Siddhartha Choudhury vs State Of Meghalaya & 2 Ors.

This application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed assailing the actions of the respondent in not mutating the property in the name of the petitioner in respect of which probate has already been granted. The petitioner also questions the action of the respondents in denying the mutation in spite of the fact that the other beneficiary of the will one Smti Sheila Margaret Sootinck has already been granted mutation and a lease agreement to this effect already issued in her favour.

I have heard the learned counsels for the parties.

Mr. K. Paul, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner's grandmother (L) Amiya Choudhury was the owner in possession of a plot of land measuring about 10802 Sq. Ft./1003.9 Sq. meter situated in Oakland, Shillong. The counsel submits that prior to her demise on 29.03.2009, (L) Amiya Choudhury had executed a will in respect of the aforementioned property on 16.11.2007, bequeathing   the property partially to the petitioner of an area measuring about 2563.47 Sq. Ft. and the remaining portion to one Sheila Margaret Sootinck measuring about 8239.51 Sq. Ft. Learned counsel submits that after the death of his grandmother, the executor of the will Smti Sheila Margaret Sootinck filed for probate before the Court of the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Shillong, who vide judgment and order dated 27.02.2013 was pleased to grant probate of the will of (L) Amiya Choudhury.

Learned counsel submits that in pursuance to the said grant of probate, the petitioner had filed an application to the respondent No. 2 for mutation of the land bequeathed to him by his grandmother on 31.3.2014. Petitioner submits that the other beneficiary of the will had also filed for mutation of the plot of land on the strength of the probate, and the same was approved by the respondents on 7.7.2015, mutation was allowed on 24.7.2015 and subsequently lease agreement was issued to her. He submits that however in the case of the petitioner though similarly situated, nothing was forthcoming on his application for mutation. He submits that he issued a reminder and thereafter made a fresh application for mutation on 5.10.2015. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was shocked therefore when he received a Government order dated 21.7.2016 wherein it was stated that the renewal for lease agreement could not be taken up as the lease of the plot had expired since 2009 and further required the petitioner to furnish a succession certificate to enable the respondents to take further necessary action.

Learned counsel submits that the aforesaid order dated 21.7.2016 being misplaced and illegal, the petitioner had preferred a representation before the concerned respondent on 5.12.2016 but even after a lapse of two years the same has not evoked any response. Learned counsel submits that the actions of the respondents in refusing to mutate the property tantamount to questioning the decision of the Court granting probate and that too in a most discriminatory fashion, inasmuch as, to the other beneficiary the mutation and lease agreement were duly granted. He further submits that the denial of the petitioner 's right, which he had accrued by way of the probate, by the respondents is illegal and smacks of mala fide and that the respondents are liable to be directed to process and mutate the property in the petitioner's name and issue a lease agreement in his favour.

Learned counsel for the respondents Mr. R. Gurung at an earlier instance had objected to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that a statutory appellate forum namely the 'Meghalaya Board of Revenue' was available for redressal of the grievances arising out of any order passed by the Sub-Registrar, Revenue Department. This Court however by order dated 29.8.2019 had rejected the objection on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case. Today Mr. R. Gurung, learned counsel for the respondents at the stage of final hearing submits that the matter may be disposed of with a direction that the petitioner approach the Meghalaya Board of Revenue and that the said appeal be disposed of within a fixed time frame. Apart from this submission Mr. R. Gurung, learned for the respondents has not advanced any further arguments.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties, it can be seen that there is no dispute as far as the facts and chain of events are concerned. The only allegation is that even after the probate was granted by a competent Court and mutation allowed to the other similarly situated beneficiary, the same was not allowed to the petitioner. In this regard it would be useful to refer to Section 273 of the Indian Succession Act, which speaks about the conclusiveness of probate or letters of administration which is quoted herein below: -

"273 Conclusiveness of probate or letters of administration.-Probate or letters of administration shall have effect over all the property and estate, movable or immovable, of the deceased, throughout the State in which the same is or are granted, and shall be conclusive as to the representative title against all debtors of the deceased, and all persons holding property which belongs to him, and shall afford full indemnity to all debtors, paying their debts and all persons delivering up such property to the person to whom such probate or letters of administration have been granted."

In the instant case the respondents had by due process in pursuance to the grant of probate, allowed mutation and issued lease agreement with regard to the bequeathed portion of land to Smti Sheila Margaret Sootinck whereas the same was denied to the petitioner in spite of repeated applications. The reasoning so contained in the impugned letter on examination is not based on any reasonable or cogent explanation. The law provides for the finality of a probate, the impugned letter therefore by overlooking this aspect has caused grave miscarriage of justice apart from discriminating against the petitioner. On this ground alone the impugned order being bad in law is liable to be set aside and quashed, which is done so accordingly.

For the foregoing reasons the instant writ application is allowed and the respondents are directed to expeditiously process the application of the petitioner in terms of the probate granted for consideration of mutation and for issuance of the lease agreement in accordance with law.

No order as to costs.