Shri. Vithlai Mahila Sahakari Dudh Vyavsayik Sanstha Maryadit Karanjphen & Ors. vs null

. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. With the consent of both sides heard extensively due to the exigency in the matters.

I propose to classify the matters in three groups, which are as follows :

In all the petitions the decisions rendered on 31.08.2026 by the respondent No. 3 – Divisional Deputy Registrar Cooperative Societies in the capacity of Returning Officer overruling the objections of the petitioners and rejecting their claim for inclusion in the provisional voters list of the respondent No. 5 -Kolhapur Zilla Sahakari Dudh Utpadak Sangh Ltd., Kolhapur (for the sake of brevity and convenience hereinafter referred as to the “Federation Sangh”) are questioned. Those are passed under Rule 11 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies (Election to Committees) Rule 2014 (for the sake of brevity and convenience hereinafter referred as to the “Rules of 2014”).

Following are the relevant facts useful for the adjudication of the controversy involved in the matter :

Following submissions are advanced by the learned counsel appearing in respective group of petitions :

I The learned counsel Mr. S. S. Patwardhan and Mr. Chetan Patil appearing for the petitioners have canvassed following submissions :

The impugned order is patently illegal. The officers and the managing committee were authorized to pass those resolutions.

The impugned orders are against letter and spirit of common judgment and order dated 12.08.2026 passed by this Court in the group of 194 petitions.

In view of the interim orders passed on 23.06.2026, 01.07.2026 21.07.2026, there was no total eclipsing of the petitioner societies. They were empowered to pass resolution.

The conduct of the respondents is objectionable in excluding the petitioners in participating in the election process.

The overruling of the objection of petitioner Datta Sahakari Dudh Vyavsayik Sanstha is against order dated 18.08.2026 passed in Writ Petition No. 3973 of 2026.

The findings that Section 105(2) of the Act is applicable and the petitioner societies were prohibited from passing any resolutions due to the interim and final orders of liquidation are fallacious.

The purport of Section 106 of the Act has not been taken into account. Before the liquidator could take charge, interim and final orders of liquidation were quashed by High Court.

The cut-off date that is 04.05.2026 has no relevance to decide eligibility of the voters.

So far as Group-II is concerned, stay was granted by the appellate authority on 10.07.2026 and ultimately their appeals were allowed on 07.10.2026. Hence, the liquidator never took charge of the record.

II The learned counsel Mr. Paranjpe appearing for respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 6 has advanced following submissions:-

The respondent No.3 is justified in examining validity of the resolutions passed by the societies.

No stay was operating from 25.03.2026 till 23.06.2026 and the resolutions passed during this period are illegal.

The petitioners are ineligible as on 04.05.2026, as they were defunct by the interim orders.

Interim relief passed on 23.06.2026 was to the extent of two petitioners only. In case of others, interim relief was passed for the first time on 01.07.2026. Till then interim order of appointment of liquidator was in force.

The authorities are bound by the cut-off date of 10.10.2026 stipulated by the Apex Court for completion of election process. Hence, no interference is called for.

In case of Shri Datta Sahkari Dudh Vyavsayik Sanstha Maryadit, through Chairman and others Vs. The State of Maharashtra through Secretary Dept. of Cooperation and others Writ Petition No. 3973 of 2026 judgment dated 18.08.2026, as per liberty granted by High Court decision was taken as per Rule – 11.

III Learned counsel, Mrs. Neha Bhide, appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 would adopt the submissions made by learned counsel, Mr. Paranjpe for respondent nos. 3, 4 and 6.

IV Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Walawalkar, has canvassed following submissions :

As per Section 103(2), it is imperative that charge of record had been taken over by liquidator and the officers or the committees had no access so as to transact any resolution. The resolutions are illegal.

The respondent No.3 has power to go into the legality of the resolutions or the validity of the nominations.

The petitioners have alternate remedy of filing election petitions and interference at this stage is impermissible.

V Learned counsel Mr. Ganbavale has made following submission additionally :

Chapter 10 of Act is complete Code for winding up of co-operative societies. The Election Rules of 2014 operate in different sphere.

The disqualification of the petitioners has nothing to do with their success in the liquidation proceedings. Interim orders passed by Appellate Authority would not come to the rescue of the petitioners.

By implication of Section 103(2), the business of the petitioners' society stood transferred to the liquidator. The resolutions passed are void. The act of liquidator are binding as per Section 103(6) of the Act.

Respondent No.1 acted within four corners of law in holding the resolutions illegal.

I The submissions of the petitioners are summarized as follows :

The respondent no.1 had no jurisdiction to examine the place of residence of the representatives. His findings are self-contradictory and against the principles of natural justice.

The respondent no.3 discarded certified copies of the extract of register of membership, Form I and J in doubting the eligibility of the representatives.

The objection raised against the petitioners was beyond the scope of Rule 11. The respondent no.1 exceeded in his powers. The membership of the representatives was undisputed.

II Learned counsel Mr. Paranjape has made the following submissions:-

The objective scrutiny conducted by the respondent no.3 is permissible under Rule 11.

The resolutions submitted by the petitioners are apparently against the bye-laws and Rule 10(2) and Section 38 of the Act. The original documents are not produced by the petitioners.

The petitioners failed to cure the defect as per Rule 10(4) of the Act.

The disputed questions of facts are involved in the petitions, which cannot be gone into.

III Learned Government Pleader Mrs. Neha Bhide, adopts the submissions made by leaned counsel Mr. Paranjape appearing for respondent nos.3, 4 and 6.

IV Learned counsel Mr. Drupad Patil appearing for respondent no.7 has made following submission:

The representatives of the petitioners are not found to be residents of area of operation in number of societies which is against bye-law No. 2(a) and 7(3).

Near about 325 persons from 10 to 15 famlies who are not residing in the area of operation have been selected to represent the petitioners, which is abuse of process of law.

The respondent no.3 has every jurisdiction to examine eligibility of a voter. He is bound to examine the place of residence.

The disputed questions of facts are involved in the petition and the remedy would be to file the election petition.

Before adverting to the rival submissions of the parties, it is necessary to disclose that common judgment and order dated 12.08.2026 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 2473 of 2026 and the connected 194 petitions were challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court. The special leave petitions were dismissed on 20.08.2026. The election of the respondent No. 5 – Federation Sangh is over due. The Apex Court was required to intervene directing the respondents to conduct the elections within stipulated period, which is extended once. Accordingly the process has to be concluded by 10^th October, 2026.

I have considered rival submissions of the parties. I have gone through common impugned order passed by the respondent No. 3 – Returning Officer. The scope of inquiry to be conducted under Rule 11 of the Rules of 2014 is relevant in these matters. As per notification dated 11^th August, 2026, the provisional voters list was to be published on 12.08.2026. The period from 12.08.2026 to 28.08.2026 was earmarked for protesting the objections. The decisions on the objections were to be rendered on 31^st August, 2026. The final voters list is to be published on 04.09.2026.

The petitioners lodged their protest applications for inclusion in the provisional voters list. Simultaneously, the respondent No. 7, who is contemporary of the petitioners also lodged written objection for not to include their names in the provisional voters list. Pursuant to the objections notices were issued to the parties and the hearing was conducted on 27.08.2026 and 28.08.2026. The respondent No. 5 was not heard by the respondent No. 3 – Returning officer. The representatives of the petitioner primary societies and their contemporaries namely the respondent No. 7 were heard before passing the impugned order.

The respondent No. 3 passed common order on 31.08.2026 in the writ petitions covered by Group I and Group II. A distinct order was passed in case of matters covered by Group III, because objections were different in nature. The respondent No. 3 recorded predominant findings in the common impugned order that the resolutions submitted by the petitioners – societies were illegal because the petitioner societies were under liquidation by interim orders and they were defunct. It was impermissible to transact anything due to eclipse by the interim orders of liquidation. It is further recorded that from 25.03.2026 when the decision was rendered in Writ Petition No. 996 of 2026 vacating stay granted by the Hon’ble Minister, the interim orders of liquidation passed on 30.10.2023, 01.11.2023 and 10.11.2023 were in operation till the indulgence was granted by the High Court on 23.06.2026, 01.07.2026 and 21.07.2026 in respective petitions. It is further recorded that by implication of Sec. 105(2) of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (hereafter referred as to the “Act” for the sake of brevity and convenience) the resolutions passed by petitioners were illegal. It has also been recorded that in case of Shri Datta Sahakari Dudh Vyavsayak Sanstha, the inquiry was conducted as per liberty granted by this Court vide order dated 18.08.2026 in Writ Petition No. 3973 of 2026. The said society was also under similar disability.

My attention is adverted by learned counsel appearing for the parties to the scope by placing reliance on various judgments. It is tried to be impressed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the respondent No. 3 – D. D. R. exceeded in his jurisdiction in conducting threadbare inquiry into the validity of the resolutions submitted by the petitioners. It was not within his purview to examine the purport of interim and the final orders of liquidation and their effect. As against the above submissions, the learned counsels appearing for the respondents vehemently argued that the respondent No. 3 acted within four corners of law as a guard or watchdog to ensure the eligibility of the representatives of the petitioners.

Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court by both sides in the matter of Dhondiba Parshuram Lakade Vs. Shri Someshwar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. (supra). Following are the relevant paragraphs :

My attention is adverted to observations in para No. 20 of the judgment of the Coordinate Bench in the matter of Balasaheb Bhikaji Gadhave Vs. S. Ganesh Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. Ganeshnagar, Kopergaon reported in 1975 SCC OnLine Bom 260 to buttress that the Returning Officer has to make necessary inquiry for preventing ineligible persons from entering in the voters list and inquiry U/Sec. 11 of the Act is proper stage to curb the mischief.

Both sides have placed on the judgment of the Coordinate Bench in the matter of Rajan Dinkarrao Pharate and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 1997(1) Mh.L.J. 543. Following are the relevant paragraph.

Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Coordinate Bench in the matter of Jalindar Tukaram Kharat Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2022(3) Mh.L.J. 547. Following is the relevant extract.

The respondent no.3 is empowered to verify the particulars as per Rule 10. It would be imperative for him to examine the resolutions and the documents submitted by the petitioners. As per the principles culled down from the judgment cited above, he is a watchdog or guard to ensure that eligible person or society is included in a voters' list. The inquiry is summary in nature and it is restricted to examine the particulars submitted by the representatives of the societies. The threadbare inquiry into membership of the representatives is impermissible. It would extend to examine as to whether the representatives is qualified to caste the vote under the statute or the rules.

In my considered view, the respondent no.3 crossed the Laxmanrekha in considering the purport and the effect of interim orders passed by the High Court and the Appellate Authority in the matters of Group I and II.

The interim orders of liquidation were passed on 30.10.2023, 09.11.2023 and 10.11.2023 which were stayed by the Minister. The stay was vacated by orders passed on 25.03.2026 in Writ Petition No. 994 of 2026. The final orders of winding up were passed on 15.06.2026 to 17.06.2026. In the matters of Group-I, interim stay was granted by the High Court by reasoned orders on 23.06.2026, 01.07.2026 and 21.07.2026. Ultimately, all those 194 petitions were allowed by common judgment and order dated 12.08.2026. The Apex Court did not upset the common judgment by dismissing the S.L.P.

In case of Group-II, the final orders of winding up were stayed by Appellate Authority on 10.07.2026. Near about 298 appeals including that of the petitioners were allowed on 17.06.2026. The very genesis to disqualify the petitioners or their representatives was negated by the intervention of the High Court. This much material was sufficient to show that the representatives were qualified to be added in provisional list. The respondent no.3 should have stopped there only and should not have enter the arena as to the legality of the resolutions passed during 05.06.2026 to 30.06.2026.

In a summary inquiry, the respondent no.3 half heartedly recorded the findings in holding that interim orders appointing liquidator were in force till those were stayed by the High Court or the Appellate Authorities. It was beyond scope of the inquiry to examine as to whether the societies under liquidation by interim orders were empowered to pass the resolution or not.

The legality of the resolutions passed by the petitioners would be very intricate issue which could not have been adjudicated in the summary manner which would involve interpretation of Sections 102, 103, 105 and 106 of the Act. I am of the considered view that the complex issue was needed to be devolve upon U/Sec. 91 of the Act or separately. All stake holders were not before the authority. The stake holders were not appraised of the intricate issue and in a cursory manner the findings are arrived at. I hold that the respondent no.3 committed error of jurisdiction in recording findings against the petitioners in Group-I and II. The findings in respect of Section 105 (2) of the Act are also perverse.

The question as to whether the petitioners were functioning and having access to the record despite interim orders of liquidation, whether the liquidator is presumed to have taken charge on passing of the interim orders of liquidation, what would be purport of Sections 102, 103(6) or Section 106 of the act are outside of purview of Rule 11.

Having understood the powers of respondent no.3 under Rule 11, the impugned order passed in Group-III needs to be examined independently. The place of residence is a vital parameter to examine eligibility of the representatives of the petitioners. It is like examining whether the member is defaulter or not or whether his right to caste vote is impeded or not under the statute or the Rules. The material produced by the petitioners and the representatives in the nature of Form I, J and the Register of member have been dealt with by the respondent no.3.

In case of Group-III, it is demonstrated that the petitioners were called upon to submit relevant documents. The respondent no.3 has recorded categorical findings against each petitioner for holding them ineligible. The fact finding exercise has been challenged by the petitioners. The respondent no.3 held representatives of 150 societies as eligible in Annexure-A, whereas in Annexure B, representatives of 175 societies are held to be ineligible for the reasons stated in the separate column. There is no reason to doubt the findings recorded by the respondent no.3.

The bye-laws shown to me by the parties namely 2A, 7(3) and 13(e) would disclose that place of residence of the representatives and area of operation of the society is a relevant factor. The resolutions at page Nos. 121, 123, 135, 140 and 145 placed on record by the petitioners would indicate that representatives are found to be outside of the area of operation.

The approach of the respondent no.3 appears to be reasonable and considerate in granting liberty to the petitioners to cure the defect as per Rule 10(4) but no endavour has been made by them to cure defects till this date. I do not find any fault in exercise of jurisdiction by respondent no.3 in Group-III of the petitions.

Learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. S.S. Patwardhan has cited judgment of Haribhau Dagdu Tandale Vs. Industrial Cooperative Association Ltd. & Ors. reported in (1996) 10 SCC 714 to buttress that the liquidator cannot take charge by any interim order but a charge is been taken after final order of liquidation as per Section 106 of the Act. My attention is adverted to paragraph no.12 of the judgment. It can be inferred from conjoint reading of Sections 102 and 106 of the Act that the liquidator actually takes the charge only after a period of appeal is over. I find substance in the submission of the petitioners that the functioning of the societies did not eclipse totally by interim order of the liquidator.

The submission is further corroborated by the observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of Vineshkumar Mavjibhai Parmar Vs. Dethali Gopalak Vividh Karyakari Sahakari Mandali Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2017) 1 SCC 273 in paragraph nos. 22 and 23, which read as under :-

The learned Senior Counsel Mr. Walawalkar has strenuously tried to impress upon me that Section 106 of the Act has no relevance and no sooner than the liquidator is appointed by interim order, the record of the office of the society would vest with him. I am unable to accept the submission in view of the observations recorded by the Supreme Court in case of Haribhau Dagdu Tandale Vs. Industrial Cooperative Association Ltd. & Ors. (supra) and Vineshkumar (supra). The statutory provisions of Section 106 cannot be discarded which expressly stipulates that order of winding up becomes effective after the period of appeal is over. In case at hand, immediately after the final order of winding up, it was stayed by the High Court and the Appellate forum. Within appeal period of 60 days the final as well as interim orders were quashed by the High Court and consequently Appellate forum. There is room to infer that the liquidator had never taken charge of the petitioners society. The respondent No. 3 overlooked provision of Section 106 of the Act.

It is vehemently submitted by Mr. Paranjape appearing for respondent nos. 3, 4 and 6 that the date i.e. 04.05.2026 was declared to be cut of date by Notification dated 25.05.2026 and as on that date, the interim order of liquidator was in force. Technically speaking, he is right but the administration of the petitioners society was not under total eclipse. It is possible to interpret that the petitioners could have become defunct totally as per Section 106 of the Act which occasion did not arise. At this stage, a useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Division Bench in case of Shri. Mahalaxmi Sahkari Doodh …. Vs. Kolhapur Zilla Doodh Utpadak Sangh Ltd. reported in (2003) 2 Bom.C.R. 494. It was observed that the societies against whom the interim orders of liquidation are passed can exercise right to vote and in case of the societies against whom final orders are passed such a right can not be exercised, except under certain circumstances. This judgment is misread by the respondent no.3. It is not possible for me to accept the submission of Mr. Paranjape.

It is further contended by Mr. Paranjape that only in case of two petitions, interim stay was granted by High Court on 23.06.2026. In case of few others, it was granted on 01.07.2026 and thereafter on 21.07.2026. I have already observed that the interim order of liquidator did not operate complete clog. Therefore, operation of the interim order would not render the resolution in question illegal.

My attention is also adverted by Mr. Paranjape to the judgments rendered in the matters of M. Meenakshi and Ors. Vs. Metadin Agarwal (dead) by LRs. & Ors. reported in (2006) 7 SCC 470 as well as Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia & Ors. Vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group & Ors. reported in (2011) 3 SCC 363, which are on the line that even the void order is required to be quashed by competent forum. Those are the trite principles of law but cannot be made applicable in the present case. The interim and the final orders of appointment of liquidator were questioned by the petitioners. Those were set aside before their enforcement.

Learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently opposed the petitions on the ground that the remedy of challenging the election is available. The election process is directed to be completed by 10.10.2026 by the Apex Court. I have gone through the judgments of Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 509 passed by the Supreme Court and judgment of the Division Bench in Dattatray Genba Lole and others Vs. Divisional Joint Registrar, Cooperative Socities and others reported in (2021) 2 HCC (Bom) 612. It is trite law that there is no absolute prohibition for the High Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the election matters. The interference is permissible without disturbing or stalling the election process and if it is warranted in case of patent illegality. This Court is aware of the time line fixed by the Apex Court. The matter is at the stage of declaration of final voters’ list. Further election programme is yet to be declared. I am of the considered view following the principles laid down in the above judgments, interference in the matters of Group-I and Group-II is permissible.

In case of Shri Datta Sahkari Dudh Vyavsayik Sanstha Maryadit, through Chairman and others Vs. The State of Maharashtra through Secretary Dept. of Cooperation and others Writ Petition No. 3973 of 2026 judgment dated 18.08.2026, the matter stands on better footing. The liberty granted by this Court vide order dated 18.08.2026 has been used as a licence to decide against the society by adopting hyper technical approach. Under the garb of liberty granted by this Court, the respondent no.3 exceeded his powers. The findings recorded by respondent no.3 are unsustainable.

Learned counsel Mr. Ganbavale has adverted my attention to the judgment of the co-ordinate bench in a group in Dattapur Seva Sahakari Society Ltd. Through its President and Anr. Vs. Divisional Joint Registrar, Cooperative Society, Amravati Division, Amravati along with connected petitions (Writ Petition No.1978 of 2023 with other connected petitions, dated 27.04.2023). As the interim orders of liquidator were in force, for all the purposes functioning of the petitioners society was lost to the managing committee and vested with the liquidator. Following is the relevant paragraph.

The co-ordinate bench was dealing with the issue as to the lack of opportunity of hearing being granted to societies before passing the order of appointment of interim liquidator and as to whether due procedure was followed before passing the orders. The observations made in paragraph No. 20 referred to above are obiter dicta. The judgments of the supreme Court in Haribhau (supra) and Vineshkumar (supra) were not brought to the notice of learned single Judge. With great respect, I am of the view that the observations would not enure to the benefits of the respondents.

My attention is adverted to the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverage Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sangli Miraj and Kupwad Municipal Corporation and Ors. reported in (2011) 7 SCC 605 and R.R. Murlidharan and Ors. Vs. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar and Ors. reported in (2006) 4 SCC 501 cited by learned counsel Mr. Paranjape. It is a self-imposed restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in matters involving disputed questions of fact. The matters in Group-I and Group-II do not involve disputed questions of facts. The material facts are admitted by the parties. The pleas of interpretations of provisions of law, interim and final orders of the High Court and scope of the powers of the Returning Officer are pressed into service. Those petitions are entertainable. In case of matters falling in Group-III, I find that disputed questions of facts are involved. In view of judgments referred to above, this Court is observing the restrain in granting any relief in those matters.

I am at pains to record that the approach of the respondent No. 3 is insensible. The observations recorded by this Court in paragraph Nos. 32, 42 and 45 of common judgment and order dated 12.08.2026, which are not upset by the Supreme Court are totally lost sight of. It would be travesty to rescue the petitioner societies from the clutches of liquidator on one hand and to prevent them from participating in the election on the other hand.

In sequitur of above analysis, I pass following order.

A. Rule is made absolute in Writ Petition No. 4341 of 2026, Writ Petition No. 4342 of 2026, Writ Petition Stamp No. 8162 of 2026 and Writ Petition Stamp No. 8166 of 2026 in terms of prayer clause ‘A’.

B. Writ Petition No. 4343 of 2026 and Writ Petition Stamp No. 8163 of 2026 are dismissed. Rule stands discharged.

C. It is clarified that the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 4343 of 2026 and Writ Petition Stamp No. 8163 of 2026 shall be at liberty to avail the benefit of Rule 10(4) of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies (Election to Committees) Rule 2014, notwithstanding the findings recorded by this Court and dismissal of the petitions.

D. Parties to act on authenticate copy of the operative part of this judgment.