High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 11 MP CK 2629

Shyam Kumar Parashar vs Chunni Khan & Ors.

Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior Bench · Decided on 6 November 2026 · Citation: 2025 INSC 490

HON’BLE JUDGES
Ashish Shroti, J
CASE NUMBER
Second Appeal No. 203 of 2012

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Judgment

41 paragraphs · 3,571 words

Shri Trishant Mishra, Advocate does not want to press I.A. No.10280/2026, an application seeking permission to change the counsel filed on behalf of respondent Sameer Khan. I.A. No.10280/2026 is accordingly rejected as not pressed.

2.

The appellant and respondents, have filed I.A. No.7710/2026, under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, seeking disposal of this appeal in terms of compromise.

3.

I.A. No.7891/2026 is filed under Order I Rule 10 CPC by one Nihal Kode.

4.

I.A. No.7938/2026 is filed under Order I Rule 10 CPC by one Rahul Jain. Further, I.A.No.7563/2026 is filed by Shri Rahul Jain (applicant of I.A.7938/2026) raising objection to the compromise arrived at between the appellant and the respondents.

5.

I.A. No.8464/2026 is also filed under Order I Rule 10 CPC by one Rohit Bindal & Hariom Gupta.

6.

The reply to the aforesaid applications have been filed by appellant as well as respondents no.1(b) & 1(c).

7.

Parties are heard on I.A. No.7710/2026, I.A. No.7891/2026, I.A. No.7938/2026, I.A. No.7563/2026 & I.A. No.8464/2026. For convenience sake, the applicants of all these applications under Order I Rule 10 CPC shall be referred to as 'applicants' in this order.

8.

The present suit was initially filed by one Chunni Khan on 15.04.2004 seeking a declaration of his title and a decree of permanent injunction in respect of suit land consisting of Survey No.165 & 168 situated at Village Shivpuri, on the ground that his father was initially the owner of suit lands. However, the defendant/appellant got his name recorded in the revenue records without any right. The Trial Court vide judgment dated 30.07.2005 dismissed the suit. However, the first appellate Court has reversed the judgment of trial Court and has decreed the suit in favour of respondents. Challenging the same, the defendant/appellant has filed the present appeal.

9.

During the pendency of this appeal, the matter has been amicably settled between appellant and respondents, whereby the respondents have admitted the appellant's title over the suit land and have agreed to withdraw their suit and have waived all their claims over the suit land. Accordingly, I.A. No.7710/2026 has been filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC.

10.

The applicants have sought their impleadment as respondents in this appeal, primarily on the ground that the respondents have entered into an agreement for sale of the suit land with them and have received part of sale consideration. They therefore, submit that they are necessary and proper party to the present appeal and should be impleaded as respondents.

11.

The applicant of I.A. No.7891/2026, namely- Nihal Kode, has placed on record agreement dated 21.04.2025 executed in his favour by respondent- Sameer Khan and Ms. Tarannum. As per this agreement, Rs.15 lakh has been paid in advance to the respondents. The sale deed is agreed to be executed after disposal of this appeal.

12.

Applicant of I.A. No.7938/2026, namely- Rahul Jain, has brought on record agreement dated 12.07.2021 again executed by Sameer Khan and Ms. Tarannum. An amount of Rs.4.70 lakh has been paid in advance and sale deed is agreed to be executed after disposal of this appeal. Applicant Rahul Jain has also filed RCSA No.160/2025 pending in the Court of First Civil Judge, Senior Division, Shivpuri seeking a decree of permanent injunction. It is averred in the application that the order of temporary injunction has been passed on 25.03.2026 thereby directing maintenance of status quo in respect of the suit land.

13.

Likewise, applicant of I.A. No.8464/2026, namely- Rohit Bindal & Hariom Gupta, have brought on record agreement dated 30.04.2026. They have also paid Rs.35 lakh as part sale consideration to the respondents and the sale deed is agreed to be executed after disposal of this appeal.

14.

The applicant Rahul Jain has also filed I.A. No.7563/2026 raising objection to the compromise entered into between the appellant and the respondents.

15.

The learned counsels for the applicants have a common contention that having entered into an agreement for sale of suit land with them, the respondents no.1(b) & 1(c) are not competent to enter into any compromise with the appellant. As per their submission, they will be entitled to execution of sale deeds after the disposal of the present second appeal. Therefore, as per their contention, the appeal cannot be disposed of in terms of compromise and needs to be decided on merits. It is their contention that since they have vital interest in the suit lands, they are required to be impleaded as party in the present appeal.

16.

On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the agreements relied upon by the applicants are executed with a specific condition that the execution of sale deed is subject to decision of this appeal. As per his submission, disposal of appeal can be either on merits or by way of compromise. The applicants therefore, cannot object to disposal of appeal in terms of compromise. By virtue of agreement for sale, the intending purchasers do not get any right in the suit property and they are required to wait till decision of the appeal. It is his submission that the intending purchaser's right is subject to final outcome of this appeal and they have no independent say in the matter and therefore they are neither necessary nor proper party to this appeal. It is his further contention that the agreements executed by applicants with respondents are governed by the doctrine of lis pendens and any transaction made by them is dependent upon outcome of this appeal.

17.

It is further submitted that the intending purchasers agreed to purchase the property knowing well about the pendency of this appeal and therefore they are not bona fide purchasers. He further argued that on 12.09.2023, this Court has directed maintenance of status quo, which is operating till date, and the agreements executed in violation of the interim order, are illegal. As per his contention, the intending purchasers can only sue for recovery of their amount, but they cannot object to the disposal of this appeal in terms of compromise. He further submits that the appellant as well as the respondents are competent to enter into a compromise and in absence of any allegation of fraud and mala fides, the compromise between them is legal and valid.

18.

On the other hand, the counsel appearing for respondent no.1(b) & 1(c) adopted the contentions of the counsel for appellant. In addition, she submitted that the respondents have not entered into any agreement with the applicants and have also not received any amount from them. As per her contention, the agreements relied upon are sham, fabricated, forged and are non-est in the eye of law. She also submitted that a mere agreement does not convey any right in favour of applicants as no title is conveyed in their favour. The agreements are governed by the doctrine of lis pendens and despite the agreement, the respondents have an unfettered right to amicably settle the matter with the appellant.

19.

Considered the submissions and perused the record.

20.

It is gathered from record that the dispute between the parties to this appeal is about the title of the suit land. The respondents have been declared owner of the land by the first appellate Court. This appeal is already admitted and is pending for final hearing.

21.

The applicants allege that the respondents no.1(b) & 1(c) have entered into an agreement for sale of the suit land with them and have also received substantial amount. It is further their case that the execution of sale deed is of course subject to final outcome of this case, however, respondents cannot be allowed to frustrate their agreements by compromising the matter with appellant. The applicants claims that they have vital interest in the suit property and therefore should be impleaded as party in this case.

22.

The respondents no.1(b) & 1(c) have though denied execution of the agreements, however, in reply filed vide Document No.9901/2026, learned counsel has accepted the endorsement made by handwriting in the agreement wherein it is endorsed that the amount is received for domestic need. Meaning thereby, the respondents have accepted the factum of part payment of sale consideration.

23.

At this stage, it is profitable to refer to this Court judgment in the case of Dharamsingh Manrakhan Singh vs. Jalima Hariya, 1980 MP LJ 803 . It was a case where plaintiff therein filed suit for declaration of title against defendant no.1 who denied his title. During pendency of suit, defendant no.1 transferred title of property to third person who was impleaded as defendant no.2. Later, defendant no.1 enters into compromise with plaintiff admitting his title over suit land. Dealing with the situation, this Court held as under:

"8.

But it is also equally true that a purchaser after having been added as a defendant to the suit remains bound by the result of the litigation which has been openly in his presence tried and decided upon. Once he comes in the array of parties then what could have been shown by way of compromise or adjustment in between his predecessor-in-interest and the opponent when he was not before the Court will not be allowed to interfere with his claim for a fair trial and decision of the lis on merits. In the present case, the suit has not been decreed on the basis of the compromise on the date when the defendant No. 2 was impleaded. The application for compromise did exist on record. But since the suit had not been decreed, the application for compromise was in the shape of a document containing certain admissions by the predecessor-in-interest of defendant No. 2 subsequent to the date of sale. The question will be whether such admissions will be binding on the purchaser and relevant for deciding the dispute in a suit to which he also is a party. In my opinion, the answer will be in negative, the reason being that the said admission had been made subsequent to the execution of the deed of sale. On the date when defendant No. I made the above referred admission, he had already ceased to have any interest in the suit property. Actually speaking, the principles of section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act will apply by analogy also. Admissions in order to be relevant must be made during the continuance of the interest of the person making them. The reason for this is that it would be against all the principles of equity and fairness to allow a person who has parted with his interest in the property to divest the right of another claiming under him by any statement which he chose to make subsequently. The statement of admission by a person from whom another person has derived interest is admissible only when the admission is of a date prior to the date of the transfer. The purchaser, in the present case, is, therefore, not bound by the admission of his vendor, i.e., defendant No. 1 Jalima. *** *** ***

10.

Shri Kaushik, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, thereafter, contended that once the application for compromise had already been received, the trial Court should not have allowed the application made by defendant No. 2 under Order 22, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code and he should not have been impleaded. The argument was that the suit should have been decreed on the basis of the compromise which should have been binding on the purchaser also as it was a case of transfer pendente lite. In my opinion, the defendant No. 2 was entitled to oppose the compromise, as it was intended to defeat his rights. It is true, had the suit been already decreed on the basis of the compromise before defendant No. 2 was impleaded, the only course left open to the defendant would have been to get rid of the decree by filing a separate suit and establishing that the same was either an outcome of collusion, fraud or coercion and that it was in any case not binding on him because defendant No. 1 Jalima admitted the rights and interest of the plaintiff on the suit property on a date when he had already parted with all his interests therein. In the present case, since there was no order passed on the terms of the compromise and the suit had not been decreed on the basis of the compromise and, in the meantime, defendant No. 2 was already impleaded as party to the suit, he had every right to oppose the request of the plaintiff for a decree being passed on the basis of the compromise....."

24.

The only difference in the facts of Dharamsingh Manrakhan Singh (supra) and the presence case is that in Dharamsingh Manrakhan Singh, the sale deed was already executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2 whereas in the case in hand, an agreement to sale has been executed by respondents in favour of applicants. However, the fact remains that by way of agreement, certain rights, if not title, has accrued in applicants' favour in the suit land which cannot be allowed to be taken away by permitting compromise between appellant and respondents. As held by this Court in Dharamsingh Manrakhan Singh, it would be against the principles of equity and fairness to allow a person who has parted with his interest in the property to divest the right of another claiming under him, by entering into compromise subsequently.

25.

The respondents, having entered into an agreement for sale, are now precluded from entering into any compromise with the appellant which is prejudicial to the interest of applicants. It is true that the applicants, being intending purchasers, have no title over the suit land merely on the basis of agreement; however, they have a right to get the agreements performed in case the appeal is decided in favour of respondents. Thus, this appeal needs to be disposed of on merits and the respondents cannot be allowed to enter into any compromise with the appellant.

26.

In fact, after having received handsome amount from the applicants and having executed an agreement for sale, entering into compromise with the appellant is a fraudulent act on the part of the respondents. The intention is apparent. Having pocketed the money from applicants, now the respondents intend to frustrate the agreements by entering into compromise with the appellant. It is reiterated here that as per compromise, the respondents have unequivocally admitted the appellant's title over the suit land and have given up all their claims thereon.

27.

Considering the aforesaid, the compromise entered into vide I.A.No.7710/2026 is impermissible in law. I.A.No.7710/2026 is accordingly rejected. It is however made clear that any observation made by this Court in this order regarding agreements in question, shall not adversely effect respondents in their defence in suit(s) filed by applicants in relation to agreements.

28.

The Apex Court was considering issue of joining transferee pendenti lite in a suit under Order I Rule 10 CPC or under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC in the case of Amit Kumar Shaw vs. Farida Khatoon, (2005)11 SCC 403. The Court held as under:

"16 [Ed.: Para 16 corrected vide Official letter dated 25-8-2005.] . The doctrine of lis pendens applies only where the lis is pending before a court. Further pending the suit, the transferee is not entitled as of right to be made a party to the suit, though the court has a discretion to make him a party. But the transferee pendente lite can be added as a proper party if his interest in the subject-matter of the suit is substantial and not just peripheral. A transferee pendente lite to the extent he has acquired interest from the defendant is vitally interested in the litigation, where the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the latter having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the suit. He may collude with the plaintiff. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lis pendens transferee a party, under Order 22 Rule 10 an alienee pendente lite may be joined as party. As already noticed, the court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. The court has held that a transferee pendente lite of an interest in immovable property is a representative-in-interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation; he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case."

29.

Though in the aforesaid case before Apex Court, there was a transfer of property, however, principles laid down therein would apply in case of an intending transferee pendenti lite also. The fact is apparent that the respondents are hand in glove with the appellant, and may not contest the appeal effectively. Therefore, in order to protect their interest, the applicants are required to be impleaded as party in this appeal. Though having so impleaded, they will not have any independent right to contest this appeal, but they will step into the shoes of respondents only. However, since now respondents may not take interest in the just disposal of this appeal and/or may act prejudicially to applicants' interest, the presence of applicants is necessary.

30.

The learned counsel for appellant placed reliance upon Apex Court judgment in the case of Gurmit Singh Bhatia v. Kiran Kant Robinson , (2020) 13 SCC 773, oppossing the prayer for applicants' impleadment in the appeal. It was a case of specific performance of contract where a subsequent purchaser was sought to be impleaded. The Court did not allow the same inasmuch as in a suit for specific performance, only the parties to the agreement are the necessary parties. This is case is close to the facts of Amit Kumar Shaw (supra) and therefore, appellant do not get any help from Gurmit Singh Bhatia (supra).

31.

The appellant's counsel also placed reliance upon Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656 , to say that no right accrued in favour of applicants only by virtue of agreements of sale. In this case, the Apex Court held that title in immovable property can be transferred only by way of registered conveyance deed and not by way of agreement to sale. This legal proposition is settled and cannot be disputed. However, the issue in this case is about permitting respondents to compromise the matter with appellant after having entered into agreement for sale with applicants. As discussed above, the answer is in negative. The appellant therefore, does not get any help from Suraj Lamp & Industries (supra) also.

32.

Accordingly, I.A. No.7891/2026, I.A. No.7938/2026 & I.A. No.8464/2026 are allowed. The applicants of these applications are directed to be added as respondents in this appeal. No notice is required to be issued to them as they are already present. The appellant's counsel shall carry out necessary amendment in the cause title within seven days from today.

33.

There is yet another aspect which needs to be taken note of. The Apex Court in the case of The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution vs. B. Gunashekar & Another reported in AIR 2025 SC 2065 (2025 INSC 490), issued following directions:

" ( A ) Whenever, a suit is filed with a claim that Rs. 2,00,000/- and above is paid by cash towards any transaction, the courts must intimate the same to the jurisdictional Income Tax Department to verify the transaction and the violation of Section 269ST of the Income Tax Act, if any, (B) Whenever, any such information is received either from the court or otherwise, the Jurisdictional Income Tax authority shall take appropriate steps by following the due process in law,

(C)

Whenever, a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- and above is claimed to be paid by cash towards consideration for conveyance of any immovable property in a document presented for registration, the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar shall intimate the same to the jurisdictional Income Tax Authority who shall follow the due process in law before taking any action,

(D)

Whenever, it comes to the knowledge of any Income Tax Authority that a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- or above has been paid by way of consideration in any transaction relating to any immovable property from any other source or during the course of search or assessment proceedings, the failure of the registering authority shall be brought to the knowledge of the Chief Secretary of the State/UT 32 for initiating appropriate disciplinary action against such officer who failed to intimate the transactions."

34.

It is seen that in the agreement dated 21.04.2025 filed alongwith I.A. No.7891/2026 an amount of Rs.15 lakh, while in agreement dated 30.04.2026 filed with I.A. No.8464/2026, an amount of Rs.35 lakh has been stated to be paid in cash. In view of Apex Court judgment contained in Clause (A) quoted above, the Principal Registrar of this Court is directed to refer these two agreements to the jurisdictional Income Tax Department, alongwith copy of this order, to verify the transaction and the violation of Section 269ST of the Income Tax Act.

35.

As agreed by the parties, the appeal be listed on 19.11.2026 for further orders.