Shyam Chand vs Roop Singh

“7.

Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder:

“438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—

(1)

The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.

Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439.

(2)

The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.

(3)

If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.”

Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record.

7.1.

This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts.

7.2.

Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case, which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following:

“5.

… In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

“27.

It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

28.

Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.”

5.3.

At this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight the key ingredients as highlighted by this Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745: 2000 SCC (Cri) 546: (2000) 100 COMP CAS 755.

“10.

On a reading of the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act, it is clear that the ingredients which are to be satisfied for making out a case under the provision are:

(i)

a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person out of that account for the discharge of any debt or other liability;

(ii)

that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(iii)

that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;

(iv)

the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;

(v)

the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.

11.

If the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied, then the person who has drawn the cheque shall be deemed to have committed an offence. In the explanation to the section, clarification is made that the phrase “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.

5.4.

The ingredients of the offence under Section 138 are as follows:

i.

The drawing of a cheque by a person on an account maintained by him with the banker for the payment of any amount of money to another from that account.

ii.

The cheque being drawn for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability.

iii.

Presentation of the cheque to the bank within the period of six months or within the period of its validity.

iv.

The return of the cheque by the drawee bank as unpaid either because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account.

v.

A notice by the payee or the holder in due course making a demand for the payment of the amount to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the receipt of information from the bank in regard to the return of the cheque.

vi.

Failure of the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice.

vii.

Filing of the complaint within a month from the date of expiry of the grace period of fifteen days before a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate not below first class.

“38.

Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross-examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client.

39.

Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except for the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition, we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner. ****

42.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that suggestions made to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on record to determine the guilt of the accused.”

36.

Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40]]. Therefore, mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of the entire contents of the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption.

37.

As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shift the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further.

“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE

15.

In the present case, the cheque in question has admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused. This Court is of the view that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arise against the accused. It is pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge Bench in Rangappa(supra).

5.7.

A conjoint and harmonious reading of the aforesaid provisions clearly indicates towards the statutory presumption that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of the negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument was executed by the drawer, the rules of presumption under Sections118and139of theNI Acthelp him and shift the burden of rebutting the said presumptions upon the said drawer. Since these presumptions are rebuttable, the accused has the burden of disproving the same by leading evidence, either direct or indirect, to the effect that there did not exist any consideration or debt or that the non-existence of the said debt or consideration is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration or debt existed. However, a bare denial of the passing of any consideration or existence of any debt does not support the defence of the accused and, therefore, to disprove the presumptions, something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted back to the complainant. The accused has to bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration and the debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did not exist.

“20.

The trial court and the High Court proceeded as if the appellant was to prove a debt before the civil court, wherein the plaintiff is required to prove his claim on the basis of evidence to be laid in support of his claim for the recovery of the amount due, and the dishonour of a cheque carries a statutory presumption of consideration. The holder of the cheque in due course is required to prove that the cheque was issued by the accused and that when the same was presented, it was not honoured. Since there is a statutory presumption of consideration, the burden is on the accused to rebut the presumption that the cheque was issued not for any debt or other liability.”

“22.

The High Court, while allowing the criminal revision, has primarily proceeded on the presumption that it was obligatory on the part of the complainant to establish his case on the basis of evidence by giving the details of the bank account as well as the date and time of the withdrawal of the said amount which was given to the accused and also the date and time of the payment made to the accused, including the date and time of receiving the cheque, which has not been done in the present case. Pausing here, such presumption on the complainant, by the High Court, appears to be erroneous. The onus is not on the complainant at the threshold to prove his capacity/financial wherewithal to make the payment in discharge of which the cheque is alleged to have been issued in his favour. Only if an objection is raised that the complainant was not in a financial position to pay the amount so claimed by him to have been given as a loan to the accused, only then would the complainant have to bring before the Court cogent material to indicate that he had the financial capacity and had actually advanced the amount in question by way of a loan. In the case at hand, the appellant had categorically stated in his deposition and reiterated in the cross-examination that he had withdrawn the amount from the bank in Faizabad (Typed Copy of his deposition in the paperbook wrongly mentions this as ‘Firozabad’). The Court ought not to have summarily rejected such a stand, more so when respondent no. 2 did not make any serious attempt to dispel/negate such a stand/statement of the appellant. Thus, on the one hand, the statement made before the Court, both in examination-in-chief and cross-examination, by the appellant with regard to withdrawing the money from the bank for giving it to the accused has been disbelieved, whereas the argument on behalf of the accused that he had not received any payment of any loan amount has been accepted. In our decision in S. S. Production v. Tr. Pavithran Prasanth, 2024 INSC 1059, we opined:

‘8. From the order impugned, it is clear that though the contention of the petitioners was that the said amounts were given for producing a film and were not by way of return of any loan taken, which may have been a probable defence for the petitioners in the case, but rightly, the High Court has taken the view that evidence had to be adduced on this point, which has not been done by the petitioners. Pausing here, the Court would only comment that the reasoning of the High Court, as well as the First Appellate Court and Trial Court, on this issue is sound. Just by taking a counter-stand to raise a probable defence would not shift the onus on the complainant in such a case, for the plea of defence has to be buttressed by evidence, either oral or documentary, which in the present case has not been done. Moreover, even if it is presumed that the complainant had not proved the source of the money given to the petitioners by way of loan by producing statement of accounts and/or Income Tax Returns, the same ipso facto would not negate such claim for the reason that the cheques having been issued and signed by the petitioners have not been denied, and no evidence has been led to show that the respondent lacked capacity to provide the amount(s) in question. In this regard, we may make profitable reference to the decision in Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735:

‘10. The trial court and the first appellate court have noted that in the case under Section 138 of the NI Act, the complainant need not show in the first instance that he had the capacity. The proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act are not a civil suit. At the time when the complainant gives his evidence, unless a case is set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice sent, that the complainant did not have the wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the complainant to initially lead evidence to show that he had the financial capacity. To that extent, the courts, in our view, were right in holding on those lines. However, the accused has the right to demonstrate that the complainant in a particular case did not have the capacity and therefore, the case of the accused is acceptable, which he can do by producing independent materials, namely, by examining his witnesses and producing documents. It is also open to him to establish the very same aspect by pointing to the materials produced by the complainant himself. He can further, more importantly, further achieve this result through the cross-examination of the witnesses of the complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of the courts to consider carefully and appreciate the totality of the evidence and then come to a conclusion whether, in the given case, the accused has shown that the case of the complainant is in peril for the reason that the accused has established a probable defence.’(emphasis supplied)’ (underlining in original; emphasis supplied by us in bold).

“21.

This Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that some District Courts and some High Courts are not giving effect to the presumptions incorporated in Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act and are treating the proceedings under the NI Act as another civil recovery proceeding and are directing the complainant to prove the antecedent debt or liability. This Court is of the view that such an approach is not only prolonging the trial but is also contrary to the mandate of Parliament, namely, that the drawer and the bank must honour the cheque; otherwise, trust in cheques would be irreparably damaged.”

“6.

The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”

19.

As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]”