Siddappa V. Annigeri and Others vs Abdul Rehaman and Others

G. Narendra, J—Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and second respondent.

This appeal arises out of the claim petition preferred by the deceased one Siddappa Annigeri who is alleged to have suffered the accident at about 7.00 p.m. on 15/4/2002.

It is stated that the injured had preferred an application under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, before the Motor Accident claimant Tribunal, District Judge, Dharwad on 18/7/2002. During the currency of the said claim petition, it is alleged that the claimant consumed pesticide and had committed suicide on 10/7/2006. The present appellants preferred an application under Order 22 Rule 3(1) of CPC, praying the Court to permit them to come on record as a legal representatives of the claimant. The Tribunal after consideration, by its order dated 8/10/2007 was pleased to reject the application preferred under Order 22 Rule 3(1) of CPC on the premise that the death of the petitioner is not due to the injuries suffered and in view of the fact that the claimant had committed suicide the claim petition was no more maintainable. The Court below arrived at the conclusion passed by the full Bench of this Court in the case of Kannamma Vs. Deputy General Manager, K.S.R.T.C.

It is true that the full Bench of this Court has disallowed the assertion of the claim of the legal representative under various heads like expenses, loss of income, loss to estate as a result of the bodily injury. The appellant''s counsel relies upon the judgment of the single Judge of this Court, referred in the case of Baburao Sataba Manabutakar, Deceased by his L.Rs. Vs. Doreswamy and Others, (2002) 3 ACC 83 : (2002) 4 KCCR 290 SN , wherein, in similar circumstances, this Court keeping in view of the circumstances, was pleased to direct the State Government to pay ex gratia compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellants.

It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the order is erroneous for the reason that the Court failed to see that they are entitled to be reimbursed in respect of the amount expended on the medical treatment to the injured. He would submit that admittedly the appellants are not entitled to the claim under the heads of amounts as expenses or loss of estate. He would submit that the Full Bench has not excluded the claims for reimbursement. He would draw an analogy stating that as per the law laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court as well as the Hon''ble High Court the road traffic accident victims are required to be treated or administered their at least make first aid by all hospitals without insisting nor prior to payment. He would submit that assuming that such a person i.e., RTA victim suffered bodily injuries and subsequently, while undergoing treatment dies in another accident say for the instance of slipping and falling on the stairs and suffering fatal injuries or as a result of electrocution and if the law as laid down by the Full Bench in strictly implemented then the person or institution which was treating the RTA victim would be left high and dry without any recourse to recover any amount expended or incurred for treating bodily injuries of RTA victims. He would submit that in sudra anomalous situation the above interpretation which would defeat the legitimate rights hence such a strict interpretation cannot be given to the judgment and the interpretation has to be restricted only to the matters relatable to the judgment like loss of estate, etc.

He would further submit that in the present case, the original claimant was self-employed and did not have any source of income. He would submit that the present appellant and the original claimant have expended the amounts from the family estate for providing treatment to the original claimant. He would submit that the Court below ought to have considered reimbursement and awarded a sum which was expended on the medical treatment for the bodily injuries suffered by the original claimant. He would also give another analogy which can to lead to a situation, if the judgment of the Full Bench is implemented in the strict sense. He would state that in the cases of RTA resulting in bodily injuries and if the RTA victim is insured for such hospitalization and the insurer also pays for the said initial hospitalization and if during the treatment as stated above if the RTA victim suffers unnatural death say by electrocution would it then make a ground for the insurer to ask for reimbursement or refund of the amounts paid by them towards treatment for the bodily injuries.

Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent would submit that it is true that the situation as analyzed by the counsel for the appellant and situation as propounded by the appellant''s counsel have not been considered by the trial Court and that it is an admitted fact that the trial Court has proceeded to pass the impugned order based on the judgment rendered by the Full Bench and he would also fairly concede that the trial Court ought to have considered all aspects.

It is seen that the trial Court has adopted a narrow view of the matter and it has failed to examine as to whether the appellants herein are entitled to be reimbursed for any amount that they might have expended for treating the bodily injuries of the original claimant. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the matter requires to be set aside and requires to considered afresh after giving an opportunity to the appellants/proposed legal representatives of the original claimants to demonstrate that they are liable to be reimbursed for any amount that they might have expended for treating the bodily injuries of the deceased/original claimant.

The appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 08.10.2007 is set aside. The Court below is directed consider the application in the light of the above observations and dispose of the same in accordance with law on merits. As the matter pertain to a claim of the year 2002, the trial Court is directed to hear and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible in any way within an outer limit of eight months from today.