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Heard Sri R.C. Singh along with Sri Satish Kumar Tyagi, for the petitioner and Sri Ashish Kumar Singh along with Sri Sumit Danga, for respondent-5. 2. The writ petition has been filed against the orders of Assistant Collector dated 01.04.2016, allowing the application of respondent-5, setting aside orders dated 28.11.2011, confirming the kurra and 05.12.2011, passing final decree in partition suit, excluding plots 512 (area 0.919 hectare) and 517 (area 0.698 hectare) from preliminary decree dated 20.09.2011/17.10.2011 and directing lekhpal to submit fresh kurra for final decree and Additional Commissioner dated 09.08.2016, dismissing the revision of the petitioner, in proceeding under U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to the Act). 3. Roop Chand Tyagi (respondent-5) filed a suit (registered as Suit No. 180 of 2011), for partition of joint holdings, recorded in khata 00093 [consisting plots 57 (area 0.738 hectare), 71 (area 1.318 hectare)] of village Azizpur hamlet of village Chandsara and khata 00253 [consisting plots 44 (area 0.367 hectare), 45 (area 0.296 hectare), 48 (area 0.118 hectare), 114 (area 0.120 hectare), 503 (area 1.661 hectare), 512 (area 0.919 hectare) and 517 (area 0.698 hectare)] of village Chandsara, tahsil and district Meerut, under Section 176 of the Act. This suit was filed on 23.05.2011. 4. Shiv Chand Tyagi (the petitioner) filed his written statement on 05.08.2011. Assistant Collector, by his order dated 20.09.2011, passed preliminary decree holding share of the plaintiff and defendant-1 as 1/2 each. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, preliminary decree was drawn on 17.10.2011. Lekhpal submitted kurra on 24.10.2011, which was approved by Assistant Collector by order dated 28.11.2011 and in pursuance thereof final decree was drawn on 05.12.2011. In the final decree an area of 0.0416 hectare of plot 512/1 was fallen in the kurra of Roop Chand Tyagi (respondent-5) and an area of 0.8774 hectare of plot 512/2 and an area of 0.6980 hectare of plot 517 was fallen in the kurra of Shiv Chand Tyagi (the petitioner). No one challenged preliminary/final decree within time. 5. It may be mentioned that National Highways Authority of India proposed to construct Delhi-Meerut Expressway and issued Notification under Section 3-A of National Highways Act, 1956 on 17.07.2010, proposing to acquire an area of 0.6752 hectare of plot 512 and an area of 0.1042 hectare of plot 517, along with various other plots. Notification dated 17.07.2010 was published in newspapers on 11.08.2010. By Notification dated 15.07.2011 under Section 3-D of National Highways Act, 1956, an area of 0.6752 hectare of plot 512 and an area of 0.1042 hectare of plot 517 of village Chandsara, tahsil and district Meerut were acquired. 6. Respondent-5 filed two time barred revisions on 15.02.2016 i.e. Revision No. 25 of 2016, from the preliminary decree dated 20.09.2011 and Revision No. 26 of 2016 from the final decree dated 28.11.2011, in respect of plots 512 and 517 aforementioned alone. Later on respondent-5 filed applications on 31.03.2016 for dismissing the revisions as not pressed as the revisions were not maintainable. These applications were allowed and the revisions were dismissed as not pressed. 7. Respondent-5 filed two applications dated 11.02.2016 under Section 151 C.P.C. before Assistant Collector for modifying preliminary decree dated 20.09.2011 and final decree dated 28.11.2011. The petitioner filed his objections dated 14.03.2016, in the aforesaid applications, stating that the applications filed under Section 151 C.P.C. after such a long time of passing decree were not maintainable. Assistant Collector, by her order dated 01.04.2016, held that the suit for partition was filed in respect of plots 44, 45, 48, 114, 503, 512 and 517. Fact relating to acquisition of plots 512 and 517 could not be brought to the notice of the Court as such preliminary decree and final decree have been passed in respect of all the plots mentioned in the plaint including plots 512 and 517 although these plots were acquired by National Highways Authority and could not be included in the suit. Preliminary/final decree in respect of plots 512 and 517 are erroneous. On these findings, she allowed the applications and set aside orders dated 28.11.2011, confirming the kurra and 05.12.2011, passing final decree in partition suit, excluded plots 512 (area 0.919 hectare) and 517 (area 0.698 hectare) from preliminary decree dated 20.09.2011/17.10.2011 and directed lekhpal to submit fresh kurra for final decree in respect of remaining plots of the suit. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid orders in Revision Nos. 39 of 2015-16 and 40 of 2015-16. Both the revisions were consolidated and heard together, by Additional Commissioner, who by order dated 09.08.2016, dismissed both the revisions. Hence this writ petition has been filed. 8. The counsel of the petitioner submitted that respondent-5 himself filed the suit for partition of joint holdings, recorded in khata 00093 [consisting plots 57 (area 0.738 hectare), 71 (area 1.318 hectare)] of village Azizpur hamlet of village Chandsara and khata 00253 [consisting plots 44 (area 0.367 hectare), 45 (area 0.296 hectare), 48 (area 0.118 hectare), 114 (area 0.120 hectare), 503 (area 1.661 hectare), 512 (area 0.919 hectare) and 517 (area 0.698 hectare)] of village Chandsara, tahsil and district Meerut, under Section 176 of the Act, on 23.05.2011. Notification under Section 3-A of National Highways Act, 1956 was issued on 17.07.2010, (published in newspapers on 11.08.2010) proposing to acquire an area of 0.6752 hectare of plot 512 and an area of 0.1042 hectare of plot 517, along with various other plots. By Notification dated 15.07.2011 under Section 3-D of National Highways Act, 1956, an area of 0.6752 hectare of plot 512 and an area of 0.1042 hectare of plot 517 of village Chandsara, tahsil and district Meerut were acquired. On the date of filing of the partition suit, part of plots 512 and 517 were not acquired. Acquisition of part of holdings mentioned in the plaint does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to decree the suit. Although land was acquired but right to receive compensation of the acquired land always remained with its erstwhile owner. Preliminary decree and final decree passed in partition suit, at the most, is void in respect of an area of 0.6752 hectare of plot 512 and an area of 0.1042 hectare of plot 517, against Union of India/National Highways Authority of India and not against the parties to the suit as they were entitled to receive compensation on the basis of decree of the acquired land. Respondent-5 who had 1/2 share in joint holdings was given his share in preliminary decree. Acquired land did not fall in kurra of respondent-5, in final decree dated 05.12.2011, as such land of his kurra was not affected by the acquisition dated 15.07.2011 as such he cannot be said to be an aggrieved person and on his application, preliminary/final decree were not liable to be recalled. Final decree was passed on 05.12.2011, while applications under Section 151 C.P.C. were filed on 11.02.2016, i.e. long after passing of final decree. The Court has become functus officio after passed the decree. The decree could be modified according to the provisions of Section 152 and 153 C.P.C. only. The application under Section 151 C.P.C. was not maintainable. In any case, there was no miscarriage of justice to either of the parties inasmuch as kurra of respondent-5 was not affected while the petitioner would get compensation of the acquired land as such jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C. could not be invoked. The judgments of the Courts below are illegal and liable to be set aside. He relied upon judgments of Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Roshan Singh, AIR 2008 SC 1190, in which it has been held that inherent powers cannot be exercised for benefit of litigant, who had remedy under relevant statute. Durgesh Sharma v. Jayshree, AIR 2009 SC 285, in which it has been held that inherent powers may be exercised ex debito justitiae in those cases, where there is no express provision in the code. The said power cannot be exercised in contravention or in conflict of or ignoring express and specific provision of law. Lalji v. VIIth Additional District Judge, 2000 All LJ 524, in which this Court held that inherent power cannot be exercised when code itself provides for a particular situation or contingency or points out to the procedure to be adopted. Inherent power cannot be adopted to nullify an express statutory provision. A court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter can decide rightly or wrongly. An erroneous decree passed with jurisdiction is binding on the parties unless it is rectified in appeal or through other remedies available under the law. Official Trustee W.B. v. Sachindra Nath Chaterjee, AIR 1969 SC 823, in which it has been held that before a court can be held to have jurisdiction to decide a particular matter it must not only have jurisdiction to try the suit brought but must also have authority to pass the order sought for. It is not sufficient that it has some jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter of the suit. Its jurisdiction must include the power to hear and decide the questions at issue, the authority to hear and decide the particular controversy that has arisen between the parties. Full Bench judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Penumatcha Neelakanteswararaju v. Jaddu Mangamma, AIR 1970 Andhra Pradesh 1 (FB), in which it has been held that jurisdiction once vested cannot be divested unless the legislature has expressly or by necessary intendment directed otherwise. 9. In reply to the aforesaid arguments, the counsel for the respondents submitted that the suit for partition can be filed in respect of joint holdings of the parties. Notification under Section 3-A of National Highways Act, 1956, proposing to acquire disputed land was issued on 17.07.2010 i.e before filing of the suit. By Notification dated 15.07.2011 under Section 3-D of National Highways Act, 1956, an area of 0.6752 hectare of plot 512 and an area of 0.1042 hectare of plot 517 of village Chandsara, tahsil and district Meerut were acquired, which vested in Union of India free from all encumbrances. On the date preliminary decree dated 20.09.2011/17.10.2011, aforementioned plots were no more joint holdings of the parties as such the Court had no jurisdiction to pass decree for it and decree was void. This Court in Nathumal v. Mohd. Nazir Beg, AIR 1955 Allahabad 584 (DB) held that void decree is a decree, which has no existence in the eye of law. This Court in Shokat Ali v. VIth Additional District Judge, 2000 (40) All LR 126, held that when the relief cannot be obtained under the provisions of C.P.C., inherent power under Section 151 C.P.C. can be invoked to prevent miscarriage of justice. Supreme Court in Dr. G.H. Grant v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237, while dealing with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 held that the land vests absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances when possession is taken by the Collector under Section 16. In Gian Chand v. Gopala, (1995) 2 SCC 528, it has been held that on publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, though it is not conclusive till declaration under Section 6 was published, the owner of the land is interdicted to deal with the land as a free agent and to create encumbrances thereon or to deal with the land in any manner detrimental for public purpose. Therefore, though notification under Section 4(1) is not conclusive, the owner of the land is prevented from encumbering the land in that such encumbrance does not bind the Government. The contract in question being a contingent contract based on uncertain future events, (here is a case of suppression of fact even otherwise) that event having occurred by notification issued under Section 6, the contract became impossible of performance. Therefore, it got frustrated and the contracting party is entitled to enforce the terms of the contract for refund of earnest money. The trial court had rightly decreed the suit for return of the earnest money. The District Judge refused the relief on the ground that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated earlier, his readiness and willingness is not relevant after the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 were published. Under those circumstances, the District Judge had taken an erroneous view in reversing the decree of the trial court. The High Court did not apply its mind nor did it advert to any of these relevant circumstances. It simply dismissed the second appeal in limine, as if it was a routine. Therefore, we hold that the decree of the High Court and that of the District Judge are vitiated by manifest gross errors of law. Shipping Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Machado Bros., (2004) 11 SCC 168, in which it has been held that by the subsequent event if the original proceeding has become infructuous, ex debito justitiae, it will be the duty of the court to take such action as is necessary in the interest of justice, which includes disposing of infructuous litigation. For the said purpose it will be open to the parties concerned to make an application under Section 151 CPC to bring to the notice of the court, the facts and circumstances, which have made the pending litigation infructuous. Of course, when such an application is made, the court will enquire into the alleged facts and circumstances to find out whether the pending litigation has in fact become infructuous or not. This Court in Ramesh Chand Yadav v. IInd A.D.J. And others, 2012 (3) ARC 50, held that jurisdiction in court cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties. It is an elementary principle that where a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action in which order has been made such order is wholly void. 10. I have considered the arguments of the counsel for the parties and examined the record. For appreciating the controversy raised by the parties, relevant provisions of National Highways Act, 1956 are quoted below :- Section 3-D. Declaration of acquisition.-(1) Where no objection under sub-section (1) of Section 3-C has been made to the competent authority within the period specified therein or where the competent authority has disallowed the objection under sub-section (2) of that section, the competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit a report accordingly to the Central Government and on receipt of such report, the Central Government shall declare, by notification in the Official Gazette, that the land should be acquired for the purpose or purposes mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 3-A. (2) On the publication of the declaration under sub-section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Section 3-E. Power to take possession.-(1) Where any land has vested in the Central Government under sub-section (2) of Section 3-D, and the amount determined by the competent authority under Section 3-G with respect to such land has been deposited under sub-section (1) of Section 3- H, with the competent authority by the Central Government, the competent authority may by notice in writing direct the owner as well as any other person who may be in possession of such land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the competent authority or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within sixty days of the service of the notice. Section 3-G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.-(1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the competent authority. (2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent, of the amount determined under sub-section (1), for that land. (3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under sub-section (1) or subsection (2), the competent authority shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired. 11. In the present case, the suit for partition of joint holdings, including plots 512 (area 0.919 hectare) and 517 area 0.698 hectare) of village Chandsara, tahsil and district Meerut, under Section 176 of the Act, was filed on 23.05.2011. Notification under Section 3-A of National Highways Act, 1956 was issued on 17.07.2010, (published in newspapers on 11.08.2010) proposing to acquire an area of 0.6752 hectare of plot 512 and an area of 0.1042 hectare of plot 517, along with various other plots. By Notification dated 15.07.2011 under Section 3-D of National Highways Act, 1956, an area of 0.6752 hectare of plot 512 and an area of 0.1042 hectare of plot 517 of village Chandsara, tahsil and district Meerut were acquired. During pendency of the partition suit, part of plots 512 and 517 were acquired. Acquisition of part of holdings mentioned in the partition suit does not render the suit as a whole infructuous. Dictum of Supreme Court in Shipping Corpn. of India Ltd.''s case (supra) has no application. The partition suit is a suit for partition of the share of existing owners and does not amount to create an encumbrance into a third party as such Gian Chanda''s Case (supra) has also no application. 12. Although a part of land which was subject matter of partition suit was acquired but right to receive compensation of the acquired land remained with its erstwhile owner. On declaration under Section 3-D of National Highways Act, 1956, land covered in the notification is vested in Union of India but the owner of the land is not completely deprived of his right of retaining possession till compensation was awarded to him, according to the provisions of Section 3-E of this Act, which requires deposit of compensation as determined under Section 3-G of this Act. There is nothing on record to prove that compensation was determined and possession over acquired land was taken before passing final decree dated 05.12.2011. It is admitted that on the date of filing the partition suit by respondent- 5, no part of plots 512 and 517 was acquired. There is no evidence to prove that on date of passing final decree in partition suit, possession over acquired land was taken after deposit of compensation according to section 3-E of this Act. As such it cannot be said that preliminary/final decree was void in respect of acquired land as right to retain possession till compensation was deposited remained with the owner. 13. Revenue Court has jurisdiction to try the suit for partition of joint holdings in view of Section 331, read with Entry-16 of Schedule II of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. Relevant part of Section 331 is quoted below :- "Section 331. Cognizance of suits, etc. under this Act.- (1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof, or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Provided that where a declaration has been made under Section 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof, the provision of Schedule II, in so far as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under Chapter VII, shall not apply to such holding or part thereof. Explanation.- If cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted. (1-A) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section-(1), an objection that a court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II or, as the case may be, a civil court, which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit, application or the proceeding, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereof shall not be entertained by any appellate or revisional court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 14. In the present case, no one has raised any objection relating to jurisdiction of the revenue court to try the suit, during pendency of the suit, in which preliminary decree was passed on 20.09.2011/17.10.2011 and final decree was passed on 28.11.2011/05.12.2011. Respondent-5 got 1/2 share in joint holdings in preliminary decree. Final decree was prepared accordingly. Respondent-5 did not file any objection against kurra prepared by Lekhpal. Land which was allotted to respondent-5 in final decree was not affected by acquisition proceeding under National Highways Act, 1956. No prejudice has been caused nor there was failure of justice to the parties, inasmuch as the petitioner would get compensation of the acquired land falling in his share in final decree while land of the share of respondent-5 was not affected by acquisition. In view of Section 331 (1-A), the Act, respondent-5 cannot be permitted to raise objection relating to jurisdiction of the Court, after about 4 years of the passing of final decree by way of application under Section 151 C.P.C. 15. Inherent power under Section 151 C.P.C. has been provided to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Supreme Court in K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275, has summarised the principles for exercise of inherent powers as follows : "(a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognises the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is "right" and undo what is "wrong", that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 recognises and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. (c) A court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or in a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. (d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the legislature. (e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the court, and in the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the Code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. (f) The power under Section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court." 16. In the present case, the power under Section 151 C.P.C. has been exercised to overreach the express bar as contained under Section 331 (1-A) of the Act as no one raised objection relating jurisdiction of the Court during pendency of the suit and such an objection could not have been raised after settlement of issues. As stated above there was no miscarriage of justice to any of the parties as such power under Section 151 C.P.C. could not be exercised to set aside final decree passed in partition suit, after more than years. 17. A constitutional Bench of Supreme Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540, laid down following principles :- (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the his commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. 18. Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court again in Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24, held that when a repeal of an enactment is followed by a fresh legislation, such legislation does not affect the substantive rights of the parties on the date of the suit or adjudication of the suit unless such a legislation is retrospective and a court of appeal cannot take into consideration a new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered because the rights of the parties in an appeal are determined under the law in force on the date of the suit. In VKNM Vocational Higher Secondary School v. State of Kerala, (2016) 4 SCC 216, held that when we make a comprehensive reference to the above principles, it can be said that for the legal pursuit of a remedy it must be shown that the various stages of such remedy are formed into a chain or rather as series of it, which are connected by an intrinsic unity which can be called as one proceeding, that such vested right, if any, should have its origin in a proceeding which was instituted on such right having been crystallised at the time of its origin itself, in which event all future claims on that basis to be pursued would get preserved till the said right is to be ultimately examined. In the event of such preservation of the future remedy having come into existence and got crystallised, that would date back to the date of origin when the so-called vested right commenced, that then and then only it can be held that the said right became a vested right and it is not defeated by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of subsequent filing of the claim. One other fundamental principle laid down which is to be borne in mind is that even such a vested right can also be taken away by a subsequent enactment if such subsequent enactment specifically provides by express words or by necessary intendment. In other words, in the event of the extinction of any such right by express provision in the subsequent enactment, the same would lose its value. 19. Supreme Court in K.N. Aswathnarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 15 SCC 394 held that the doctrine of lis pendens is based on legal maxim ut lite pendente nihil innovetur (during a litigation nothing new should be introduced). The principle of "lis pendens" is in accordance with the equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. A litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. 20. Thus in the cases of voluntary sale of suit property during pendency of the litigation by the parties to the suit, the decree is binding upon the transferee. In the present case, doctrine of eminent domain will apply as such the decree would not be binding upon Union of India/ Nation Highways Authority of India, as under the law they were competent to acquire the land. Vesting of acquired land and taking possession of it is not affected due to pendency of litigation. However liability of Union of India to pay compensation to the erstwhile owners remained. So far right of erstwhile owners to receive compensation is concerned, they are bound by the decree as it has become final between them. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussions, writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders of Assistant Collector dated 01.04.2016 and Additional Commissioner dated 09.08.2016 are set aside. Petition Allowed.