Shri Surender Singh Malik vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Others

Gita Mittal, J.—These writ petitions raise identical issues of law and fact and are, therefore, being disposed of by this common judgment. The basic issue which arises for consideration is the entitlement of a person to issuance of a writ in his favour protecting a possession which is not supported by law against any other person or the true owner.

The writ petitioners, all claim to be owners of plots of land in what is stated to be "Freedom Fighters Colony" located in Village Neb Sarai, Delhi. Ownership is claimed on these plots of land under documents in the nature of agreements to sell, power of attorneys, affidavits and wills which are not registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. The petitioners claim to be owners in occupation and possession of the plots mentioned in these documents. Based on averments of attempted forcible dispossession at the hands of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3, the petitioners submit that such possession is liable to be protected by this Court.

All the petitioners have also raised a plea of entitlement to relief on the ground of individuous discrimination at the hands of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 submitting that the petitioners are bonafide purchasers residing on the constructions raised on these plots which are being used for residential purposes and have claimed possession of ration card, gas connections, fine receipts, medical treatment records, postal documents, election photo ID cards, identity cards, children education records and such like documents. They assert peaceful enjoyment of the premises for the last about 24 years without any interference. It is also submitted that no notice has been issued or legal proceedings initiated against the petitioners at any point of time.

According to the petitioners, the respondent No. 4 Shri Raghvinder Singh, is a land grabber who has trespassed on land in the area, carried out plotting and developed roads etc in connivance with officials of the respondents 1 to 3. As he wanted to connect his illegally plotted area to the main road, which could only be done by building a pathway over the land of the petitioners, the respondent No. 4 threatened the petitioner to get him illegally dispossessed from the premises in question. The petitioners have also alleged that respondent No. 4 has committed several illegalities which have been published in the newspapers as well.

It is further submitted that this respondent No. 4 has himself filed writ petition (C) 1193/99 against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 wherein he has been granted interim protection. This respondent No. 4 has not filed any counter affidavit to the instant petition.

The petitioners also place reliance on the policy of the Central Government and the State Government of regularisation of unauthorised colonies. It is submitted that the colony where the property of the petitioners is situated is one of the colonies which is to be regularised. Reliance is placed on resolution No. F22(1)6/2000-LAS-II dated 3rd August, 2000 in respect of regularisation of 1071 unauthorised colonies. The petitioners contend that multi-storeyed constructions have been raised on the land in question and no legal action has been initiated against the same. Claiming equal protection of law as other persons occupying the other colonies, it is submitted that the officials of the respondents cannot adopt differential standards.

The writ petition was necessitated as, it is stated, that the respondents took the law into their own hands and they visited the site/vicinity of the plot of the petitioner on 13th December, 2004 causing some demolition of the properties without giving any notice to the petitioners and directing them to vacate their occupation within two weeks failing which the property would be uprooted and the petitioners would be dispossessed.

The petitioners have also pointed out that in a Writ Petition (C) 7193/99 entitled Raghvinder Singh v. Deputy Commissioner and Ors., an order dated 22nd February, 2002 granting interim relief has been passed even though a FIR bearing No. 663/2004 u/s 441/447 of the IPC has been registered by the Police Station Mehrauli against him.

The petitioner also place reliance on an interim order of stay dated 23rd May, 2001 passed in WP(C) 3338/2001 filed by the Freedom Fighter Colony Welfare Association.

In answer to the writ petitions, detailed counter affidavits have been filed. The respondents have disputed ownership and possession of the petitioners and have also strenuously contended that the documents in the nature of agreements to sell, wills, power of attorneys, letters of possession etc. relied upon by the petitioners do not create any title in law in the petitioners. Furthermore, there is nothing on record to establish title of the executants of these documents. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that there is nothing placed on record by the petitioners to establish that these plots are located within the Freedom Fighters Colony which is the subject matter of the list circulated by the authorities as colonies slated for regularisation. It is further submitted that the petitioners were attempting encroachments on land in respect of which demolition action was taken by the respondents on 2nd November, 2004. All such illegal constructions were removed in this demolition. It is stated that the possession of the land is with the owners, that is the authorities, except for a parcel of land measuring about 1600 sq. yards situated in khasra No. 85 which is stated to be in possession of respondent No. 4 and is the subject matter of CW 7193/99. The demolition report dated 2nd November, 2004 has been placed on record. According to the respondents, the petitioners are hand in glove with the respondent No. 4 and are land grabbers who have attempted to encroach upon Gaon Sabha land in khasra Nos. 82, 84 and 85 in village Neb Sarai. The respondents also place reliance on photographs of the site taken on 2nd November, 2004 and photographs taken on 24th December, 2004 which have been placed on record.

The respondents have also strongly refuted the claim of the petitioners that the parcels of land over which they claim title and possession are situated adjacent to each other. In this behalf it is pointed out that in some documents filed by the petitioners, the khasra numbers of the land are mentioned as 148/141 and in some as 84 and 85. The description of land mentioned in these petitions cannot be reconciled with the documents filed by them or with the site possession.

It is further submitted that the documents placed on record in support of the plea of long and settled possession are random documents without continuity and do not establish or even reflect actual or continuous possession of the petitioners. No sanctions or permissions to raise constructions are placed on record.

The respondents submit that the land measuring 31 bighas and 11 biswas comprising khasra Nos. 74(4-16), 75(4-16), 76(2-08), 77(3-10), 82(3-06), 83(4-14), 84(4-04) and 85(3-17) in village Neb Sarai was allotted to the Directorate of Training and Technical Education for establishment of an ITI vide letter No. F.4(192)/P/M/94/V/729 dated 17th February, 1995. By this communication the ADM/Director (P) conveyed the approval of the Lt. Governor, Delhi for allotment to lease out the Gaon Sabha land for establishment of an ITI, a public necessity.

Reliance is placed on a pronouncement reported at Sh. Sanjiv Lamba and Another Vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation and Others, in support of the submission that no relief can be granted against the true owner in favour of a person without a title to the land.

The respondents have also placed on record the relevant revenue records in support of their claim that the land is Gaon Sabha land.

I have heard the parties at great length. I find that the present petitioners have approached this Court asserting a title of the land based on documents. It would be appropriate to deal with the claims made in this behalf in each writ petition. Dealt with case wise, the claims are noticed hereafter.

In WP(C) 19912/04, filed by Surender Singh Malik, it has been claimed that the petitioner had purchased a property bearing No. B-44/11. Freedom Fighters Colony, Neb Sarai, measuring 400 sq. yards, out of khasra No. 84 on 25th August, 1980 from Shri Baljeet Singh and Shri Sukhbir Singh for a sale consideration of Rs. 80,000/-. Photo copies of the documents placed on record as documents establishing title are in the nature of GPA, agreement to sell, will, affidavit, possession letter and cash receipt. There is nothing on record to establish as to how Baljeet Singh and Sukhbir Singh had any valid title to the land which is claimed to have been sold by them to the petitioners. Shri Sukhbir Singh has not signed these documents.

While Surender Singh Malik claims ownership and residence in B-44/11. Documents have been annexed by the petitioner in WP 19913/04 by Shri Gauri Shankar Goswami showing his residence as B-44/11.

A police complaint has also been filed as Annexure P-6 which states that the land had been purchased in 1995 and the construction was not carried out on account of paucity of funds. The photographs which have been placed on record by the petitioners do not establish either the location nor occupation by the petitioner.

In WP(C) 19913/04 filed by Gauri Shankar Goswami, it is claimed by him that he has purchased the property bearing No. B-44/6, Freedom Fighters Colony, Neb Sarai measuring 100 sq. yards out of khasra No. 85 on 24th September, 1992 from Sukhbir singh for a sale consideration of Rs. 41,000/-. Photo copies of the documents in the nature of GPA, agreement to sell, will, affidavit, possession letter and cash receipt, ration card have been relied upon.

The documents filed on record show that they are also unstamped and unregistered. This petitioner though is claiming occupancy of B-44/6, he is reflected as occupying B-44/11. There is no document which has been signed or executed by Sukhbir Singh who is stated to be the alleged co-owner. It is not stated as to how Sukhbir Singh secured title and and in what capacity he has sold the land in question.

In WP(C) 20183/04, filed by Durga Singh, it has been claimed that the petitioner had purchased a property bearing No. B-44/5. Freedom Fighters Colony, Neb Sarai, measuring 300 sq. yards, out of khasra No. 85 on 25th November, 1991 from Shri Baljeet Singh and Shri Sukhbir Singh for a sale consideration of Rs. 80,000/-. Again the only documents of title relied upon are in the nature of a General Power of Attorney, agreement to sell, will, affidavit, possession letter, cash receipt and ration card. None of these documents are signed or executed by Sukhbir singh who is stated to be the alleged co-owner. All documents are unregistered and insufficiently stamped.

In WP(C) 20187/04, filed by Vijay Kumar Singh, it is alleged that the petitioner had purchased a property bearing No. B-44/7, Freedom Fighters Colony, Neb Sarai, measuring 200 sq. yards, out of khasra No. 84 on 28th December, 1991 from Shri Baljeet Singh and Shri Sukhbir Singh for a sale consideration of Rs. 80,000/-. Photo copies of the documents are in the nature of GPA, agreement to sell, will, affidavit, possession letter, cash receipt and ration card have been relied upon. The documents do not disclose as to how the sellers/executants derived ownership in the land and are unregistered and insufficiently stamped documents.

Shri Vijav Kumar Singh (who is the petitioner in WP(C) 20187/04) has claimed to have purchased 200 sq. yards of land in 1991 which is stated by him to be bearing plot No. B-44/7. It has been claimed that he has sold his land to three other petitioners before this Court.

These three petitioners are firstly, S. Narain Singh who has filed CW 20182/04 in respect of other property bearing No. B-44/8, admeasuring 122 sq. yards; secondly Smt. Sheela who has filed WP(C) 20185/04 in respect of plot No. B-44/9 purportedly measuring 139 sq. yards and Deepender Sharma who has filed WP(C) 20186/04 in respect of plot No. B-44/10 purportedly measuring 125 sq. yards. Thus from the averments made by these petitioners Shri Vijay Kumar Singh who was allegedly owner of only 200 sq. yards has sold 380 sq. yards of land to these petitioners. The documents of title relied upon by Shri Vijay Kumar Singh and all the three other petitioners are in the nature of agreement to sell, will affidavit and cash receipt which are all insufficiently stamped, unregistered documents and unstamped documents without disclosure as to how the executant of the documents derived title.

In WP(C) 20184/04, the petitioner Wazir Singh is claimed to be the owner in possession of 325 sq. yards of land which has been numbered as B-44/12, Freedom Fighters Colony, Neb Sarai, out of khasra No. 84-85 on 21st September, 1989 from Shri Ramesh Chand for a sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/-. Photo copies of the documents are in the nature of GPA, agreement to sell, will, affidavit, possession letter, cash receipt and ration card have been relied upon. Again these are insufficiently stamped unregistered documents without disclosing as to how the executant derived title of the property which he was purportedly selling.

The respondents have placed on record the relevant revenue records wherein the land has been shown to as Gaon Sabha land. A demolition report clearly stating out that the demolition action was taken on 2nd November, 2004 and its details have been placed before the Court. Photographs of the land taken on 2nd November, 2004 and 24th December, 2004 show that there is no construction whatsoever on the land in question and no person could possibly be in possession or occupation of the same.

Perusal of the documents relied upon by the petitioners show that there is nothing on record to establish the title of the person from whom the petitioners claim to have derived title.

None of the writ petitioners have shown any document evidencing sanctions from any of the competent authorities of any construction on any of the plots. I find that documents in all the writ petitions are unregistered and insufficiently stamped. u/s 17(i)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, no right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards can be created only by a registered document of transfer. The documents appear to be executed in a standard printed or photostat format wherein indiscriminate particulars have been filled in. It is noteworthy that the land in question is not lease hold land. There is no reason for not having registered sale deeds other than lack of title in the vendor/seller.

It is also settled law that such kind of unregistered and unstamped documents cannot create any legal title or interest in the immovable property and as such the claims of the petitioners that they are owners in possession has to be rejected.

The writ petitions contain no averments of the claimed construction, dates, extent or nature. There is no document on record to show any construction was effected or date on which the persons effected any construction or its nature. No permissions or sanctions have been placed on record. In WP(C) 20185/2004 and 20186/2004 no documents even in the nature of alleged possession receipts, have been filed.

In find force in the submissions of the respondents that there is nothing on record to show possession at all, let alone actual, long and settled possession of the petitioners.

The site plans, filed by the petitioners do not show the location of the property vis-a-vis Freedom fighters Colony.

It is trite that a person claiming entitlement to a relief has to establish a subsisting legal right and entitlement to the same. Such a right has to be independently established. It cannot rest on the pleas or case set up by a respondent or a defendant. In other words a trespasser cannot say that the respondent has no right to the land and, therefore, he is entitled to protection of his possession. A person claiming a relief in equity has not only to establish bonafides, that he is before a court with clean hands and, more importantly, he has a legal right to the relief. It is also well settled that when a petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is open to the High Court to consider, whether in the exercise of its undoubtedly discretionary jurisdiction, it should decline relief to such petitioner as the grant of relief would defeat the interests of justice.

I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the petitioners are not the owners of the claimed plots and have no legal right, title or interest therein. The petitioners were also not in possession of the land in question on the date when the writ petitions were filed and as such have no legal right to the reliefs prayed for in the writ petitions.

It has been authoritatively held in a catena of authoritative and binding judicial precedents that wider public interest is liable to be borne in mind while exercising the power of issuing a prohibitory writ and granting a stay and injunction.

Even if it were to be found that the petitioner had some kind of a right, it has been held by the Apex Court that such individual right has to give way to overriding interests of the public at large. In this behalf, in Ramniklal N. Bhutta and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, the Court held thus:

Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as "Asian tigers", e.g. Sough Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernization. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these courts. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interest of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 - indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings.

In the instant case, the land is required in public interest for the establishment of an ITI by the Directorate of Training and Technical Education, a department of the Government of NCT of Delhi. Undoubtedly this is a salutory purpose in order to enhance the availability of technical education to the common man. There is no dispute that there is genuine need for such like institutions in Delhi. Such a purpose must necessarily prevail over private interest of persons who are attempting to purportedly encroach upon the land in question.

The Court always is entitled to refuse the relief where the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been invoked to secure dishonest advantage or to perpetuate illegal gains. Re: M.P. Mittal Vs. State of Haryana and Others,

It has been authoritatively laid down that where quashing of an order results in greater harm to society, then even an order which may be contrary to law, may not be necessarily quashed. Re: 1984 (2) SCC 481 entitled Sikander Pal Jain Vs. State of Haryana and Others,

In Union of India (UOI) Vs. Joginder Sharma, , it was held that the Courts cannot compel authorities to exercise jurisdiction in a particular way. The Court shall not direct relaxation of essential conditions when no grievance or violation of substantial rights of parties could have been already proved.

It is noteworthy that where a challenge was laid to the taking of possession on completion of acquisition by the beneficiary of the acquisition proceedings, in Nagin Chand Godha Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . the Division Bench of this Court held thus:

...Suffice it so say that after symbolic possession is taken, if the petitioner is enjoying the possession, he is enjoying the possession as a trustee on behalf of the public at large and that by itself cannot be considered to be a ground to contend that possession is not taken. It is the duty of the person who is occupying the property to look after the property and to see that the property is not defaced or devalued by himself or by others. He cannot subsequently come to the Court to say that actual possession is not taken and therefore he should be protected and land be denotified.

Therefore, the petitioners as trespassers on public land can claim no right to protection of possession.

With regard to the delays which result in execution of public projects on account of prohibitory writs and interim orders of injunction, it would be useful to advert to the observations of the Apex Court in a matter wherein a challenge was laid to the grant of a tender. In the pronouncement reported at Raunaq International Limited Vs. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and Others, , the Apex Court in the context of interim orders observed thus:

The same considerations must weigh with the court when interim orders are passed in such petitions. The party at whose instance interim orders are obtained has to be made accountable for the consequences of the interim order. The interim order could delay the project, jettison finely worked financial arrangements and escalate costs. Hence the petitioner asking for interim orders in appropriate cases should be asked to provide security for any increase in cost as a result of such delay or any damages suffered by the opposite party in consequence of an interim order. Otherwise public detriment may outweigh public benefit in granting such interim orders. Stay order or injunction order, if issued, must be moulded to provide for restitution.

I have no manner of doubt that the same principles would guide grant of final relief.

In yet another matter at JT 1994(6) SC 585 entitled Premji Ratansey Shah and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. expressing anguish for the delay which ensued on account of injunctions being granted at the instance of persons who ultimately may be held to be without any legal right or entitlement to the same, the Court observed thus:

...The question, therefore, is whether an injunction can be issued against the true owner. Issuance of an order of injunction is absolutely a discretionary and equitable relief. In a given set of facts, injunction may be given to protect the possession of the owner or person in lawful possession. It is not mandatory that for mere asking such relief should be given. Injunction is a personal right u/s 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the plaintiff must have personal interest in the matter. The interest or right not shown to be in existence, cannot be protected by injunction.

It is equally settled law that injunction would not be issued against the true owner. Therefore, the Courts below have rightly rejected the relief of declaration and injunction in favour of the petitioners who have no interest in the property. Even assuming that they had any possession, their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession, as against the owner. Pretext of dispute of identity of the land should not be an excuse of claim injunction against true owner.

So far as the plea of discrimination is concerned, there is no dispute that this plea is being asserted against the statutory authorities and the Government in respect of actions contrary to law. No person can legally set up a plea of individuous discrination or arbitrariness merely because some other person has committed the same violation and no action has been taken against other persons who have committed the same illegality. The principles in this behalf were laid down by the Supreme Court in case Chandigarh Administration and another Vs. Jagjit Singh and another, etc. wherein the Court held thus:

We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent- authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Mrely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law - indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law - but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners'' case is similar to the other persons'' case. But then why examine another person''s case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person''s case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course - barring exceptional situations - would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises.)

I may also appropriately advert to the observations of the Apex Court wherein such a plea of individuous discrimination was based on the land acquiring authorities under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In Chandra Bansi Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, ., it was held by the Court that it was not open for such a person to assert a positive right and entitlement to relief but it was open to such a person to seek the same action in respect of other persons who are similarly placed.

So far as issuance of writs and injunctions is concerned, I have no manner of doubt that the same are discretionary reliefs based on equitable considerations and similar principles would guide their grant.

This being the position in law no relief can be permitted or granted to the petitioners for the sole reason that their claim is steeped in illegality; the authorities have to be required to take action to ensure compliance with the law and to ensure that the overriding interests of the public are protected.

The other issue urged on behalf of the petitioners is based on the plea that the colony in which the plot of the petitioners are located is slated to be regularised under the policy of the Government. In the instant case the petitioner has failed to show that the plots in question are part of that colony. This fact is streneously contested on the part of the respondents. There is no document evidencing the boundaries of the colony or the location of the plots in the instant case. The documents relied upon by the petitioners do not establish location of the plots. Therefore, I am unable to hold that the plots in question are part of any colony which is slated for regularisation.

In any case, even assuming in favour of the petitioners that such plots are located in a colony which was slated for regularisation under a policy of the Government, it has been repeatedly held that such a policy does not create any rights in favour of a person against statutory and government authorities claiming ownership of the property especially where the plot is required for undertaking developmental projects in public interest. The ownership of the government may be by virtue of statutory provisions under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or by virtue of devolution of land under the revenue laws. However it is settled law that even existence of such a policy of regularisation would not prohibit the real owner from carrying out a developmental project in public interest.

In 2002(65) DRJ 313 entitled Moolchand Gaur v. Delhi Development Authority and Ors. the Delhi Development Authority (DDA for short), beneficiary of acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act, became owner thereof by its vesting in the DDA by issuance of the notification u/s 22 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957. A submission was made that the colony where the petitioner''s property was located was slated for regularisation under Government policy and also that the Government had a policy not to acquire built up property as the petitioner''s. It is noteworthy that the petitioner in this case (Mool Chand Gaur) was placing reliance on the very orders passed in CW 4771/93 which have been relied upon by the present petitioners.

Upon consideration of the submissions, the Court held as under:

I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties. There is no dispute on the factual matrix to the extent that the land in question stood acquired and the land was handed over to the DDA u/s 22(1) of the Act and stood vested with respondent DDA. However, the land in question is occupied by the occupants where an unauthorised colony exists. The question of regularisation of the unauthorised colonies which form a part of the list of 1071 unauthorised colonies is pending consideration before the competent authority and despite the observation of the Division Bench in CW No. 4771/1993 no final decision has been taken. The Division Bench has noted that in case colonies are not to be regularised then the matter should be taken to its logical end by demolition but selected demolition should not be done.

There is however, no doubt about the proposition that the petitioner as such has no right as the land stands acquired and vested with respondent PDA. The continued possession of the petitioner is undoubtedly illegal and unlawful as held by the Supreme Court in Balmokand Khatri Educational And Industrial Trust''s case (supra).

Specific allegations have been made in CW No. 6424/1998 that under the garb of the interim orders passed by this Court the petitioner is trying to encroach upon certain open areas which stood acquired. It is further stated that the issue of regularisation is pending consideration which cannot give a licence to the occupants to construct at will or encroach upon the open areas. The respondent authorities are well within their rights to protect the open areas whether by construction of boundary wall or in whatever manner it deems appropriate. This is specially so as the land vests with the respondent authorities.

Based on the plea that the Government had a policy not to acquire built up lands, acquisition was challenged in 1991(2) Delhi Lawyer 59(DB) entitled Shri Bhagwan and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. which was rejected by this Court.

This issue had also arisen for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in 66(1997) DLT 482 entitled Prem Chand Ramesh Chand v. DDA and Anr. wherein the Court held as under:

The contentions that there is any policy to regularise unauthorised colonies or there is a policy decision not to acquire built up area, are concluded against the petitioner by a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Attar Singh v. DDA CW 3110 of 1991 decided on 10th August, 1992. In Attar Singh''s case also it was alleged that the petitioner had a godown built up an area situate in village Haiderpur on private land and no action can be taken by the respondents against the petitioner. In that case too, the Bench referred in the judgment to the same Award No. 50/80-81 made on 18th July, 1980. The contention that there was a policy of Government to regularise the unauthorised colonies and also not to acquire built up area was rejected and it was observed that:

It was further contended that unauthorised colonies on Government land are sought to be regularised. It is possible that a political decision to this effect may be taken with regard to some of the colonies but as far as this land is concerned, there have been valid proceedings for acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. If there was any built up area as on the date when Section 4 Notification was issued the claimants would be entitled to receive compensation in accordance with law. As far as the petitioner is concerned, we do not find that the petitioner is entitled to any compensation and in fact it is one Udai Singh who has already received the compensation. Be that as it may merely because some of the colonies are going to be regularised cannot be of any assistance t the petitioner specially when, in the writ petition, there is no challenge to the acquisition proceedings. The proposal of excluding the land from the award which was there is 1968 has apparently been given a go bye and this has resulted in, first Notification u/s 6 being issued on 2nd January, 1969, followed by the award in 1980.

The contention in respect of the policy of leaving out from the acquisition built up area has also been repelled in another Division Bench decision of this Court in Shri Bhagwan and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. 1991(2) Delhi Lawyer 59(DB). This decision has been affirmed by a Full Bench of this Court in Roshanara Begum Vs. Union of India, We may also notice that the appeal filed against Full Bench decision has been dismissed by the Supreme Court see Murari and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

Apart from above, the petitioner is not entitled to any discretionary and equitable relief for the reasons which we would presently notice. The petitioner has not filed any document of title on record except only a copy of Khasra Girdhawari for 1979-80. It cannot and has not been urged to be a document of title. This Khasra Girdhawari only shows that there are some godowns on the land in question. The petitioner is not the recorded owner. The recorded owner of the land are different persons. The petitioner has not even disclosed in the writ petition as to when the structures/godowns were constructed. It has also not been disclosed in the writ petition that in respect of land in question Section 4 and Section 6 notifications had been issued. It could not be disputed that the alleged constructions were made after issue of the said notifications. The petitioner has also not disclosed as to whether the recorded owners filed or not objections u/s 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. These material facts were suppressed and not disclosed with a view to secure interim protection from this Court. The demolition and dispossession could not take place because of the interim orders and, therefore, it does not now lie in the mouth of the petitioner to contend that the acquisition is not complete since possession has not been taken. We feel that the writ petitions deserve dismissal on the short ground of suppression of material facts.

I may also appropriately refer to the observations of the Division Bench of this Court in Shanti Sports Club and another Vs. Union of India and others, . wherein dealing with the submission that construction had been raised by the petitioners and for this reason the acquisition of the land deserved to quashed, the Court held thus:

In Gian Chand Vs. Gopala and Others, , the Supreme Court held that any encumbrances created by the owner of the land after the notification u/s 4(1) is published does not bind the Government. The agreement of sale, if any, would be frustrated. Again in Yadu Nandan Garg Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, , it was held that the purchase of the land after issuance of a notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was not lawful and did not clothe the purchaser with any colour of title as against the State. It was also observed that by operation of Section 16 of the Act all encumbrances stand extinguished and the purchaser gets no title to the acquired land. In this view of the matter, the court found the sale to be void u/s 23 of the Act. This view was followed by the Supreme Court in The Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur Vs. Daulat Mal Jain and Others, Again Jaipur Development Authority Vs. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society, Jaipur and Others, it was held that the purchaser who buys the land after issuance of a notification u/s 4 of the Act cannot have a higher right than the original owner himself had and he cannot set up any title to the property on the basis of sale deeds. He is only entitled to compensation obviously by getting into the shes of the original land owner.

While we are dealing with the second reason on which the impugned decision is grounded, we may note the further submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners in their attempt to demolish the same and to seek our intervention on equitable grounds. The learned senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners have developed the sports complex at a huge cost. According to him the sports complex has all the modern facilities for the sports person and in case the same is demolished it will not be in the national interest.

The Full Bench in Roshanara Begum Vs. Union of India, while upholding acquisition took note of the construction raised by the petitioners. The Full Bench found that the construction was raised obviously with complete knowledge of the fact that this land was liable to be acquired for public purpose. Even the Supreme Court in Murari v. Union of India (supra) has observed that where large tracts of land measuring thousands of acres have been acquired, it would not be proper to leave out some areas here and there over which some structures are said to have been constructed. While making these observations, the Supreme Court relied upon its earlier decision in State of U.P. Vs. Smt. Pista Devi and Others, in which it was held that when large chunks of land are acquired for planned development of the urban area, it would not be proper to leave small portions of the land, out of the development scheme, over which some structures have been constructed. The Supreme Court in Murari''s case (supra), however, left the question of release of land from acquisition to the discretion of the Appropriate Authority in view of the statement of the counsel for the Government that it will consider each of the structures and take a decision in respect thereof. In consonance with the statement of the learned Counsel appearing for the Government in that case, the representation of the petitioners was considered but their request to denotify the land was not accepted. Since the impugned order is, inter alia, based on the consideration that the land is needed for Vasant Kunj Housing Project no interference is called for by this Court. Taking cue from the aforesaid decisions it also appears to us that the petitioners cannot claim any equity on the ground of having raised the constructions on the land in question. The construction was raised at their own risk and peril. In case the argument of the petitioners is accepted it would amount to encouraging unauthorised construction and conferring legitimacy to brazen illegalities.

So far as constructions on acquired property is concerned the Court noticed thus:

In Nirmalendu Dev Nath and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, it was urged that in view of the policy decision of the Government built up area cannot be acquired. The contention raised was rejected in view of the several decisions of this Court. In this regard it was held as follows:

Mr. Saini contended that the Government in view of its policy decision cannot acquire built up area and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings must be quashed. The contention of the learned Counsel is not well founded. The power to acquire land is to be exercised in the manner laid down by the Act. The power is statutory power which is required to be exercised in public interest. If the land is needed for a public purpose the mere fact that there is a policy of the Government not to acquire built up area cannot come in the way of acquisition. If it was otherwise, the public authorities will not be able to acquire built up areas to decongest the localities and to provide civic amenities including sanitation, parks, amusement centres, etc. which are essential for healthy living.

Reliance was placed by the Bench on the decisions rendered in Prem Chand Ramesh Chand v. Delhi Development Authority and Anr. 66(1977) DLT 482 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court relying on Attar Singh v. DDA CWP No. 3110 of 1991, decided on August 10, 1992; Shri Bhagwan and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. 1991(2) Delhi Lawyer 59 (DB), and Roshanara Begum Vs. Union of India,

The last noticed decision in Shanti Sports Club (supra) is the subject matter of a challenge before the Apex Court.

I am bound by the authoritative pronouncements on this issue. It is settled law that mere existence of a policy does not create any vested right in a person entitling him to the protection by way of discretionary and equitable relief of issuance of a writ or injunction in his favour as a final relief.

So far as FIR No. 663/2004 and WP(C) No. 7193/99 are concerned, no copy thereof has been placed before this Court. Legal action and proceedings shall follow in due course. No particulars or details are forthcoming on the records of the cases before me.

For all the foregoing reasons I find no merit in the writ petitions which are hereby rejected.