such delinquent juveniles. Five different remedies in (a) to (e) are provided, they need no reference. The two provisos attached to this section are in addition to said five remedies. Section 22 of the Act provides for ''do nots'', meaning thereby ''what is not to be done''. It provides that no Court can sentence him to death or imprisonment or commit him to imprisonment in default of payment of fine. Proviso makes an exception to the general rule of incarceration in any criminal case on conviction for a delinquent juvenile. It also provides for incorrigible delinquent juvenile to be kept in safe custody according to the situation and necessity. Sub-section (2) provides right to detain such a juvenile to the State Government, but such detention will be subject to limitation of maximum period of imprisonment accruable under the penal clause he is charged with. According to Section 23 of the Act no order under Chapter VIII of Code of Criminal Procedure can be passed against any delinquent juvenile. Section 24 (1) and (2) of the Act prohibits joint trial of such delinquent juveniles with other accused persons. Section 25 of the Act provides for non-attachment of any disqualification occurring on conviction to such delinquent juveniles. Section 26 of the Act deals with pending trials and provides that if the Court finds any undertrial a juvenile such juvenile has to be referred to a juvenile court or an advisory board and he would be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of this Act after these Courts returned a finding about his juvenility.

A close scrutiny of the proviso to Section 22 (1) of the Act provides us a clue to the issue at hand. If an offence is committed by a juvenile about 14 years of age and the offence is very heinous and the delinquent is incorrigible, he can be given in the custody of some responsible person or remanded to jail under distinct terms and conditions determined by the juvenile court or an advisory board, or the competent authority.

Section 32 of the Act, on a sincere scrutiny, reveals that it only talks of a juvenile in its generic sense (social sense) and includes a delinquent juvenile too. It actually speaks of correct age of every juvenile to be determined at the time when such juvenile appears or is produced or brought before the board, the competent court or competent authority.

Now let us meander into the meaning of the term "delinquent juvenile" as defined in Section 2 (e) of the Act. It means a juvenile who was found to have committed an offence. Thus, from a commensurate analysis of Sections 2 (e) and 2 (h) of the Act, it is easily discernible that delinquent juvenile is a distinct specie from a juvenile. A juvenile is not attached with delinquency, i.e., criminality or commission of an offence whereas a delinquent juvenile is so attached with it. It, therefore, means a different treatment to him such as the one provided under Chapter IV. The Act has provided for some special safeguards to such delinquent juveniles. It is abundantly clear from a simple reading of the provision of Section 33 proviso (1). In substance the discussion made above clearly leads us to the conclusion that the yardstick to be applied to determine the age of a juvenile as defined by Section 2 (h) of the Act would be the date of his appearance before the advisory board, the competent authority or the juvenile court. It would serve the purpose because in his case rehabilitation alone is involved. The same cannot be held good for the delinquent juvenile. If in the case of a delinquent juvenile this yardstick is applied, the benefit that are envisaged to him by this Act would stand completely negated. The purpose, so sanguine in its execution, would thus be frustrated. Therefore, the date, which is to be taken into consideration by the Courts in this connection, shall be one which shall be commensurate to the date of commission of the offence by him. He would be entitled to the benefits provided under the Act from this particular day. It is to be understood in this manner that if a delinquent juvenile has committed an offence just a few days before he is to attain the age of 16 years or 18 years as the new Act, 2000, contemplates, can he be denied that benefit under the provisions of the Act he is entitled to if on the date of his arrest or appearance or production before the competent authority or the board, he has crossed the age prescribed for a juvenile. If we go by the cut-off date envisaged in the case of Arnit Das (supra), in that event in all certainty the plea of juvenility would not be lawfully raised by him after he has crossed the prescribed age at the time of his production before the Board. This clearly shows that if that will be the cut-off date then the benefits accruable to a delinquent juvenile under this Act after he became a delinquent shall positively be denied to him though they are post-delinquency benefits. Delinquency occurs, to a juvenile or a child immediately on the commission of an offence by the child. Thus, it rules out this yardstick from consideration in the case of a delinquent juvenile. The yardstick laid down in Arnit Das''s case is inflexible in nature and will undoubtedly defeat the intendment of the Act. A homogenous construction of all the provisions pertaining to a delinquent juvenile, especially those enshrined in Chapter IV and Section 32 (Chapter II) of 1986 Act and Section 49 of the Act of 2000, therefore, has become imperative. In this case age on the date of commission of the offence will be plausible criterion and that alone will allow the post delinquency benefits to visit him. No other construction of the meaning of delinquency of an accused or child in conflict with law would serve the avowed purpose of this social, reformative and rehabilitative enactment. The board or the competent authority or juvenile court would determine his actual age on the date of his production or appearance, but the Courts or the board while holding trial would have to determine his age on the date of commission of the offence to allow the delinquent juvenile to reap the benefits, i.e., the benevolence of this Act. The length of the period that passed between such a determination and the date of commission of the offence is to be excluded from consideration by criminal courts or the Juvenile Justice Boards to allow him to have all such benefits. In the case of Arnit Das (supra), these aspects were primarily not taken into consideration. Court was mainly concerned with the social aspect alone. The observation of the Apex Court that The Act aims at laying down a uniform juvenile justice system in the country avoiding lodging in jail or police lock-up of the child ; and providing for prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency, for care, protection, etc., post-juvenility. In short the field sought to be covered by the Act is not the one which had led to juvenile delinquency but the field when a juvenile having committed a delinquency is placed for being taken care of post-delinquency. Thus, the legislative aims and objectives go to show that this legislation has been made for taking care of the care and custody of a juvenile during investigation, inquiry and trial, i.e., from the point of time when the juvenile is available to the law administration and justice delivery system ; it does not make any provision for a person involved in an offence by reference to the date of its commission by him. The long title of the Act too suggests that the content of the Act is the justice aspect relating to juveniles.

We cannot lose sight of the fact that justice is also to be done to a juvenile who is attached with delinquency and it includes not only the investigation, inquiry and trial but even post-trial status of such a delinquent juvenile. This Act takes care of the same. The last aspect seems to have missed the attention of the Court somehow. The Act also deals with post trial consequences and protects a delinquent from its rigours like sentence and consequent incarceration and stigma of any such criminality. In case if we proceed on the above dictum, the above benefits would not visit a delinquent if on the date of his availability or production to the justice system he has crossed the said age limit.

From the scrutiny of the scheme of this chapter it becomes fully evident that this chapter lays down clearly that both the Board or the Court have first to determine that the juvenile has committed an offence cognizable or non-cognizable. It further imposes an obligation upon the investigating agency also in this regard. It has also to foster the cause of such a delinquent juvenile promptly before the Court or the Board. No such provision was there in 1986 Act. Act of 2000, does have such a provision. The determination of the aspect of criminality, therefore, is the criterion. The definition of ''juvenile'' under the 1986 Act does not include within its ambit delinquent juvenile in any straitjacket manner. No time frame was prescribed under 1986 Act for the conclusion of any such inquiry. Whereas a time frame, i.e., 4 months, has been prescribed under Chapter II of the Act of 2000, for finding out whether the juvenile appeared, brought or produced has committed an offence, cognizable or non-cognizable. This is available from Sections 18, 20, 21, and 22 to 26 of 1986 Act and also sections analogous to these in the new Act. The proviso to Section 33 enumerates the circumstances to be taken into consideration in making the orders under the Act. They are shown as (a) to (f). The proviso to this section relates to a delinquent juvenile and states that conditions (a) to (f) can be taken into consideration after a finding of commission of offence against him is returned by the Court-meaning thereby-that unless criminality is determined by the Court it cannot do anything towards the benefits guaranteed to him under these Acts. This clearly implies that in the case of a delinquent juvenile it is the criminality which is the factor most relevant. Provisions of Section 56 also throw some light on the subject. Section 32 or Section 49 has a limited purpose. It confers jurisdiction upon the board impliedly because it can proceed against a person brought before it if he is below 18 years, otherwise it could not have any jurisdiction to proceed. This enquiry u/s 32 is mainly envisaged keeping this intent in mind. This enquiry is related more to juveniles other than delinquent juveniles. Any enquiry regarding a delinquent is not contemplated under this section. It is contemplated only u/s 20 of 1986 Act. As a matter of fact he is not required to be produced before the board. It has to be produced before the juvenile court for all such purposes. This is absolutely clear from a reading conjunctively of all the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act and Section 32.

While I was in the midst of the preparation of this judgment, learned Counsel for the State has brought to my notice the judgment of a Full Bench of the Apex Court noted in review petition in the abovesaid case filed by the Petitioner. The only question raised before the Full Bench was that the two Judges'' Bench deciding Arnit Das''s case (supra), while holding that the crucial date to determine whether the accused is a juvenile or not under the 1986 Act or 2000 Act is the date on which the juvenile first appeared in the Court or was brought before the board or competent authority in inquiry proceedings has not considered the earlier decision made by a three Judge Bench in the case of Umesh Chandra Vs. State of Rajasthan, , wherein it had been held that the crucial date in such cases is the date on which the offence was committed and not when the accused first appeared before the Court in inquiry proceedings. The proceedings of the Board are purely in nature of an ''enquiry''. In the circumstances, the Bench that dismissed the appeal of the Petitioner had referred the review petition to a larger Bench. The review petition was dismissed by the Constitution Bench on the ground that It is settled practice that this Court does not decide matters which are only of academic interest on the facts of a particular case." However, in paragraph 8 the Constitution Bench observed that "We, however, clarify that since learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner had reserved his argument on the applicability of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, which repealed the 1986 Act, for raising it in the trial court when the order of reference was made, we are not expressing any opinion on the question whether the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, applies to the facts and circumstances of the instant case or not.

Thus, the Division Bench judgment in Arnit Das''s case was directly in conflict with the decision in the case of Umesh Chandra (supra), which was delivered by a Bench comprising three Hon''ble Judges.

Coming to Umesh Chandra''s case the Apex Court has come to a clear conclusion in paragraph 26 of the judgment, quoted as under:

Another question argued at the Bar was as to what is the material date which is to be seen for the purpose of application of the Act. In view of our finding that at the time of the occurrence the Appellant was undoubtedly a child within the provisions of the Act, the further question if he could be tried as a child if he had become more than 16 years by the time the case went up to the Court, does not survive because the Act itself takes care of such a contingency. In this connection Sections 3 and 26 of the Act may be extracted thus:

Continuation of inquiry in respect of a child who has ceased to be child.--Where an inquiry has been initiated against a child and during the course of such inquiry the child ceases to be such, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the inquiry may be continued and orders may be made in respect of such person as if such person had continued to be a child.

Special provision in respect of pending cases.--Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a child pending in any Court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that Court as if this Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the child has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and, instead of passing any sentence in respect of the child, forward the child to the children''s court which shall pass orders in respect of that child in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it has been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that the child has committed the offence.

In paragraph 28 the Apex Court has come to a complete finding in the following words:

As regards the general applicability of the Act, we are clearly of the view that the relevant date for the applicability of the Act is the date on which the offence takes place. Children Act was enacted to protect young children from the consequences of their criminal acts on the footing that their mind at that age could not be said to be mature for imputing mens rea as in the case of an adult. This being the intendment of the Act, a clear finding has to be recorded that the relevant date for applicability of the Act is the date on which the offence takes place. It is quite possible that by the time the case comes up for trial, growing in age being an involuntary factor, the child may have ceased to be a child. Therefore, Sections 3 and 26 became necessary. Both the sections clearly point in the direction of the relevant date for the applicability of the Act as the date of occurrence. We are clearly of the view that the relevant date for applicability of the Act so far as age of the accused, who claims to be a child, is concerned, is the date of the occurrence and not the date of the trial.

It further sounded a note of caution in paragraph 29 in the following words:

The High Court has failed to take notice that the Act being a piece of social legislation is meant for the protection of infants who commit criminal offences and, therefore, its provisions should be liberally and meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act. Bearing this in mind we have construed the documents in the instant case.

These observations of the Apex Court lead to the positive and practical aspect of the enforcement of any Act which takes into account not only the social justice aspect but all the fall-outs of criminality of a child, who has committed an offence, a delinquent juvenile. All other Acts have been superseded by the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 or later on by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

In view of these facts and circumstances, it has become evident that the cut off date for the application of either 1986 Act or 2000 Act [Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)] would be the date on which offence was committed and not the date on which the delinquent juvenile appears or is brought before the Court or the advisory board or the competent authority. It is very clear from Section 4 and Section 10 of the Act of 2000. That date would be relevant only in the cases of "juvenile", ''neglected'' and ''destitute juvenile'', but not in the case of a "delinquent juvenile". This distinction has certainly to be borne in mind while dealing with the case of a delinquent juvenile that the essence lies in the attribute of criminality. There are so many penal consequences that ensue against him from this situation. This Act contemplates their total amelioration and his complete emancipation from such consequences. According to the 2000 Act, which superseded 1986 Act, any ''juvenile in conflict with law'' on his arrest by police has to be placed under the charge of the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the designated police officer who shall immediately report the matter to a member of the Board. This deviation is not made for nothing in the new enactment. On the contrary, it clearly makes out that the makers of the law were conscious of the delay that may otherwise occur in his production or appearance so as not to defeat the avowed purpose of the Act vis-a-vis the ''juvenile in conflict with law''. Thus, the purpose in introducing Section 10 is surely to avoid any delay in his production. It required promptness as an obligation. Apart from this, it also imposes an obligation on arresting officer to determine the fact himself as well. Thus, from this also, it is truly clear that the purpose is not to deny the benefit accruable to the juvenile in conflict with law as far as possible. The main aim of the Act is social justice to juveniles, therefore, a liberal interpretation of these provisions is the ultimate goal.

To apply the principle enunciated, as above, mention of facts of the present case is necessary. Sikander Ali is the accused in the present case. The occurrence had taken place on 12.12.1999. There are two types of evidence before me in the present case. Firstly, transfer certificate filed by the prosecution, which shows the date of birth of this applicant to be 15.2.1976. This certificate was filed by the prosecution showing this applicant to be student of Swastik Vidya Bhawan, 33, Shanker Nagar, Nirala Nagar, Lucknow. The approximate age, therefore, on the date of occurrence, according to the certificate, comes to 23 years 9 months and 27 days. Secondly, the medical certificate dated 27.11.2001, countersigned by the C.M.O., Lucknow. According to this, the estimated age of the applicant was about 20 years on 27.11.2001, meaning thereby that on the date of occurrence, i.e., 12.12.1999 he was about 18 years of age but not above 18 years.

With regard to the school leaving certificate the contention by the learned Counsel for the applicant is that it is a forged document. But from the discussion in the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge in S.T. No. 1076 of 2000, it has been evident that apart from this vague suggestion nothing has been done by the applicant to refute the prosecution case or the impugned school leaving certificate. Neither any documentary evidence of his being a student of any other college was filed before the trial Judge nor any oral evidence was adduced to doubt the above said school leaving certificate produced in the evidence by the prosecution side against him. In view of this discrepancy it would be difficult to hold him a delinquent juvenile, even if the date for him is presumed to be the date of offence that he was a juvenile at the relevant time. Even from the medical certificate issued by the C.M.O., Lucknow, he was above 18 years by 15 days at the relevant time. Accrual of benefit of two years either way can occur only if the evidence furnished by the medical examination may be treated as conclusive. It is common knowledge and also acknowledged by the courts of law that it is not a conclusive proof of the factum of age. It is only an approximation. Therefore, it cannot be given precedence over the school leaving certificate, especially when nothing in its rebuttal was brought on record from the side of the applicant.

However, no categorical finding can be returned at this stage since the court below has presently issued notice u/s 340, Cr. P.C. against the informant to explain the truthfulness of the counter-signatures of the Basic Shiksha Adhikari on the school leaving certificate. The applicant moved an application before the Basic Shiksha Adhikari to verify his counter-signatures on the said certificate. On enquiry by the said officer the Principal gave in writing that the certificate did not bear his signature and the officer found the countersign also not genuine. An application was thereafter filed by the applicant and it was entertained by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who passed the above referred order against the complainant. Learned Counsel in the course of further hearing informed this Court that a complaint was filed against the informant by the Court. However, no evidence in corroboration of the same is brought on the record by him. So far as the question regarding the application of the Juvenile Justice (Protection and Care of Children) Act, 2000, is concerned, I am of the opinion that its application will depend upon the date on which the case was registered and whether the accused on the said date was in judicial custody or from the date he was committed to the Court of Sessions. The Additional Sessions Judge is to determine the issue accordingly.

By its very nature the benefits are post juvenility. This is imbibed in the term juvenile. It is not to be defined, demarcated or settled by the law. Once the person is not a child within the meaning of the Act, these benefits will be alien to him. No emphasis, therefore, ought to be attached to the intent of the law to it being ''post juvenility benefits''. Criminality when attached to a child, therefore, is essence of the post juvenility benefits accruing to a ''child in conflict with law''. The law decided in Arnit Das''s case (supra) is not to interpret literally. In my opinion it does not create any conflict with Umesh Chandra Vs. State of Rajasthan, .

In view of the discussions made above, this revision is allowed. The impugned order dated 8.4.2002, is hereby set aside. The case is remanded back to the Court concerned to decide it in accordance with the observations made in this judgment and apply the new law if it applies to the facts of the case.