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Judgment
Muralee Krishna S., J.
This is the 4th writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the mother of the detenue, namely, Nikhila C., challenging Ext.P1 order of detention dated 29.08.2025 passed by the authority empowered under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (‘PITNDPS Act’ for short), and Ext.P2 order of confirmation dated 14.11.2025 issued by the 1st respondent under Section 9(f) read with Section 11 of the PITNDPS Act.
The pleadings and materials in the writ petition would show that, for passing the detention order, the detaining authority considered two cases in which the detenue was involved. Out of these two cases, the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.4 of 2025 of the Excise Range Office, Payyannur, registered for the offence punishable under Section 22(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘NDPS Act’ for short), the incident of which occurred on 22.02.2025. The proposal for preventive detention of the detenue was submitted by the 3rd respondent Deputy Excise Commissioner, Kannur, to the empowered Officer, as per the letters dated 04.04.2025 and 30.06.2025, which were forwarded by the Excise Commissioner vide letter dated 07.07.2025.
On receipt of the proposal, the Government examined the proposal and placed the same before the Screening Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of the Law Secretary on 17.07.2025. The Screening Committee examined the proposal in detail and, arriving at a subjective and objective satisfaction, opined that it is a fit case for issuing preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. The Screening Committee report was sent to the Sponsoring Authority, and on getting their authentication, it was received back by the empowered authority on 05.08.2025. Subsequently, Ext.P1 order of detention was issued on 29.08.2025.
The detention order was communicated to the additional 6th respondent as per the letter dated 30.08.2025 as mandated under Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act. The detenue was thereafter arrested on 09.09.2025 and was detained in the Central Prison and Correctional Home, Thiruvananthapuram, on 11.09.2025. The case of the detenue was thereafter referred to the PITNDPS Advisory Board as provided under Section 9(b) of the PITNDPS Act, as per the letter dated 19.09.2025. The Advisory Board heard the detenue and the Sponsoring Authority on 05.11.2025 and, by the report dated 11.11.2025, opined that there are sufficient reasons for continuing the detention of the detenue. After examining the report of the Advisory Board, the 1st respondent State Government passed Ext.P2 order dated 14.11.2025 under Section 9(f) read with Section 11 of the PITNDPS Act, ordering the detention of the detenue to be continued for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention.
Challenging the detention order, the petitioner filed W.P.(Crl.)No.1632 of 2025 before this Court. By Ext.P3 judgment dated 25.11.2025, this Court dismissed that writ petition.
Contending that the detenue is the mother of an 8-year-old child suffering from autism spectrum disorder from the date of his birth and the presence of the detenue is inevitable for taking care of the child, the petitioner again filed W.P.(Crl.)No.301 of 2026, challenging the very same detention order. By Ext.P8 judgment dated 10.03.2026, this Court dismissed the 2nd writ petition also. However, it was observed by this Court in that judgment that since the detenue has already resorted to the statutory remedy by submitting Ext.P7 representation dated 07.03.2026 before the Government, it is for the Government to consider the same in accordance with law. After Ext.P8 judgment, the petitioner submitted Ext.P9 letter dated 13.03.2026 before the Chief Secretary, Home Department to consider the aforesaid representation dated 07.03.2026.
The petitioner again preferred W.P.(Crl.)No.703 of 2026 before this Court, projecting a reason that there is an inordinate delay of 47 days in considering Ext.P7 representation dated 07.03.2026, which was rejected by Ext.P10 cryptic order dated 25.04.2026. By Ext.P11 judgment dated 03.06.2026, this Court disposed of the aforesaid 3rd writ petition filed by the petitioner, directing the authorities concerned to consider and dispose of the representation, taking into account the subsequent developments and pass a reasoned order, and directed to communicate the result to the detenue within a fortnight from the date of its issue. It was further ordered that in the event, upon such reconsideration, the authorities concerned are of the view that the order of detention deserves to be revoked, the detenue shall be released forthwith.
Contending that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in Ext.P11 judgment, the petitioner filed R.P.No.666 of 2026 before this Court. By Ext.P12 order dated 23.06.2026, this Court disposed of that review petition, leaving open the right of the petitioner to file an appropriate application for release of the detenue on the ground of alleged non-compliance with the direction in the judgment. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present writ petition, again challenging the very same Exts.P1 and P2 detention order and the confirmation order, respectively, which were under challenge in the previous round of litigation.
Along with a memo dated 16.07.2026, the learned Senior Government Pleader produced the statement of facts submitted by the Under Secretary, Home (SS) Department, opposing the averments in the writ petition and detailing the steps taken for ordering preventive detention of the detenue. Thereafter, along with I.A.No.1 of 2026, the petitioner produced Ext.P15 order dated 27.06.2026 passed by the Government in Ext.P7 representation dated 07.03.2026, which was directed to be reconsidered in Ext.P11 judgment.
On behalf of the additional 6th respondent, a statement dated 14.08.2026 was filed by the learned Central Government Counsel.
Heard Shri. Deepak Raj, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Smt. Reeha Khader K., the learned Senior Government Pleader and Shri. Rahul Venugopal, the learned Central Government Counsel.
The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that a successive writ of Habeas Corpus, on the same cause of action, is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if a new ground which was not stated in the earlier writ petition is stated in the later writ petition. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that the detenue is a lady aged 30 years suffering from various ailments. Though the Medical Board examined the detenue on 20.06.2026, as discernible from Ext.P15 order of the Government, no reason is stated by the Medical Board to conclude that the detenue is not suffering from illness. There is an unreasonable and unexplained delay in considering the representation submitted by the petitioner to the Government, as evident from the steps taken by the petitioner by filing a writ petition, which was disposed of by Ext.P11 judgment dated 03.06.2026. There is non-application of mind on the part of the authorities concerned while ordering preventive detention of the detenue. In support of his arguments regarding maintainability of the successive writ petition, the learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India [(1981) 2 SCC 427]. As far as the delay in consideration of the representation submitted by the petitioner is concerned, the learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Harish Pahwa v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 710], Piara Singh v. State of Punjab [(1987) 4 SCC 550], and K. M. Abdulla Kunhi and B. L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India [(1991) 1 SCC 476].
On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that this is the 5th round of litigation by the petitioner challenging the very same order of detention. Ext.P7 representation submitted by the petitioner was considered in time by the Government, which is evident from Ext.P10 order dated 25.04.2026. This Court set aside the said order by Ext.P11 judgment dated 03.06.2026. Again, the representation was considered in detail, as evident from Ext.P15 order dated 27.06.2026. The Medical Board examined the detenue in detail and found that there is nothing to suggest that there is any medical emergency against the detenue at present. Therefore, the present writ petition is devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed.
The learned Central Government Counsel submitted that the Central Government has not received any representation from the petitioner and no relief is sought against the Central Government in the writ petition. As far as the non-maintainability of the successive writ petition on the same cause of action, the learned Central Government Counsel relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Ramseena S. v. State of Kerala [2024 (2) KHC 470].
In Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel [(1981) 2 SCC 427], the challenge was against the preventive detention of the detenue therein under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. In paragraph 13 of the said judgment, the Apex Court held thus;
“13.The position that emerges from a survey of the above decisions is that the application of the doctrine of constructive res judicata is confined to civil actions and civil proceedings. This principle of public policy is entirely inapplicable to illegal detention and does not bar a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 32 of the Constitution on fresh grounds, which were not taken in the earlier petition for the same relief.”
[Underline supplied]
In Harish Pahwa [(1981) 2 SCC 710], which is an appeal filed against the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition by the Allahabad High Court, challenging the preventive detention of the detenue therein, the Apex Court held thus;
“3.In order to decide the point we may refer to certain admitted facts. The order of detention is dated May 16, 1980 and the representation made by the appellant against it from Varanasi Jail bears date June 3, 1980. The State Government received the representation on June 4, 1980, but for two days no action was taken in connection with it. On June 6, 1980, comments were called for from the customs authorities with regard to the allegations made in the representation and such comments were received by the State Government on June 13, 1980. On June 17, 1980, the State Government referred the representation to its Law Department for its opinion which was furnished on June 19, 1980. The rejection of the representation was ordered on June 24, 1980 and it was communicated to the jail authorities two days later.
The case of the State is that the representation was with the customs authorities who were formulating their comments from June 7, 1980 to June 12, 1980 and that the representation was under the consideration of the government for four days from June 13, 1980 to June 16, 1980, of its Law Department from June 17, 1980 to June 19, 1980 and then again under its own consideration for six days from June 19, 1980 to June 24, 1980.
In our opinion, the manner in which the representation made by the appellant has been dealt with reveals a sorry state of affairs in the matter of consideration of representations made by persons detained without trial. There is no explanation at all as to why no action was taken in reference to the representation on June 4, 5 and 25, 1980. It is also not clear what consideration was given by the government to the representation from June 13, 1980 to June 16, 1980 when we find that it culminated only in a reference to the Law Department, nor it is apparent why the Law Department had to be consulted at all. Again, we fail to understand why the representation had to travel from table to table for six days before reaching the Chief Minister who was the only authority to decide the representation. We may make it clear, as we have done on numerous earlier occasions, that this Court does not look with equanimity upon such delays when the liberty of a person is concerned. Calling comments from other departments, seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to is not the type of action which the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import. We would emphasise that it is the duty of the State to proceed to determine representations of the character above mentioned with the utmost expedition, which means that the matter must be taken up for consideration as soon as such a representation is received and dealt with continuously (unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance in connection with it) until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu. This not having been done in the present case we have no option but to declare the detention unconstitutional. We order accordingly, allow the appeal and direct that the appellant be set at liberty forthwith.”
[Underline supplied]
In Piara Singh [(1987) 4 SCC 550], in a petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ of habeas corpus quashing the detention order of the petitioner therein under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1985, the Apex Court held thus;
“7.In the light of these decisions in the present case it must be held that the delay in dealing with the representation of the petitioner, which was admittedly received by the government on 14.01.1987 and rejected as late as on 26.02.1987, must be considered as inordinate delay in dealing with the representation. No explanation is given in the counter-affidavit as to why the representation could not have been dealt with and disposed of earlier, and hence it must be held that the order of detention of the petitioner is vitiated by reason of delay in dealing with his representation.
9.It is next sought to be contended by learned Counsel for the respondent that the delay in dealing with the representation had caused no prejudice to the petitioner, because it admitted that he preferred a writ petition against his detention to the Punjab and Haryana High Court and that writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. In our view this submission also cannot sustain the order of detention. It is true that the writ petition preferred by the petitioner to the Punjab and Haryana High Court was dismissed, but we are informed that a special leave petition filed against that decision is pending in this Court. Moreover at the time when the writ petition was dismissed, the petitioner had not made any representation to the State Government at all and hence the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court cannot be regarded as any substitute for consideration of his representation by the State Government which, unlike the court, might be entitled to go into the factual merits of the grounds forming the basis of detention order. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the respondent sought to rely on the decision of this Court in Smt Asha Keshavrao Bhosale v. Union of India [(1985) 4 SCC 361 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 561] in which case it was held that the delay of about two months in disposal of the representation made by the petitioner on behalf of the detenu to the Chief Minister against his order of detention did not vitiate the order of detention. That case, however, is of no assistance to the respondent because it turns on its own facts. A detailed representation was made in that case by the Secretary, Khed Taluka Maratha Seva Sangh which espoused the cause of the detenu and challenged the detention. That representation was received on 29.11.1984 in the Secretariat of the Chief Minister. It was forwarded to the Home Department on 03.12.1984 and disposed of expeditiously, namely, on 12.12.1984. The rejection of that representation was communicated on 13.12.1984. The High Court, which dismissed the petition of the detenu, had considered the contents of both the representations and held that the representation made by the petitioner was the second one and based on the same grounds and delay in disposing of that representation did not prejudice the case of the detenu. That conclusion was confirmed by the Supreme Court. The facts in this case are nowhere comparable to the facts of that case, and hence the principles laid down in that case have no application to the case before us.”
[Underline supplied]
In K.M. Abdulla Kunhi [(1991) 1 SCC 476], wherein the persons were under preventive detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the Apex Court held thus;
“16.We agree with the observations in Frances Coralie Mullin case, AIR 1980 SC 849. The time imperative for consideration of representation can never be absolute or obsessive. It depends upon the necessities and the time at which the representation is made. The representation may be received before the case is referred to the Advisory Board, but there may not be time to dispose of the representation before referring the case to the Advisory Board. In that situation the representation must also be forwarded to the Advisory Board along with the case of the detenu. The representation may be received after the case of the detenu is referred to the Board. Even in this situation the representation should be forwarded to the Advisory Board provided the Board has not concluded the proceedings. In both the situations there is no question of consideration of the representation before the receipt of report of the Advisory Board. Nor it could be said that the Government has delayed consideration of the representation, unnecessarily awaiting the report of the Board. It is proper for the Government in such situations to await the report of' the Board. If the Board finds no material for detention on the merits and reports accordingly, the Government is bound to revoke the order of detention. Secondly, even if the Board expresses the view that there is sufficient cause for detention, the Government after considering the representation could revoke the detention. The Board has to submit its report within eleven weeks from the date of detention. The Advisory Board may hear the detenu at his request. The Constitution of the Board shows that it consists of eminent persons who are Judges or persons qualified to be Judges of the High Court. It is therefore proper that the Government considers the representation in the aforesaid two situations only after the receipt of the report of the Board. If the representation is received by the Government after the Advisory Board has made its report, there could then of course be no question of sending the representation to the Advisory Board. It will have to be dealt with and disposed of by the Government as early as possible”.
[Underline supplied]
While coming to the judgment relied by the learned Central Government Counsel, in Ramseena S. [2024 (2) KHC 470], in a writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner therein challenging a detention order under Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, a Division Bench of this Court held thus;
“12.We note that both in the Apex Court judgment as well as in the judgment of this Court, no proposition of law was decided as to the impact of a second judicial review through a successive writ on the legality of the detention order. In any other habeas of simpliciter, nothing prevents a person from approaching the Court repeatedly on fresh grounds for a writ of habeas. Our constitution gives utmost importance to the liberty of the citizen. The constitutional Courts are not barred from exercising its power of habeas corpus and issuing a prerogative writ of habeas corpus in a successive writ petition filed on a new ground or grounds which were omitted to be canvassed in the first writ petition if such writs are not depended upon any predicated challenge. The liberty of the citizen is supreme, and it neither rest on pleas and counter pleas but on the freedom offered to him under the Constitution. The law discourages only repeated agitation of issues already decided and does not discount granting reliefs that have no bearing on issues. Therefore, in habeas of simpliciter, the successive writ petition is possible, and judicial practice only discourages fresh writ petitions being brought before the Court as more as a vexatious attempt to redo what the Court already refused. However, relief of habeas sought based on the challenge against detention order stands differently. The essential challenge in that process is against the detention order though ultimate relief is granted, by way of habeas corpus. If the substantial challenge is against the detention order, the very same Court cannot entertain writ petition, even if new grounds have been raised as the Court is precluded from reopening its judgment challenging the validity of detention order which has become final. The Apex Court in P. Bandopadhya v. Union of India, (2019) 13 SCC 42, after referring to the judgments in S. V. Vasaikar v. Union of India, [2003 SCC OnLine Bom. 171] and Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715, held that the principles of res judicata is equally applicable in writ jurisdiction. Therefore, we order that the successive writ petition challenging the very same detention order is not maintainable. Accordingly, the writ is dismissed.”
[Underline supplied]
As already noted hereinbefore, this is the 4th writ petition filed by the petitioner against the preventive detention of her daughter. It is also true that a successive writ of Habeas Corpus is maintainable if it is filed on a new ground or grounds which were omitted to be canvassed in the 1st writ petition, if such writs are not dependent upon any predicated challenge. In the present case, the new ground of challenge raised against the preventive detention of the detenue herein is the delay in consideration of the representation submitted by the petitioner. From Ext.P7 representation, it can be seen that the said representation is dated 07.03.2026. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner filed W.P.(Crl.)No.301 of 2026, which was dismissed by Ext.P8 judgment dated 10.03.2026, noting the filing of the aforesaid representation before the Government. By Ext.P10 order dated 25.04.2026, the Government rejected Ext.P7 representation. By Ext.P11 judgment, this Court set aside the Ext.P10 order and directed reconsideration of the representation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a review petition and then the present writ petition, and meanwhile the Government considered the representation afresh and passed Ext.P15 order dated 27.06.2026. From Ext.P15 order, it can be seen that a Medical Board was constituted by the Government and the detenue was examined in detail on 20.06.2026. The Medical Board was consisting of experts such as Assistant Professor Psychiatry, Associate Professor General Medicine, Assistant Professor Forensic Medicine, Associate Professor Urology and Professor and HOD Dermatology and Venereology. The Medical Board opined that there is no medical emergency against the detenue at present.
Except the delay in considering the representation submitted by the petitioner, all the other grounds raised by the petitioner against the preventive detention of the detenue were considered in the previous rounds of litigation. Having considered the fact that Ext.P7 representation was initially considered by the Government and passed Ext.P10 order and then, after constituting the Medical Board, passed Ext.P15 order rejecting the representation, we find no reason to hold that there is unreasonable and unexplained delay in considering the representation submitted by the petitioner as contended by the petitioner. In such circumstances, we find that none of the judgments relied upon by the petitioner will come to the aid of the petitioner for challenging the impugned order of detention.
Moreover, as noted above in the present case, the relief sought is not a writ of Habeas Corpus alone. Such a prayer has no independent existence without a prayer for writ of certiorari to quash Exts.P1 and P2 detention orders, which was already found against the petitioner in the earlier round of litigation. Therefore, the present writ petition to quash Exts.P1 and P2 orders is not maintainable. On appreciation of the materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find no merit in the writ petition.
In the result, this writ petition stands dismissed.