Shri. Sidagouda Modagi vs The State Of Karnataka & Ors.

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA)

Batch of these appeals call in question a solitary order dated 14-07-2026 passed by a learned single Judge in writ petition No.104886 of 2026 c/w W.P.Nos.104603/2026, 105156/2026 and 105517/2026, permitting the petitioners to avail the remedy of filing an appeal before the Tribunal.

Facts adumbrated are as follows:

Heard the learned senior counsel Sri. Anant Mandgi, learned senior counsel appearing for appellant in W.A.Nos.100483 of 2026 and 100434 of 2026; Smt Shobha H, learned counsel appearing for appellants in W.A.No.100479 of 2026 and Sri Gangadhar J.M., learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State, Sri Pramod N Khatavi, learned senior counsel appearing for the Association; Sri C V Angadi, learned counsel appearing for APMC and Sri. Gopal Krishna Kurandwad, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 120 and Sri Nitin Bolabandi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.130 in W.A.No.100479 of 2026.

The learned senior counsel Sri Anant Mandgi, appearing for the appellant in two of the appeals, would vehemently contend that the learned Single Judge of this Court permitted availing of the remedy of filing an appeal. The Division Bench also reiterated of filing an appeal within a particular period. The appeal was preferred after 58 days delay of the passage of the order by the learned Single Judge. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the delay contrary to the statute. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in its place in rejecting the appeals before it on the ground of delay of the said 58 days. It is his submission that no Court can confer jurisdiction, much less jurisdiction qua limitation, when the statute prescribes a particular period of limitation and the Limitation Act is not specifically included in the statute to file an appeal. Therefore, the learned senior counsel submits that the rejection of the appeals on the ground of limitation was correct in law and the learned Single Judge has misdirected himself on facts and law in allowing the petitions and restoring the appeals on the file of the Tribunal and a direction to hear it on its merit. He would seek the order of the Tribunal to be restored and the order of the learned Single Judge to be set aside.

We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned senior counsel and have perused the material on record. In the light of the submission and contra-submission of the respective learned senior counsels, one unmistakable fact is that none of the submissions have been made on the merit of the matter; it is only on the question of entertainment of the appeals before the Tribunal. Therefore, what is required by us to do is to notice the statutory provisions and to analyze as to whether the order of the learned Single Judge suffers from want of tenability in law.

Two dates assume significance. On 14-11-2021, the license is granted to the Association under the APMC Act by the office Bearers. It is cancelled by the Director of Agricultural Marketing on 15-09-2025. This cancellation comes to be challenged before the learned single judge in W.P.No.107119 of 2025 and connected case. The learned Single Judge disposes the petition by the order dated 27-10-2025. It reads as follows:

The Association prefers Co-operative Appeals 317 and 341 of 2025 before the Tribunal within 10 days after the order was uploaded as directed by the Division Bench along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act by filing an affidavit which reads as follows:

The Tribunal frames the following issues:

Answering the issues, the Tribunal orders as follows:

In this context the relevant Rule 87-J of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and Development) Rules, 1968 is also examined, which is extracted for reference

It is crystal from careful perusal of the materials on record that the instant Appeal is filed beyond the time line with delay of 58 days. That, the Appellant and the seriously contesting Respondents have placed marathon pleadings and objections, added to this have enlightened this Forum with mammoth arguments placing reliance on celebrated dictums of Hon'ble Apex Court, which are taken note of and asserted and assailed in superior paragraphs for useful and profitable consideration. At this juncture it becomes impeccable to state that without touching on merits and demerits of case, the excerpts of application and memorandum of objections are juxtaposed, the pivotal point which arise for consideration is as to whether the Appellant is entitled for the relief arrayed in the Interlocutory Application by condoning the delay pleaded by Appellant. When the said point is deciphered on the backdrop of the salubrious decisions relied on by the Appellant and the Respondents the given set of circumstances, it becomes emphatic to state that in the landmark dictums of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ganesan (supra) and The Property Company (supra), on back drop of well settled ratio decidendii, has held that the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act is not applicable to quasi-judicial authorities/Tribunals unless it is expressly provided or by necessary implication of the provisions in a the special law or local law. However, as contended by the counsel for the Respondents, with regard to the applicability of the Limitation Act the A.P.M.C Act and the A.P.M.C. Rules is absolutely silent on the aspect of limitation and its and its applicability in respect of appeals before instant Forum.

At the risk of repetition, having due regards to the facts, circumstances and arguments buttressed by either sides designated Senior Counsel, it is pertinent to note that the Appellant has relied on the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Sewing Thread Company Ltd. Vs James Chadwick and Brothers Ltd.-(1953) 1 SCC 794 to lay emphasis on the applicability of the provisions of KAT Regulations in regulating the conduct of appeal proceedings before this Tribunal and on the said backdrop relying on the ratio laid down in the said judgment, the forceful arguments is that Section 72-E or any other provisions of the allied A.P.M.C. Act do not entail any procedure for the future conduct of the appeals before instant Forum, added to this the A.P.M.C. Act is silent on the aspect of the applicability/no applicability of the Limitation Act to appeals preferred under Section 72-E. Wherefore, it becomes crystal after catching glimpse of the appeal under Section 72-E of the A.P.M.C Act which has landed in instant Forum for consideration, it has to be determined according to the provisions of primordial KAT Act under which the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal is constituted and which confers the instant Forum the authority in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. Therefore, the appeals before this Tribunal shall be regulated by the practice and procedures governed under the provisions of KAT Regulations, added to this there is no whisper in the provisions of the allied A.P.M.C. Act, which prohibits the instant Forum from hearing appeals arising under Section 72-E according to the KAT Act/Rules/ Regulations under which the other appeals are heard by the Bench, but only couches statutory timeline. Section 72-E of allied A.P.M.C. Act confers a right of appeal under said Act and says nothing more about it as stated supra. When situation stood so, instant Forum couched with the appellate jurisdiction conferred by Section 72-E has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction i.e. under the procedures and provisions adumbrated under KAT Regulations. It is further submitted that the allied A.P.M.C. Act is not a complete code by itself and the proceedings of the appeal before instant Forum is therefore governed by the provisions emulating the KAT Act, Rules and Regulations.

That, from the plain reading of Section 15 of said Act it is apparently clear that the Legislature has conferred the authority on Karnataka Appellate Tribunal to coin regulations regarding the practice and procedure of the Tribunal. Wherein it is not in dispute that the Appeal in question is covered by the provisions contained in the KAT Act/ Rules and the relevant KAT Regulations. According to Clause (vi) of Regulation 4, the memorandum of appeal should state how the appeal or petition is in time. Regulation 4(b) specifies that other than statutes/ special law specified under Regulation 4(a), if the appeal or petition is filed after expiry of period of limitation, it shall be accompanied by an application for condonation of delay supported by an affidavit. The provisions of Regulation 4 are extracted for reference at para 7 above.

In furtherance to this, clause 9(e) of the KAT Regulations provides that, on presentation of appeal petition as above, the Registrar shall examine or cause to be examined to see if it is filed within the time prescribed under the statute, rules or regulations and any other law for the time being in force applicable to such appeal or petition. How an appeal filed beyond time is to be considered is set out in Regulation 9(f). Clause (f) of Regulation 9 which is relevant, reads as under:

Though in a different context of the case, the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Smt. Sudhatai (supra) has held that the aforesaid regulation provides for admission of appeals filed beyond time keeping open the question of limitation. The Hon'ble High Court further held that when a specific regulation is made providing for admission of the appeal in the aforesaid manner, the general principles which are applicable either under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or under any other law cannot be pressed into service to decide the rights of the appellants in an appeal filed before this Tribunal. The maintainability of the appeal or petition and its admission, have to be decided strictly in accordance with the KAT Regulations. It is pertinent to note here that the case referred supra pertained to an appeal filed under the provisions of Section 46 of the Karnataka Souharda Sahakari Act, 1997 and at this juncture the recitation of Section 46 assumes importance to draw a comparison with the provisions of appeal under Section 72-E of the allied A.P.M.C. Act.

From the plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is seen that Section 46 of the Karnataka Souharda Sahakari Act only provides for an appeal before this Tribunal within 60 days from the date of the decision or award or order made under Section 41, or an order made under section 37-A without any reference to the applicability of the Limitation Act which is akin to the provision of Section 72-E of the A.P.M.C. Act.

Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of the Property Company (supra) has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act, (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘Courts' and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard; and further, the general rule as regards any appeal or application filed before a 'Court' is that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply, unless indicated otherwise. Further, the Hon'ble Court observed that the reverse is the general rule insofar as quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are concerned i.e., that the provision of the Limitation Act, do not apply, unless indicated otherwise. Therefore, in respect of quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals the focus would shift to whether there is any "express inclusion" rather than an “express exclusion".

That, at this juncture it is emphatic to impress and stress on the provisions of Regulation 61 of Chapter XII- Limitation of the KAT Regulations, which is extracted as under:

Therefore, from the above discussions, the relevant provisions of the KAT Act and KAT Regulations, and in the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in The Property Company (supra) and the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Sudhatai (supra), it is apparently evident that under the authority vested by the Legislature to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal under Section 15 of the KAT Act, the appeals under Section 72-E of the A.P.M.C. Act before this Tribunal are governed and regulated by the provisions of the KAT Regulations. Consequently, by virtue of the provisions of clause 4(b), 9(e) and express inclusion of provisions of Section 4, 5 and 12 of Limitation Act in Regulation 61(b) of the KAT Regulations, it is apparently clear that the Bench hearing an appeal under Section 72-E of the A.P.M.C. Act is conferred with authority to operate the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in respect of appeals filed beyond the prescribed period of 30 days. Hence, without hesitation we proceed to answer Point No.1 in the Affirmative.

POINT NO.2: It is the submission of the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that, at the cost of repetition, as per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others the time spent by the Appellant in prosecuting the writ petition and the writ appeal before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka is obligated to be excluded for the purpose of calculation of the limitation period under Section 72-E of the allied A.P.M.C. Act. Further the learned senior counsel has relied on the ratio of the judgement in P. Şarathy Vs State Bank of India wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not speak of "Civil Court" but only speaks only of a "Court". Any authority or Tribunal having the trappings of a Court would be a "Court" within the meaning of this section. That as per Section 11 of the KAT Act, the proceedings before this Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding and hence this Tribunal is having the trappings of a Court. The learned senior counsel relied upon Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act which makes provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act applicable to special or local laws unless these provisions are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. The senior counsel has also placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in M.P. Steel (supra) wherein it was held that the principles of the Limitation Act as contained in Section 14 would apply to applications or appeals made before a quasi-judicial body/tribunal, unless there is any express indication to the contrary in the wording and scheme of the said provision. Further, the senior counsel has relied on the decision in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court indicated that the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, stand on a different footing. It was emphasized that while the power to excuse delay and grant extension of time under Section 5 is discretionary, the power to exclude time under Section 14 is mandatory when the necessary ingredients are fulfilled. Since the case of the Appellant fulfilled the necessary ingredients of Section 14, the time spent by the Appellant in pursuing the abortive proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court is to be excluded for the computation of limitation.

Per contra the learned senior counsel for the Respondent No.7 relying on the judgment of The Property Company (supra) has vehemently argued that the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the statutory Appellate authorities/Tribunals are merely administrative forums/Tribunals and not "Courts" and Section 14 of the Limitation Act, therefore per se does not, in terms apply to proceedings before such Tribunals unless it is expressly provided under the special or local law i.e. A.P.M.C. Act or the KAT Regulations in the instant case. The learned senior counsel has buttressed his arguments that M.P. Steel (supra) had also indicated, which was subsequently laid down in Ganesan (supra), that it has been settled the savings provision in the Limitation Act, i.e. Section 29(2), is of no relevance when the special or local law deals with a suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, which is to be filed before a quasi-judicial body. The counsel has further relied on the Property Company (supra) to stress that the general rule insofar as quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are concerned is that the provisions of the Limitation Act, do not apply, unless indicated otherwise. Therefore, in terms of the principles laid down in The Property Company (supra) judgement, the focus now would shift to whether there is any "express inclusion" rather than an “express exclusion" in the relevant Act i.e. A.P.M.C. Act or the KAT Regulations and thereby has contended that in the absence of express inclusion of applicability of Section 14, either in the A.P.M.C. Act or the KAT Regulations, the principles of Section 14 cannot be imported in the instant case for exclusion of time spent in the course of the abortive proceedings.

From the aforesaid discussion now, the question of law for determination in the instant Appeal is whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act, in terms, or, in principle, can be invoked by this Tribunal for excluding the time spent by the Appellant in prosecuting the writ petition and writ appeal before the Hon'ble High Court challenging the impugned order of the Director of Agricultural Marketing passed under Section 72-D under the A.P.M.C. Act, for computation of the period of limitation for filing an Appeal. under Section 72-E before instant Forum.

That, there is no room for argument that in the judgments relied on by the Respondents and also the Appellant herein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the statutory Appellate authorities/ Tribunals are merely administrative forums/Tribunals and not "Courts" and Section 14 of the Limitation Act, therefore per se does not, in terms apply to proceedings before such Tribunals unless it is expressly provided under the special or local law. or statute. Thus, where the Legislature prescribed a special limitation of 30 days for the purpose of the appeal under Section 72-E of the allied A.P.M.C. Act and the period of limitation is to be computed after taking the aid of only Section 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act provided under Regulation 61(b) of the KAT Regulations, wherein which the specific inclusion of these sections meant that only limited to the extent of Section 4, 5 and 12 the provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended to appeals and petitions before this Tribunal and the applicability of the other provisions, including Section 14 by express exclusion/ necessary implication stood excluded.

The anathema question that remains is as to whether the general principle underlying Section 14 is applicable on grounds of justice, equity and good conscience for excluding the time spent in prosecuting the abortive proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court for computing limitation for the purpose of appeal before instant Forum. The senior counsel for the Respondents maintains that the answer to this question, also, must be in the negative because definite indications are available in the scheme and language of the allied A.P.M.C. Act, which does not expressly or even by necessary implication conclude that the provisions of Limitation Act apply to appeals under the allied A.P.M.C. Act to the Tribunal. The senior counsel for the Respondent enlightened that even for a moment if the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant on the point that the allied A.P.M.C. Act is not a complete code by itself and the appeals before KAT are governed by the KAT Regulations i.e. Regulation 4(b) and 61(b) is acceded to by this Tribunal, however Regulation 61(b) excludes the application and operation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act even in principle or by analogy by this Tribunal. Therefore, the delay condonation application of the Appellant for exclusion of the time spent before the Hon'ble High Court pursuing the writ proceedings is outrightly liable to be dismissed since this Tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to even consider such an application which is founded on the strength of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel Sri.Ananth Mandagi, Regulation 61(b) has expressly excluded the application of the principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act and does not couch the jurisdiction to the instant Tribunal to operate Section 14 and thereby exclude such period for the computation of limitation. Therefore, it is apparently evident that provisions of the Limitation Act except to the extent and in the truncated form embodied in Regulation 61(b) of KAT. Regulations is only applicable for operation by this Tribunal i.e. only the provisions of Section 4, 5 and 12 of Limitation Act shall be applicable to the instant appeal.

Thus the principle that emerges from the discussions and the judgments relied on by the contesting parties in the instant Appeal is that, if the provisions in the special statute i.e. Section 72-E of the allied A.P.M.C. Act in the instant case, prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing an appeal thereunder i.e. within 30 days of receipt of the order and further, Regulation 61(b) of the KAT Regulations provides in clear terms the applicability of only Section 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, then this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it for excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

That, on the said foothold we are of the opinion that the object, the scheme and language of the allied A.P.M.C. Act and Rules read with Regulation 61(b) of the KAT Regulations does not permit the operation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act by this Tribunal, either, in terms, or, in principle, for excluding the time spent by the Appellant in prosecuting proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court, for computation of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal under Section 72-E of the A.P.M.C. Act before the instant Forum. Accordingly, we answer the Point No.2 coined by this Tribunal in the Negative.

POINT NO.3: From the foregoing discussions it is imminent that the governing statute i.e. allied A.P.M.C. Act prescribes limitation of 30 days for preferring an appeal under Section 72-E before this Tribunal, but is silent on the condonation power. But under the aegis of Section 15 of the KAT Act, Regulation 61(b) of the KAT Regulations confers the instant Forum for the condonation power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, but operation of Section 14 is expressly and explicitly excluded. Now, the examination of the instant application filed by the Appellant reveals that the said application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act wherein it is prayed that for the reasons in the accompanying Affidavit, this Tribunal be pleased to condone the delay of 27 days in filing of the instant Appeal by extending the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in the interest of justice and equity.

That, in light of the detailed deliberations made on Point No.1 and 2, the provisions of A.P.M.C. Act and Rules read with KAT Regulations do not authorize instant Forum for operation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, either, in terms, or, in principle and whereby it is humbly opined that there is no scope for instant Forum to consider the exclusion of time spent by the Appellant in prosecuting proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court, in computation of the period of limitation prescribed under the allied A.P.M.C. Act under Section 14.

The learned senior counsel for the Appellant has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy to advance the arguments that the object of fixing the time limit to prefer an appeal is not meant to destroy the rights of litigants, but is founded on the public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare and the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, if the explanation does not smack of malafides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy. Also, the senior counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Superintending Engineer & Anr. Vs. Excise and taxation officer, Sunder Nagar/Assessing Authority to take home the proposition that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to appeals filed before this Tribunal which we have agreed to as discussed in Point No.1. Further, that Regulation 61(b) expressly incorporates Section 5 of the Limitation Act, thereby conferring jurisdiction upon this Tribunal to condone delay upon demonstration of sufficient cause.

Now, the examination of the affidavit accompanying the instant application reveals that the reasons for the delay assigned in the present case is solely on account of the Appellant prosecuting the writ proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court. The senior counsel for the Appellant has explicated that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Steel (Supra) and Consolidated Engineering (Supra) has referred to the observations made in Parson Tools that the pendency of proceedings of the nature contemplated under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act may amount to "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay and extending the limitation. It is true that while Section 14 may not be expressly included for operation under the KAT Regulations, however its underlying equitable principles remain relevant. The exclusion of Section 14 under Regulation 61(b) only bars automatic exclusion of time, but does not bar consideration of the same facts under Section 5 for extension of limitation. Further, the provision of Section 5 operates on broad equitable considerations and is the discretion of the instant forum. The issue that crops for determination before us is that the instant application having been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, (i) whether the Appellant has "satisfactorily explained" the delay of 58 days caused in preferring the instant appeal and (ii) whether the Appellant has made out "sufficient cause" for the purpose of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The facts of the case are that the Respondent No.2 authority has passed the impugned order under Section 72-D by the cancelling the private market license of the Appellant by impugned order dated 15.09.2025. The statutory remedy of appeal to this Tribunal against the order of cancellation made by the Director of Agricultural Marketing is provided under Section 72-E(1)(b) of the A.P.M.C. Act and the limitation prescribed is within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. As contended by the counsel for Respondent No.5, that the Appellant's own pleadings in the Affidavit demonstrates that the Appellant approached the Hon'ble High Court notwithstanding the availability of a statutory appeal under Section 72-E and hence we specially make a note here that the Appellant approaching the Hon'ble High Court is not a case of bonafide confusion as to Forum.

Further, it is the contention of the Appellant that the Hon'ble High Court proceedings were prosecuted in good faith and under the bonafide belief, but the proceeding failed for defect of jurisdiction. It is not the case of the Appellant that it was genuinely unable to pursue the statutory appeal due to a good faith mistake but approached the Hon'ble High Court inspite of the same. Therefore, the said argument of the Appellant is unfounded particularly when the Appellant had full knowledge of the statutory appeal route before this Tribunal under Section 72-E of the allied Act. When the statutory appeal under Section 72-E seized before this Tribunal was within the knowledge of the Appellant, now the contention of the Appellant that the writ petition and writ appeal came to be dismissed by the Hon'ble High Court for defect of jurisdiction is not justified.

The Appellant was all along aware of the statutory appeal remedy to this Tribunal and yet chose to invoke writ jurisdiction by filing the writ petition No.107119/2025 on 22.09.2025. Even after the writ petition was dismissed on 27.10.2025 on the ground of availability of alternative efficacious remedy before this Tribunal, the Appellant chose to pursue writ appeal and continued to keep the statutory remedy in abeyance. It is pertinent to note here that after the dismissal of the writ petition the Appellant has not preferred the writ appeal before the Hon'ble High Court immediately or at least within a reasonable time and it is seen that the writ appeal No.100752/2025 against the order of the learned Hon'ble Single Judge came to be filed only on 25.11.2025. There is no explanation whatsoever as to why there was a considerable delay in preferring the writ appeal. The said writ appeal came to be dismissed on 08.12.2025 with a direction to approach this Forum within a period of 10 days from the date of uploading of the order and the instant Appeal came to be filed on 12.12.2025. However, filing of the Appeal within the time frame directed by the Hon'ble High Court, does not by itself, save the instant Appeal from limitation and the statutory limitation period under the provisions of Section 72-E(1)(b) of the A.P.M.C. Act continues to govern the instant Appeal.

The Hon'ble Apex Court during the discussion in the case of The Property Company (supra) has clarified that when the Court extends time under Section 5, what essentially occurs is that the applicant is required to satisfy the Court about the existence of a sufficient cause starting from the date on which limitation began till the actual date of filing. Upon being satisfied about the existence of sufficient cause, the Court then extends the prescribed period of limitation itself till the date of filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be, such that the appeal or application is deemed to have been filed within limitation, Now, with this background we have examined the delay condonation application filed under Section 5 and the accompanying affidavit. The impugned order is dated 15.09.2025 and the instant Appeal is preferred before this Tribunal on 12.12.2025 i.e. after a span of 88 days from the passing of the impugned order. The period of limitation prescribed to prefer an appeal under Section 72-E(1)(b) of the allied A.P.M.C. Act is within 30 days and thereby, the limitation in the instant case began on 15.10.2025. Therefore, there is an overall delay of 58 days in preferring the instant Appeal. However, the perusal of the application reveals that the Appellant has sought for condonation of delay of only 27 days in preferring the Appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by extending the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It is seen that challenging the impugned order dated 15.09.2025 the writ petition No. 107119/2025 was filed on 22.09.2025, which came to be dismissed by order dated 27.10.2025, wherein the Appellant was relegated to avail the statutory remedy of appeal before this Tribunal. The Appellant has proceeded to file the writ appeal on 25.11.2025, which was disposed by order dated 08.12.2025. As contended by the Respondents, the Appellant has not provided any arithmetic calculation or made any efforts to demonstrate as to how the delay of 27 days is arrived at in the instant application, which is sought for condonation by this Tribunal. It appears that the Appellant has excluded the time period from 15.09.2025 to 27.10.2025 and 25.11.2025 to 11.12.2025 for the purpose of computation of limitation under the pretext of Section 14 and has sought to condone the delay of the remaining period from 28.10.2025 to 24.11.2025 for the purpose of limitation.

As rightly contended by the Respondents No.5 and 7, the Appellant has not disclosed the date of receipt of the order, the date on which certified copies were applied for/ copies were obtained nor the date of filing the writ petition and the writ appeal, the date of presentation of the appeal before this Tribunal, in the affidavit filed by the Secretary of the Appellant Association. The burden entirely vests on the Appellant to plead and prove the exact delay in strict sense the exact dates, and the precise period sought to be excluded. The Appellant has failed to provide the breakup of days allegedly spent in the writ petition and the writ appeal and in the first place, how the delay of 27 days is arrived at and these legal lacunae does not come to the aid of Appellant as there is no supporting documentary trail. The affidavit is silent regarding the intervening gap of 28 days between the disposal of the writ petition and the preferring of writ Appeal before the Hon'ble High Court i.e. from 27.10.2025 to 25.11.2025.

It is also the submission of the counsel for the Respondents, which is admitted by the counsel for the Appellant, that in the proceedings before the Hon'ble Division Bench, the counsel for the Appellant had sought an indulgence in relation to the delay in approaching this Tribunal, and the Hon'ble High Court expressly disapproved such a submission and directed the Appellant to move this Tribunal by filing such application as is permissible in law before this Tribunal itself. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be non-condonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.

Now, with regard to the condonation of delay, in Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors., the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship and when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. Further, In Lanka Venkateswarłu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation and the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach', justice-oriented approach' and 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. It has also been settled in State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Also, in Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression 'sufficient cause' as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the Courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.

With this backdrop we proceed to examine the instant application. As discussed in Point No.1 and 2 above, since the benefit of Section 14 cannot be extended by this Tribunal to the case of the Appellant for exclusion of the time spent in pursuing the abortive writ proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court, this Tribunal is now required to examine whether the Appellant has provided satisfactory explanation for the entire period of delay of 58 days to establish "sufficient cause" for delay condonation. Even going by the own pleadings of the Appellant in the instant application under Section 5 for condonation of delay, the Appellant has prayed to condone the delay of only 27 days however, from the examination of the accompanying Affidavit it is seen that the Affidavit is absolutely silent and that there is no explanation whatsoever explaining the delay of 28 days from 27.10.2025 to 25.11.2025 in the Affidavit. It is crystal clear that when the instant application is for condonation of delay of 27 days, the Appellant is bound to necessarily explain with calculation of the limitation period to show what was the time period spent before the Hon'ble High Court in prosecuting the abortive writ proceedings and also explain the reasons which prevented the Appellant from approaching the instant Forum during the intervening period of 28 days regarding which a single line of explanation is not forthcoming in the Affidavit.

Further, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kolanjiammal (D) (supra) relied on by Respondents No.5 and 7, the failure of the Appellant to avail of the specific appeal remedy cannot be ignored merely because parallel proceedings were pending before the Hon'ble High Court. The filing of writ petition for whatsoever reasons did not suspend the statutory obligation to seek redress under the A.P.M.C. Act. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel of the Appellant that though it was within the knowledge of the Appellant that the appeal provision against the order of the Director of Agricultural Marketing under Section 72-D of the A.P.M.C. Act seized only before this Tribunal under Section 72-E, however, the Appellant had approached the Hon'ble High Court because of the disputation that the impugned order passed by the Respondent No.2 did not come within the purview of Section 72-D of the A.P.M.C. Act i.e. within the jurisdiction of Respondent No.2. The said contention of the Appellant is also unsubstantiated as it can be seen that the Hon'ble Single Judge while disposing the writ petition has answered both these issues in the affirmative and relegated the Appellant to avail statutory remedy of appeal before the instant Forum. Also, if the facts are viewed independently, it is not in dispute that the order impugned cancelling the license of the Appellant Association is an order made under Section 72-D of the A.P.M.C. Act and the said order was passed by the Director of Agricultural Marketing. The three ingredients of the impugned order i.e. cancelling of the private market license, under Section 72-D and the authority who passed the order i.e. Director of Agricultural Marketing, beyond doubt established that appeal under Section 72-E(1)(b) against the said impugned order only lies before the instant Forum. In view of the same the disputation of the Appellant that they had approached the Hon'ble High Court because the impugned order did not come within the purview of Section 72-D of the A.P.M.C. Act i.e. within the jurisdiction of Respondent No.2 does not find substance since the issues of defects in the impugned order could be agitated by the Appellant before the appellate authority.

That, after detailed deliberations we are of the opinion that if the Appellant has disabled itself from availing the statutory remedy of appeal at its own will by not evincing diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Tribunal by taking appropriate steps within the prescribed time, the Appellant cannot certainly be permitted to urge their lapse/ inaction as a ground before this Tribunal to exercise its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of the Appellant. The delay or inaction of the Appellant in pursuing statutory remedy of appeal before this Tribunal, inspite of having full knowledge in this regard, in our opinion does not meet the requirements to be a sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5. That subsequent to the dismissal of the writ petition on 27.10.2025, the writ appeal came to be filed on 25.11.2025. There is a gap of 28 days during this interregnum, which is considerably large taking into consideration the time required to file a writ appeal under the normal circumstances. But, now, the self-created disability by the Appellant in not showing the calculation of the exact number of days of delay and satisfactorily explaining the entire period of delay of 58 days, in particular the interregnum of 28 days, does not attract the discretion of this Tribunal. Therefore, the only reasons assigned by the Appellant that it did not approach this Tribunal because it was pursuing writ proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court in good faith and diligence, in our considered opinion does not amount to be a "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay of the entire period of 58 days in preferring the Appeal over the prescribed period of 30 days because of the pertinent fact that the Appellant having the knowledge that the statutory remedy of appeal against an order of cancellation of license by the Director of Agricultural Marketing was only before this Tribunal, had refrained from availing the remedial measure of appeal. Also, the Appellant has miserably failed to explain the delay for the entire period of 58 days and in the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation the delay cannot mechanically condoned. The Hon'ble Apex Court in several decisions has observed that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice. However, the instant application thoroughly fails on these aspects since deliberate inaction to prefer an appeal before this Tribunal within 30 days from the receipt of the impugned is writ large, and gross negligence in not explaining the period of delay of 27 days in their own application, is evidently forthcoming in the instant application. Apparently, the Appellant has not shown that it was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the prescribed period. On the facts and in the circumstances, we are of the opinion that there is apparently no due diligence on the part of the Appellant in availing the remedy of appeal within the prescribed period under the allied Act. The averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the instant Appeal do not show any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to exercise the discretion to condone the delay for a period of 58 days in favour of the Appellant. Also, solely on the pleadings of the Appellant that hardship was caused due to closure of the market cannot be a ground to be considered for the condonation of the delay. Hence, we proceed to answer Point No.3 in the Negative.

POINT NO.4: In view of the above said discussions on Point No.1, 2 and 3 and for the reasons stated therein, we proceed to pass the following:

The interim application No.1 filed by the Appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the instant Appeal is hereby rejected.

Consequently, the instant Appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, no order to costs.”

It is this action of the Tribunal in rejecting the appeals on the ground of limitation, the Association along with others again knock at the doors of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition Nos.104886 of 2026 c/w W.P.Nos.104603/2026, 105156/2026 and 105517/2026. The learned Single Judge answering the contentions disposes the writ petitions by the following order:

A plain reading of Section 72-E(1)(b) of the APMC Act indicates that any person aggrieved by an order of the Director of Agricultural Marketing may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal within 30 days of receipt of the copy of the order.

The Tribunal has been constituted under the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal Act, 1976 [Hereinafter referred to as the ‘KAT Act’]. Section 15 of the KAT Act enables framing of regulations. Regulation 61 of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal Regulations, 1979 [Hereinafter referred to as the ‘KAT Regulations’], reads as under:

It is clear from a plain reading of Section 72-E of the APMC Act that an appeal would lie being aggrieved by the order dated 15.09.2025 to the KAT. It is in view of the said provision that this Court in the earlier round of litigation did not entertain the writ petitions filed by the Association and the Traders. A bare perusal of Rule 61 of the KAT Regulations indicates that in the absence of any other law stipulating a period of limitation, a first appeal before the Tribunal ought to be filed within 60 days. Further, Regulation 61(b) specifically stipulates that the provisions, inter alia, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply mutatis mutandis to all appeals and petitions.

It is clear from the aforementioned that Section 72€ of the APMC Act provides for filing of the Appeal to the Tribunal, within 30 days, being aggrieved by an Order passed by the respondent No.1-Director of Agricultural Marketing. Regulation 61(b) of the KAT Regulations, specifically stipulates that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to appeals filed before the Tribunal.

In view of the clear stipulations, as noticed above, the conclusion of the Tribunal in considering the application for limitation cannot be faulted.

Although it is the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the APMC in support of W.P.No.105517/2026 that the finding of the Tribunal on Question No.5 is erroneous having regard to the fact that the Parent Act, i.e., 1966 Act, does not contain a stipulation regarding the applicability of the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 [Hereinafter referred to as the ‘1963 Act’] and the recourse of the Tribunal in considering the application for condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the 1963 Act is erroneous, the said submission is ex facie untenable and liable to be rejected having regard to the appeal remedy as provided under the APMC Act as well as the provisions of KAT regulations as noticed above.

With regard to the order of the Tribunal refusing to condone the delay of 01 month and 10 days in filing the appeal, the Tribunal has undertaken a detailed examination of the relevant fact situation as well as noticed various judgments that were cited between the parties. However, the Tribunal has held that pursuing of the writ petitions by the Association would not suspend the statutory obligation of the individual trader in seeking redressal under the provisions of the APMC Act. In this context, as already noticed above, the individual traders had also filed W.P.No.107123/2025 before the Court.

A perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay by the Tribunal clearly discloses that the reason for the condonation of delay was that the appellant before the Tribunal awaited the outcome of the writ petitions that were filed before this Court. It is further pertinent to note that the writ petition was disposed of on 27.10.2025 and the appeals were filed on 25.11.2025, i.e., within 30 days of the disposal of the writ petitions. This is notwithstanding the fact that the writ appeal (W.A.No.100752/2025) was disposed of on 08.12.2025.

It is further relevant to notice that the order dated 15.09.2025 passed by respondent No.1/Director of APMC, is sought to be impugned in the appeals filed before the Tribunal. The said order cancels the license that was issued under Section 72-E of the APMC Act, under which a private market yard was established. The said order dated 15.09.2025 adjudicates upon valuable rights of traders. Hence, it is expedient that the statutory right of appeal vavailable to an aggrieved party ought not to be ordinarily denied.

Although it is the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the APMC that the said private market yard was not functional, the said aspect is required to be decided when the merits of the order dated 15.09.2025 are adjudicated upon.

At this juncture, this Court is constrained to place on record the conduct of the APMC, which is a body created by a statute, in agitating the present issue.

Notwithstanding the fact that the application for condonation of delay was vehemently opposed before the Tribunal, both by the APMC as well as by the original complainant, which aspect is forthcoming from a bare perusal of the impugned Orders dated 29.04.2026, the APMC has also resorted to filing an independent writ petition (W.P.No.105517/2026) impugning the findings in the impugned order with regard to question No.1. Even the present writ petitions were sought to be vigorously pursued by putting forth various contentions. The said exercise has been done with the sole purpose of delaying/defeating the aggrieved parties from availing their statutory remedy of an appeal vis-à-vis the order dated 15.09.2025 passed by respondent No.1.

It is also relevant to notice here that in the earlier round of litigation, the writ petitions filed by the traders as well as the association were contested on the ground of availability of alternate remedy of an Appeal before the Tribunal; and when the association and the traders filed the appeal, the same was contested on the ground that the said appeals are filed belatedly.

This aspect of the matter is required to be viewed from the fact that it is the persistent request made on behalf of the association and traders for grant of an interim relief vis-à-vis the order dated 15.09.2025. However, since the interim relief was not considered by the Tribunal, having regard to the pendency of the applications for condonation of delay, it is expedient that the aspect of interim relief is not considered for the first time in the present petitions.

In view of the discussions made above, the Tribunal was justified in answering question No.1 in the ‘affirmative’, that the provisions of the Limitation Act could be resorted for the purpose of considering the application for condonation of delay. Further, the finding of the Tribunal on question No.2 in refusing to condone the delay is exfacie erroneous and is to be set aside.

Hence, the following:

The issue now would be, whether the Tribunal was right in rejecting the appeals on the ground of delay. Certain statutory provisions are necessary to be noticed. Filing an appeal under the APMC Act is dealt with under Section 72E of the APMC Act. It reads as follows:

The Tribunal regulates its procedure under the Appellate Tribunal Act. Certain provisions of the Appellate Tribunal Act are necessary to be noticed. Section 6(2) of the Appellate Tribunal Act reads as follows:

Section 6(2) deals with admission of appeal or revision petition. Section 15 empowers the Tribunal to make regulations for the purpose of its functioning. It also becomes apposite to notice the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal Regulations, 1979. Regulation 61 assumes significance, it reads as follows:

(Emphasis supplied at each instance)

Regulation 61(a) mandates that whenever any law under which the Tribunal exercise jurisdiction, the period stipulated for filing an appeal, first appeal is 60 days, second appeal is 90 days, so on and so forth. Regulation 61(b) is indicative of the fact that the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to all appeals and petitions.

The submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the Limitation Act is not applicable to the statute, i.e., the APMC Act, may in the first blush become acceptable, but a deeper delving would lead to the submission getting tumbled down on the ground that the Division Bench had clearly permitted 10 days. The Tribunal ought not to have overreached the time stipulated by the Division Bench and dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. The Tribunal appears to have blissfully ignored the procedure stipulated for its functioning under the regulation, which clearly makes the Limitation Act, mutatis mutandis, applicable to its procedure.

Insofar as the judgments relied on by the respective learned senior counsels, there can be no qualm about the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments relied on by the appellants and the respondents, but they are inapplicable to the fact situation, as the fact situation is completely covered by the orders passed by this Court, both by the learned single Judge and that of the Division Bench, which have become final inter-parties.

Therefore, finding no merit in these appeals, the appeals must fail and they accordingly stand rejected.