AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Heard.
Admit.
The applicant seeks quashing of the First Information Report bearing Crime No.24/2025 dated 22.01.2025 registered with Police Station, Imamwada, Nagpur for the offences punishable under Sections 69, 64(2)(m) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “BNS”) and consequent proceedings arising out of the said crime.
The FIR depicts that there are allegations made by non-applicant no.2/complainant against the applicant that they met on a matrimonial website where the applicant told the complainant that she should speak to him only if she intends to get married to him. On 01.10.2024, the applicant took the complainant to his home at Chandan Nagar, Nagpur and established physical relations with her. After 8 to 10 days, when the complainant came to Nagpur for MPSC classes, the applicant again took the complainant to his home and established physical relations with her. Thereafter, from 16.11.2024, the complainant stayed at the house of the applicant for 8 days. During that period as well, there were physical relations between the applicant and the complainant. Thereafter, the applicant started avoiding the complainant. On 24.12.2024, the applicant quarreled with the complainant over phone call and told her that he will not be able to marry her. However, on 31.12.2024 as well, physical relations were established between the applicant and the complainant. On the complaint of the complainant, the aforesaid FIR came to be registered against the applicant.
Heard Shri Shubhankar Dable, learned counsel for the applicant, Shri N.H. Joshi, learned APP for non-applicant no.1/State as well as Ms Shubhada Phaltankar, learned Amicus Curiae. I have gone through the record.
For the purpose of appreciating the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the applicant as well as learned APP, it will be appropriate to reproduce Section 69 of the BNS under which the applicant is charged. Section 69 of the BNS reads as under :
“69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc.
Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation. - "deceitful means" shall include inducement for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.”
Under the IPC, the false promise of marriage was prosecuted under Section 375 read with Section 90 of the IPC (corresponding Sections 63 and 28 of the BNS). Therein the requirement was to find that the consent, if at all coming out from the facts, was tainted insofar as the victim having been led to believe a promise of marriage and physical relations having been permitted only on the belief that the promise will be complied with; which the promise or even at the time of giving such promise had no intention to comply with. It was held in the aforesaid decision that misconception of fact cannot be alleged if the promise is made with good intention and later for unavoidable circumstances, the person is forced to rescind the aforesaid promise. The BNS by incorporating Section 69 brought in a separate offence carving out the fraudulent and deceitful conduct as spoken of therein from the grave offence of rape, while at the same time providing a penalty for the deceptive conduct alleged therein. The word employed “deceitful means or by making a promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same” brings in the same rigor of the promise having been given with an intention of never being fulfilled, which is the deceitful conduct sought to be punished. In view of this legal position, let me move to the facts of the present case.
The charge-sheet indicates that the complainant is a widow. Her husband died in the year 2022 by committing suicide. Whereas, the applicant is married and has a daughter. The applicant and the complainant met on a matrimonial site namely, jeevansathi.com in the month of August 2024. The applicant and the complainant started speaking to each other over phone calls, and soon, a friendship developed between them. The applicant had informed the complainant that he is married and divorce proceedings are pending before the Court of law. It appears that on 01.10.2024, the complainant herself came all the way to Nagpur and had been to the house of the applicant, where the initial sexual intercourse was established between them. That apart, thereafter, she again had been to Nagpur for the purpose of preparation of the MPSC exam. At that time as well, physical relations were established. Rather, from 16.11.2024, she stayed with the applicant for 8 days at his house where again, physical relations were established between them. When the complainant asked the applicant about marriage, he initially told her that he will speak to his family and then, he started avoiding her.
The charge-sheet further depicts that on 24.11.2024, 29.12.2024 as well as 30.12.2024, a quarrel took place between the applicant and the complainant and ultimately, on 30.12.2024, the applicant refused to marry her. It is to be noted here that even thereafter on 31.12.2024, the complainant had been to Nagpur and on that day as well, physical relations were established between them.
Thus, perusal of the entire charge-sheet does not disclose any allegation that sexual intercourse has been committed by the applicant by deploying deceitful means i.e. by promising to marry her. What is alleged is that, when the complainant contacted the applicant, he told her that she should contact him only if she is interested in marrying him. Though, thereafter, the complainant had been to Nagpur all the way from Akola and established physical relations with the applicant at the house of the applicant on multiple occasions. There are no allegations that at the time of initial intercourse, the applicant promised her that he would marry her and only on that promise, the complainant engaged herself in sexual intercourse. There is nothing on record in the entire charge-sheet by virtue of which it can be said that by deploying deceitful means, the applicant established physical relations with the complainant. The facts on record do not show that promise of marriage was of immediate relevance and bears direct nexus to the decision of the complainant to engage herself in the sexual act. Rather, the facts on record show that relations between the applicant and the complainant were consensual in nature. Even after the applicant refused to marry her, the complainant continued to have physical relations with the applicant on 31.12.2024. Therefore, I do not find force in the argument of the learned APP that the applicant committed sexual intercourse by deploying deceitful means. Rather, it appears that there was a prolonged relationship and intimacy between the applicant and the complainant and on multiple occasions, physical relations were established between the applicant and the complainant. That apart, the complainant knew that the applicant is a married man whose divorce has not yet been finalized and therefore, he is not legally qualified to perform marriage with her.
In this regard, a reference can be made to the decision of Ravish Singh Rana Vs State of Uttarakhand & Anr reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1055, wherein it has been held as under:
“10.An overview of the facts makes it clear that relationship between the appellant and the second respondent (the informant) had been there since 2021.This relationship was not merely of knowing each other but of living together as a couple under one roof in a rented accommodation. The FIR does not allege that physical relationship was established only because there was a promise of marriage. Besides, physical relationship continued for over two years without a complaint in between. In such circumstances, a presumption would arise of there being a valid consent for initiating and maintaining the physical relationship that spanned over two years.”
A reference can also be made to the decision in the case of Biswajyoti Chatterjee v. State of W.B. 1, wherein in para 15, the Supreme Court has held as under:
“15.Even if we take the case of the complainant at the face value or consider that the relationship was based on an offer of marriage, the complainant cannot plead “misconception of fact” or “rape on the false pretext to marry”. It is from day one that she had knowledge and was conscious of the fact, that the appellant was in a subsisting marriage, though separated. It is upon having an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and the consequences of the acts, that the complainant made a reasoned choice to sustain a relationship with the appellant.
Evidently, the applicant and the complainant resided together at the house of the applicant for quite some time. If two able minded adults are residing together and are cohabiting with each other continuously, it suggests that both of them have voluntarily chosen that kind of relationship being fully aware of its consequences. Thus, the relationship between the applicant and the complainant is an outcome of prolonged deliberation. Therefore, I find substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant that neither the case of rape nor the case of sexual intercourse by deploying deceitful means is made out against the applicant. Rather, the entire charge-sheet does not depict that any promise was made by the applicant to the complainant and on that promise, the complainant was deceived and she eventually succumbed to the same. In such circumstances, it can be inferred that the complainant gave her free consent for initiating and maintaining physical relationship with the applicant and thereafter, the relationship continued for quite some time. That apart, the complainant knew that the applicant was married and his earlier marriage was in subsistence and therefore, no case is made out under either of the Sections.
Further, a reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajanlal and others 1, which reads thus:
“102.In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party
(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
In view of the above, the present case is squarely covered by the decision of Bhajanlal (supra) and therefore, a case is made out for quashing of the FIR and consequent proceedings. Hence, the following order is passed:
The application is allowed.
First Information Report bearing Crime No.24/2025 dated 22.01.2025 registered with Police Station, Imamwada, Nagpur for the offences punishable under Sections 69, 64(2)(m) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and consequent proceedings arising out of the same crime are hereby quashed and set aside.
The application stands disposed of.