Shyam Swarup Dubey and Another vs District Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies and Another

R.R. Misra, J.—By means of this writ petition the Petitioners have challenged the order dated 16-11-1987 passed by the District Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Society, Etawah, Respondent No. 1. By the said impugned order he in the exercise of powers conferred u/s 29(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) had appointed Sri Jai Veer Singh, Respondent No. 2, as Administrator of U.P. Govt. Roadways Emyloyees Cooperative Credit Society, Etawah.

We have heard learned Counsel for the Petitioners. The grievance of the Petitioners, as stated in the writ petition, is that the said Sri Jai Veer Singh js not a member of the Society and is a rank outsider and, therefore, in view of the circular dated 20-9-1984, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure No. V. to the writ petition, issued by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, the said appointment could not be made by the aforesaid District Assistant Registrar. In the case of Raghuvir Singh v. State of U.P., Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14960 of 1984, decided on 2-3-1987 and reported in 1987 U.P. Local Bodies and Educational Cases 433, relevant page 445 in a silimar condition the said argument was repelled by this Court in paragraph 27 of the said judgment by observing as follows:

We are not impressed with the argument put forward by Sri Chauhao to the effect that the Administrator appointed u/s 29(4)(b) has necessarily to be a member of the Committee of Management. No such limitation or qualification may be found incorporated expressly or by implication in Section 29.

We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view of the Division Bench in the case cited above and are of the opinion that the argument raised on behalf of the Petitioners has got no substance. Prom a perusal of the relevant provision contained in Section 29(4)(b) of the Act, we find that there is no such limitation as is alleged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners. In our opinion, under the aforesaid provision even an outsider who is not a member of the Society can be appointed as an administrator as has been done by the impugned order.

The second submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that the District Assistant Registrar is appointed u/s 3(2) of the Act to assit the Registrar. He has further relied upon the dictionary meaning of the word ''assist '' stated in the Webster lllrd International Dictionary, wherein word '' assist '' has been stated to mean " to help, stand by, to give support or aid ". The argument developed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that having regard to the circular aforesaid issued by the Registrar. A copy of which has been filed as Annexure No. V. to the writ petition, it was not open to the District Assistant Registrar to go against the same. From a perusal of the said circular, it is clear that it has only laid down guide lines for the appointment of an Administrator. It has been specifically stated in the said circular that a person sought to be appointed as Administrator should be a major and should have faith in the cooperative movements and must not have been a person eligible under Rule 453 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Rules, 1968 framed under tht Act.

From a perusal of the averments made in the writ petition, it is amply '' clear to us that no such averments have been made m the writ petition that the appointment in question by the District Assistant Registrar under the impugned order is in contravention of the aforesaid guidelines issued under the said circular, in this view of the matter, we find that there is nothing in the said circular which is not in conformity with the impugned order passed by the District Assistant Registrar.

Relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B.S. Minhas Vs. Indian Statistical Institute and Others, it has further been urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the aforesaid circular is binding on the concerned District Assistant Registrar although the same is not in consonance with the statutory provisions as laid down u/s 24(4)(b) of the Act. In our opinion, it is not necessary to go into this question because as we have earlier indicated the impugned appointment has not been made in defiance of the aforesaid circular. In this view of the matter, the said argument advanced on behalf of the Petitioners need not be gone into by us.

Along with the writ petition a copy of a letter issued by the Chief Minister have been filed as Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition. It has been stressed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the impugned appointment has been made in violation of the aforesaid direction issued by the Chief Minister. This submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has legally no force for the reason that the aforesaid letter has not been issued in the exercise of statutory powers under the Act and further that in the said letter all that his been stated is that no nomination as Administrator ;is to be made without the consent of the Chief Minister. In our opinion, no legal right can be based on the aforesaid letter of the Chief Minister.

Lastly, learned Counsel for the Petitioners relied upon a supplementary affidavit filed by them. It has been urged that in another case the very same District Assistant Registrar has relied upon the above mentioned circular of the Registrar and had made a nomination in accordance with the same but in the present case, the terms pf the said circular have not been complied with. For the reasons already stated above, there is no basis of the said submission, because the impugned appointment has not been made in violation of the aforesaid circular. Hence, in our opinion, having regard to the facts of the case no discrimination has been made by the opposite parties in making the impugned appointment.

Thus, all the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners fail.

In the result, the writ petition is dismissed summarily.