Shyamlal Sah vs The State of Bihar

S.B. Sanyal, J.—This is an application for grant of anticipatory bail for an offence under the Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984. It has been alleged that food-stuffs were recovered from the house of the petitioner but he had no license under the Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984 to carry on trade and business. It is said that the place from where the food-stuffs were recovered is outside the municipal limit of a ''B'' class city or ''C'' class city. On the contrary, it is in a village. Therefore, one of the points, inter alia, is that no license is at all required to be taken for the stocks found from the petitioner''s house. It may be stated here that the petitioner has denied the stock as belonging to him. In short, the contention is that the food-stuffs were admittedly found in village Fulhara, which is not a city. As such, the stock limit prescribed in Government Notification No. G.S.R. 49 dated 17th October, 1985, under Clause 3 of the Unification Order has no application. It is further contended that the said notification does not spell out ''A'', ''B'' and ''C'' class cities. Therefore, there is effective definition with regard to wholesale and retail dealers, and, therefore, the Unification Order is unenforceable. Unification Order defines "dealer" under Clause 2 (e) as meaning a person, a firm, an association of persons etc., engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of any trade article......but it does not include an agriculturist, a manufacturer of sugar and hawkers engaged in the purchase and sale of non-controlled cloth. Clause 2 (p) of the Unification Order defines "retail dealer" as meaning a person engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage of any article specified in Schedule I for purpose other then personal consumption within the storage limit fixed by the Government from time to time. Clause 2 (U) defines "wholesale dealer'' as meaning a person engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage of any article specified in Schedule I for purpose other than personal consumption within the storage limit fixed by Government from time to time. Clause 3 prohibits a dealer in carrying on business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of any of the trade articles mentioned in Schedule I except in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence. But no such licence is required for a dealer who stores for sale at any time the trade articles, in quantities not exceeding the limits as may be prescribed by the State Government. Clause 4 deals with the issuse of licence and Clause 5 speaks about its renewal.

In exercise of the powers conferred u/s 3of the Essential Commodities Act, the State Government has issued a Notification, being G.S.R. 49 dated the 17th October, 1985 with the prior concurrence of the Central Act fixing the stock limits of the trade articles. For wholesale dealer of food-stuffs in ''B'' class cities stock limit has been prescribed of different foodstuffs. Under Clause 14 of the said Notification ''B'' class cities have been indicated.

Learned Counsel relying upon the English version of the said Notification, to be found at page 252 of Bihar Control Orders by Malhotra Bros., contended that no stock limit has been provided for wholesale dealer in foodgrains in rural areas, as required by the first proviso to Clause 3 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order 1984. Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, the learned Advocate General, on the other hand referred to the Hindi version of the said Notification and contended that there has been an omission in the English translation of the Notification since the Hindi version speaks about rural areas as well. Therefore, for a person carrying on trade and business in rural areas stock limits have been provided and he is also required to take a licence.

Mr Bharuka, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted, relying on a Division Bench decision of this Court in M/s Mahabir Flour Mills, Bakhtiarpur v. The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bihar (C.W.J.C. No. 2725/84) and analogous cases decided on 11th December, 1986, that in case of conflict between Hindi and English versions of the Notification, the Notification published in English language must prevail in view of the provisions of Article 348of the Constitution of India. The Bihar Legislature in pursuance of Clause 3 of Article 348has prescribed Hindi as the language for use in Bills, Acts, Ordinances in the State of Bihar. Pursuant thereto, the order was made in Hindi. There has been official translation thereof in English language which has also been published in the Official Gazette. Under Article 348 (3) the English translation should be deemed to be the authoritative text of the order. But all the same, as held in Rajendra Prasad v. The Chancellor, Magadh University reported in 1984 (1) S.L.R. 315 : 1984 PLJR 316, (Division Bench), "...the English translation, though official, cannot override the Hindi text. The English version is the interpretation of the person entrusted with the task of translation. It cannot be equated with the original text." This matter came to be considered by a Division Bench of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1111 of 1973 (Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Jute Miils (P) Ltd., Katihar v. The State of Bihar and others) decided on the 22nd April, 1977, where, however, this question was not answered but there Lordships observed.

.........all ordinances made in Hindi, where the legislature so authorised, will be valid pieces of legislations even without English translations. The Bihar Legislature in pursuance of Clause (3) of Article 348of the Constitution has prescribed Hindi as the language for use in bills, Acts and ordinances of the State of Bihar.

A similar matter came to be considered in another Patna judgment in Ramdhyan Singh v. The State of Bihar reported in 1979 (3) S.L.R. 369 where a similar type of omission was considered in great detail by noticing almost all the prior decisions. There the word "suspension" was omitted to be translated in the English version. this Court observed:

On the facts and the circumstances of the instant case also, therefore, it is just and proper that Hindi version should prevail.

In the case of Mahabir Flour Mills (supra) it was observed in paragraph 34 as follows:

It is well settled that if the inconsistency/contradiction between the Notification issued in English and the Notification issued in Hindi does not affect the substance of the matter, it is the Notification published in English language which must prevail in view of the provision of Constitution of India over the Notification published in Hindi.

Thereafter it has been held that there has been no contradiction/inconsistency between the Notification issued in Hindi and the Notification issued is English in the said case and as such the Notification published in English was given effect to. This has again been repeated in paragraph 36 to the effect:

... there is no conflict/inconsistency/ divergence between the two Notifications.....

The Bench distinguished Ramdhyan Singh''s case (supra) by observing that-

On the facts of that case a great conflict/inconsistency/contradiction existed between the two versions of the Notification and on the facts and in the circumstances of that case it was held that ''it is just and proper that Hindi version should prevail

But

In the present case...there is no conflict/inconsistency between the two versions of the Notification of 9th March, 1978.

and

The case of Ramdhyan Singh v. State of Bihar (supra), relied upon by the Learned Counsel for the respondents, is quite distinguishable

Similarly, Rajendra Prasad''s case (supra) was distinguished as

There was apparent inconsistency between the amending statute (admittedly in Hindi) and the English version of the amendment and hence the ratio decided in this case was on the particular facts and circumstances of that case.

Having gone through the case, relied upon by Learned Counsel for the petitioner at some depth, it appears that the ratio of the said case is; if the official language of the State is Hindi, and if there is no conflict/inconsistency/ contradiction in the Hindi and English versions of the Notification, the English version of the Notification, would prevail over the Hindi version of the Notification. Even if there is some inconsistency and conflict between the Hindi and English versions of the Notification but the same do not affect the substance of the matter, the English version must prevail. The said case, therefore, is not an authority for the proposition, if there is conflict/inconsistency/contradiction and the inconsistency and conflict affect the substance of the matter, in spite of the official language of the State of Bihar under the Official Language Act be Hindi, the English translation of the Hindi statute will prevail. The present case is squarely covered by Ramdhyan Singh''s case (supra) and 1 accordingly hold that there being conflict/inconsistency /contradiction because of the omission to translate "Dehati Keshtra" in the English translation of the Notification and the said omission to translate the said words, vastly affects the substance of the matter, the official language of the State of Bihar being Hindi, the English translation, through official, cannot override the Hindi text. I, therefore, find no substance in the submission of Learned Counsel for the petitioner on this legal question. I, however, do not express any opinion on the merits of the case beyond stating that it is not a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail. The application is accordingly dismissed. But this order of dismissal will not affect the consideration on merit of the petitioner''s regular bail petition as and when filed.