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Judgment
S.N. Shankar, C.J.—The Petitioner, a trained Science Graduate, was appointed as a Lady Science Graduate teacher in the Government Girls High School at Keonjhar sometime in 1969. She was transferred to the Pattamundai Girls'' High School in December, 1969. On September 9, 1971 she was appointed as Lady Science Graduate teacher in the Municipal Girls'' High School, Thoria Sahi, Cuttack. According to the Petitioner she was appointed to this post as a result of an interview. But according to the opposite party this appointment was temporary against a leave vacancy as one of the teachers, namely, Gajendra Kumar Pani was allowed to the undergo B. Ed training. Towards May, 1972 this teacher returned after the training and he was allowed to join his previous post and the services of the Petitioner were terminated. On Petitioner''s representation the order was however recalled and she was allowed to continue as Trained Science Teacher, but with the proviso that this position would continue until Pani became a trained teacher on the declaration of his result. In August, 1972 Pani was declared to have passed the B. Ed. Examination. On January 2, 1973 by order of the Executive Officer (Annexure-18 in O.J.C. No. 767 of 1973 referred to hereafter) Pani was transferred to another High School run by the Municipality at Rajabagicha against the post of Trained Intermediate Arts teacher. He, however, avoided to join this post and made a representation appeal to the Urban Development Department of the Government. On June 9, 1973 the State Government allowed the appeal and directed that Pani should be allowed to remain in the Municipal Girls'' High School. Solely on the basis of this decision of the Government, on September 12, 1973 the Executive Officer of the Municipal Council passed the following order (Annexure-9) in O.J.C. No. 767 of 1973):
In pursuance of Government Order No. 18138/UD dated 9-6-1973, and No. 19145/UD dated 21-6-1973 and pending finalisation of the matter for further examination Sri Gajendra Kumar Pani, Science Teacher, Municipal Girls'' High School (opposite party No. 3) is allowed to continue against the Trained Science Graduate Teacher in the prescribed scale of pay and D.A. in the same school....
Smt. Snehamayee Sahu, Municipal Girls'' High school (Petitioner) who was appointed purely on temporary basis against the post of Science Teacher in the said school is hereby reverted from the date of issue of this order and posted temporarily in the City High School, Rajabagicha against the Trained I.A. post to which Sri Pani was transferred.
The Petitioner challenged this order in O.J.C. No. 767 of 1973. Amongst others, the two principal grounds of challenge were that (1) in August 1971 the Petitioner had been selected for appointment as Assistant Mistress in the Girls'' High School and could not be reverted and posted in the City High School, Rajabagicha, and (2) Education Department vide Annexure-3 in O.J.C. No. 767 of 1973 had evolved the policy that so far as the Girls'' schools of the State were concerned, no male teachers should be posted in such schools and all male teachers who were appointed earlier to the date of the circular should be withdrawn and posted in the boys schools. These averments were denied in the counter affidavit filed by the opposite parties in those proceedings. This Court in the judgment dated January 17, 1975 deciding O.J.C. No. 767 of 1973 held,
The facts alleged in the writ application to provide the foothold for the various contentions raised by Mr. Rath for Petitioner have been seriously disputed both by the Municipal Council as also the opposite party No. 3, Ordinarily, in the face of such disputed facts, we would have declined to entertain the writ petition and required Petitioner to agitate her grievance in an appropriate Court, but in this case however, we find a special feature to which we will advert now.
The special feature referred to was the contention that the order passed unreliable by the Government which had been adopted by the Municipal Council without exercising their own judgment was without jurisdiction because no appeal lay to the Court u/s 77 of the Orissa Municipal Act. While upholding this contention the Court said,
The Municipal Council is at liberty to make its own arrangements of posting of teachers and unless the Municipal Council thinks it appropriate to alter the order under Annexure-18, it is not for the State Government to direct its alteration. Since the order under Annexure-9 which is impugned before us is the direct outcome of the Governmental order in purported exercise of appellate powers under section. 77 of the Act, we think it appropriate to quash the same.
The operative portion of the Court''s order then said,
We would accordingly quash the order in Annexure-9. Consequently the arrangement made by the Municipality shall revive. It is appropriate at this stage to draw the attention of the Municipal Council to the communication from the Education Department (Annexure-3) that no male teachers should be posted In Girls'' Schools. We do not know whether the said direction binds the Municipality, but we think it appropriate that the Municipal Council should keep that direction in view when making its own arrangements.
The Municipal Council consequently took the following decision on February 21, 1975,
Srimati Snehamayee Sahu, Assistant Mistress is allowed to continue in the Municipal City High School, Rajabagicha as Assistant Teacher against I.A. (C.T.) post temporarily.
By this application the case of the Petitioner is that the opposite parties to this application, the Executive Officer, the Additional Executive Officer and the Chairman of the Cut tack Municipality have acted in deliberate violation of the Court''s order inasmuch as (1) the old arrangement in Annexure-18 was not revived, and (2) while deciding the matter, the direction of the Court that Annexure-3 be kept in view was not observed.
We see no merit in either of these contentions. While observing that after the quashing of the impugned order the arrangement made by the Municipality shall revive, the Court in terms held that the Municipal Council had the right to make its own arrangements of posting of teachers and that it was for the Municipal Council to consider if it was appropriate "to alter the order under Annexure-12". The Municipal Council therefore was entitled to take its own decision in the matter of posting of teachers and to decide whether it would be as in Annexure-IS or otherwise. This power having been explicitly recognised in the order of the Court, we are unable to accept the submission that the failure of the opposite parties to again decide in the same terms as Annexure-18 amounts to a disobedience of the order of the Court.
We are also unable to sustain the contention that immediately on the passing of the order of the Court the Municipal Council could have made the transfer in terms of Annexure-18. The time lag between the date of order of this Court, namely, January 17, 1975 and the date of decision of the Executive Officer of the Municipality namely, February 21, 1975 is only 35 days. The power to consider the question being there, we do not think any unreasonable time was taken by the Municipal council to justify the charge of an intentional or contumacious disregard of the order of the Court.
As for the second contention that Annexure-3 was not kept in view in taking the decision we find that this grievance is also misconceived. The Court nowhere held that the direction in Annexure-3 was binding on the Municipal Council. In fact in the operative part of the order extracted above the Court clearly said, "we do not know whether the said direction binds the Municipality". In answer to the notice issued in this petition on the legal aspect in this respect it is the contention of the opposite parties that the Education Department has no control whatsoever in the management and administration of the Municipal High Schools and therefore had no jurisdiction to issue a direction like Annexure-3. They further state that no fact no such direction was ever received by the Municipality for compliance. In the original writ proceedings also they had questioned the binding nature of this direction and the Court did not decide this plea and said, "we do not know whether the said direction binds the Municipality". It is not possible to sa therefore that disregard of Annexure-3 in these circumstances would justify initiation of contempt proceedings.
In reply to this contempt petition the opposite parties however state that they kept in view Annexure-3 in arriving at the conclusion dated February 21, 1975, but it is true that in the detailed order dated February 18, 1975 on the basis of which the decision dated February 21, 1975, was taken and communicated to the Petitioner there is no specific reference to this Annexure or the directions contained therein. If the opposite parties were bonafide of the opinion that this Annexure and the directions contained therein were irrelevant and did not apply to the case, the commission to refer to them specifically in the detailed order is reasonably explainable.
The question whether there is contempt of Court or not is a serious one. The Court has to act with as great circumspection as possible. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct not explainable otherwise is made out that the contemner has to be punished See Debabrata v. State AIR (1060) 189. Proceedings for contempt of Court should not be lightly initiated for collateral purposes. An action in this regard is called for only when it is in the interest of the administration of justice when the lapse on the part of the contemner is found to be deliberate and in defiance of the authority of the Court. The practice of initiating contempt proceedings solely for the purpose of obtaining the benefit of the Court''s order has to be depricated. See Nand Kishore Chela Mal Vs. Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others, . In A. Ramalingam Vs. V.V. Mahalinga Nadar, , the Bench held that the contempt of the Court is essentially a matter which concerns the administration of justice and the dignity and a authority of judicial tribunals, and should not be resorted to only for the purpose of enforcing inter parties rights.
For those reasons we are of the view that no case for initiating contempt proceedings in this case is made out. The rule is accordingly discharged.
P.K. Mohanti, J.
I agree.