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Judgment
This appeal by the assessee is directed against the order of Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) (in short 'the CIT(A)') dated 31st May, 2024, for assessment year 2012-13.
The appeal is time-barred by 630 days. The assessee has filed an application supported by an Affidavit seeking condonation of delay in filing of appeal. A perusal of the application shows that the delay in filing of the appeal is attributed to illness of the mother of the assessee followed by her death on 4th February, 2025. The assessee has given detailed history of his mother's illness starting from December 2020 till the date of her death. No other reason is given by the assessee for delay in filing of the appeal. The impugned order was passed on 31st May, 2024 and the appeal was filed before the Tribunal on 23rd April, 2026. Even if the reason given in the application causing delay in filing of appeal is accepted, it would only cover partial period i.e., from 31st May, 2024 to 4th February, 2025 i.e. till the date of death of assessee's mother. Even if thereafter, two months' period is allowed to the assessee for last rites etc. still there is a delay of more than 300 days in filing of the appeal for which no cause much less 'sufficient cause' is given. Thus, delay of more than 300 days in filing of the appeal is unexplained.
I am very much live to the law expounded by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. 167 ITR 471 and in the case of Ram Nath Sao vs. Gobardhan Sao & Others reported as 2002 AIR 1201. The Hon'ble Court in the said cases have held that acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also pointed that the said rule shall apply when no negligence or inaction or want of bona-fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. Further, the Hon'ble Court has held that the expression 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of Civil Procedure Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. In the present case, the assessee has failed to give any reason causing delay in filing of appeal for a period of more than 300 days. Here in my considered view the assessee/appellant was not only negligent but was also irresponsible.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N. Balkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy – (1998) 7 SCC 123 has observed that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation, whereas, in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. In the present case, no explanation whatsoever has been given by the assessee to explain delay in filing of appeal after February, 2025 i.e., after the death of mother of the assessee.
In the case of Balwant Singh vs. Jagdish Singh reported as 2010 AIR SC 3043/2010 SCC 8 68, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held:
'26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.
27.The application filed by the applicants lacks in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex facie lack bona fide. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not specify any of the enunciated ingredients of judicial pronouncements, then the application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the application is bona fide and based upon true and plausible explanations, as well as reflects normal behaviour of a common prudent person on the part of the applicant, the Court would normally tilt the judicial discretion in favour of such an applicant. Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party.
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32.It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly.
33.Furthermore, it is also a well-settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to the provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law.
34.Liberal construction of the expression “sufficient cause” is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect “sufficient cause” as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edn., 1997)
35.The expression “sufficient cause” implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word “sufficient” means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated.
[Emphasis supplied]
From the aforesaid decision it is explicit that in the first place the application for condonation should express reason for delay. The reason or explanation so given should be true and worthy of being considered as ‘sufficient cause’. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. In the present case no reason whatsoever worthy for consideration as ‘sufficient cause’ is given by the appellant to explain delay of more than 300 days out of total 630 days as pointed above. Negligence and inaction is visible writ large from the application.
Thus, in facts of the case and various case laws discussed above, I find application of the assessee seeking condonation of delay lacks merit, hence, dismissed. In the result, appeal of the assessee is dismissed on the ground of limitation.