Siddhartha Singh vs Union Of India & Ors

Rajendra Menon, CJ(Oral)

This petition in public interest has been filed challenging the Notification No.S.O.1522(E) dated 06.04.2018 issued by the Ministry of Road

Transport and Highways, Government of India increasing the speed limit for plying of motor vehicles from 100 kmph to 120 kmph on National

Highways and for motor cycles from 60 kmph to 80 kmph. Â

Challenge to the notification increasing the speed limit for plying of motor vehicles and motor cycles on the national highways is made on the ground

that it violates the fundamental right to life available to the citizens under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the consequence of the increase of

the speed limit would be loss of life due to increase in the number of accidents which may result due to permitting increase of the indiscreet plying of

the vehicle. Inter alia it is contended that the impugned notification permitting increase of the speed is unsustainable. In view of the above, the

petition has been field by the petitioner, a practicing advocate in public interest.Â

The learned counsel for the respondents submit that on the basis of expert opinion, the quality of the roads and the scientific manner in which the

vehicles are now being manufactured, a conscious decision by the executives have been taken after collecting various information germane to the

issue in question and, therefore, in such matter, interference by this Court in a public interest litigation exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution need not be made.  Â

Having considered the contentions advanced, we are of the considered view that the question of permitting plying of vehicle at a particular speed on

a particular road like the national highway is an administrative action, an executive decision, in fact, a policy matter taken by the administrative

authorities after due consideration of various factors which includes the manner in which the roads are constructed, the scientific manner in which the

vehicles are manufactured and the speed limit based on safety provisions available in a vehicle prescribing the manner of plying of the vehicles and

various other factors based on expert and scientific evaluation and merely because there is possibility of accident due to plying of vehicles on the road

in a speed which, according to the petitioner is too high, we see no reason to interfere into the matter. Â

The notification in question is purely within the domain of the policy decision or the legislative power available with the government and in the

absence of any statutory rules, regulations or constitutional provisions having been shown to be violated, we are not inclined to interfere in the

matter. It is for the government to decide as to what should be the speed limit permissible for plying of a vehicle in a particular road and it is not for

a writ Court to go into the various aspects and interfere in such matters until and unless statutory provisions in doing so are found to be breached or

violated. Â

The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.