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Judgment
ADMIT. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
In both the applications, the applicant is common. The FIRs are arising out of a dispute over agricultural land between the applicant and the non-applicant No.2 in both the applications who are husband and wife. Therefore, both the applications are being disposed of analogously.
In Criminal Application (APL) No.545/2024, the applicant seeks quashing of the First Information Report (FIR) No.204/2022, dated 31.07.2022, registered with Police Station, Channi, Tahsil Patur, District Akola lodged by the complainant-husband for the offences punishable under Sections 294 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) as well as Section 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short the “Act of 1989”) and consequent Chargesheet No.256/2022, dated 18.10.2022. Whereas, in Criminal Application (APL) No.358/2024, the applicant seeks quashing of First Information Report (FIR) No.312/2022, dated 03.11.2022, registered with Police Station, Channi, Tahsil Patur, District Akola lodged by the complainant-wife for the offences punishable under Sections 354, 323 and 504 of the IPC as well as Section 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(1)(w)(i)(ii) of the Act of 1989 and consequent Chargesheet No.02/2023, dated 10.01.2023.
The allegations in FIR No.204/2022 :-
On 31.07.2022, non-applicant No.2-Sandip Vinayak Thakre (who is the husband of the complainant in FIR No.312/2022), lodged a complaint with the concerned police station alleging that the agricultural land of the Ram Mandir Sansthan was in possession of the family of the complainant. Since long, there are civil disputes pending before the Court regarding the said agricultural land. The father of the applicant is the Secretary of the said Sansthan. On 14.07.2022, between 05.00 to 06.00 pm., the complainant went to the shop of Ramesh Ishware, a tailor at village Aalegaon on his motorcycle for paying the money that he owed. The applicant allegedly abused him, made obscene remarks and questioned his presence in the village by referring to him by the name of his caste. He threatened the complainant of dire consequences and also warned Ramesh tailor regarding his association with the complainant. On his complaint, FIR No.204/2022 came to be registered and after completion of investigation, Chargesheet No.256/2022 came to be filed.
The allegations in FIR No.312/2022 :-
On 03.11.2022, non-applicant No.2 Sau. Padmina Sandip Thakre, lodged a complaint with the concerned police station alleging that her family is cultivating the land of the Ram Mandir Sansthan on a fixed-rate lease. The civil dispute between her family and the Ram Mandir Sansthan in respect of the agricultural land is pending adjudication. The father of the applicant is the Secretary of the said Sansthan. On 02.11.2022 at about 01.30 pm., the applicant came to visit the disputed agriculture land in an intoxicated condition. At that time, the complainant, her husband and her son were working in the said field. The applicant abused the complainant and her family members in the name of their caste in obscene language and also scuffled with the complainant as a result of which, her blouse was torn and she felt awkward and ashamed. It is also alleged that the applicant pushed her son, grabbed her hair and pushed her on the ground. On her complaint, FIR No.312/2022 came to be registered and after completion of investigation, Chargesheet No.02/2023 came to be filed.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant submitted that false complaints have been lodged by the husband-wife duo out of rivalry between the applicant and the complainant family because there are several civil cases pending between the family of the complainants and the Ram Mandir Sansthan. It is contended that in Regular Civil Suit No.48/2022 filed by the Ram Mandir Sansthan, Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Patur has granted temporary injunction against the complainant and his family members restraining them from disturbing or obstructing the peaceful possession of the Sansthan. In the Regular Civil Suit, Civil Judge, Junior Division, Patur has granted police protection to the Sansthan. Despite of that, the complainant and his family members are regularly visiting the said field and have now filed false criminal complaints against the applicant to support their false claim of possession.
It is contended that in FIR No.204/2022 lodged by complainant-Sandeep Thakare, there is a delay of more than 15 days in lodging the complaint, which itself shows that a false complaint has been filed just to bring the caste of the complainant into picture to attract the stringent provisions of the Act of 1989. According to him, even if the allegations against the applicant are taken at their face value, the FIR does not make out any case against the applicant under the provisions of Section 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the Act of 1989. He further submitted that mentioning the caste of a person is not an offence and that there is nothing on record to suggest that the applicant abused the complainant with the intention to insult or humiliate the complainant just because he is a member of the Scheduled Tribes.
Learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that 3 months after lodging of FIR No.204/2022, one more FIR bearing No.312/2022 came to be lodged by the complainant, who is the wife of the complainant in FIR No.204/2022. According to him, false allegation of outraging modesty has been levelled against the applicant. Despite of the restraining order, the complainant and his family members claim themselves to be in possession of the said disputed land every now and then and are also interfering with the possession of the Sansthan. According to him, the statement of the complainant under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “Cr.P.C.”) recorded before the learned Magistrate does not depict any allegations of abusing the complainant-wife and her family members in the name of their caste. Just to restrain the complainant from entering the agricultural land, a false complaint has been lodged. According to him, the relationship between the applicant and the complainant couple is strained and therefore, the applicant is unnecessarily being framed under stringent provisions of the Act of 1989. It is further submitted that there was no intention on the part of the applicant to humiliate or insult any member of the Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, he seeks quashing of both the FIRs.
To buttress his submission, learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs. State of Bihar & Another, in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.12144/2025, dated 12.01.2026 reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 799.
Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for non-applicant No.1/State and learned counsel for non-applicant No.2 objected to both the applications on the ground that in FIR No.204/2022, the applicant used a castiest remark against the complainant-husband in public view in the tailor shop which is a public place. According to him, there are statements of independent witnesses in both the cases stating that they have seen the incident as alleged in the FIR. According to the learned counsel for non-applicant No.2, if caste related obscene remarks are made in public view, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act of 1989 would be made out. Similarly, learned APP submitted that the offences under Sections 294, 354, 323 and 504 of the IPC are also attracted. Therefore, the offences under Sections 3(2)(va) and 3(1)(w)(i)(ii) of the Act of 1989 have also been committed. According to him, the allegations levelled against the applicant make out a prima facie case and warrants a trial in both the cases. Hence, he sought rejection of both the applications.
Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant, learned APP and learned counsel appearing for non-applicant No.2, I have perused the chargesheet in both the applications.
First, it will be appropriate to state the settled law with regard to Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act of 1989 for which the applicant is charged in both the chargesheets. Section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989 reads as under :
“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities -
(1)Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, -…..
(r)intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
Thus, Clause (r) uses the words ‘with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view’. Thus, insult or intimidation of a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community will lead to a caste based humiliation only in those cases where the intentional insult or intimidation occurs either due to the prevailing practice of untouchability or due to reinforcement of the historical social hierarchy containing the idea of superiority of one caste over another, which can be termed to be an insult or intimidation of a type that is envisaged under the Act of 1989.
Pertinently, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989 contemplates that the act of intentional insult or intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe has to take place within a public view.
In the case of Swaran Singh & others vs. State and another, (2008) 8 SCC 435, the Supreme Court while discussing Section 3(1)(x) [now section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989], has observed as under :
“24.In our opinion, calling a member of the Scheduled Caste “chamar” with intent to insult or humiliate him in a place within public view is certainly an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. Whether there was intent to insult or humiliate by using the word “chamar” will of course depend on the context in which it was used.
28.It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.”
Another landmark Judgment of the Supreme Court in this regard in the case of Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand & another, (2020) 10 SCC 710, can be referred here wherein, relying on the decision of Swaran Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under :
“14.Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435]. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below: “Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”]. The Court held as under :
“28.It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (emphasis in original)
15.As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.
Thus, what is deduced from the authorities referred above is that, in order to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r), the caste name of the victim should be uttered by the accused in a public place within public view with intent to humiliate or insult the victim.
This takes me to the allegations of commission of the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(s) of the Act of 1989. It will be appropriate to reproduce the said Section, which reads as under :
3. Punishments for offences of atrocities -
(1)Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, -….. (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;”
Perusal of the Section shows that in order to bring the allegation of hurling castiest abuses by the applicant within the purview of Section 3(1)(s) of the Act of 1989, it has to be shown that the abuses were given in public view.
The Supreme Court in the case of Keshaw Mahto (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant has discussed Section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the Act of 1989. In para Nos.12 to 19 it has been held as under :
“12.Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation by the accused is that the person who is subjected to is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community.
13.To put it briefly - first, the fact that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly, any insult or intimidation towards the complainant must be on the account of such person being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
14.With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).
15.Further, for an offence to be made out under Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence.
16.In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse.
17.What appears from the aforesaid is the element of humiliation is present in Section 3(1)(s) as well. It has to be gathered from the intentional insult towards the caste, and the content. The content under Section 3(1)(s) are the abuses hurled at a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. However, the intent with which the abuses were hurled must be found to be denigrating towards the caste, resulting into a feeling of caste-based humiliation.
18.In the case at hand, we find that there is nothing on record to indicate that the alleged acts of the appellant were motivated for the reason that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. Neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contains any whisper of an allegation of insult or intimidation by the appellant herein, let alone one made with the intention to humiliate the complainant.
19.The allegations levelled in the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie, constitute an offence under either Section 3(1)(r) or under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act.”
Section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989 is attracted when the accused intentionally insults or intimidates a person with intent to humiliate him for the reason that he is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Thus, unless the insult or intimidation is with an intention to humiliate the member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot sustain. Likewise, to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the Act of 1989, it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe by the name of his caste in any place within public view. The allegations must reveal whether abuses were made by merely mentioning the name of the caste of the victim or the name of the caste itself had been hurled as an abuse.
Notably, here there is history of litigation between the parties which forms the background of the dispute. The father of the applicant is the Secretary of the Sansthan which owns the land which is being cultivated by the complainant family on fixed rate lease. As stated above, civil disputes are pending between the Ram Mandir Sansthan and the family of the complainants in FIR No.204/2022 and FIR No.312/2022. There are almost 22 cases pending between the applicant and the complainant family, which are reproduced here :
| Sr.No. | Case Nos. | Name of Court | Name of Parties |
| 1 | RCS No. 26/2004 | C.J.J.D., Patur | Ram Mandir Sansthan vs. Sukhnandan Thakare |
| 2 | R.C.A. No. 35/2016 | District Judge, Akola | Vinayak Thakare vs. Ram Mandir Sansthan |
| 3 | Appeal No.164/2024 | High Court Bombay Bench Nagpur | Vinayak Thakare vs. Narayan Mahalle |
| 4 | Atrocity Case No.08/2023 | Atrocity Court, Akola | State vs. Shyam |
| 5 | Atrocity Case No.147/2022 | Atrocity Court, Akola | State vs. Shyam |
| 6 | Cri.M.A. No. 240/2023 | J.M.F.C., Patur | Vinayak Thakare vs. Shyam |
| 7 | Cri. M.A. No. 61/2014 | J.M.F.C., Patur | Vinayak Thakare vs. Narayan |
| 8 | Cri. M.A. No.164/2023 | J.M.F.C., Patur | Sandip Thakare vs. Narayan and others |
| 9 | R.C.C. No. 117/2023 | J.M.F.C., Patur | Sansthan vs. Vinayak |
| 10 | R.C.C. No. 64/2023 | J.M.F.C., Patur | Sansthan vs. Haridas Thakre |
| 11 | Cri.M.A. No. 215/2022 | J.M.F.C., Patur | Sansthan vs. Haridas Thakare |
| 12 | Cri.Rev.No. 04/2023 | District Judge, Akola | Sansthan vs. Haridas & others |
| 13 | Cri.Rev.No. 49/2023 | District Judge, Akola | Sansthan vs. Vinayak & others |
| 14 | Cri.Rev.No. 50/2023 | District Judge, Akola | Sansthan vs. Vinayak & others |
| 15 | Cri.M.A. No. 343/2023 | J.M.F.C., Patur | State Vs. Vinayak & others |
| 16 | R.C.C. No. 106/2023 | J.M.F.C., Patur | State Vs. Vinod +2 |
| 17 | M.C.A. No. 129/2022 | District Judge, Akola | Vinayak vs. Sansthan & others |
| 18 | M.A. No. 30/2023 | J.M.F.C., Patur | Sansthan vs. Vinayak |
| 19 | R.C.S. No. 48/2022 | C.J.J.D., Patur | Sansthan vs. Haridas and others |
| 20 | R.C.S. No. 10/2023 | C.J.J.D., Patur | Sansthan vs. Vinayak and others |
| 21 | R.C.S. No. 06/2007 | C.J.J.D., Patur | Sansthan vs. Vinayak |
| 22 | W.P. No. 6189/2015 | High Court Bombay Bench Nagpur | Sansthan vs. Sukhnandan |
The long list of pending litigation demonstrates that the relationship between the applicant and the complainant family is strained. Both the parties have lodged civil and criminal cases against each other and frequent quarrels are taking place between the applicant and the complainant family.
As stated above, for attracting the offences under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989, the reason for abuse to a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes must be intentional insult or intimidation. It is a matter of record that the said incidents are arising out of the earlier disputes, which is evident from the chart depicting the litigation pending between the applicant and the complainant family as referred above. Thus, even if it is presumed that the applicant abused the complainant duo in the name of their caste, those abuses were not with intent to insult or humiliate the complainant duo just because they are members of the Scheduled Tribes, or in order to practice untouchability or discrimination on the basis of caste but are arising out of pending civil disputes.
Notably, FIR No.204/2022 has been lodged by the complainant-husband almost after 15 days of the alleged incident. In FIR No.312/2022, though the complainant alleged that she was abused in the name of her caste, but in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate, there is no whisper of any allegations of the applicant having abused the complainant in the name of her caste.
Putting it altogether, firstly, there is a delay of 15 days in lodging FIR No.204/2022. Secondly, in FIR No.312/2022, there is discrepancy in the statement recorded before the Magistrate and the allegations made in the FIR with regard to hurling casteist abuses. Thirdly, there was no intention on the part of the applicant to insult or humiliate the complainants for the reason that they belong to a certain caste. Lastly, the name of the caste has not been used as an abuse in either of the FIRs. To conclude, if all the circumstances are considered together, in the backdrop of the fact that there is a series of disputes which is going on between the applicant and the complainant family as well as the fact that the complainant in FIR No.204/2022 is the husband of complainant in FIR No.312/2022, I find support in the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant that the FIR is an exaggeration of the verbal altercation between the parties to attract the stringent provision of the Act of 1989 against the applicant.
Moving to the offences registered under the IPC, in FIR No.204/2022, the complainant-husband has alleged that the applicant abused him in filthy language. The FIR alleges commission of the offence punishable under Section 294 of the IPC. It is a settled position of law that mere use of abusive language is not enough to attract the provision of Section 294 of the IPC. The test of obscenity is whether the matter has the substantial tendency to corrupt those minds that are open to such immoral influences by arousing lustful desires which corrupt thoughts. The allegations made in the FIR do not pass the test of obscenity and therefore, Section 294 of the IPC will not be attracted.
So far as the allegations under Section 354 of the IPC in FIR No.312/2022 are concerned, let me state that the complainant-wife has alleged that the applicant tore her blouse. However, the statement of the husband of the complainant does not reveal that the applicant tore the blouse of the complainant-wife as a result of which, she felt ashamed. The statement merely reveals that the applicant pulled the hair of the complainant and pushed her on the ground. It further appears from the chargesheet that two independent witnesses Vinod Haridas Dakhore and Pramod Haridas Dakhore were present at the time of the incident. Though, they have stated about the abuse in the name of the caste as well as the verbal altercation but none of them have stated that a scuffle happened between the applicant and the complainant-wife. It appears that the police was also called at the spot of incident and PSI Ganesh Mahajan immediately reached at the spot. At that time, the husband of the complainant informed PSI Mahajan that the applicant has opened the bags of soyabean and therefore, he was insisting PSI Mahajan to prepare a panchnama. Pertinently, no alleged incident of assault or outraging the modesty of the complainant was informed by the husband of the complainant to the police at that instance.
No doubt, the applicant was caught by the complainant’s family i.e. the husband of the complainant who is also the complainant in FIR No.204/2022 along with other relatives when he had been to the agricultural land, however considering the facts and circumstances emerging from the record, coupled with the long standing strained relationship and the 22 pending cases between the parties, the complaint lodged vide FIR No.312/2022 appears to be an exaggerated version of a verbal spat that occurred between both the parties.
Considering the legal position enumerated above as well as the attending circumstances appearing on the face of record, I find support in the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant that an exaggerated version of the allegations of Section 354 and 323 of the IPC and abuse in the name of caste appear to have been levelled by the complainants in both the FIRs.
So far as Sections 3(1)(w)(i)(ii) and 3(2)(va) of the Act of 1989 are concerned, once it is held that the scheduled offences under Sections 294, 354 and 323 are not made out, the offences under Sections 3(1)(w)(i)(ii) and 3(2)(va) also do not stand against the applicant.
What remains is Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC which are non-cognizable offences and therefore, in absence of any cognizable offence being made out, the police could not have investigated the same without seeking permission from the jurisdictional Magistrate as held in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335] .
Even otherwise, for attracting Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC, the prosecution has to demonstrate that the applicant threatened the complainants with any injury to their person, property or reputation with intent to cause alarm to them or insulted them intentionally in order to provoke breach of public peace. The ingredients of these sections are absent in the allegations made in the FIR. Thus, even if the allegations are taken at their face value, no offences under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC are made out against the applicant.
At this stage, it will be appropriate to refer to the decision in the case of of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others (supra), wherein, the Supreme Court has postulated 7 categories where the Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR. Para 102 of the decision has been reproduced as under :
“102.In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1)Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2)Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4)Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
In view of the legal position discussed above, coupled with the circumstances appearing on the face on record in both the cases, a case is made out for exercising the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to quash the FIR and consequent proceedings against the applicant. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following order :
Both the Criminal Applications are allowed.
FIR No.312/2022, dated 02.11.2022, registered with Police Station, Channi, Tahsil Patur, District Akola for the offences punishable under Sections 354, 323 and 504 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(1) (w)(i)(ii) of the Act of 1989 and consequent Chargesheet No.02/2023, dated 10.01.2023 as well as FIR No.204/2022, dated 31.07.2022, registered with Police Station, Channi, Tahsil Patur, District Akola for the offences punishable under Sections 294 and 504 of the IPC as well as Section 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act of 1989 and consequent Chargesheet No.256/2022, dated 18.10.2022, are hereby quashed and set aside.
Both the criminal applications stand disposed of.